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1. NATURE OF COPYRIGHT 
Article 1 Section 8 Clause 8 of the Constitution of the 
United States of America empowers Congress "to promote the 
progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited 
times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their 
respective writings and discoveries". This simple clause 
sums up in a few words the philosophy and underlying princi-
ples of modern copyright law. Copyright law, like other 
branches of intellectual property law (i.e. the laws of 
patents, trade marks and designs), seeks to create a system 
whereby the creator of original works or intellectual prop-
erty is afforded a qualified monopoly in the use or 
exploitation of his work in order, first, to compensate and 
reward him for the effort, creativity and talent expended 
and utilized in the creation of his work, and secondly, to 
act as an incentive for him to use his talents and efforts 
to create more and better works or items of intellectual 
property. The qualified monopoly is limited in duration and 
after the expiry of the term the work falls into the public 
domain and can be freely used and reproduced by others. A 
balance is struck between the interests of the individual 
and the public interest. The rationale behind this 
philosophy is the establishment of a profit incentive for 
creators of intellectual property. The effectiveness of the 
profit motive is dependent upon the degree to which the 
creator of the intellectual property is able to maintain and 
enforce his qualified monopoly. If the law is not effective 
2. 
in enabling the creator of intellectual property to maintain 
and enforce his monopoly then the efficiency of the opera-
tion of the profit motive will be impaired. Consequently, 
the soundness and effectiveness of the law of copyright is a 
. significant factor in the promotion of the creation of 
intellectual property and ultimately· in enriching our cul-
ture and promoting our knowledge and well-being. Viewed from 
a different perspective, the purpose of copyright is to 
prevent one man from appropriating to himself what has been 
produced by the skill and labour of others1 . 
In broad terms, copyright may be described as the exclusive 
right in relation to a work embodying intellectual property 
(i.e. the product of the intellect) to do or to authorize 
others to do certain acts in relation to that work, which 
acts represent in the case of each type of work the manners 
in which that work can be exploited for personal gain or 
profit. 
Copyright is an immaterial property right. The subject of 
the right is a work of the intellect or spirit and thus an 
intangible. Copyright in a work is akin to ownership in a 
tangible article. The following analysis of the essential 
nature of copyright by Slomowitz AJ in Video Parktown North 
(Pty) Limited v Paramount Pictures Corporation is instruc-
tive: 
"It seems to me that when he who harbours an idea, by 
dint of his imagination, skill or labour, or some or 
all of them, brings it into being in tactile, visible 
1 . See 'lhe Johannesburg Operatic and Dramatic Society v Music 'lheatre 
Interna.ticnal & others, South African Patent Joumal March 1969 223 at 
225. 
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or audible form, capable thereby of being communicated 
to others as a meaningful conception or apprehension of 
his mind, a right of property in that idea immediately 
comes into existence. The proprietary interest in that 
object of knowledge is the ownership of it and is 
called 'copyright'. It might just as well be called 
'ownership', but we have chosen to call it by another 
name, reserving 'ownership' as the appellation for the 
proprietary interest in corporeal things, by way of 
semantic, but not, as I see it, legal, distinction. In 
this sense, copyright has sometimes been called 
'intellectual property', as it indeed is. "2 
Copyright subsists in the work of the intellect embodied in 
a material form which is a tangible article. The tangible or 
physical form of the work embodies two separate items of 
property, i.e. the copyright in the work of the intellect 
and the ownership of the tangible article. Ownership of the 
two items of property must be distinguished and can vest in 
different persons. Transfer of the ownership of one of the 
i terns of property does not necessarily affect transfer of 
the ownership of the other item of property3 . 
2. ORIGINS OF COPYRIGHT 
The word "plagiarize" or "plagiarism" means "take and use 
another person's (thoughts, writings, inventions or abs.J as 
2. 1986 (2) SA 623 (T) at p 631. 
3. See Ecx:uk>"tat (Fty) ·Ltd v Laumecilt & Annthe:r, case No. 19592/81 
in tre WID - unrep:Jrt.ed. 
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one's own" 4 . This word is an embodiment of the modern con-
cept of copyright or more specifically copyright infringe-
ment. It is said to have its origins in the writings of 
Martial[is], the Roman poet, who in one of his works drew a 
parallel between his poems ano freed slaves; he termed 
another poet who had misrepresented his (i.e. Martial [is] ) 
works as being his own a 'plagiarius', i.e. an abductor, of 
them. 
Throughout early history and in the Middle Ages instances of 
copying of works of the intellect occurred but these acts 
incurred only moral censure and no legal consequences. The 
development of the printing press by Johannes Gutenberg 
towards the middle of the 15th century was the event which 
sparked off the beginnings of the concept of copyright. This 
event coincided with the Renaissance and the Reformation 
which led to an increased desire to acquire knowledge. The 
initiative in creating a form of copyright was taken by the 
city of Venice in the late 15th century when it established 
a system of granting monopolies or privileges for printing 
books. By the 16th and 17th centuries the practice- of 
sovereigns granting monopolies of this nature had spread 
widely throughout Europe and it had become a common prac-
tice. The beneficiaries under the monopolies were willing to 
pay for the privileges which were bestowed on them and the 
sovereign, apart from receiving remuneration, derived the 
advantage of being able to require approval of the material 
being printed. This enabled censorship to be exercised. The 
irony of this early form of protection for works of the 
intellect was that the author who created the works received 
4. The Con:::ise Oxford Dictionary of Current English, 5th Edition. 
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no benefit at all; the beneficiaries were limited to the 
sovereigns and the tradesmen who printed the books. Perhaps 
it was fortuitous that sovereigns, who had the power to 
influence the course of events, were prejudiced by 
unauthorized copying of books; as a result in time a prac-
tice which had incurred no more than moral censure began to 
be transformed into a contravention of law. 
The development of copyright was given impetus in England in 
the Sixteenth Century. At that time Roman Catholicism had 
been restored in England and widespread persecution of 
Protestants was taking place under the heresy laws. A system 
of printer's privileges was in operation but the need was 
felt to impose stricter censorship of written matter. In 
1556 Queen Mary chartered the Stationer's Company, a guild 
of London printers. Monopoly rights in books they published 
were granted to the members of this guild. In return, 
however, all books which they published were required to be 
submitted for official approval and to be registered. A 
failure to meet these requirements was punished by decrees 
of the Star Chamber. The Star Chamber was abolished in 1641 
by Parliament. The Star Chamber and its transparent limita-
tion of the freedom of the press had become unpopular. It 
was replaced by a new Printing Licencing Act in 1643. This 
Act granted arbitrary powers and was very unpopular. It was 
repealed in 1694 and all restrictions on the copying of 
books were lifted. This gave rise to widespread copying and 
anarchy reigned in the printing field. 
As a result of pressure by the printing industry in England 
to restore order in the chaotic situation which prevailed, 
the Statute of Anne was adopted in 1710. This piece of 
6. 
legislation was a watershed in the development of copyright 
because for the first time the author was recognized as the 
cornerstone of a system for protecting literary works and 
the term of the monopoly granted by the state was of limited 
duration, namely twenty-eight years. The Statute of Anne 
thus changed the fundamental concepts of the protection of 
works of the intellect and it exercised a far reaching 
effect on the development of copyright throughout the civi-
lized world. 
The granting of copyright spread from England to other parts 
of Europe. Denmark adopted copyright legislation in 1741 and 
France in 17 93. The French legislation later served as a 
model for many European systems of copyright. Throughout the 
19th Century most civilized countries adopted copyright 
legislation. The underlying principles of these laws were 
those first given expression in the Statute of Anne, namely, 
making the author the cornerstone of the legislation and the 
primary beneficiary, and granting protection of 
predetermined 1 imi ted duration. The trend throughout the 
19th Century was to expand the types of works protected by 
copyright and the scope of the copyright (i.e. activities 
which gave rise to infringement), and to lengthen the term 
of copyrights. 
The further development of British copyright law will be 
dealt with in Chapter III. 
5. See RF Whale arx:l Jeremy J Phillips, M1al.e en Copyright p 1 et seq; 
EP Skene Jarres, JF Mumrery, J Rayner Jarres, Copinger & Skcoe Janes en 
Copyright, 12th Editicn, p 7 et seq; A Iatlnan, 'ltle Copyright law, 5th 
Edition, p 2 et seq; arx:l Encyclopaedia Brittanica, 15th Edition, Vol 5 p 
152 et seq, J. I.aOOre Intellectual P.topeLty in Australia - Copyright, p 
7. 
3. DEVELOPMENT OF COPYRIGHT IN SOUTH AFRICA 
The first legislative enactment which had any direct bearing 
on copyright in South Africa was the British Literary 
Copyright Act of 1842 which had replaced the Statute of 
Anne. This Act conferred copyright on any work first pub-
lished in the United Kingdom, irrespective of the country of 
origin of the author. The copyright conferred by this Act in 
literary works subsisted not only in the United Kingdom but 
also in the "British Dominions", which term was defined to 
include "all the colonies, settlements and possessions of 
the Crown which now are or hereafter may be acquired".6 Con-
sequently, to the extent that areas of South Africa were 
colonies, settlements or possessions of the Crown from time 
to time during the currency of this Act (until 1917) works 
first published in the United Kingdom enjoyed copyright in 
South Africa. The British International Copyright Act, 1886, 
also applied to the British dominions. This Act extended the 
protection of British copyright legislation, including the 
Act of 1842, to works originating from the dominions. 
The first of the South African colonies or republics to 
adopt copyright legislation was the Cape Colony which passed 
Act No. 4 of 1854 authorizing the importation of foreign 
reprints of books. This Act was followed by the Copyright 
Act, No. 2 of 1873, The Books Registry Act, No. 2 of 1888, 
The Copyright Protection and Books Registration Act, No. 18 
of 1895, and The Copyright in Works of Art Act, No. 46 of 
1905. 
17 et seq. 
6. Section 2. 
8. 
The Natal Colony followed after the Cape Colony in introduc-
ing copyright legislation. The earliest copyright legisla-
tion in Natal was Ordinance 14 of 1856 which was to the same 
effect as Act No. 4 of 1854 adopted in the Cape Colony. This 
Ordinance was repealed by Act 9 of 1896 which was in turn 
repealed by the Copyright Act, No. 17 of 1897. This Act was 
followed by the Play Right's Act, No. 44 of 1898 which was 
subsequently amended by Act No. 18 of 1899. 
The Transvaal Republic followed the example of the Cape and 
Natal and introduced copyright legislation. The first 
statute was The Copyright Act, No. 2 of 1887. This law was 
modified slightly in the First Volksraad Resolution of June 
20, 1895 - Article 420. This was followed by Proclamation 
No. 24 of 1902 which dealt with copyright in military maps. 
The Orange Free State Republic passed no copyright legisla-
tion during its existence as a separate territory. 
Not long after the formation of the Union of South Africa in 
1910, the Union Parliament passed the Patents, Trade Marks, 
Designs and Copyright Act, No. 9 of 1916. This Act repealed 
all the copyright legislation which had previously existed 
in the provinces which composed the Union. This Act marked 
the beginning of modern copyright in South Africa. 
The 1916 Act was a composite Act dealing with the laws of 
patents, designs, trade marks and copyright. Copyright was 
dealt with in Chapter 4 of the Act, in Sections 141 to 160, 
and in the Third Schedule to the Act. The Third Schedule 
consisted of the text of the Copyright Act 1911 of the 
Imperial Parliament, the 'so-called "British Copyright Act". 
Section 143 of the 1916 Act declared the British Copyright 
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Act to be in force in South Africa, subject to certain 
modifications and additions provided for in Sections 141 to 
160 of the 1916 Act. In other words, subject to minor 
alterations, the British Copyright Act was incorporated 
holus bolus into South African law. 
The 1916 Act and the Third Schedule contained provisions 
perpetuating copyright which subsisted in South Africa in 
works in existence prior to 1917. Such copyright was derived 
from the earlier South African legislation, i.e. the so-
called "Provincial Copyright Acts", the British Copyright 
Act of 1842, or from the Roman-Dutch common law. In terms of 
Section 147(1) of the 1916 Act copyright subsisting in musi-
cal, dramatic and artistic works subsisting in the United 
Kingdom prior to 1917 was recognized and conferred in South 
Africa. These works had not necessarily previously enjoyed 
protection in South Africa. In other words, the 1916 Act 
perpetuated the copyright in works which previously enjoyed 
copyright in South Africa under British legislation, the 
Provincial Copyright Acts and the common law, as well as 
copyright in musical, dramatic or artistic works which 
previously subsisted only in the United Kingdom. The way in 
which this was achieved was to create a system whereby sub-
stituted rights under the new legislation were granted in 
respect of existing rights under the common law, early South 
African legislation or British legislation. Henceforth only 
the substituted rights would continue to subsist. Works made 
prior to 1917 in which no substituted rights subsisted after 
that date fell into the public domain. 
The Act of 1916 was repealed by the Copyright Act, No. 63 of 
1965 which came into force on 11 September 1965. This Act 
was very closely based on the British Copyright Act of 1956, 
' . r:.1·. 
10. 
which had repealed the British Copyright Act of 1911. Unlike 
the Act of 1916, the Act of 1965 did not, however, declare 
the British Act of 1956 to be in force in South Africa but 
simply adopted substantial portions of the language of the 
British Act of 1956. 
The 1965 Act repealed the 1916 Act in its entirety, includ-
ing the Third Schedule. It dealt with existing works in Sec-
tion 48, read together with the Sixth Schedule. In terms of 
Section 41(1) of the Sixth Schedule, the provisions of the 
1965 Act applied, except insofar as was otherwise expressly 
provided in that schedule, in relation to things which 
existed at the commencement of the Act in 1965 in the same 
way as they applied in relation to things which came into 
existence after 1965. In other words, it was envisaged under 
the 1965 Act that no reference, or very little reference, 
was necessary to the 1916 Act and that the law of copyright 
was regulated both in regard to then existing and future 
works by the provisions of the 1965 Act. In essence, 
however, the essential provisions of the 1916 Act, particu-
larly those relating 
ship of copyright, 
to the subsistence, duration and owner-
were embodied in the 1965 Act, read 
together with the provisions of the Sixth Schedule. It was 
virtually a case of the relevant provisions of the 1916 Act 
being re-enacted in the 1965 Act for application to pre-1965 
works. 
The Act of 1965 was repealed by the Copyright Act, No. 98 of 
1978 which came into force on 1 January 1979. Although the 
Act of 1978 shows a degree of similarity to the British 
Copyright Act of 1956, it has departed from the British Act 
in several material respects and it really amounts to the 
South African legislature departing on an independent course 
11. 
in the field of copyright law, as compared with its 
predecessor, the 1965 Act. 
The Act of 1978 has been amended by Act No. 56 of 1980, Act 
No. 66 of 1983, Act No. 52 of 1984, Act No. 39 of 1986 and 
Act No. 13 of 1988. The dates of the coming into force of 
the aforementioned amendments are 23 May 1980, 17 October 
1983, 22 June 1984, 23 April 1986 and 23 March 1988, respec-
tively. 
4. CURRENT SOUTH AFRICAN COPYRIGHT LAW 
The law of copyright in South Africa is currently regulated 
entirely by the Copyright Act, 1978, as amended. All prior 
copyright legislation which applied in any way in South 
Africa has been repealed. In terms of Section 43, the Act 
applies to works made before it came into operation in the 
same way as it applies to works made thereafter. This prin-
ciple is however subject to certain provisos the most impor-
tant of which is that the Act in no way affects the owner-
ship, duration or validity of any copyright which subsisted 
under the Copyright Act, 1965, and that it does not create 
any copyright which did not subsist prior to 11 September 
1965, the date on which the Copyright Act, 1965, came into 
operation and repealed the copyright chapter of the Patents, 
Trade Marks, Designs and Copyright Act, 1916. The effect of 
the aforegoing apparently simple principle will be examined 
in detail in this thesis and it will be shown that the 
application of Section 43 could involve recognizing or per-
petuating rights under copyright derived from 19th century 
and subsequent British· and South African copyright law. 
These rights, however, owe their current existence to the 
12. 
Copyright Act, 1978, as amended, and their content and 
enforcement are regulated by it. It is therefore necessary 
to commence the analysis of copyright in works made prior to 
1979 by examining the Copyright Act, 1978, as amended, and 
the way in which it regulates the field of copyright law. 
CHAPTER II 
CURRENT SOUTH AFRICAN COPYRIGHT LAW 
1. WORKS WHICH ENJOY COPYRIGHT 
Current South African law is regulated by the Copyright Act, 
1978, as amended (hereinafter referred to as "the Copyright 
Act"). Current South African copyright law is entirely a 
creature of statute. Our common law has long since not 
granted, and at the present time does not grant, any pro-
tection in the nature of copyright to works of intellectual 
property. Indeed, the current Copyright Act specifically 
provides in Section 41(4) that no copyright or right in the 
nature of copyright shall subsist otherwise than by virtue 
of the Act or some other enactment in that behalf. 
A. SUBJECTS OF COPYRIGHT 
The types of works which can be the subjects of copyright 
will first be dealt with. They are the following: 
(1) Literary Works 
The Act gives a definition of "literary works" which reads 
as follows: '"literary work' includes, irrespective of 
literary quality and in whatever mode or form expressed -
(a) novels, stories and poetical works; 
(b) dramatic works, stage directions, cinematograph film 
scenarios and broadcasting scripts; 
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(c) textbooks, treatises, histories, biographies, essays 
and articLes; 
(d) encycLopaedias and dictionaries; 
(e) Letters, reports and memoranda; 
(f) Lectures, addresses and sermons; and 
(g) written tabLes and compiLations." 1 
It will be noted that the definition of "Literary work" 
includes dramatic 
Act as follows: 2 
works. "Dramatic work" is defined in the 
" 'Dramatic work' incLudes 
work or entertainment in dumb show, if 
a choreographic 
reduced to the 
materiaL form in which the work or entert?inment is to be 
presented, but does not incLude a cinematograph fiLm as dis~ 
tinct from a scenario or script for a cinematograph fiLm." 
The term "literary work" is something of a misnomer and a 
description such as "written works" would probably convey a 
more accurate impression. What is in fact meant by 
"literary" works in the Copyright Act is any combination of 
letters and/or numerals which embody the results of a 
measure of intellectual effort or skill. 3 Mere sentences or 
slogans, however mundane, can qualify as literary works 
under the Act. 4 The British courts have even not excluded 
the possibility that a single word can be a literary work 
and thus the subject of copyright. 5 It follows from the 
aforegoing that, for instance, a book or an article in a 
1. Section 1(1) definition "Literary ..vrk". 
2. Section 1(1) definition "dramatic ..vrk". 
3. Northern Office Micro CCJrputers (pty) Ltd & Others v Rosenstein 
1981 (4) SA 123 (C) at 129. See also Klep Valves (pty) Ltd v Saunders 
Valve Co Ltd 1987 (2) SA 1 (A)· at 21. 
4. Exxcn Corporation v Exxc:n Ca1.sul tants Interna.tic:nal Ltd ( 1982) 
RFC 69. 
5 • Exxcn Corporation v Exxc:n Ca1.sul tants Interna.tic:nal Ltd, supra 
at 83. 
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journal, being a literary work, embodies a host of separate 
literary works, i.e. each paragraph or even each sentence or 
possibly each phrase. 
Computer software6 and wage and salary forms 7 have been held 
by our courts to be literary works and to be protectable as 
such. A literary work must exist in writing or in some other 
material form, for instance a speech recorded on a tape. 8 
The term "writing" is defined in the Act to include any form 
of notation, whether by hand or by printing, typewriting or 
any similar process.9 
(2) Musical Works 
There is no definition in the Act of a musical work and the 
term must therefore be given its ordinary meaning with the 
important qualification that music must have been reduced to 
writing or musical notations or otherwise have been 
preserved in a material form, e.g. on a record or a tape. 10 
(3) Artistic Works 
The Act defines "artistic work" as meaning: "irrespective of 
the artistic quality thereof -
(a) paintings, sculptures, drawings, engravings and 
photographs; 
(b) works of architecture, being either buildings or models 
of buildings; and 
6. Northern OffiCE Micro Colputers (pty) Ltd & others v Rose:lstein, 
supra; Ecx:rx>stat (pty) Ltd v Laniu:aht & Another, supra. 
7. Kalamazoo Divisicn (pty) Ltd v Gay & others 1978 (2) SA 184 (C). 
8. Section 44; Nart:hern OffiCE Mi=o Colputers (pty) Ltd· & others v 
Rosenstein, supra. 
9. Section 1(1) definition "writing". 
10 . Section 44. 
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(c) works of artistic craftsmanship, or works of 
craftsmanship of a technical nature, not falling within 
either para (a) or (b)."ll 
Some of the terms used in the definition are themselves the 
subjects of definitions in the Act. We mention only that 
"drawing" is defined to include any drawing of'· a technical 
nature or any diagram, map, chart or plan, 1 2 and 
"photograph" means any product of photography or of any 
process analogous to photography, but does not include any 
part of a cinematograph film.l3 
As in the case of the term "literary work", the term "art-
istic work" is also something of a misnomer. What is in 
effect included in the description are visual representa-
tions of ideas or of the results of intellectual effort, in 
a material form.l4 
Works such as cutlery, needlework and stained glass would 
constitute works of artistic craftsmanship, 15 while to date 
it has been stated by our courts that the glass fibre hull 
of a boat, 16 the prototype of a motor car silencer, 17 a 
wooden model of a kitchen appiiance18 and a valve1 9 are 
11. Section 1(1) definition "artistic work". 
12. Section 1(1) definition "drawing". 
13. Section 1(1) definition "photograph". 
14. See laddie, Prescott am Vitoria, 'lbe fobder:n law of Copyright, 
paras 3.12, 3.13 am 3.25. See also Klep Valves (pty) Ltd v Saunders 
Valve Co Ltd, supra at 19. 
15. Laddie, PrescDtt and Vitoria, op cit, para 3.24. 
16. Butt v Sdrultz & Azx>ther 1984 (3) SA 568 (E); Sdrultz v Butt 1986 
(3) SA 667 (A). 
17. Bosal Afrika (pty) Ltd v Grainci (pty) Ltd & Aix>ther 1985 (4) SA 
882 (C). 
18. Kanbrcx:k Distributing v Haz Products & others Case No 21810/84 in 
t:h3 WlD - unreported. 
19. Insanror (pty) Ltd v Macbi.nenfabriek Sidler Stalder l\G t/a Sistag 
& Azx>ther 1987 (4) SA 660 (W). 
16. 
included in the concept of "works of craftsmanship of a 
technical nature". 
(4) Sound Recordings 
The Act defines a "sound recording" as "a direct exclusively 
aural fixation of the sounds of a performance or of other 
sounds capable of reproduction. " Sounds embodied in the 
sound-track of a cinematograph film are, however, specifi-
cally excluded from the definition. 20 
The Act defines "record" to mean "any disc, tape, perforated 
roll or other device in or on which sounds are embodied so 
as to be capable of being automatically reproduced therefrom 
or performed". 21 
It must be emphasized that the work which is here being 
dealt with is the actual record or tape, not, for instance, 
the musical work embodied in the record. The musical work as 
such is a separate work and is an independent subject of 
copyright. So too, the record is an independent work and an 
independent subject of copyright, although it may embody 
another copyrighted work. 
(5) Cinematograph Films 
This type of work is defined in the Act as being 
"the first fixation by any means whatsoever on film or 
any other material of a sequence of images capable, 
when used in conjunction with any mechanical, elec-
tronic or other device, of being seen as a moving pic-
ture and of reproduction, and includes the sound 
20. Secticn 1(1) definiticn "sounj recording". 
21. Section 1(1) definition "record". 
17. 
embodied in a sound-track associated with the film". 22 
The Act extends this definition so as to cover also works 
expressed by a process analogous to cinematography. 23 The 
"sound track" referred to in the definition is a record of 
sounds which is incorporated in any print, negative, tape or 
other article on which the film or part of it is recorded or 
which is issued for use together with the fil~. 24 
The definition of cinematograph film is very wide in its 
scope and includes conventional celluloid films as well as 
video tapes. Our courts have held that even a micro-chip 
embodying computer software for a video game falls within 
the definition. 2 5 
Once again it must be emphasized that 
independent work 
a cinematograph film 
and the subject of is a separate and 
copyright and must be distinguished, from, for instance, the 
scenario of the film, which is a literary work, or the musi-
cal score, which is a musical work - these works are the 
subjects of independent copyright. 
(6) Sound and Television Broadcasts 
These types of works are defined to have the same meaning 
assigned to them in the Broadcasting Act 1976. 26 The Broad-
casting Act defines "broadcasting service" to mean "a 
telecommunication service of transmissions consisting of 
sounds, images, signs or signals which takes place by means 
of radio and is intended for reception by the general pub-
22. Section 1(1) definition "cinematograph film". 
23. Section 2(1)(d). 
24. Section 1( 2). 
25. Atari, Inc. & Another v J B Radio Parts (pty) Ltd case No 17419/83 
in the TPD - order granted, but no written judgement delivered. 
26. Section 1( 1) definition "broadcast". 
18. 
1ic•. 27 The Copyright Act, however, elaborates on this 
definition so as to clarify that "broadcast" includes the 
emitting of programme carrying signals to a satellite. 28 As 
in the case of cinematograph films and sound recordings, 
broadcasts are independent subjects of copyright and may 
embody other independent works which are the subjects of 
copyright, such as artistic works, literary works or 
cinematograph films. 
(7) Programme Carrying Signals 
This type of work is an innovation in the Act of 1978 and in 
e:(fect is a broadcast while in the course of transmission 
through the ether from a satellite. The following defini-
tions have relevance to this type of work.29 
(a) "programme" means a body of live or recorded material 
consisting of images or sounds or both, embodied in 
signals emitted for the purpose of ultimate distrib-
ution; 
(b) "signal" means an electronically generated carrier 
capable of transmitting programmes. 
(c) "emitted signal" means a programme carrying signal 
which goes to or passes through a satellite; 
(d) "satellite" means any device in extra-terrestrial space 
capable of transmitting signals; 
(e) "derived signal" means a signal obtained by modifying 
the technical characteristics of the emitted signal 
whether or not there have been one or more intervening 
fixations. 
27. Section 1 of the Broadcasting 1\ct, 1976, 1\ct No. 73 of 1976. 
2 8 . Section 1 ( 1 ) definition "broadcast". 
2 9 . See the definitions of these terms in s 1 ( 1) . 
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This type of work, while being the subject of independent 
copyright, also may embody other independent copyrighted 
works. 
(8) Published Editions 
This type of work is defined in the Act to mean: "the first 
print by whatever process of a particular typographical 
arrangement of a literary or musical work".30 
In effect this type of work amounts to the typographical 
arrangements featured on the page of a book or on other 
material. This category of work was protected under the 1965 
Act31 but the protection was done away with in the 1978 
Copyright Act, initially, save to the extent that published 
editions which had enjoyed protection under the 1965 Act 
continued to enjoy such protection until the term of 
copyright under that Act, i.e. 25 years, has expired. 32 Pro-
tection for published editions was reintroduced into the 
1978 Copyright Act in the 1984 Amendment.33 By virtue of the 
retrospective operation of the Act, 34 the reintroduction of 
published editions as a category of work capable of enjoying 
copyright has had the effect of conferring copyright on pub-
lished editions made during the period 1979 to 1984, as well 
as on published editions made subsequent to the coming into 
operation of the amendment in 1984. 35 
A published edition, being the subject of independent 
copyright, often embodies other independent copyright works. 
30. Section 1(1) definiticn "p..Jblished edition". 
31. See Section 16 of tiE J\ct of 1965. 
32. See Section 43(b) prior to its arrerrlnent by tiE Copyright 1\marrl-
rrent J\ct 1984 . 
33. See, inter alia, Secticn 2 of tiE Copyright AITElrlrEnt Jlct, 1984. 
34. See s 43 arrl page 94 infra. 
35. cf Butt v. SduJltz & Another, supra, arrl SduJltz v. Butt, supra. 
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The product of intellectual activity cannot be protected by 
the law of copyright unless it can be accommodated within 
one of the above categories of works. 36 So, for instance, 
computer software cannot be protected by copyright save 
insofar as it can be considered to be a literary work, art-
istic work, cinematograph film, etc. A work should thus 
always be categorized in one of the recognized classes when 
copyright is sought to be exerted in it. As will appear 
below the scope of the copyright in a work is also 
determined to a large extent by into which class or type it 
falls. 
B. CONDITIONS FOR SUBSISTENCE OF COPYRIGHT 
What conditions or requirements must the types of works dis-
cussed above meet in order to qualify for copyright? Before 
going on to state the conditions or requirements it is 
necessary to emphasize that there are no formalities as such 
prescribed for the coming into being of copyright. Unlike 
other forms of intellectual property law, the Copyright Act 
does not make provision for any form of registration or the 
taking of any formal step in order to obtain copyright in a 
work. 
(1) General Requirements 
There are two general requirements which a work must meet in 
order to enjoy copyright, namely, the following: 




It is a requirement for the subsistence of copyright in a 
work that the work must be original. 37 This does not mean 
that the work must be in any way unique or inventive, but 
merely that it should be_ the product of the author's or 
maker's own labours and endeavours and should not be copied 
from other sources. 38 It is submitted that a work can be 
partially original, i.e. where it is based on a previous 
work but contains new matter; it is original to the extent 
of the new matter. Insofar as an independent copyright sub-
sists in the work, it covers that part of the new work which 
is original to the author and is new matter. It is specifi-
cally provided in Section 2(3) of the Act that a work is not 
ineligible for copyright simply because making it involved 
doing something which infringed the copyright in an existing 
work. Insofar as the second work consists of copied material 
it is not original and may infringe another copyright, but 
insofar as it contains new matter it is original and 
eligible for copyright.39 
(b) Material Form 
37. Section 2(1). 
38. For discussions on the question of "originality", see Topka t/a 
Topring Marrufacturing & Engineering v. Ehrenberg Engineering (pty) Ltd, 
an unreported decision of the Appellate Division; Kalamazoo Divisioo. 
(pty) Ltd v. Gay & Others, supra; Northem Office Micro Calputers (pty) 
Ltd & Others v. Rosenstein, supra; Ecxxlostat (pty) Ltd v. Lauined•t & 
Another, supra; Barl>er-Greelle Call>anY & Others v. Cz:ushquip (pty) Ltd, 
Case No. 14752/83 in the WID - unreported; Saunders Valve Co. Ltd v. 
Klep Valves (pty) Ltd, 1985(1) SA 646 (T); Baker & NelsaJ. (pty) Ltd v. 
Procast Holdings (pty) Ltd & Another,- Case No. 10555/83 in the CPD -
unreported; Pan African Engineers (pty) Ltd v. Hydro '1\Jbe (pty) Ltd & 
Another, 1972(1) SA 470 (W); Klep Valves (pty) Ltd v. Saunders Valve Co. 
Ltd, supra; l<arrbrcrl< Distributing v Haz Products & Others, supra. 
39. See in this CXJfll"r2Ction Bosal Afrika (pty) Ltd v. Graplel (pty) Ltd 
& Another, supra; l<arrbrcrl< Distributing v Haz Products & Others, supra. 
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The work must exist in writing or some other material 
form. 40 The Act defines "writing" to mean "any form of nota-
tion, whether by hand or by printing, typewriting or any 
similar process". 41 For copyright purposes, a work does not 
come into existence until it is reduced to a material 
form. 42 So, for instance, a musical work does not come into 
being while it only exists in the composer's mind even 
though he might give a rendition of it on a musical instru-
ment; it will only come into being when it is reduced to 
some rna teri al form such as a written notation. The same 
principle applies to a novel or a lecture, etc. It is a 
maxim in copyright law that there is no copyright in ideas. 
It is the material form of expression of the idea which is 
the subject of copyright. 43 
It is difficult to reconcile the requirement that a work 
must exist in a material form with the nature of broadcasts 
and programme carrying signals, which are electrical 
impulses often not embodying pre-recorded material. It is 
submitted that this requirement must be adapted in the case 
of these works to allow for the existence, and thus pro-
tection, of the work when it is in a form in which it is 
capable of being received and recorded and thus of being 
reduced to a material form. 
40. Section 44; s 2(2) in regard to literary, musical and artistic 
wo:rks. 
41. Section 1(1) definition "writing". 
42. Narthem Office Micro catp.Iters (pty) Ltd v. Rosenstein, supra. 
43. In regard to tiE question of ropyright not subsisting" in ideas but 
in tiE material expression of ideas see Natal Picture Framing Co. Ltd v. 
Levin, 1920 WID 35; Boshoff v. Art Metal & Elecb:oplating" Works (pty) 
Ltd, 1939 WID 198; Pan African Engineers (pty) Ltd v. Hydro Tube (pty) 
Ltd & Another, supra; BarlJer-Greene Carpany & others v. Crushqui.p (pty) 
Ltd, supra; Era.snus v. Galago Publishers (pty) Ltd & Another, Case No. 
8310/85 in tiE TPD - unreported; ~ Distributing v Haz Products & 
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The British courts have held, and it is widely accepted, 
that the law will not protect works which are considered by 
society to be improper, indecent or lacking in propriety. 44 
Propriety has sometimes been laid down as a condition for 
the subsistence of copyright. 45 However, the Copyright Act 
is silent on this question and, particularly as the norms of 
our censorship authorities undergo frequent modification, it 
cannot be that propriety of a work is a condition for the 
subsistence of copyright. Rather propriety is a condition 
for the enforcement of copyright. In other words, it is sub-
mitted that copyright subsists in a work irrespective of its 
propriety or otherwise but, depending on the norms prevail-
ing from time to time, our courts will not come to the 
assistance of the owner of the copyright in a work which is 
lacking in propriety or is otherwise contra bonos mores in 
the same way as the courts may refuse to enforce a right 
where the person claiming the enforcement of the right has 
so-called "unclean hands".46 
(2) Specific Requirements 
Before going on to deal with the specific requirements or 
conditions laid down in the Copyright Act for the sub-
sistence of copyright in a work it is necessary to deal with 
two concepts which are relevant and material to the condi-
tions: 
(a) Qualified Person 
others, supra. 
44 . See Goeie Hoop Ui tgewers (Edms) Bpk v. Central News Jlgency & 
Another, 1953(2) SA 843 (W). 
45. See Copelir.g Copyright and the llct of 1978, para 15. 
46. See Royal Baking Pa«1er eo. v. Crystallisers Ltd, 1928 cro 448; 
24. 
A "qualified person" in terms of the Act is an individual 
who is a citizen of, or is domiciled or resident in, South 
Africa or a country to which the operation of the Act has 
been extended by proclamation, and in the case of a juristic 
person, a body incorporated under South African law or under 
the law of a country to which the operation of the Act has 
been extended. The operation of the Act has been extended to 
specified countries which are signatories of the Berne Con-
vention on copyright and to the United States of America. 47 
(b) Publication 
The Act states that publication of a work occurs when, with 
the exception of a cinematograph film, copies of the work 
are issued, with the consent of the copyright owner, to the 
public in sufficient quantities so as, having regard to the 
nature of the work, to satisfy the public's reasonable 
requirements. A cinematograph film is considered to be pub-
lished when copies of the film are sold, let for hire or 
offered for sale or hire to the public. 48 The Act states 
specifically that certain acts in relation to works do not 
amount to publication, namely the following: 
(i) The performance of a dramatic, dramatic- musical or 
musical work, or of a cinematograph film; 
(ii) The public delivery of a literary work; 
(iii) The transmission of a work in a diffusion service; 
Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria, op cit para 2.101 et seq. 
4 7 • Section ( 1) read tq;jether with s 37 and the Regulations published 
in terms thereof in GN 704 dated 25 September 1987, and in PI:= R566 
dated 13 March 1981. See p 80 infra. 
4 8 . Section 2( a); publication can anount to passive avai1abili ty of 
copies - see Fidltel and Sachs A.G. v. LacD Parts (Pty) Ltd & lllDther; 
Case No. 5150/84 in the TPD - unreported; Klep Valves (Pty) Ltd v. 





Th·e broadcasting of a work; 
The exhibition of a work of art; and 
The construction of a work of architecture. 49 
For copyright to subsist in a particular work, in the case 
of literary, musical and artistic works and sound record-
ings, the author (i.e. the maker of the work), or in the 
case of a work of joint authorship, one of the authors, must 
have been a qualified person at the time when the work or a 
substantial part of it was made. 50 Alternatively, if the 
work has been published, the first publication of the work 
must have taken place in South Africa or in a country to 
w.hich the operation of the Act has been extended, i.e. a 
country which is a signatory of the Berne Convention on 
copyright, or the United States of America (hereinafter 
referred to as a "recognized country").5l 
In the case of a cinematograph film, the author of the film 
must have been a qualified person at the time when the film 
or a substantial part of it was made, 52 or alternatively, 
the film must have been first published in South Africa or 
in a proclaimed country, or must have been made in South 
Africa. 53 
In the case of broadcasts and programme carrying signals, 
they must have been made or emitted by the South African 
Broadcasting Corporation, 54 or, alternatively, must have 
49. Section42(d). 
50. Section 3( 1). 
51. Section 4(1) read together with s 37 am the RegulatiCilS issued in 
terms thereof referred to in footnote 47. 
52. Section 3(1). 
53. Section 4(l)(d). 
54. Section 3(1) read together with s 1(1) definition "autmr", paras 
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been emitted from within the Republic. 55 Provision is made 
in the Act for the Minister to extend protection to such 
works made or emitted by other persons in South Africa 
besides the SABC or by organizations constituted under the 
laws of other countries, or made or emitted from other 
countries, 56 but to date the Minister has not exercised 
these powers at all. 
In terms of Section 5 ( 2) of the Act, any work which is 
capable of being the subject matter of copyright and which 
is made by or under the direction of the State or a pres-
cribed international organization enjoys copyright in South 
Africa irrespective of whether the aforementioned conditions 
have been met. To date no international organizations have 
been prescribed as aforementioned. 
2. THE AUTHOR 
The author or maker of a work is the corner-stone of 
copyright law. The Copyright Act uses the terminology of 
"author" to designate the maker of any type of work which 
can be the subject of copyright. Thus the Act refers to the 
"author" of an artistic work, the "author" of a musical 
work, etc. 
The underlying philosophy or principle of copyright law is 
to reward or compensate the author of a work for the 
utilization or expenditure of his talents, time and effort 
in creating works of intellectual property. Copyright is 
(e) and (f). 
55. Section 4(l)(b) and (c). 
56. Section 38. 
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intended to provide and establish the incentive for the 
author to create more and better works. Copyright law serves 
to look after the interests of the author and to define and 
regulate the scope and operation of his qualified monopoly 
in relation to his work.57 
As shown above, the subsistence of copyright in a work can 
depend upon the circumstances of the author (i.e. whether he 
is a "qualified person" )58 and as will appear below, 
generally speaking the first ownership of the copyright in a 
work vests in the author or derives from him. 59 It is thus 
of paramount importance to identify the person who is the 
author of a particular work. 
The identification of the author can in certain circum-
stances be very closely interwoven with the recognition of 
the moment of the coming into being of the work. Unless one 
knows at what precise stage the work is "born" it is diffi-
cult to identify the author of that work. The moment of 
birth of a work can, depending upon the circumstances, be a 
difficult moment to isolate. Many types of works go through 
several stages of development before being cast in their 
final form, whereafter they are exploited or reproduced in 
derivative forms. For instance, an artistic work used as the 
design printed on a textile may be conceived and embodied by 
the artist in a rough drawing; thereafter he may develop it 
into a fully fledged painting, which painting is transformed 
into a textile design. 60 Which version is "the work"? At 
what stage is "the work" born? 
57. See p. 1 supra. 
58. See p. 25 supra. 
59. See p. 32 infra. 
60. See cavendish Textiles Ltd v. Mamlark (pty) Ltd, Case No. 2218/82 
in the TPD - unreported. 
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Each case will be determined by its own facts but, 
generally, it is submitted that "the work" is the final com-
plete version which is ready for utilization or commercial 
exploitation. It is this version which usually forms the 
basis of any copyright infringement proceedings when the 
author's finished product or derivative articles are copied 
or are otherwise misappropriated. In the example quoted "the 
work" would be the fully fledged painting; the rough drawing 
is simply a stage in the development of the work and is not 
a complete work in the sense that it is ready for utiliza-
tion or commercial exploitation, while the textile design 
represents the manner of commercial exploitation of the 
painting and is a derivative work of the painting. It may be 
that the textile design could constitute a separate and 
independent work the originality of which lies not in the 
conception of the design applied to the textile but rather 
in the transformation of the painting into a textile design. 
The textile design may thus be a subordinate but independent 
original work as is the case with the translation of a 
literary work. In this situation there may be two separate 
authors each having copyright in separate works but the 
design as such would be the work of the artist and he would 
be the author of this work as embodied in the painting. 
Interim versions of a work in the creation process can, of 
course, enjoy copyright and if copied or otherwise misused 
without .authority copyright infringement occurs, but this 
does not alter the general proposition advanced above. 
In the first place, the author of a work is the person who 
is responsible for the creation of the material embodiment 
of the work. This person may not necessarily be the person 
who conceived the idea which gave rise to, or which is 
embodied in the material work. Ideas as such are not pro-
29. 
tectable by copyright and therefore the originator of an 
idea cannot, per se, claim any right in his idea. 61 
While it is true that the person who embodies ideas in a 
material form is under the law the author of the work, his 
activity in regard to the work must involve the application 
of independent intellectual effort or skill. If the activity 
of the person who reduces the work into its material form is 
purely mechanical in nature, in the sense of a shorthand 
typist who takes down what is dictated to her and reproduces 
it in a written form, that person is not the author but 
rather the ·agent or mere amanuensis of the author. 62 This 
situation can be contrasted with, for instance, a reporter 
who listens to a speech and then writes a summary of such 
speech. In that instance the reporter will be the author of 
the reported speech, being a literary work.63 Identification 
of the author of a work is largely a question of fact.6 4 
Where two or more persons are engaged in the creation of a 
work in a material form, they can be joint authors and co-
owners of the copyright in that work.65 If a work has gone 
through various development phases involving input by 
several people before reaching finality it can be a diffi-
cult question of fact to assess whether a particular indi-
vidual must be considered to be a co-author. The issue is 
61. Pan African D:lgineers (pty) Ltd v. Hydro Tube (pty) Ltd & Another, 
supr-a; Klep Valves (pty) Ltd v. Saunders Valve Co. Ltd, supr-a. See p. 23 
supr-a. 
62. See Ilaloghue v. Allied Ne.>spapers ( 1938). Ch 106. 
63. See Walter v. lane (1900) AC 539. 
64. Pan African Engineers (pty) Ltd v Hydro Tube (pty) Ltd & Another, 
supr-a. See also Klep Valves (pty) Ltd & Another v. Saunders Valve Co. 
Ltd, supr-a. 
6 5 • See s 1 ( 1) defini ticn of "work of joint authorship" and, for 
~. s 21(1). 
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one of fact and degree and each case must be judged on its 
own merits. 
The Copyright Act gives guidance in the determination of 
which person is the author of a work. The question of who is 
the author of a literary, musical or artistic work is in 
principle a relatively simple one - the author is the maker 
or the creator of the work. In the case of the perhaps more 
impersonal types of works covered by the Act, in which a 
number of different people are often involved in different 
aspects of the creation of the final work, it is in princi-
ple difficult to designate the person who is in the main 
responsible for the creation of the final work. In this 
respect the Act creates finality, sometimes perhaps rather 
arbitrarily, on the question. In the case of a photograph, 
the Act designates the person responsible for the composi-
tion of the photograph as the author; in respect of a sound 
recording, the Act designates the person by whom the 
arrangements for the first fixing of the sounds of a per-
formance or of other sounds are made as the author; in the 
case of a cinematograph film, the Act designates the person 
by whom the arrangements for the making of the film were 
made as the author; in the case of both broadcasts and 
programme carrying signals the South African Broadcasting 
Corporation is designated as being the author; in the case 
of a published edition the author is the publisher of the 
edition. 66 The Act contemplates that the author of a work 
can be a juristic person. 67 It is submitted that in the case 
of cinematograph films and sound recordings the author of a 
work will often be a juristic person, i.e. the production 
6 6 . See s 1 ( 1) defini ticn of "aut:lrJr". 
67. Sees 3(l)(b) nean.i.rYJ of "qualified persan" an:l Fichtel aiXi Sachs 
.1\G v. Iaco Parts (pty) Ltd & Another, supra. 
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company which operates through its servants and agents col-
lectively. 
3. INITIAL OWNERSHIP OF COPYRIGHT 
With a few exceptions, the author is the initial owner of 
the copyright in the case of all the various types of works 
covered by the Act.68 The exceptions, i.e. cases where the 
author, although being the maker of the work, is not the 
first owner of the copyright in such work are the following: 
(a) Where the author is employed by a newspaper, magazine 
or similar periodical and a literary or artistic work 
is made by him during the course of his employment and 
is made for the purpose of publication in a newspaper, 
magazine or similar periodical, the employer is the 
owner of the copyright in the work insofar as the 
copyright relates to its publication in a newspaper, 
magazine or similar periodical, but the author is the 
owner of the balance of the copyright in the work.69 
(b) Where a person commissions the taking of a photograph, 
the painting or drawing of a portrait, the making of a 
gravure, the making of a sound recording or the making 
of a cinematograph film and pays or agrees to pay for 
it in money or in money's worth, and the work is made 
in pursuance of that commission, the person who commis-
sions the work is the owner of the copyright in such 
work. It should be noted that this provision relates 
68. Section 2l(l)(a). 
69. Section 2l(l)(b). 
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only to the commissioning of certain specified works 
and not to all works. 70 
(c) Where, in a case not falling within paragraph (a) and 
(b) above, a work is made by the author during the 
course of his employment by another person under a con-
tract of service or apprenticeship, that other person 
is the owner of the copyright in the work in ques-
tion.71 
(d) Where a work is made under the direction or control of 
the State or a prescribed international organization, 
the State or such international organization is the 
owner of the copyright in such work and not the 
author. 72 
The exceptions to the general rule set out in paragraphs 
(a), (b) and (c) above are variable by written agreement 
between the author and the other party. 73 In other words, 
for instance, where an author is commissioned to take a 
photograph it can be agreed between the parties that, 
notwithstanding the provisions of the Act, the ownership of 
the copyright in the photograph will vest with the author 
and not with the person giving the commission. 
70. Section 2l(l)(c). 
71. Section 2l(l)(d). See Northern Office Micro Carp.rters (pty) Ltd v. 
Rosenstein, supra; arrl Eccnostat (pty) Ltd v. Lantn:ai1t & Another, 
supra; Tret.ilella Bros. (UK) Ltd v. Deton Engineering (pty) Ltd, an 
unreported decision of the Appellate Division. 
72 . Section 5( 2) read together with s 21 ( 2) . '100 GovermEnt Printer 
has been designated by the State President in terms of s 5( 6) as the 
person in wh::rn State CMrai cnpyright vests for admi.nistrlitive ~. 
See Proc. R24, 1979 in 00 dated 19 February 1979. 
73. Section 2l(l)(e). 
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It must be noted that the aforementioned provisions do not 
alter the identity of the author of the work but rather they 
divorce the position of author and initial owner. The sub-
sistence of copyright in the work will still be determined 
by the status of the author (i.e. is he a qualified person?) 
and will not be determined by the status of the initial 
owner. 
The original text of the Copyright Act, 1978, prior to its 
amendment in May 19 80, did not contain the exceptions 
described in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) above. These excep-
tions were reintroduced by the Copyright Amendment Act, 
1980. 74 The amendment was not, however, retrospective with 
the result that for the peribd January 1, 1979 until May 23, 
1980, 75 the author of any work, except where the work was 
made by or under the direction or control of the State or a 
prescribed international organization, was the owner of the 
copyright in the work which he created notwithstanding the 
fact that he might have created such work during the scope 
of his employment by another person or pursuant to a commis-
sion given to him by another person. In other words, a dif-
ferent rule applies to the first ownership of certain works 
made during the period January 1, 1979 until May 23, 1980, 
to that which applies to works made either before or after 
that period. 76 
7 4. Section 9 of the Copyright Arrerrllent Act, 1980. TOO exceptions 
applied in the Copyright Act 1965. 
7 5 . TOO date on which too Copyright Amendrrent Act 1980 came into 
operation. 
76. See Northern Office Micro Computers (pty) Ltd & others v. 
Rosenstein, supra; Preformed Line Products (SA) (pty) Ltd v. Hardware 
Assalillies (pty) Ltd, Case No. M1303/83 in the NPD - uru:epJrted. 
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4. DURATION OF COPYRIGHT 
The period afforded to the owner of copyright in a work for 
controlling the use of his work and deriving remuneration 
from it - in other words, the duration of the copyright - is 
a very generous one.77 
Besides works of this type made under the direction or con-
trol of the State or of a prescribed international organiza-
tion, in the case of literary, musical and artistic works 
(except photographs), the copyright endures for a period of 
50 years after the death of the author. If, however, before 
the death of the author none of the following acts have been 
done in respect of a work of this nature or an adaptation 
thereof, namely: 
( i) the publication thereof; 
( ii) the performance thereof in public; 
(iii) the offer for sale to the public of records 
thereof; 
(iv) the broadcasting thereof; 
the term of copyright continues to subsist for a period of 
50 years from the end of the year in which the first of any 
of these acts is done. If none of these acts is ever done in 
relation to a work of this nature, the duration of the 
copyright is perpetual.78 
In the case of cinematograph films and photographs the 
copyright expires 50 years after the work is first lawfully 
77. The equivalent periods urner the Patents Act, am the Designs Act, 
1977 are 20 years arrl a total of 15 years, respectively, fran the date 
of registration. 
78. Section 3(2)(a). 
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made available to the public or if the work is not lawfully 
made available to the public within 50 years of its making, 
then the copyright expires 50 years after the making of the 
work. 79 Sound recordings and published editions enjoy 
copyright for a period of 50 years from the date on which 
they are first published80 and broadcasts and programme car-
rying signals enjoy copyright for 50 years after they are 
made. 81 
The copyright in anonymous 
or artistic works subsists 
or pseudonymous 
for a period of 
literary, musical 
50 
end of the year in which the work is lawfully 
years from the 
made available 
to the public or from· the end of the year in which it is 
reasonable to presume that the author died, whichever is the 
shorter term. 'In the event of the identity of the author of 
an anonymous or pseudonymous work becoming known before the 
expiration of the aforementioned period, the duration of the 
copyright is determined in accordance with the normal provi-
sions referred to above relating to known authors.82 
In the case of a work of joint authorship, the death of the 
author is deemed to be the death of the author who dies last 
even though that person might not have been a qualified per-
son.83 
The term of copyright in a literary, musical or artistic 
work (except a photograph) made under the direction or con-
trol of the State or a prescribed international organization 
79. Section3(2)(b). 
80. Section 3(2)(c) arrl (f). 
81. Section 3(2)(d) arrl (e). 
82. Section 3(3). 
83. Section 3(4). 
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subsists for fifty years from the end of the year in which 
the work is first published, while the terms of copyright in 
all other types of works (i.e. photographs, cinematograph 
films, sound recordings, broadcasts and published editions) 
made in these circumstances are the same as for non-
governmental works.84 
5. NATURE AND SCOPE OF COPYRIGHT 
In essence, copyright is the right to do or to authorize 
others to do, or to prevent others from doing, the acts 
which are designated in respect of each of the different 
types or categories of works which are eligible for 
copyright, as the monopoly of the copyright owner. In 
respect of each of the types or categories of works the Act 
details a list of acts or dealings with the work which are 
the monopoly of the copyright owner. The lists of restricted 
acts differ from one category of work to another but in 
essence they amount to copying the work in one form or 
another and/or exploiting the work commercially.85 
The acts restricted by copyright are: 
(1) Literary or musical works:86 
(a) Reproducing the work in any manner or form;87 
(b) publishing the work; 
84. Section 5(3) and (4). 
85. See ss 6 to 11A. 
86. Section 6. 
87. See footnote 91 i:nfra. 
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(c) performing the work in public;88 
(d) broadcasting the work; 
(e) causing the work to be transmitted in a diffusion 
service, unless such service transmits a lawful 
broadcast including the work, and is operated by 
the original broadcaster; 
(f) making an adaptation of the work;89 
(g) doing, in relation to an adaptation of the work, 
any of the acts specified in relation to the work 
in paragraphs (a) to (e) inclusive. 
(2) Artistic works:90 
(a) Reproducing the work in any manner or form;91 
(b) publishing the work; 
(c) including the work in a cinematograph film or a 
television broadcast; 
(d) causing a television or other programme, which 
includes the work, to be transmitted in a diffu-
sion service, unless such service transmits a law-
ful television broadcast, including the work, and 
is operated by the original broadcaster; 
(e) making an adaptation of the work;92 
(f) doing, in relation to an adaptation of the work, 
any of the acts specified in relation to the work 
in paragraphs (a) to (d) inclusive. 
88. See Southem African ~ic Rights Organisaticn Ltd v. Svemlill 
Fabrics ( pty) Ltd, 1983( 1) SA 608 (C) for the meaning of "in p..lblic" • 
89. See Bosal Afrika (pty) Ltd v. Grap1el (pty) Ltd & .!lnothe:r, supra. 
90. Section 7. 
91. See Laubscher v. Vos & Others, case No. 278/74 in the WID. -
unreported, in regard to "reproducinJ"; an:l Tolima (pty) Ltd v. Otgacius 
M:>tor .!lcoessaries (pty) Ltd, 1983(3) SA 504 (W), in regard to "any man-
ner or form". See also Klep Valves (pty) Ltd v. Saunders Valve Co. Ltd, 
supra. 
92. See Cavendish Textiles Ltd v. Mamnark (Fty) Ltd, s.p:a 
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(3) Cinematograph films:93 
(a) Reproducing the film in any manner or form; 
(b) causing the film, insofar as it consists of 
images, to be seen in public, or, insofar as it 
consists of sounds, to be heard in public; 
(c) broadcasting the film; 
(d) causing the film to be transmitted in a diffusion 
service, unless such service transmits a lawful 
television broadcast, including the film, and is 
operated by the original broadcaster; 
(e) making an adaptation of the film; 
(f) doing, in relation to an adaptation of the film, 
any of the acts specified in relation to the film 
in paragraphs (a) to (d) inclusive. 
(g) importing (other than importing for the private 
and domestic use of the importer), selling, let-
ting, offering or exposing for sale or hire by way 
of trade, or distributing, directly or indirectly, 
a reproduction or an adaptation of the film. 
(4) Sound Recordings:9 4 
(a) Making, directly or indirectly, a record embodying 
the sound recording; 
(b) importing (other than for the private and domestic 
use of the importer), selling, letting, offering 
or exposing for sale or hire by way of trade, or 
distributing, directly or indirectly, a reproduc-
tion of the sound recording, 
93. Section 8. 
9 4 . Section 9. 
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(This provision was introduced by the 1984 Amend-
ment and is a variation of the earlier provision. 
The aforegoing version of the provision will only 
come into operation on April 1, 1989 and the 
original provision is thus operative until that 
date. 95 The original provision reads "importing 
records embodying the sound recording and distrib-
uting them, directly or indirectly, to the general 
public or any section thereof" ) . 
(5) Broadcasts:96 
(a) Reproducing, directly or indirectly, the broadcast 
in any manner or form, including, in the case of a 
television broadcast, making a still photograph of 
an individual image; 
(b) rebroadcasting the broadcast; 
(c) causing the broadcast to be transmitted in a dif-
fusion service, unless such service is operated by 
the original broadcaster. 
(6) Programme-carrying signals:97 
Undertaking or authorizing the direct or indirect 
distribution of programme-carrying signals by any 
distributor to the general public or any section 
thereof in the Republic, or from the Republic. 
(7) Published editions:98 
95. See Proc 108 of 1985 in m 9830 dated 5 July 1985. 
96. Section 10. 
97. Section 11. 
98. Section llA. 
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Making or authorizing the making of a reproduction of 
the edition in any manner. 
Some of the terms mentioned above are defined in the Act. 
The definitions of "reproduction" and "adaptation" are dis-
cussed below in paragraph 7.99 
"Diffusion service" is defined as: 
"a telecommunication service of transmissions consist-
ing of sounds, images, signs or signals, which takes 
place over wires or other paths provided by material 
substance and intended for reception by specific mem-
bers of the public; and diffusion shall not be deemed 
to constitute a performance or a broadcast or as caus-
ing sounds, images, signs or signals to be seen or 
heard; and where sounds, images, signs or signals are 
displayed or emitted by any receiving apparatus to 
which they are conveyed by diffusion in such manner as 
to constitute a performance or a causing of sounds, 
images, signs or signals to be seen or heard in public, 
this shall be deemed to be effected by the operation of 
the receiving apparatus".lOO 
"Distribution" in relation to -
(a) a sound recording, means any act by which records 
embodying the sound recording are offered, 
directly or indirectly, to the general public or 
any section thereof; 
9 9 . See pp 46 and 48 infra. 
100. Section 1(1) definition of "diffusion service". 
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(b) programme-carrying signals, means any operation by 
which a distributor transmits derived signals to 
the general public or any section thereof. 101 
"Performance" is defined so as to include: 
"any mode of visual or acoustic presentation of a work, 
including any such presentation by the operation of a 
loudspeaker, a radio, television or diffusion receiver 
or by the exhibition of a cinematograph film or by the 
use of a record or by any other means, and in relation 
to lectures, addresses, speeches and sermons, includes 
delivery thereof; and references to 'perform' in rela-
tion to a work or an adaptation of a work shall be con-
strued accordingly: Provided that 'performance' shall 
not include broadcasting or rebroadcasting or transmit-
ting a work in a diffusion service".l02 
6. INFRINGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT 
There are two forms of civil law copyright infringement, 
namely, so-called direct (or primary) infringement and 
indirect (or secondary) infringement. In certain instances 
infringement of copyright constitutes a criminal offence. 




DIRECT OR PRIMARY INFRINGEMENT: 
Section 1(1) definition of "distribution". 
Section 1(1) definition "performance". 
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A direct or primary infringement of the copyright in a work 
takes place when a person, without the authority of the 
copyright owner, does or causes someone else to do any of 
the acts which are in respect of that work designated as 
restricted acts (i.e. the acts detailed in respect of each 
type of work in paragraph 5 above) and therefore are within 
the monopoly of the copyright owner . 103 As said earlier 
when dealing with the scope of copyright, this in very gen-
eral terms amounts to the unauthorized copying of the work 
and/or commercial exploitation of it. 104 Copyright is not 
only infringed by misusing or misappropriating the whole of 
the work but also by misusing or misappropriating a substan-
tial part of the work. 10 5 The concept "substantial part" 
relates primarily to quality, not quantity. Thus the copying 
of a small but essential part of a work constitutes 
copyright infringement.l06 
In practical terms, in many instances the question of 
whether or not a substantial part of a work has been taken 
amounts to the degree of similarity between the original 
work and the alleged infringing copy. 107 The corresponding 
tests under the Trade Marks Act, 1963, and the Designs Act, 
1967, are, respectively, whether one trade mark so nearly 
resembles another trade mark as to be likely to deceive or 
cause confusion (confusing similarity), and whether an 
103. Section 23(1). 
104. See p 37 supra. 
105. Section 1(2A). 
106. Ehre!lberg Engineering (pty) Ltd v. 'l'oJ:'.ka t/a 'lqlring Mam.lfacturing 
and Engineering, case No. I 8652/77 in tffi TPD - unreported, at p 25 of 
tffi typewritten judgenent. 
107. Ehre!lberg Engineering (pty) Ltd v. 'l'oJ:'.ka t/a 'lqlring Mam.lfacturing 
and Engineering, supra; Laubsdler v. Vos & others, supra; Cavel'ldish Tex-
tiles Ltd v. Mannarl< (pty) Ltd, supra; Erasms v. Galago Publishers 
(pty) Ltd & Another, supra. 
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alleged infringing design is substantially different to a 
registered design. The degree of similarity between a 
copyrighted work and an alleged infringing copy must also be 
assessed against the background of what it is about the 
copyrighted work which is original.l08 As explained, a work 
can be partially original. The court must determine wherein 
lies the originality of the copyrighted work and then view 
the alleged infringing copy from this perspective. Put dif-
ferently, the court must take account of the prior art when 
making the comparison between the two works. 10 9 For 
instance, where B makes a painting, utilizing unusual shad-
ing and perspective, of A's statue, and C, using B's paint-
ing, produces a statue which is an exact likeness· of A's 
statue, B cannot sustain a claim of infringement by C of the 
copyright in his painting because the form or configuration 
of the sculpture, while being depicted in his painting, was 
not "original" to him but to A. The originality of B's 
painting lies in the particular manner of depiction of the 
sculpture and C has not misappropriated this contribution. 
Viewed against the background of the prior art, C has not 
reproduced a substantial part of B's painting (i.e. a sub-
stantial part of that which is original about B's painting). 
C's statue will, of course, be an indirect reproduction of a 
substantial part of A's statue. 
It is essential to appreciate that copyright in a work is 
only infringed if there is copying. This means that the 
108. Ellrenberg Engineering (pty) Ltd v. TcP<a t/a 'l'qlring Mam.lfacturing 
and Engineering, supra; Laubsdler v. Vos & Others, supra; Klep Valves 
(pty) Ltd v. Saunders Valve Co. Ltd, supra. 
109. See Bosal Afrika (pty) Ltd. v Graplel (pty) Ltd & Another, supra; 
Preformed Line Products 8SA)(pty) Ltd v Hardware Asselrblies (pty) Ltd, 
supra; ~ Distributing v Haz Products & Others (pty) Ltd, supra; 
Insanr::or (Pty) Ltd Madlinenfabriek Sidler Stalder llG t/a Sistag & 
Another, supra. 
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making of a work which is very similar to or even identical 
to another work will not constitute an infringement of that 
other work if the creator produced the second work independ-
ently and without reference to the other work. Copyright 
therefore prevents the copying of a work or even of a part 
of a work but does not prevent the creation of an identical 
work without copying.llO 
In order to establish that infringement by reproduction has 
taken place a plaintiff must show that the defendant has 
copied a substantial part of his work. The courts have 
rationalized the assessment of this issue into a two-stage 
process consisting of, firstly, an objective comparison as 
to whether the two works are substantially similar followed 
by an analysis of whether a causal connection exists between 
the plaintiff's work and the defendant's alleged infringing 
copy; if either of these tests is not met, i.e if there is 
no objective similarity between the two articles, or if so, 
a causal connection between them cannot be established, then 
no copying of a substantial part of the copyrighted work has 
taken place and there has been no infringement. 111 The onus 
of proving that copying of a substantial part of a work has 
taken place rests squarely on the plaintiff and it is not 
sufficient for him merely to show that there is a similarity 
between two articles and that the defendant had access to 
the plaintiff's work; an inference must be drawn from all 
the facts of a particular case. 112 Due attention must be 
given to whether the similarity between two items is 
110. See Laddie, Prescott and Vitaria, op cit para 2.75 and Basal 
Afrika (pty) Ltd v. Graplel. (pty) Ltd & Another, supra. 
111. See Laubsdler v Vas & Others, supra; To{:Ma t/a Topring Marrufactur-
ing and Engineering v Ehrenberg Engineering (pty) Ltd, supra, arrl Klep 
Valves (pty) Ltd v Saunders Valve Co Ltd, supra. 
112 . Karrbrook Distributing v Haz Products & Others, ap:a. 
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attributable to common ideas or concepts embodied in them or 
to similarity of material expression of ideas. 113 
Copyright, which is concerned with copying the au twardly 
perceptible form, must not be confused with the rights con-
ferred by a patent in respect of the conception that is its 
subject matter. It is often difficult to decide in a partic-
ular case whether the idea or its expression has been copied 
and where the idea and its expression are indistinguishable 
the courts should be slow to find that copyright infringe-
ment has occurred as there is a danger that a monopoly can 
be conferred upon an idea free of the conditions and limita-
tions imposed by patent law. 114 
The term "reproduction" which features prominently in the 
restricted acts in respect of the various categories of 
works, is defined in the Act as follows: 115 
" 'reproduction' , in relation to-
(a) a literary or musical work or a broadcast, includes a 
reproduction in the form of a record or a cinematograph 
film; 
(b) an artistic work, includes a version produced by con-
verting the work into a three-dimensional form or, if 
it is in three dimensions, by converting it into a two-
dimensional form; 
(c) any work, includes a reproduction made from a reproduc-
tion of that work; 
and references to 'reproduce' and 'reproducing' shall be 
construed accordingly;" 
113. Basal Afrika (pty) Ltd v GraiDel (pty) Ltd & .1\nother, supra; Kam-
brook Distributing v Haz Products & Others, supra; Erasnus v Galago Pub-
lishers (pty) Ltd & Another, supra. 
114 . KanDrook Distributing v Haz Products & Others, supra. 
115. Section 1(1) definition of "reproduction". 
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Paragraph (c) of the above definition was added to the 
definition by Section l(d) of the Copyright Amendment Act, 
1983. This amendment clarified and confirmed the position as 
it had existed in the case law, particularly the British 
case law. 116 This form of reproduction, i.e. making a 
reproduction from a reproduction of a copyrighted work, is 
commonly known as "indirect copying". 
Paragraphs (b) and (c) of the definition of "reproduction" 
are of particular importance in connection with the 
infringement of artistic works, more particularly drawings 
of a technical nature. Our courts, following the example of 
the British courts, have held in a number of cases that the 
copyright in a technical drawing can be infringed by copying 
an article which is made from the technical drawing. 117 For 
instance, where a tooth for a mechanical shovel is made from 
a technical drawing and that tooth is copied by a competitor 
who makes an identical tooth, the competitor's tooth is an 
infringing copy of the basic technical drawing . 118 The 
logic is that a tooth made from a technical drawing is a 
version of the drawing converted into a three-dimensional 
form (paragraph (b) of the definition of "reproduction") and 
where the competitor copies the tooth he is indirectly copy-
ing the technical drawing or is making a reproduction from a 
116. See, inter alia, Scaw Metals Ltd v. Apex Foundry (pty) Ltd & 
Another, 1982 (2) SA 377 (D); Tol:ima (pty) Ltd v. 0'!}3ciUS fobtor llcces-
sories (pty) Ltd, supra; J.K. Fultcn (pty) Ltd v. Logic Engineering 
Enterprises (pty) Ltd & others, 1983( 1) SA 735 (W); arrl ToJ;ka t/a 'l'c.pr-
ing Marrufacturing arrl Engineering v. Ehrenberg Engineering (pty) Ltd, 
supra; Klep Valves (pty) Ltd ·v. Saunders Valve Co. Ltd, supra. For a 
digest of British cases see British Leyland fobtor Cocpcn:atim Limited & 
others v. Armstroog Patents Carpany Ltd & others - 1986 FSR 221, per 
lDrd Griffiths. 
117. See tre cases listed in footn:Jte 116. 
118. Scaw l-Etals Ltd v Apex Foundry '(pty) Ltd, s.p:a. 
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reproduction of the technical drawing (paragraph (c) of the 
definition of "reproduction"). 
Closely analogous to this form of copyright infringement is 
the reproduction by a competitor of an article of manufac-
ture which is derived from a prototype or a work of artistic 
craftsmanship of a technical nature, for instance, the hull 
of a boat or a silencer system.ll9 
The term "adaptation" which also features commonly in the 
restricted acts in respect of the various types of works is 
defined as follows:l20 
" 'adaptation', in relation to -
(a) a literary work, includes -
(i) in the case of a non-dramatic work, a version of 
the work in which it is converted into a dramatic 
work; 
(ii) in the case of a dramatic work, a version of the 




a translation of the work; or 
a version of the work in which the story or action 
is conveyed wholly or mainly by means of pictures 
in a form suitable for reproduction in a book or 
in a newspaper, magazine or similar periodical; 
(b) a musical work, includes any arrangement or transcrip-
tion of the work, if such arrangement or transcription 
has an original creative character; 
119. See Butt v. Sdrultz & Another, supra; Sdrultz v. Butt, supra; arrl 
Bosal Afrika (pty) Ltd v. Gr:ainel {pty) Ltd & Another, supra. 
120. Section 1(1) definition of "adaptation". 
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(c) an artistic work, includes a transformation of the work 
in such a manner that the original or substantial fea-
tures thereof remain recognizable;"l2l 
Infringement of the copyright in an artistic work by making 
an adaptation of the work can produce the same or similar 
results to infringement of the copyright in drawings by 
making three-dimensional indirect copies. It could be argued 
that a three-dimensional indirect copy of a drawing (for 
instance a technical drawing), is likewise an adaptation of 
that drawing. 
Where a three-dimensional article primarily has a 
utilitarian purpose and is made by an industrial process, 
the right to control the reproduction of that article in 
three-dimensional form (i.e. indirect copying of a technical 
drawing by copying a three-dimensional version of it, or the 
copying of a prototype or work of artistic craftsmanship of 
a technical nature or of a replica of the same) falls away 
once authorized three-dimensional versions of the work are 
distributed to the public anywhere in the world. This 
was brought about by the Copyright Amendment Act limitation 
1988.122 Prior to this amendment and subsequent to 1983 
(i.e. an earlier amendment made by the Copyright Amendment 
Act 1983) ·this limitation came into operation ten years 
after the end of the year in which authorized three-
dimensional reproductions of the work had been distributed 
121. In regard to tOO interpretation of "adaptation" see cavendish Tex-
tiles Ltd v. Mam1ark (pty) Ltd, supra; an:1 Basal Afrika (pty) Ltd v. 
Grap1el (pty) Ltd & Another, supra. 
122. Section 15(3A). The limitation was introduced with retrospective 
effect until 25 Septanber 1987 - Section 2(2) of tOO Copyright l\rrlelrltEnt 
llct 1988. 
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to the public anywhere in the world, or at the end of 1993, 
whichever was the later. This question will be reverted to 
below. 
Depending upon the circumstances, doing a restricted act in 
respect of an article without appropriate authority can 
infringe the copyright in more than one work. For instance, 
a person who makes an unauthorized video tape of a 
cinematograph film in principle reproduces a cinematograph 
film, a literary work (being the script of the film) and a 
musical work (being the musical score of the film) . The 
authorization of the reproduction by the copyright owner in 
respect of one of these works will not necessarily include 
the authorization of the owners of the copyright in the 
other works involved. To avoid copyright infringement in 
this situation it will be necessary to obtain the author-
izations of the owners of the copyright in all three types 
of work. 
In terms of Section 23(4) of the Act, where the subject mat-
ter of the soundtrack of a cinematograph film (considered to 
be part of the film) is also embodied in a separate record, 
the copyright in the film is not infringed by any use made 
of that separate record. 
Knowledge of the infringing nature of an act performed is 
not a component of direct copyright infringement. A person 
can infringe the copyright in a work by performing one of 
the restricted acts in relation to that work without the 
authority of the copyright owner even though he may be in 
perfectly good faith.123 
123. See Laddie, PrescDtt and Vitaria, op cit, para 2. 75. 
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B. INDIRECT OR SECONDARY INFRINGEMENT: 
Indirect infringement takes place when certain acts are done 
without the authority of the copyright owner in connection 
with dire.ct infringements of copyright. In general terms an 
article which is made by infringing the copyright in a work 
is referred to as an "infringing copy" of that work. There 
are basically two forms of indirect infringement of 
copyright: 
(1) Infringement committed by 
(a) importing into the Republic for a purpose other 
than the importer's private and domestic use; 
(b) selling, letting or by way of trade offering or 
exposing for sale or hire; or 
(c) distributing for the purposes of trade, or for any 
other purpose, to such an extent that the owner of 
the copyright is prejudicially affected, infring-
ing copies of a protected work (or in the case of 
imported articles, articles the making of whicl:l 
would have constituted copyright infringement if 
the actual maker had hypothetically made them in 
South Africa) with the knowledge that the copies 
concerned are infringing copies (or the imported 
articles would have been infringing copies if 
hypothetically made in South Africa).1 24 
124. S.23(2). See Gramophale· Co. Ltd v. Music Machine (pty) Ltd & 
Others, 1973(3) SA 188 (W); 'Thlentieth Century Fax Film Coqxnaticn & 
Another v. Anthcny Black Films (pty) Ltd, 1982(3) SA 582 (W); Colmi:lia 
Pictures Industries Inc. v. Videarent Parlmore, 1982( 1) SA 49 (W); Video 
Rent (pty) Ltd & another v. Flamingo Film Hire, 1981(3) SA 42 (C); Para-
IIDIJ[lt Pictures Coqx.liaticn v. Video Parkt:cHl North (pty) Ltd, 1983(2) SA 
251 (T); Universal City Studios Inc. v. fobvie Time, Case No. 5118/82 in 
tte D & CID - unreported; arxl. Fidl.tel and Sachs P.G v. Laco Parts (pty) 
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(2) Infringement committed by permitting a place of public 
entertainment to be used for the public performance of 
a protected literary or musical work in circumstances 
where such public performance is itself an infringe-
ment, with the knowledge that such public performance 
is an infringement.l25 
It will be clear from the above that so-called "guilty 
knowledge" on the part of the person committing what is in 
principle an indirect infringement of copyright is required 
before the Act in question can constitute indirect copyright 
infringement. lZ6 Guilty knowledge is often in practice 
imparted by the copyright owner despatching a letter to the 
infringer in which. he informs the latter of the infringing 
nature of the articles in question and then affords him an 
opportunity of verifying his claims. 127 
C. CRIMINAL OFFENCES: 
The Copyright Act also provides that certain types of 
copyright infringement constitute criminal offences. The 
following acts are criminal offences when, in the case of 
all types of work besides cinematograph films which are 
registered under the Registration of Copyright in 
Cinematograph Films Act, a person commits them in respect of 
articles which the doer knows to be infringing copies of a 
Ltd & llnother, 51..7pra. See also "Parallel Inportaticn - Infri.ngarent of 
Copyright" bY O.H. !:€an, SALJ May 1983, p 258. 
125. section 23(3) 
126. See tOO cases listed in footnote 124, in particular Twentieth 
Century-Fa>< Film Coqxnatic:n & llnother v. Anthc.ny Black Films (pty) Ltd. 
127. See Parannmt Pictures Corporatic:n v Video Parktown North (pty) 
Ltd, supra, arrl "Parallel Inportatim - Infringement of Copyright" bY OH 
!:€an, supra. 
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work (i.e. articles the making of which constitutes an 
infringement of copyright or, in the case of imported arti-
cles, would have constituted an infringement of copyright if 
they had hypothetically been made in South Africa by the 
person who actually made them in the place of manufac-
ture),128 and in the case of cinematograph films registered 
as aforementioned, commits them in respect of articles which 
are reproductions or adaptations of a cinematograph film: 
(a) makes for sale or hire; 
(b) sells or lets for hire or by way of trade offers 
or exposes for sale or hire; 
(c) by way of trade exhibits in public; 
(d) imports into the Republic otherwise than for the 
private domestic use of the importer; 
(e) distributes for purposes of trade; or 
(f) distributes for any other purpose to such an 
extent that the owner of the copyright is prejudi-
cially affected. 129 
The aforegoing acts of criminal copyright infringement are 
in general terms comparable with the indirect or secondary 
acts of civil copyright infringement. 
A person convicted of any of the aforegoing offences is 
liable, in the case of a first conviction, to a fine not 
exceeding R5 000 or to imprisonment for a period not exceed-
ing three years, or to both, for each article to which the 
128. See s 1(1) definition of ":iiJfringi.ng COPJ" and Twentieth Century 
Fox Film Ccn:p:u:atim & Another· v • .llnthaly Black Films (pty) Ltd, supra. 
129. Section 27(1). See World Wide Film Distributors (pty) Ltd v. 
Divisional Comnissimer SA Police & Others, Cape Town 1971(4) SA 
312(C); and Cine Films (Fty) Ltd & Others v. Cannissimer of Police & 
Others, 1972(2) SA 254 (A). 
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offence relates; in the case of a second or further convic-
tion, to a fine not exceeding RlO 000 or to imprisonment for 
a period not exceeding five years, or to both, for each 
article to which the offence relates. In both the aforemen-
tioned instances the total fine or the total period of 
imprisonment which can be imposed cannot exceed R50 000 or 
ten years in respect of articles comprised in the same 
transaction.l30 Where any of the aforementioned offences 
are committed in respect of the copyright in a cinematograph 
film the court may in its discretion, in addition to the 
aforementioned penalties, prohibit the doer for a period of 
which the commencement and duration is determined by the 
court from carrying on, or having any direct or indirect 
financial interest in, or deriving any direct or indirect 
financial benefit from, any business which sells, lets, 
offers, exposes or distributes reproductions or adaptations 
of cinematograph films. A person who contravenes this 
prohibition is guilty of an offence, and a fine not exceed-
ing ten thousand Rand, or a term of imprisonment not exceed-
ing five years, may be imposed. 131 
In addition, the following acts also constitute criminal 
copyright infringement: 
(i) making or having in one's possession a plate (i.e. 
a mould, negative and the like) knowing that it is 
to be used for making infringing copies of a 
work. 132 
(ii) causing a literary or musical work to be performed 
in public knowing that copyright subsists in the 
130. Section 27(6). 
131. Section 27(8). 




work and that the performance in question con-
stitutes an· infringement of the copyright.l33 
causing a sound or television broadcast to be 
rebroadcast or transmitted in a diffusion service 
knowing that copyright subsists in the broadcast 
and that such rebroadcast or transmission con-
stitutes and infringement of the copyright.l34 
causing programme carrying signals to be distrib-
uted by a distributor for whom they were not 
intended in the knowledge that copyright subsists 
in the signals in question and that such distrib-
ution constitutes an infringement of copyright. 135 
Any person convicted of any of the aforegoing offences is 
liable, in the case of a first conviction, to a fine not 
exceeding Rl 000, and in any second or further conviction, 
to a fine not exceeding Rl 000 or to imprisonment for a 
period not exceeding one year. 136 
7. EXEMPTIONS FROM INFRINGEMENT 
The Copyright Act makes provision for a number of exemptions 
from copyright infringement. A perusal of these exemptions 
leads to the conclusion that they are all instances in which 
it is considered to be in the public interest that the 
copyright owner should not have a monopoly in the perform-





Sectic:n 27( 3). 
Sectic:n 27( 4). 
Sectic:n 27 ( 5 ) • 
Secticn 27(7). 
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The following acts are exempted from being infringements of 
copyright: 
(1) The copyright in a literary, musical or artistic work, 
or in a cinematograph film, sound recording, broadcast 
or published edition is not infringed if the work . is 
used in any manner, which would normally constitute an 
infringement of copyright, solely and only to the 
extent reasonably necessary -
(a) for the purposes of research or private study by, 
or the personal private use of, the person using 
the work; 
(b) for the purposes of criticism or review of that 
work or of another work; or 
(c) for the purposes of reporting current events -
( i) in a newspaper, magazine or similar peri-
odical; or 
( ii) by means of broadcasting or in a cinema-
tograph film. 
The aforegoing provision is subject to the proviso that 
the exemption does not cover the making of a copy of 
the whole or of a substantial part of the work in ques-
tion, and that the items referred to in paragraphs (b) 
and (c) ( i) only apply if the source of the material 
taken is mentioned as well as the name of the author of 
such material if it appears on the work from which the 
material is taken.l37 
(2) The copyright in a literary, musical or artistic work, 
cinematograph film, sound recording, broadcast or pub-
lished edition is not infringed by using the work for 
137. Section 12(1) read together with ss 15(4), 16, 17, 18 and 19A. 
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the purposes of judicial proceedings or by reproducing 
it for the purposes of a report of judicial pro-
ceedings.138 
(3) The copyright in a literary or musical work, 
cinematograph film, sound recording or broadcast which 
is lawfully available to the public is not infringed by 
taking any quotation from it, including any quotations 
from articles in newspapers or periodicals that are 
summaries of such a work; provided that the quotation 
must be compatible with fair practice, the extent of it 
must not exceed the extent justified by the purposes 
for which it is used and the source from which the 
material is taken as well as the name of the author, if 
same appears on the work, must be mentioned.l39 
(4) The copyright in a literary, musical or artistic work, 
cinematograph film, sound recording, broadcast, or pub-
lished edition is not infringed by using the work, to 
the extent justified by the purpose, by way of 
illustration in any publication, broadcast or sound or 
visual recording for teaching provided the use in ques-
tion is compatible with fair practice and the source of 
the material, as well as the name of the author, if it 
appears on the work, is mentioned. 140 , 
(5) The copyright in a literary, musical or artistic work, 
sound recording or published edition is not infringed 
by the reproduction of it by the SABC by means of its 




Secticn 12(2) read together with ss 15(4), 16, 17, 18 an::1 19A. 
Secticn 12(3) read together with ss 16, 17 an::1 18. 
Secticn 12(4) read together with ss 15(4), 16, 17, 18 an::1 19A. 
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sively for use in a lawful broadcast of the SABC and is 
destroyed within six months after the making of the 
copy or within a longer period which may be agreed upon 
by the owner of the copyright in the work. A copy of 
' this nature is commonly referred to as an "ephemeral 
copy". Where the ephemeral copy is of an exceptional 
documentary nature it may be preserved in the archives 
of the SABC but it may not be used for broadcasting or 
for any other purpose without the consent of the 
copyright owner save insofar its use falls within any 
of the exemptions from copyright infringement, includ-
ing this exemption.l41 
( 6) The copyright in a literary work such as a lecture, 
address or similar work which is delivered in public is 
not infringed by reproducing the work in the press or 
by broadcasting it if the reproduction or broadcast is 
for informatory purposes. The right of making a collec-
tion of the lectures, addresses or other works of an 
author is, however, exclusive to the author or his suc-
cessor in title.l42 
(7) The copyright in an article published in a newspaper or 
periodical, or in an article in a broadcast, on any 
current economic, political or religious topic is not 
infringed by reproducing the article in the press or 
broadcasting it provided that the right of reproduction 
or broadcasting the work in question has not expressly 
been reserved by the copyright owner and the source of 
the material reproduced or broadcast in terms of this 








(8) Official texts of a legislative, administrative or 
legal nature, or translations of such texts, or 
speeches of a political nature, or speeches delivered 
in the course of legal proceedings, or news of the day 
in the form of items of press information, are not the 
subject matter of copyright, provided that the right of 
making collections of any speeches of the aforemen-
tioned nature is exclusive to the author or maker of 
such speeches. 144 
(9) The copyright in a literary, musical or artistic work, 
cinematograph film, sound recording, broadcast or pub-
lished edition is not infringed by the use of such 
works by a licensed dealer in radio or television 
receivers or in any type of recording equipment making 
a demonstration of the operations of such i terns of 
equipment to a specific client or customer. 145 
( 10) The copyright in a musical work is not infringed by 
making a sound recording or a copy of the work, or of 
an adaptation thereof, if copies of the work or of a 
similar adaptation were previously made in or imported 
into South Africa for the purposes of retail sale by or 
with the licence of the copyright owner and certain 
requirements set out in Section 14 of the Act are 
met.l46 
(11) The copyright in an artistic work is not infringed by 
its inclusion in a cinematograph film or in a televi-
144. Section 12(8). 
145. Secticn 12(12) read together with ss 15(4), 16, 
146. Secticn 14 read together with Chapter 2 of R2530 
6252 dated 22 December 1978. 
17, 18 and 19A. 
publish=d in m 
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sion broadcast or transmission in a diffusion service 
if such inclusion is merely by way of background or 
incidental to the principal matters represented in the 
film, broadcast or transmission. 147 
(.12) The copyright in a work of architecture or in drawings 
from which a work of architecture is derived, both 
being artistic works, is not infringed by the 
reconstruction of a building on the same site and in 
the same style as the original building. 148 
(13) The copyright in an artistic work is not infringed by 
its reproduction or its inclusion in a cinematograph 
film, a television broadcast, or a transmission in a 
diffusion service, if that work is permanently situated 
in a street, square or similar public place. 149 
( 14) The copyright in an artistic work of which three-
dimensional reproductions have been made available to 
the public, whether inside or outside South Africa, by 
or with the consent of .the copyright owner (which 
reproductions are referred to for present purposes as 
"authorized reproductions") is not infringed if some-
one, without the consent of the copyright owner, makes 
or makes available to the public three-dimensional 
reproductions or adaptations of the authorized 
reproductions, provided the authorized reproductions 
primarily have a utilitarian purpose and are made by an 
industrial process.150 A variation and forerunner of 
147. Secticn 15(1). 
148. Secticn 15(2). 
149. Secticn 15(3). See .11rgus Printing and Publishing Co. Ltd v. Die 
Perskorporasie van Suid-Afrika ~. 1975(4) SA 814 (A). 
150. Secticn 15(3A). 
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this exemption was introduced by the Copyright Amend-
ment Act, 1983, but the present form of the exemption 
was introduced in the Copyright Amendment Act, 1988. 151 
The rights of copyright owners of artistic works of 
this nature which originate from certain foreign 
countries are further circumscribed. This question will 
be discussed further below. 
Until three-dimensional utili tar ian industrially pro-
duced derivatives of an artistic work have been issued 
to the public the work enjoys full copyright, including 
the right to restrain making three-dimensional 
reproductions of the work. Even after three-dimensional 
utili tar ian industrially produced derivatives of the 
work have been issued to the public the copyright owner 
can still restrain the making of three-dimensional 
articles from the drawing itself or two-dimensional 
reproductions of it. This flows from the use of the 
words "makes ... three-dimensional reproductions of the 
authorized reproductions" (emphasis added) i.e. the 
three-dimensional derivative articles. All that is 
excised from the copyright or is "forfeited" is the 
right to restrain the making of three-dimensional 
reproductions or adaptations by indirect copying from 
an authorized reproduction. For the rest the copyright 
remains intact. 
Before the aforementioned "forfeiture" of protection 
takes place the authorized reproductions, i.e. the 
derivative articles, must primarily have a utilitarian 
151. Secticn 2(1) of tre Cqlyright J\merrlrent .1\ct 1988. TOO introduction 
of tre IOOaSUre was, tn..ever, made retwsp:ctive until 25 Septa11ber 1987 
[see s 2(2)]. 
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purpose and must have been made by an industrial 
process. The latter concept has a reasonably clear 
meaning but the meaning of the former concept is more 
problematical. Would, for instance, a spoon or other 
item of cutlery made of silver and having an aesthetic 
shape primarily have a utilitarian purpose? The concept 
of an article primarily having a utili tar ian purpose 
warrants closer examination. 
It is submitted that, upon an historical analysis, the 
ratio of the provision is to prevent copyright from 
operating in relation to industrial articles and thus 
from trespassing on the terrain of registered designs 
and patents and the intention is not unduly to deprive 
authors of protection. On this premise it is submitted 
that the question should be approached as follows: The 
term "utilitarian" should be contrasted with "artistic" 
or "aesthetic" and should be viewed against an indus-
trial background. In practical terms the derivative 
article must be a useful thing in an industrial con-
text. On this basis an article such as a toy would not 
primarily have a utilitarian purpose. Items of 
machinery on the other hand would obviously have such a 
purpose. In cases of doubt the motivation of the 
average purchaser in purchasing the article should be 
considered. Would he buy the particular article to use 
it to achieve a useful practical result or would he buy 
it for some other purpose such as ornamentation or 
deriving pleasure (e.g. a replica of an early gun which , 
has ornamental value and could be hung on a wall)? 
This approach accords basically with the approach 
adopted in comparable circumstances in the law of 
62. 
designs. 152 If the latter motivation is dominant then 
the article primarily has an artistic purpose and not 
primarily a utilitarian purpose. In this case the "for-
feiture" of protection will not occur. In the former 
case the article primarily has a utili tar ian purpose 
even if it might have an artistic character and have 
strong aesthetic appeal and the "forfeiture" of pro-
tection will occur. It should be noted that it is the 
purpose of the article and not the article itself which 
must be primarily utili tar ian for the "forfeiture" to 
occur. 
( 15) The copyright in programme carrying signals is not 
infringed by the distribution of short excerpts of the 
programme carried by the signals where such excerpts 
consist of reports of current events or are compatible 
with fair practice, and are only used to the extent 
justified by the informatory purpose of such excerpts. 
This exemption does not, however, apply to programme 
carrying signals carrying a programme representing a 
sporting event. 153 
(16) The copyright in any work is not infringed by reproduc-
ing that work if such reproduction is permitted by 
regulations made under Section 13 of the Copyright Act 
and is . not in conflict with a normal exploitation of 
the work and is not unreasonably prejudicial to the 
152. See IAWSA vol 8 : "Designs" by TO Burrell para 83 p 125. It must 
be appreciated that in design law the ~ goes to the nature of fea-
tures of design wbareas s 15(3A) is concerned with the nature of the 
purpose of articles. This is an important distin::t:icn arrl CDUld lead to 
different results in the n..u areas of law in a given instance. 
153. Section 19. 
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legitimate interests of the copyright owner. 154 To 
date, the Minister of Economic Affairs has, in terms of 
Section 13 of the Act, issued regulations dealing with 
circumstances in which reproductions of works may be 
made generally and in particular by libraries or 
archives and for use in educational institutions. 155 
(17) The copyright in a literary, musical or artistic work 
or in a sound recording or broadcast is not infringed 
if the Copyright Tribunal for which provision is made 
in Chapter 3 of the Copyright Act (Sections 29 to 36 of 
the Act) grants a compulsory licence to do an act in 
relation to any such work and the act is done pursuant 
to such a compulsory licence. The Copyright Tribunal is 
empowered to grant the following types of licences: 156 
(a) In the case of a literary or musical work, a 
licence to publish the work in a material form or 
to perform the work or an adaptation thereof in 
public or to broadcast it or to record it or to 
cause it to be transmitted in a diffusion service; 
(b) In the case of an artistic work, a licence to 
include it or an adaptation thereof in a 
154. Secticn 13. 
155. Olapter I of Reg 2530 in 00 6252 dated 22 December 1978, as 
ameOOed by Reg Rl211 in 00 9755 dated 7 June 1985. 
156. Secticn 1(1) definiticn of "licence". Alth::lugh the definiticn is 
rot limited to Olapter 3, the co~ definiticn in the Copyright 
Act, 1965, was limited in this way. This limited definiticn of "licence" 
can obviously not apply to the broad concept of licensing un:ler 
copyright law am our courts have given a broad meanir.g to licerx:e un:ler 
the Act. See J.K. Ful:txn (pty) Ltd v. IDgic Engineering Entmprises 
(pty) Ltd and others, supra, am Video Parkt:oom. North (pty) Ltd v. Para-
IICUilt Pictures Cot:pot:aticn, 1986 (2) 623 (T). Consequently it is clear 
that the definiticn of "licence" in s 1 refers to th:lse licerx:es which 
may be granted by the Copyright Trib.mal. 
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cinematograph film or in a pre-recorded or live 
television broadcast or to cause the work or an 
adaptation thereof to be transmitted in a diffu-
sion service; 
(c) In the case of a sound recording, a licence to 
make a record embodying it; and 
(d) In the case of a broadcast, a licence to re-
broadcast it, to record it or to cause it to be 
transmitted in a diffusion service. 
The Copyright Tribunal is empowered to grant the 
aforementioned types of licences in basically two types 
of situations, namely, firstly, where a licence is 
sought in terms of a licence scheme operated by a 
licensing body, either by an individual or by an organ-
ization claiming to be representative of a group of 
persons to which the scheme relates, 157 or, secondly, 
where a person claims that he requires a licence in a 
case not covered by a licence scheme. 158 The powers 
and procedures of the Copyright Tribunal and the cir-
cumstances relating to applications for compulsory 
licences made to it are set out in the aforementioned 
provisions of the Copyright Act and the Regulations 
relating to the Copyright Tribunal.l59 
( 18) While Section 8 of the Act deals with the scope of 
copyright in a cinematograph film, sub-section (2) in 
effect creates an exemption applicable to all types of 
works capable of being incorporated in a cinematograph 
15 7 . Sec:ticn 30. 
15 8 • Secticn 33( 3) • See 'lbe JOOannesburg Operatic and Dramatic Society 
v. Music 'lbea.tre Internatialal & others, supr-a. 
159. 01apter 4 of Reg 2530 in ro 6252 dated 22 Dec:anber 1978. 
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film, save for musical works. In terms of the sub-
section where authority 
(besides a musical work) 
is granted to utilize a work 
' in the making of a film, or a 
work (besides a musical work) is made. for incorporation 
in a film, that work may be broadcast during the broad-
casting of the film unless a contrary stipulation is 
made by the owner of the copyright in that work. 
8. INFRINGEMENT OF AN AUTHOR'S RESIDUARY OR MORAL RIGHTS 
The Copyright Act confers upon the author the right to claim 
authorship of his work, being a literary, musical or art-
istic work, or a cinematograph film, and to object to any 
distortion, mutilation or other modification of that work 
where such action is or would be 
or reputation. 160 This right, 
author's "residuary right", is 
prejudicial to his honour 
which the Act calls the 
more commonly known in 
copyright law as the author's "moral right". The right 
granted to the author in this respect by the Act is enforce-
able in the same way as copyright and any encroachment on 
that right is treated by the Act as an infringement of the 
copyright . 161 The author's moral right endures for the 
duration of the term of copyright in the work and, it is 
submitted, is a right which always attaches to the author or 
his heir, notwithstanding the fact that the author might 
have assigned the copyright in his work to someone else. 
This would seem to follow from the personal nature of the 
right which is comparable to the author's reputation. 
160. Secticn 20(1). 
161. Secticn 20(2). 
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In the case of an author who authorizes the use of his work 
in a cinematograph film or a television broadcast, the 
author's moral right-is limited to a certain extent in that 
he does not have the right to oppose modifications which are 
absolutely necessary on technical grounds or for the pur-
poses of the commercial exploitation of the work. 162 
9. COURT PROCEEDINGS RELATING TO COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT 
A. CIVIL REMEDIES: 
Infringements of copyright are actionable at the suit of the 
owner of the copyright163 or an exclusive licensee (includ-
ing an exclusive sub-licensee) 164 and such person can claim 
an interdict restraining the performance of the infringing 
act, damages or an account of profits, and delivery up of 
infringing copies of the work in question and plates (i.e. 
moulds, negatives and the like) used or intended to be used 
for making infringing copies . 1 65 If a defendant was not 
aware and had no reasonable grounds for suspecting that 
copyright subsisted in the work concerned, the copyright 
owner is not entitled to recover damages although he is 
entitled to an account of profits. 1 6 6 On the other hand, 
162. See tie proviso to s 20(1). 
163. Secticn 24(1). 
164. Secticn 25. See Video PaJ:kta.n North (pty) Ltd v. Par'anrult Pic-
tures Ccnp;::u:atim, supra, arrl Kinekor Films (pty) Ltd. v. Dial-a-foDvie, 
1977(1) SA 450 (A); Klep Valves (pty) Ltd v. Saunders Valve Co. Ltd, 
supra. 
165. Secticn 24(1). 
166. Secticn 24(2). In regard to tie ranedies of an J\aDunt of Profits, 
Conversicn and Detention see "llc:CDUnt of Profits in South African 
Copyright Law" by O.H. Dean SALJ February 1986 p 103. The ranedies of 
Ccnversion arrl Detention which existed urx3er tie earlier legislaticn 
were ckne away with in the 1978 llc:t. 
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if the infringement is flagrant, the court is, in certain 
circumstances, empowered to award such additional damages as 
it may consider appropriate, by way of a penalty (so-called 
"penal damages"). 1 67 
Our courts have granted so-called "Anton Piller Orders" in 
copyright infringement matters. An Anton Piller Order as 
approved by the Appellate Division is primarily a procedural 
remedy whereby the Deputy Sheriff is directed to enter the 
premises of the respondent and to take possession of and 
retain in his custody pending the hearing of the matter all 
relevant evidence relating to the applicant's cause of 
action. The order is granted without notice to the respond-
ent and is usually sought in camera in order to preserve 
secrecy which is of the essence of the matter because the 
rationale behind the granting of the order is that the 
respondent is in possession of material evidence which he is 
likely to destroy or otherwise place beyond the reach of the 
applicant if he becomes aware that proceedings are being 
instituted against him. Interim interdicts are often sought 
and granted in conjunction with Anton Piller Orders. 1 68 
B. PRESUMPTIONS RELATING TO ONUS OF PROOF 
Section 26 of the Copyright Act contains a number of pre-
sumptions which alter the general principle that it is 
encumbent upon the copyright owner (or exclusive licen-
167. Sectim 24(3). See Priority Rectnds {Pty) Ltd & Another v Ban-Nab 
Radio and Til, 1988 (2) SA 281 (D); CCP Reoord Co. (Pty) Ltd v Avalcn 
Rectnd Centre, case 1-b 11490/86 in the em - unreported. 
168. See Universal City Studios Inc & Others v Nebxlrk Video (Pty) Ltd 
1986 (2) SA 734 (A); warner Bros Inc & Others v Me1otrcni.cs, Cases r-bs 
4607-15/86 in the em - unreported. 
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see), in any court proceedings relating to civil copyright 
infringement, or the State in any court proceedings relating 
to criminal copyright infringement, to prove all the facts 
necessary to establish the subsistence of copyright, the 
plaintiff's or the complainant's title to that copyright and 
that infringing acts have been committed. The existence of 
these p~esumptions is of substantial importance. These 
presumptions are set out below: 
( 1) Where in the case of a literary, musical or artistic 
work, a name purporting to be that of the author or of 
a co-author appeared on copies of the work as pub-
lished, or in the case of an artistic work, appeared on 
the work when it was made, the person whose name 
appears in this manner is presumed, in any civil pro-
ceedings, unless the contrary is proved, to be the 
author of the work, or one of such authors, provided 
the name in question was his true name or the name by 
which he was commonly known.169 
( 2) Where in civil proceedings in respect of a literary, 
musical or artistic work of which the authorship is 
anonymous or pseudonymous, it is established that the 
work was first published in South Africa, in the United 
States of America or in a Berne Convention country dur-
ing the 50 years preceding the beginning of the year in 
which the proceedings were brought and that a name pur-
porting to be that of the publisher of the work 
appeared on copies of the work as first published, it 
is presumed until the contrary is shown that copyright 
subsists in the work and that the person named as the 
169. Secticn 26(1) am (2). 
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publisher was the owner of the copyright at the time of 
publication of the work. This provision does not, 
however, apply if the actual name of the author of a 
pseudonymous work is commonly known.l70 
(3) In civil proceedings relating to a literary, musical or 
artistic work, where it is established that the author 
of the work was dead at the time of the bringing of the 
proceedings, the work is presumed to be an original 
work unless the contrary is proved. 171 Similarly, where 
a work has been published and the author was anonymous 
or is claimed to be pseudonymous and it is not shown 
that the work was ever published under the true name of 
the author or under a name by which he was commonly 
known, or that it is possible for a person without 
previous knowledge of the facts to ascertain the 
identity of the author by reasonable enquiry, the work 
is presumed to be original unless the contrary is 
proved. 172 
(4) If it is proved in civil proceedings relating to the 
copyright in a cinematograph film that a name purport-
ing to be the name of the author of that film appears 
on it in the prescribed manner, it is presumed that the 
named person is the author of that film unless the con-
trary is shown. 173 
170. Secticn 26(3). 
171. Section 26(4). See Saunders Valve Co. Ltd v Klep Valves (Pty) 
Ltd, supra; Klep Valves (Pty) · Ltd v Saunders Valve Co. Ltd, supra. 
172. Secticn 26( 5). 
173. Secticn 26( 6). See Olapter 3 of Reg 2530 in 00 6252 dated 22 
Dec:anber 1978, for tiE prescribed manner. See also Video Rent (Pty) Ltd 
& Another v. Flamingo Film Hire, supra. 
70. 
( 5) In civil proceedings relating to the copyright in a 
sound recording, if it is proved that records embodying 
the sound recording or a part of it have been issued to 
the public bearing a label or other mark comprising 
certain particulars, then the label or mark in question 
is sufficient evidence of the facts so stated save to 
the extent that the contrary is proved. The particulars 
referred to above are that a person named on the label 
or mark was the author of the sound recording, that the 
recording was first published in a year specified on 
the label or mark, or that the recording was first pub-
lished in a country specified on the label or mark. 174 
( 6) In civil or criminal proceedings relating to the 
infringement of the copyright in a cinematograph film 
which has been registered in terms of the Registration 
of Copyright in Cinematograph Films Act, 1977, it is 
presumed that every party to those proceedings had 
knowledge of the particulars entered in the Register of 
Copyright in respect of that film from the date of the 
lodging of an application to record those particu-
lars, 17 5 and it is presumed that the defendant or 
accused who is alleged to have done an act which 
infringes the copyright in that film did that· act 
without appropriate authority unless the contrary is 
proved.l76 The first mentioned presumption is irrebut-









( 7) In any civil or criminal proceedings relating to the 
infringement of the copyright in a cinematograph film, 
it is presumed, unless the contrary is shown, that any 
person who trades in the selling, letting or distrib-
ution of copies of cinematograph films and who is found 
in possession of a reproduction or adaptation of a 
cinematograph film, in fact sold or let for hire, or by 
way of trade offered or exposed for sale or hire, the 
reproduction or adaptation of the films in question. 177 
10. TRANSMISSION OF COPYRIGHT 
Copyright in respect of any particular work comprises in 
effect a monopolistic right to a number of different acts. 
The sum total of all these rights constitutes a whole 
copyright. 178 The scope of the copyright in the different 
types of work varies from class to class (e.g. ·see Section 6 
in regard to what rights are comprised in the copyright in a 
literary or musical work). 
Copyright, or a portion thereof, may be transmitted or 
transferred to another person. Copyright may be apportioned 
in the following ways or a combination of two or more of 
these ways: 
( i) As to the nature of or manner of dealing in the 
work, for instance the right to publish the work, 





Secticn 26( 10) . 
See Video Parkt:own 
supra, at 632. 
North (Ply) Ltd v. Parannm.t Picture Corpo-
72. 
(ii) As to the country or geographical area in respect 
of which the copyright subsists. 
(iii) As to the duration or term of the right 
granted. 179 
It follows therefore that in the case of, for instance, a 
literary work, the owner of the copyright can assign to one 
person the right to publish the work in book form in the 
Republic, to another the right to publish it in book form in 
the United States and to others such rights as dramatiza-
tion, filming, translation or publication in serial form; or 
he may assign certain of these rights and license others and 
he may set a time limit on the granting of any of these 
rights. 
It is a maxim of our Roman-Dutch common law that "nemo pius 
juris transferre potest quam ipse habet" (No-one can trans-
fer greater rights than he himself has). 180 This principle 
is particularly pertinent to copyright law with its princi-
ple of compartmentalization of rights. A person who owns or 
holds merely some of the rights comprised in the copyright 
in a work cannot transmit greater rights to another than 
those which he holds himself. For instance, someone who has 
taken assignment of the right to publish a literary work in 
English cannot grant to another the right to publish the 
work in Afrikaans as he does not hold that right. 
Copyright can be assigned, licensed, and transmitted by 
testamentary disposition or by operation of law as movable 
179. Secticn 22(2). 
180. See Ranan Private Law, 2rrl Ed by Max Kaser, translated by R. Dan-
nenbr:in;J, para 24 I 2, an:l. Silberberg an:l. Scroeman, 'Ihe Law of P.LOperty, 
2rrl Ed, para 2.3 en p 73. ~ autl'xn:s of the latter work clesc:I:'ibe this 
pri=iple as the "golden rule" of the law of propert:y. 
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property. 181 Assignments and licences of copyright will be 
discussed below. 
A. ASSIGNMENT: 
The author, as the first owner of the copyright in the work, 
or any subsequent owner, can transfer all or some of his 
rights under the copyright to another person. Where a trans-
fer of rights or assignment has taken place, the assignor 
divests himself entirely of the right or rights concerned 
and these become the property of the assignee. The assignor 
thereafter no longer has any claim to such rights and is in 
fact no longer able to perform the acts covered by those 
rights himself without the authority of the assignee. 18 2 
Consequently, an author who has assigned all the rights 
under the copyright in his work to, for instance, a pub-
lisher, no longer has any rights in that work - these rights 
have become the property of the publisher. If he should 
thereafter reproduce his own work without the publisher's 
permission he will infringe the copyright in that work. 
The Act provides that no assignment of copyright, whether 
total or partial, will be effective unless it is in writing, 
and signed by or on behalf of the assignor. 183 There must, 
however, be an agreement to assign or cede, i.e. there must 
be a mutual intention to transfer rights by offer and 
acceptance. 184 A verbal or tacit agreement purporting to 
assign copyright will be ineffective and invalid. An agree-
181. Secticn 22( 1 ) . 
182. See Kinekor Films (pty) Ltd v Drive-In Hc:me Movies, 1976(2) SA 87 
(O) at p 90; Erasrus v Galago Publishers '(pty) Ltd & llnother, supra. 
183. Secticn 22(3). 
184. See PrefamEd Line Products (SA)(pty) Ltd v Hardware Assarblies 
(pty) Ltd, supra. 
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ment can effect an assignment of copyright even though no 
specific mention of copyright is made in it.l85 
It is possible for a prospective owner of copyright to 
assign any future copyright wholly or partially to another 
person and, on the copyright coming into existence, it will 
vest in that other person. 186 For example, an artist can 
assign the copyright in a painting which he is about to 
undertake to another person and, upon the work being com-
pleted, that other person will become the owner of the 
copyright. 
The transfer of the ownership of a physical article embody-
ing a work which is the subject of copyright must be distin-
guished from the assignment of the copyright in the work in 
question. The article embodying a work which is the subject 
of copyright is an i tern of tangible property, whereas the 
copyright in the work is an item of intellectual property. 
The two i terns of property are the subjects of separate 
rights which can have separate owners. The transfer of the 
ownership of an item of tangible property does not, 
This can 
per se, 
only be transfer the ownership of the copyright. 
done by assignment of the copyright. 187 For instance, when 
an original oil painting is sold the ownership of the physi-
cal article is transferred to the purchaser. However, unless 
the artist enters into a Deed of Assignment of copyright 
with the purchaser of the painting, or signs a document 
which can be construed as an assignment, the copyright 





Klep Valves (pty) Ltd v Saunders Valve Co. Ltd, supra. 
Secticn 22( 5) • 
See Boshoff v. Art Metal and Electroplating \bz:Ks (pty) Ltd, 
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article can enjoy the fruits of his ownership save to the 
extent that his dealings in the article infringe the 
copyright in the artistic work. He cannot therefore, for 
instance, reproduce the painting which he owns unless he 
obtains the permission of the copyright owner. An exception 
to the general rule that the passing of ownership in a 
physical article does not affect the ownership of the 
copyright in intellectual property embodied in the physical 
article is, however, provided for in Section 22 ( 6) of the 
Act. In terms of this section a testamentary disposition of 
the material on which a work is first written or otherwise 
recorded effects the disposition of any copyright in the 
work which is vested in the deceased at the time of his 
death. 
An assignment or cession of copyright must be distinguished 
from a cession by the copyright owner of his right of action 
arising from an infringement of his copyright. In the latter 
instance the copyright owner simply cedes a claim but 
retains ownership of the copyright the infringement of which 
gives rise to his claim against a third party. 1 88 
B. LICENCES: 
A copyright licence is tantamount to an undertaking by the 
copyright owner not to sue the licensee, or his sub-
licensee, for infringement and, except in the case of an 
exclusive licensee, confers no rights as against third 
parties. 189 In other words, the copyright owner remains the 
188. See Video Parktown North (pty) Ltd v ParanDUnt Pictures Corpo-
raticn, supra. 
189. Video Parktown North (pty) Ltd v ParaiOOUilt Pictures Cmpmaticn, 
supra; Kinemas Ltd v African 'lheatres Ltd, 1927 TPD 100; Klep Valves 
(pty) Ltd v Saunders Valve Co. Ltd, supra. 
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owner of the right and merely allows the licensee to 
exercise that right. As he does not own the right, the 
licensee cannot enforce it against third parties. A licence 
can be contrasted with an assignment, and whereas by assign-
ing the whole or part of his copyright, an owner divests 
himself of all rights therein, in the case of a licence, the 
copyright owner retains the ownership of the rights con-
cerned even though he might have undertaken not to exercise 
the particular rights himself during the currency of the 
licence. Upon the termination of the licence the full rights 
revert to the copyright owner. 
A non-exclusive licence under the copyright in a work may be 
written or may even be inferred from conduct. It can be 
revoked at any time but if granted by a contract cannot be 
revoked by the grantor or his successor except in accordance 
with the contract or as provided in a further contract. 190 
A licensee can grant sub-lice;nces which fall within the 
scope of his own licence and acts performed by the sub-
licensee are deemed to have been done with the authority of 
the copyright owner.l9l 
An exclusive licence is a licence in writing signed by or 
the grantor (i.e. the copyright owner or sub-on behalf of 
licensor) 192 authorizing the licensee, to the exclusion of 
all other persons, including the grantor himself, to 
exercise acts which fall within the scope of the 





Secticn 22( 4) • 
Secticn 22( 8) • 
Kinekor Films (pty) Ltd v Dial-a-~e, supra. 
Secticn l(l) definiticn of "exclusive licence". 
77. 
be explicit but can be inferred. 19 4 An exclusive licensee, 
unlike an ordinary licensee, is specifically given the right 
in terms of the Act, to take action against third parties 
for copyright infringement, in his own name. The rights of 
action of an exclusive licensee exist concurrently with the 
right of action of the copyright owner. An exclusive sub-
licensee is in the same position as an exclusive licensee 
and his right of action is concurrent with the copyright 
owner and the exclusive sub-licensor . 195 An exclusive 
copyright licence can be inferred from an agreement even 
though no specific mention is made of copyright. 196 
A sub-licence must be distinguished from the cession of a 
licence. If A grants a licence to B and B then grants a 
licence to C or allows C to exercise the rights granted to 
him by A, the relationship between B and C is that of sub-
licensor and sub-licensee. A contractual nexus remains 
between A and B and there is no contractual nexus between A 
and C. C is entirely reliant for the existence of his rights 
on B. If, however, B does not simply allow C to exercise the 
rights granted to him by A, but transfers or cedes the 
rights which he derives from the licence with A to C, B will 
no longer remain A 1 s Licensee or C 1 s sub-licensor; B will 
fall out of the picture altogether and C 1 s 1 icence will 
derive directly from A. If there are obligations flowing out 
of the licence in favour of A, A would have to be a party to 
194. Kinekcr Films (pty) Ltd v Dial-a-Movie, supra. 
195. Sectim 25. See Parannmt Pictures Corparatim v Video Parkta-ln 
North (pty) Ltd, supra; Video Parktown North (pty) Ltd v Parannmt Pic-
tures Corparatim, supra; arrl Kinekcr Films (pty) Ltd v Dial-a-Movie, 
supra; Klep Valves (pty) Ltd v Saunders Valve Co. Ltd, supra. 
196. .J.K. Fultm (pty) Ltd v Logic Engineering Enterprises (pty) Ltd & 
Others, supra. en the other harrl, see also Prefmmed Line Products 
(SA) (pty) Ltd v Hardware Assalhlies (pty) Ltd, supra. 
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the substitution of C for B as his licensee. This distinc-
tion between a sub-licence and a cession of a licence is of 
particular importance where B is an exclusive licensee. If B 
simply grants a sub-licence, even an exclusive sub-licence 
he will retain his independent right of action for infringe-
ment and C will also acquire a right of action if he is an 
exclusive sub-licensee. If, however, B has ceded his exclu-
sive licence to C, then B will not have any right of action 
for infringement. 
A licence granted by a copyright owner is binding upon his 
of the copyright successor in title except upon a 
in good faith who has no notice, 
purchaser 
actual or constructive, of 
the licence, or upon a person deriving title from such a 
purchaser. 197 
11. INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT 
In dealing with the ambit of the works which it protects, 
the Copyright Act refers specifically only to works first 
published in South Africa or works made by qualified per-
sons, being persons who are citizens of, or are resident or 
domiciled in, South Africa, in the case of individuals, or 
bodies corporate organized and existing under the laws of 
South Africa, in the case of juristic persons. 198 However, 
the Minister of Economic Affairs has, in regulations made in 
terms of Section 37 of the Act, 199 made provisions whereby 
the Act applies also to works of foreign origin. More par-




Secticn 22( 7) • 
Secticns 3(1) and 4(1). 
Notice 704 of 1987 in 00 10947 dated 25 Septanber 1987. 
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(a) In relation to literary, musical or artistic works, 
cinematograph films, sound recordings and published 
editions first published in scheduled countries (i.e. 
countries listed in a schedule to the Regulations), the 
Act will apply in the same way as it applies to those 
types of works first published in South Africa.200 
(b) The Act will apply to persons who are citizens of, or 
are domiciled or resident, in a scheduled country in 
the same way as it applies to persons who are citizens 
of or domiciled or resident in South Africa.20l 
(c) The Act will apply to bodies incorporated under the' 
laws of a scheduled country as they apply in relation 
to bodies incorporated under the laws of South 
Africa. 202 
This effectively means that works emanating from scheduled 
countries are protected in exactly the same way under the 
Copyright Act as are works emanating from South Africa. The 
protection granted in terms of the regulations to foreign 
sound recordings, published editions and those artistic 
works referred to in s 15(3A) of the Act is, however, sub-
ject to the qualification that works of this nature origi-
nating from a foreign country will only enjoy protection in 
South Africa to the extent that protection in the nature of, 
or related to copyright is granted in that country to such 
works first published in South Africa or made by a qualified 
person referred to in s 3(1) of the Act and such works do 
not enjoy any wider protection in South Africa than is 




Regulatim 2(a) of Ql 704 (See !wbote 199). 
Regulatim 2(b) arrl (c) of GN 704 (See !wbote 199). 
Regulatim 2(d) of Ql 704 (See !wb:at:e 199). 
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the same description. 203 In consequence the right to 
enforce a particular restricted act only exists if the law 
of the country of origin provides for that restricted act, 
e.g. the right to control hiring out of a record embodying a 
sound recording - many countries do not recognize this 
right. 
(a) Conventions and Treaties 
There are two major international copyright conventions in 
operation. The first is the Berne Convention which dates 
originally from 1886 but which has been revised several 
times since that date and there are numerous texts of the 
convention in existence which differ from one another. 204 
The Berne Convention lays down certain-minimum standards of 
protection which must be granted to works under copyright in 
the member countries. The underlying principle of the Berne 
Convention is that each member country must afford pro-
tection to the works of other member countries on exactly 
203. See the proviso to Reg 2 of GN 704 (See footnote 199). Soun:l. 
reco~ are rot covered by tre Berne Cc:nventicn, but are dealt with 
in tre Internaticnal Cc:nventicn for tre Protecticn of Performers, Pro-
ducers of Pl"xn:lgrams and Broadcasting Organizaticns of 1961 (RatE Ccn-
venticn) and tre Cc:nventicn for Protecticn of Producers of Ph:n::gram:s 
against Unautrorized Duplicaticn of treir Ftv:n:>grarns (Geneva Cc:nven-
ticn). South Africa has rot to date acoaded to tre RolE Cc:nventicn. It 
can thus not be taken for granted that South African sourrl recordings 
enjoy protecticn in foreign counries, and ~ore that foreign sourrl 
recordir.gs are protected in South Africa. Publisb:d editicns are rot 
covered by any internaticnal ccnventicn with the result that cnly in 
exc:Epticnal circumstaooes are South African publisb:d edi ticns protected 
in other cotmtries (e.g. Britain) In regard to artistic worl<s of a tech-
nical nature dealt with in s 15(3A) of the Act) see p 86 i:nfra. 
204. . 'Iba Berne Cc:nventicn was supplemented at Paris in 1896; thereafter 
it was revised at Berlin in 1908 and CD!illeted in Berne in 1914; it was 
revised subsequently at RatE in 1928, Brussels in 1948, Stocktx:>lm in 
1967 and Paris in 1971 and arren:led in 1979. See the publication entitled 
Cq:lyright, Jarruary 1988, publisb:d by the \'k>rld Intellectual Property 
Organisation (Wiro) at p 6. 
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the same basis and to the same extent as protection is 
afforded to that country's own works. 205 It is not a 
requirement or principle of the Berne Convention that member 
countries must grant to foreign works the same protection 
which they enjoy in their own countries (i.e. foreign 
countries) 206 although, since member countries are supposed 
to meet minimum standards of protection for works, 207 it 
follows that the protection granted in the various countries 
which are signatories of the Convention should be basically 
the same. 
South Africa is a signatory of the Berne Convention, having 
' become an independent contracting party to it on 3 October 
1928, and has subscribed to the Brussels text of that Con-
vention, which dates from 1948 (South Africa acceded to this 
text on 1 August 1951), as far as substantive law is con-
cerned, and the Paris text, dating from 1971 (South Africa 
acceded partially to this text on 24 March 1975), as far as 
administrative provisions (Articles 22 38) are con-
cerned.208 
The countries which are listed in the schedule to the 
aforementioned regulations are countries which are sig-
natories of the Berne Convention. 209 The regulations do not 
extend the protection of the Copyright Act to countries 
simply because they are signatories of the Berne Convention, 
but because, being signatories of that Convention, they are 
205. Article 5(1) am (3) of the BeJ:ne Ccrlvention (Brussels Version). 
206. Article 5(2) of the BeJ:ne Ccrlvention (Brussels Version). 
207. See the preamble to the BeJ:ne Ccrlvention read together with the 
Convention as a wtnle am articles 1 am 2(6) in particular (Brussels 
Version). 
208 0 See Copyright - January 1988. 
209. Schedule to GN 704/1987 (see fcot:rDte 199). 
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listed in the schedule. Should it transpire that the list of 
Berne Convention countries in the schedule is not complete, 
it would mean that there are certain members of the Berne 
Convention to the works of which the Copyright Act has not 
been extended. The signatories of the Berne Convention 
include the major Western countries and South Africa's prin-
cipal trading partners, with the notable exception of the 
United States of America.210 
The other major international copyright convention is the 
Universal Copyright Convention which dates from 1952 and was 
revised in 1971. 211 South Africa is not a signatory of this 
convention. The United States of America is, however, a sig-
natory of the Universal Convention. This means that South 
Africa and United States of America do not have common mem-
bership of any international convention on copyright. 
(b) Reciprocal Arrangement with the United States of 
America 
In order to compensate for their lack of common membership 
of an international convention, the United States of America 
and South Africa have entered into a bilateral arrangement 
in terms of which the two countries grant each other 
reciprocal copyright recognition and United States works are 
protected in South Africa and vice versa. This arrangement 
dates from 1924 and as far as the protection of United 
States works in South Africa is concerned, 
by proclamations dated July 1, 1924,212 
has been effected 
5 -October 1973213 
210 • F= a list of the cw:'rent signat=ies of the Berna Ccnvention see 
Oopyright - January 1988, p 6. 
211. See Cbpyright - January 1988, p 6. 
212. Pr=l.amation 118/1924 publisred in a:; dated 13 June 1924. 
213. Pr=l.amation R231/1973 publisred in a:; 1850 dated 5 October 1973. 
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and 13 March 1981. 212 
repealed its predecessor. 
The latter two proclamations each 
The effect of the current proclamation is that it provides 
in effect that the United States of America is a scheduled 
country under the 1987 regulations. In practice, the United 
States of America is deemed to be an "honorary member" of 
the Berne Convention for purposes of South African copyright 
law. There is, however, one proviso to the protection of 
United States works and that is that, in contrast to Berne 
Convention works which are protected on exactly the same 
basis as South African works (as required by the Berne Con-
vention), American works are only protected under South 
African copyright law for a term which does not exceed the 
term of copyright enjoyed by the type of work in question 
under the laws of the United States of America. This flows 
from the proviso to the 1981 Proclamation. In determining 
the duration of the copyright in a particular American work, 
say a literary work, in South Africa, one has regard not to 
the duration of the copyright in that particular work in the 
United States of America but to the term of copyright grant-
' 
ed to literary works in general, or, put differently, to the 
term for which a literary work is capable of being protec-
ted, under United States copyright law. This flows from the 
reference to the term of copyright enjoyed by "that type of 
work" (emphasis added) in the 1981 Proclamation. Section 
3(2) of the Copyright Act deals with the term of copyright 
granted to various types of works and the intention of the 
212. Proclamation R566/1981 published in 00 7486 dated 13 March 1981. 
Al tlxJugh this Proclamation makes specific refereme to GN R2565 of 22 
December 1978, which l'btice has been repealed arrl superseded by l'btice 
704 of 1987, this Proclamation must be interpreted to refer to the lat-
ter l'btice in view of the provisions of s 12 of the Interpretation Act, 
1957. 
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proclamation is that the duration of the copyright enjoyed 
by these types of work must be compared with the duration of 
copyright of the same types of work under United States 
law.215 
(c) Broadcasts and Programme Carrying Signals 
Although the Minister is empowered to make the provisions of 
the Act applicable to broadcasts and programme carrying sig-
nals emanating from other countries, and, indeed to broad-
casts and programme carrying signals made by other persons 
besides the South African Broadcasting Corporation, 216 he 
has not to date given effect to his powers in any of these 
regards with the result that the only broadcasts and 
programme carrying signals afforded copyright protection in 
South Africa are those made by the SABC. 
The probable reason for this is that the Minister's powers 
in general to. make the provisions of the Copyright Act 
applicable to works emanating from other countries are sub-
ject to the restriction that he may not extend the operation 
of the Act to works emanating from a particular country 
unless he is satisfied that such other country protects or 
will in due course protect equivalent South African 
works. 217 Broadcasts and programme carrying signals are not 
covered by the Berne Convention and although there are 
international conventions dealing with protection of these 
types of works, 218 South Africa is not at present a sig-
215. See Barber-Greene CoTpany & Others v. Crushquip (pty) Ltd, supra. 
216 • See Secticn 38. 
217. Secticn 37(3). 
218. Rare Ccrnlenticn of 1961 for t::lE Protecticn of Performers, Pro-
ducers of Ptx::n::grdlliS an:i ~ Organi.zaticns; Geneva Ccrnlenticn 
of 1971 for Piotecticn of Pio:iucers of Prorograms Against Unautrorized 
Duplicaticn of t::lEir Prorograms; an:i Brussels Ccnventicn of 1974 relat-
ing to t::lE distriooticn of prr.grantre carrying signals transmitted by 
satellite. 
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natory of those conventions. 
(d) Technical Artistic Works 
The introduction of the principle of reciprocity into the 
protection afforded to artistic works of a technical nature 
in GN 704 is an unusual measure as it appears to be out of 
step with the underlying principle of the Berne Convention 
that member countries must grant to foreign works the same 
protection as they grant to their own works. Artistic works 
of a technical nature are covered by the Berne Convention. 
They are referred to in the Berne Convention as "works of 
applied art". The reciprocity measure can probably be justi-
fied, however, by the provisions of article 2( 5) of the 
Berne Convention (Brussels text). In terms of this article 
member countries may determine the extent to which they pro-
tect works of applied art, industrial designs and models 
under their copyright law and works which are protected in a 
country of origin solely as designs and models are only 
entitled to protection in other countries in the way in 
which designs and models are protected in those countries. 
In the final analysis foreign artistic works of a technical 
nature may, depending on the circumstances, have very 
limited protection, if any. In terms of s 15(3A) of the Act 
once three-dimensional reproductions of an artistic work, 
being versions of the work which primarily have a utili-
tarian purpose and being made by an industrial process, are 
made available to the public anywhere in the world, the 
copyright owner will not be able to restrain the making of 
three-dimensional indirect copies of that work, i.e. copies 
made from a derivative three-dimensional article. In princi-
ple, however, and subject to what is said below, the balance 
of the copyright in the artistic work remains enforceable, 
e.g. the right to restrain the making of two-dimensional 
86. 
reproductions or adaptations, or three-dimensional reproduc-
tions directly from the original drawing or from a two-
dimensional reproduction of it. 
The application of the proviso to s 2 of GN 704/1987 to the 
question of the protection enjoyed by artistic works of a 
technical nature is a complicated issue. Immediately after 
three-dimensional utilitarian industrially-produced deriva-
tive articles of such works are issued to the public any-
' 
where in the world, the aforementioned proviso comes into 
operation, but not until that moment; prior to that moment 
the proviso does not operate and reciprocity is not a fac-
tor. The proviso only comes into operation at that moment 
because only then does the work become "an artistic work, 
such as is referred to in s 15(3A) of the Act". once the 
proviso comes into operation the protection of the original 
work becomes subject to the reciprocity principle. When that 
stage is reached, if the country of origin of a foreign work 
does not grant any copyright at all in that work or does not 
grant the balance of the copyright granted in South Africa 
to that type of work, then the foreign work will no longer 
enjoy any protection in South Africa. For instance, let us 
take the example of the Federal Republic of Germany. In 
order to qualify for copyright under German law an artistic 
work must embody a degree of artistic (in the strict sense) 
creativity. The work must have artistic quality or merit and 
this criterion would seem to disqualify technical drawings 
of purely functional articles from enjoying any copy-
right.219 
219 • see Olristine Felmr 'lbe Future of Legal P.totectim far Industrial 
Design at p 133 (published by ESC Publishi.nJ Limited, Oxford, &glarrl). 
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Accordingly, a German drawing embodying the design of a 
motor car silencer or a tooth for earth moving equipment 
would not enjoy any copyright at all in Germany. A South 
African drawing under German law would be in the same posi-
tion. In terms of the proviso to Section 2 of GN 704/1987 a 
German drawing of a motor car silencer (being a silencer 
which has been mass produced and marketed) would thus not be 
invested with any copyright in South Africa once such 
proviso became operative even though an equivalent drawing 
of South African origin would continue to enjoy the balance 
of the copyright in these circumstances. Ironically if the 
German drawing has not yet given rise to three-dimensional 
utilitarian industrially-produced derivative articles which 
have been sold somewhere in the world and the conditions in 
respect of the proviso to Section 2 of GN 704/1987 will not 
yet have been met and the proviso will thus not have come 
into play, such drawing will enjoy full copyright in South 
Africa notwithstanding the position in Germany. The applica-
tion of the principle of reciprocity to foreign artistic 
works of a technical nature is therefore only partial. In 
other words, while a German work of this nature remains so 
to say "unpublished" it enjoys full copyright in South 
Africa; once it is "published" it ceases to enjoy any 
copyright at all. In the same circumstances a "published" 
South African work will only forfeit a part of its pro-
tection and the balance will be unaffected. If, however, the 
law of the country of origin grants the balance of pro-
tection or a part of it then the "published" foreign work 
will continue to enjoy commensurate protection in South 
Africa. Britain would be an example of such a country. 
In short if three-dimensional utilitarian industrially-
produced derivative articles of an artistic work are dis-
tributed anywhere in the world so-called "reverse engineer-
88. 
ing" of those articles does not constitute copyright 
infringement irrespective of the country of origin of the 
work. In the case of unauthorized reverse engineering of 
articles which do not have primarily a utili tar ian purpose 
or are not made by an industrial process, copyright 
infringement does occur irrespective of the country of 
origin of the original works. Where a derivative article 
primarily has a utilitarian purpose and is made by an indus-
trial process whether the foreign original work enjoys the 
balance of the copyright in South Africa will depend on the 
law of the country of origin of the work. That part of the 
balance of copyright enjoyed in the country of origin will 
be enjoyed in South Africa. 
(e) Proof of Foreign Law 
In litigation with respect to the enforcement of the 
copyright in a sound recording, published edition or art-
istic work of a technical nature of foreign origin in South 
Africa the South African courts may have to determine 
whether the law of the country of origin grants in respect 
of the work in question the rights which are sought to be 
enforced in such litigation. This could involve the South 
African courts in adjudicating upon complex issues of for-
eign copyright law. It is submitted, however, that in terms 
of the well-recognized presumption that the law of a foreign 
country is the same as South African law unless the contrary 
is shown, an onus of proof of the non-existence of the right 
in question under the law of the country of origin would lie 
on the defendant; the plaintiff would not bear the onus of 
proving the existence of the right in question in the 
country of origin. 
(f) Extended Scope of International Regulations 
89. 
The schedule to GN 704/1987 comprises countries which did 
not appear in the schedule to its predecessor. South African 
copyright has thus now been extended to works originating 
from those countries, no matter when they were made. 
The term "country" is defined in Section 1(1) of the Act. to 
include any colony, protectorate or territory subject to the 
authority or under the suzerainty of any other country, and 
any terri tory over which .trusteeship is exercised. The 
countries listed in the schedule to GN 704/1987 should be 
viewed against this background. For instance, although Hong 
Kong is not specifically listed in the schedule, it is sub-
mitted that the reference to the United Kingdom in such 
schedule includes Hong Kong in view of its status as a 
colony of the United Kingdom. 
12. POSITION OF THE STATE 
The Act binds the State and the general question of 
copyright in relation to the State is set out in Section 5 
of the Act. The Government printer has been designated by 
the State President by Proclamation in the Government 
Gazette as the person in whom copyright belonging to the 
State vests for administrative purposes.220 
13. POWER OF THE MINISTER TO ABROGATE COPYRIGHT IN CERTAIN 
INSTANCES 
Section 45 of the Act empowers the Minister of Industries, 
Commerce and Tourism to make regulations empowering any 
220. see Pro::: R24 1979 1n oo 6299 dated 9 February 1979. 
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specified person to prohibit the circulation, presentation 
or exhibition of any work or production, or conversely, to 
authorize the circulation, presentation or exhibition of any 
work or production subject to conditions which may be 
specified in the Regulations. Any circulation, presentation 
or exhibition of any work or production pursuant to an 
authority granted in terms of such regulations will not con-
stitute an infringement of copyright in such work or produc-
tion but the copyright owner shall be entitled to a 
reasonable remuneration which can be determined by arbitra-
tion in the event that the amount thereof cannot be agreed 
upon by the parties. 221 The counter-part of this Section in 
the 1965 Act was commonly referred to as the "piracy clause" 
as it entitled the Minister to override the wishes of a 
copyright owner and thereby empowered him to authorize 
"piracy" of a work. The appellation is equally applicable to 
Section 45 of the 1978 Act. Section 45, however, like its 
predecessor, Section 50 of the Copyright Act; 1965, has not 
been brought into operation. This section is, however, not 
contrary to the provisions of the Berne Convention (See 
Article 17 of the Brussels version), and its being brought 
into operation ought not to place South Africa's standing in 
the Berne Union created by the Convention in jeopardy. 
Nevertheless, it is perhaps understandable that there is a 
reluctance on the part of the legislature to bring it into 
operation. It is intended as an emergency provision to be 
utilized in extreme circumstances such as may be occasioned 
by cultural or other boycotts of South Africa. 
Ironically, Section 45 of the Act, although it has not been 
brought into operation, has been amended. This has been 
221. Section 45. 
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brought about by Section 4 of the Copyright Amendment Act, 
1983. The main thrust of the amendment has been to replace 
references to the "circulation" and "presentation" of a work 
with references to the "distribution" and "performance" of a 
work. Section 4 of the Copyright Amendment Act, 1983, has 
also not yet been brought into operation with the result 
that for the time being Section 45 of the Copyright Act, 
1978, remains unaltered. 
At the same time the Copyright Amendment Act, 1983, in Sec-
tion 5, introduced a new section 45A. This new section is 
very similar in principle and effect to Section 45 and it 
empowers the Minister to make regulations empowering a 
specified person to authorize the reproduction or adaptation 
or the making available to the public of reproductions or 
adaptations of any artistic works subject to conditions 
specified in such Regulations. The carrying out of any act 
authorized in terms of such Regulations will not constitute 
an infringement of the copyright in any artistic work but 
the copyright owner is not to be deprived of any right which 
he may have had to obtain reasonable remuneration, the 
amount of which will be determined by arbitration in the 
event that the parties cannot agree thereon. Section 5 of 
the Copyright Act, 1983, has also not been brought into 
operation with the result that although the new section has 
been adopted by the legislature it does not at the present 
time form part of the Copyright Act, 1978. 
In the light of the right of the owner of the copyright in 
an artistic work to restrict the making of three-dimensional 
reproductions of such work, in particular the making of 
spare parts by means of .reproduction of the original parts, 
the reason why the legislature considers it necessary for 
the Minister to be able to override the effects of any eco-
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nomic or military boycott brought about by means of enforce-
ment of copyright, is self-evident. 
14. RESTRICTING IMPORTATION OF INFRINGING COPIES 
Section 28 of the Act makes provision for the owner of, or 
exclusive licensee under, the copyright in any published 
literary or musical work, any published cinematograph film, 
or any sound recording or published edition to enter into an 
arrangement with the Commissioner of Customs and Excise 
whereby the latter prohibits the importation into South 
Africa of infringing copies (including copies which would 
have been infringing copies if hypothetically made in South 
Africa by the actual maker) of his work for a specified 
period. The period cannot exceed the duration of the 
copyright in the work. The Commissioner can require the 
copyright owner or exclusive licensee, as the case may be, 
to furnish an indemnity and security against any expenses 
which he may incur in giving effect to the arrangement. In 
practice, arrangements of this nature are seldom entered 
into or, if entered into, are very rarely, if ever, put into 
effect. 
15. RETROSPECTIVITY AND SAVINGS PROVISIONS 
(a) Retrospective Operation of the Act 
In applying the Copyright Act, 1978, to works made prior to 
1 January 1979, the date on which the Copyright Act, 1978, 
came into operation, one must, depending upon the circum-
stances, have regard to certain of the provisions of the 
Copyright Act, 1965, and the Patents, Trade Marks, Designs 
and Copyright Act, 1916. This thesis examines to which of 
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the provisions of the aforementioned two statutes one must 
have regard in connection with pre-1979 works and in what 
circumstances they are applicable under the present law. The 
key to the whole question is Sections 43 and 41 of the Act. 
In terms of Section 43 the Copyright Act, 1978, is retro-
spective in effect and it applies to works made before its 
commencement in the same way as it applies to works made 
thereafter. 222 This provision, save for certain exceptions, 
which will be dealt with below, is subject to two qualifica-
tions, namely, the following: 
(a) The Act does not affect the ownership, duration or 
validity of any copyright which subsists under the 
Copyright Act, 1965 (Act No. 63 of 1965); and 
(b) The Act does not create any copyright which did 
not subsist prior to September 11, 1965, the date 
upon which the Copyright Act, 1965, came into 
operation. 223 
Section 41( 1) of the Copyright Act, 1978, provides that 
nothing in the Act will affect any right or privilege of the 
State subsisting otherwise than by virtue of a statute, or 
any right or privilege of the State or of any other person 
under any law not expressly repealed, amended or modified by 
this Act. The interpretation of Section 41 will be con-
sidered first. 
(b) Interpretation of Section 41 
Section 41(1) of the Act reads as follows: 
222. 
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"Nothing in this Act shall affect any right or 




virtue of any law, or any right or privilege of the 
state or of any other person under any law not 
expressly repealed, amended or modified by this Act" 
(emphasis added). 
The sub-section is susceptible of two interpretations i.e. 
firstly, that the words "not expressly repealed, amended or 
modified by this Act" refer to "any law", or, secondly, that 
the aforegoing words refer to "any right or privilege". It 
is submitted that the latter interpretation is to be 
preferred because the successively used terms "repealed, 
amended or modified" (the Afrikaans text reads "herroep, 
gewysig of verander") are more easily reconcilable as refer-
ring to a right or privilege than to a law. (How does one 
"modify" , as distinct from "amend" or "repeal", a law?) By 
contrast this terminology could be appropriate to a 
privilege or right, particularly the former. Furthermore, as 
will be shown below, the Patents, Trade Marks, Designs and 
Copyright Act, 1916, expressly granted vested rights, which 
rights were recognized and retained in the Copyright Act, 
1965, and the 1965 Act itself created vested rights. There 
is no reason to suppose that the legislature did not intend 
to perpetuate those rights under the present Act. The first 
mentioned alternative interpretation of Section 41(1) would 
have the effect of abrogating such rights as were provided 
for in "the law" (the Copyright Act, 1965) which was 
"expressly repealed" by the 1978 Act. 
The sub-section is derived from Section 44( 1) of the 1965 
Act, which it repeats verbatim save that the comma which 
appears roughly in the middle of the sub-section after the 
word "law" did not appear in the 1965 version. The comma 
which appears in the 1978 version has the effect of suggest-
ing that the expression "expressly repealed, amended or 
modified by this Act" does not refer to the first half of 
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the sub-section and thus the "right or privilege" of the 
State or alternatively the "law" dealt with in that portion. 
By contrast the 1965 version is capable of the interpreta-
tion that the aforementioned expression applies to "right or 
privilege", alternatively "law" dealt with in both halves of 
the sub-section. Indeed, it is submitted that the,sub-
section ought to be interpreted as though commas appeared 
after the terms "any law" in both the first half and the 
second half of the sub-section. 
The Afrikaans text of Section 41 ( 1) of the Act (the 
Afrikaans text is the signed text) reads as follows: 
"Geen bepaling van hierdie Wet raak 'n reg of 
privilegie van die staat wat andersins as uit hoofde 
van 'n wet bestaan nie, of 'n reg of privilegie van die 
staat of iemand anders ingevolge 'n wetsbepaling wat 
nie uitdruklik deur hierdie Wet herroep, gewysig of 
verander word nie." (emphasis added). 
This sub-section, like its English counterpart, is also 
capable of the two interpretations referred to above. 
Section 44(1) of the 1965 Act was derived from Section 46(2) 
of the British Copyright Act of 1956. This sub-section reads 
as follows: 
"Nothing in this Act shall affect the right of the 
Crown or subsisting otherwise than by virtue of an 
enactment; and nothing in this Act shall affect any 
right or privilege of the Crown or of any other person 
under any enactment (including any enactment of the 
Parliament of Northern Ireland), except in so far as 
that enactment is expressly repealed, amended or 
modified by this Act." 
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The word "law" is not used in the British sub-section; the 
equivalent term ut:ilized in the British sub-sect:ion is 
"enactment". The latter portion of the British sub-section 
goes to pains to make it clear that the words "expressly 
repealed, amended or modified by this Act" relate to the 
word "enactment". If the South African legislature intended 
the aforementioned expression to relate to the word "law" it 
could and should have followed the British model more 
closely. The use of the semi-colon after the word "enact-
ment" at the end of the first portion of the sub-section has 
the effect of clearly denoting that the aforementioned 
expression does not apply to the first portion of the sub-
section. In the 1965 South African Act the legislature not 
only did away with the demarcation between the two portions 
qf the sub-section but it also changed the very clear 
indication that the aforementioned expression was intended 
to relate to "enactment" and not "right or privilege". It is 
submitted that this change of approach on the part of the 
South African legislature is indicative of an intention to 
adapt the wording of the sub-section to suit South African 
circumstances. It would appear that the South African legis-
lature decided to change the emphasis of the sub-section 
away from having the expression relate to "enactment" or 
"law" but rather to "right or privilege". 
The rights or privileges of the Crown subsisting otherwise 
than by virtue of an enactment under British law are ana-
lyzed in Sterling and Carpenter Copyright Law in the United 
Kingdom. 224 They deal mainly with the Crown's prerogative 
right to print and vend certain books, namely Acts of Par-
liament, Orders-in-Council, Royal Proclamations; Statutory 
224. Para 105. 
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Rules and Orders, Statutory instruments, Parliamentary 
papers, Hapsard, Papers of government departments, Ministry 
of Defence maps and Ordinance Survey Publications and the 
Bible, t.he Book of Common Prayer and certain other documents 
concerning the Church of England. Neither the learned 
authors nor any of the other British textbook writers deal 
with the rights or privileges of the Crown or any other per-
son under any enactment and it is thus not clear what these 
encompass under British law. Recourse to the British Act and 
the British authorities thus does not shed much light on the 
interpretation of the South African sub-section. 
The alternate interpretation of Section 41(1) of the Act to 
that propounded above, namely that the phrase "not expressly 
repealed, amended or modified by the Act" relates to the 
word "law" in the sub-section seems to be anomalous. It is 
difficult to contemplate that the Copyright Act of 1978 
could, without specific reference to any other Act, affect 
any right or privilege granted to the State or any other 
person in such an Act. For instance, were it not for Section 
41 ( 1) (assuming the second alternative interpretation is 
accepted) could it be argued that the 1978 Act affected any 
rights or privileges of the State or of any other person 
under the Designs Act, 1968? Surely the Copyright Act could 
not affect any rights existing under the Designs Act without 
making specific reference in it to such rights. If this is 
so, then one asks why Section 41(1), in particular the lat-
ter half thereof, is necessary at all (if it is to have the 
second alternative interpretation). The legislature must not 
be assumed to have enacted a purposeless sub-section. 
To sum up, if the interpretation of Section 41(1) which has 
been propounded above is accepted the sub-section is 
meaningful and purposeful because it would serve to preserve 
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and perpetuate vested rights which were granted and sub-
sisted under previous Copyright Acts. In the absence of Sec-
tion 41(1) being interpreted in this way there is nothing in 
the 1978 Act which would serve to perpetuate such vested 
rights. There is no good reason why the legislature should 
have decided to revoke such vested rights. On the contrary, 
the whole pattern of the transitional provisions of the 1978 
Act is to preserve the status quo which existed on 31 Decem-
ber 1978. By contrast, if the alternative interpretation is 
accepted, it is submitted that the sub-section has no useful 
purpose. It would purport to rectify a situation which would 
not in any event arise in the normal course and it would 
have the effect of revoking vested rights held by non-
copyright holders and potential infringers, some of which 
rights have been in existence for many years. While there 
may conceivably have been good reason for the British Act to 
make provision for an interpretation which corresponds with 
the second alternative interpretation, there appears to be 
no such reason or justification for the South African legis-
lature to make such a provision and this may explain why the 
South African legislature chose to depart from the wording 
utilized by the British legislature in Section 46(2) of the 
British Act of 1956. 
It is submitted that the "right" or "privilege" referred to 
in the section is a right under copyright or in the nature 
of copyright. This would not only be in keeping with the 
nature and purpose of the section, and indeed of the Act as 
a whole, but it is also consistent with the provisions of 
Section 41(4) of the Act which provides that subject, inter 
alia, to sub-section ( 1), no copyright or right in the 
nature of copyright shall subsist otherwise than by virtue 
of the Act of some other enactment in that behalf. 
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(c) Court's Interpretation of Section 43 - Saunders Valve 
and Topka Cases 
The interpretation of Section 43 of the 1978 Act has 
received attention in a number of cases. 225 The principle 
to be distilled from the initial batch of these cases is 
stated most positively in Saunders Valve Co. Ltd v. Klep 
Valves (Pty) Ltd. 226 In dealing with the question of the 
subsistence of copyright in engineering drawings made 
between the years 1938 and 1958, O'Donovan, J. said the fol-
lowing, referring to Section 43 of the 1978 Act read 
together with Section 1 of the Third Schedule to the 1916 
Act: 
"The effect of the aforegoing provisions, for the pre-
sent purposes, is that the remedies available to the 
owner of copyright are now governed by the 1978 Act, 
but that the subsistence of copyright in the drawings 
upon which the applicant relies as at the date when the 
1978 Act came into force is to be determined in accord-
ance with the 1916 Act, and therefore by the 1911 
British Copyright Act".227 
This same principle was accepted by the Appellate Division 
of the Supreme Court, without really going into the ques-
tion, in the case of Topka t/a Topring Manufacturing & 
Engineering v Ehrenberg Engineering (Pty) Ltd. 228 In that 
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case, Galgut, AJA. said the following in connection with 
drawings which were made in 1972: 
"It was common cause that the provisions of the 1965 
Act are relevant to the question of the subsistence of 
copyright and its ownership; to the questions of 
infringement and relief available to the owner of 
copyright up to 31 December 1978; but the provisions of 
the 1978 Act are relevant to the question of infringe-
ment and the relief available from l January 1979." 229 
The position as set out in the Saunders Valve and Topka 
cases is, it is submitted, a sound and logical interpreta-
tion of Section 43 of the 1978 Act and is, subject to one 
qualification which will be discussed below, correct. In the 
case of a work made prior to 11 September 1965 the sub-
sistence of copyright and its ownership and duration must be 
determined in accordance with the provisions of the 1965 
Act, in particular the Sixth Schedule thereto (alternatively 
the 1916 Act, in particular the Third Schedule thereto -
this point will be elaborated on below). In the case of a 
work made between 11 September 1965 and 31 December 1978, 
the subsistence, ownership and duration of the copyright 
must be determined in accordance with the 1965 Act. The 
scope of the copyright subsisting in pre-1979 works and the 
remedies available to the copyright owner in the case of 
current infringements must, however, be determined in 
accordance with the 1978 Act. In this regard Galgut, AJA in 
the Topka case refers to "the question of infringement and 
the relief available" being matters which must be determined 
by the 1978 Act in regard to current infringements. 
(d) Courts' Interpretation of Section 43 - Klep Valves Case 
229. At page 8 of t:ha typewritten judgarent. 
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The position as accepted in the Topka case, a decision of 
the Appellate Division, has, however, been clouded by what 
would appear to be a conflicting dictum of that same divi-
sion of the court in the subsequent case of Klep Valves 
(Pty) Ltd v Saunders Valve Co. Ltd. 230 This case was an 
appeal against the decision of 0 'Donovan, J. in saunders 
Valve Co. Ltd. v. Klep Valves {Pty) Ltd and thus dealt with 
engineering drawings made prior to 11 September 1965. 
In the Klep Valves case (i.e. the case in the Appellate 
Division) Grosskopf, JA said the following: 
"The effect of Section 43 of the 1978 Act accordingly 
is to render earlier legislation applicable to the 
question whether copyright subsists in works made prior 
to the commencement of the 1978 Act, whereas the 1978 
Act governs the remedies for infringement of copyright 
and the procedures relating thereto." 231 
This formulation of the relevant principle differs slightly 
from the formulations made by O'Donovan, J in the Saunders 
Valve case (i.e. in the court of first instance - the Trans-
vaal Provincial Division) and by Gal gut, AJA in the Topka 
case. Galgut, AJA in the Topka case, when referring to what 
must be determined in accordance with the 1978 Act, used the 
terminology "questions of infringement and relief available 
to the owner of copyright", (emphasis added) while 
Grosskopf, JA uses the terminology "the remedies for 
infringement of copyright:. and t:.he proc;::edures relating 
thereto" (emphasis added). Grosskopf, JA in applying the 
principle as formulated by him, then went on to say, with 




At page 18. 
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is infringed by the unauthorized doing of any act which the 
owner of the copyright may authorize. He then said the fol-
lowing: 
"The enquiry is therefore directed towards what the 
owner of copyright is entitled to authorize. That 
depends on the ambit of his right. And, as I have 
already indicated, Section 43 of the 1978 Act disavows 
any intention of creating copyright which did not exist 
prior to the commencement of the 1965 Act. It follows 
that in the present case one must look at the 1916 Act 
(incorporating the 1911 British Act) to ascertain what 
the ambit of the respondent's copyright was so that one 
can determine whether the acts which the appellant did 
were acts which the respondent might authorize."232 
Based on this assumption, Grosskopf, JA concluded that the 
1911 British Act granted to a copyright owner in respect of 
a technical drawing the right to authorize, or restrain, 
indirect three-dimensional copying of his work, i.e. making 
a three-dimensional reproduction of a drawing by copying an 
intermediate three-dimensional version of the drawing, and 
that the respondent (applicant in the court a quo) was 
entitled to an interdict restraining infringement of its 
copyright. I have no argument with the learned judge's con-
clusion but, with the greatest respect, it is submitted that 
his assumption that the scope of the copyright owner's 
infringement action for purposes of current infringements 
must be determined in accordance with the 1911 British Act, 
and not the 1978 Act, is incorrect and is at variance with 
the principle which had earlier been accepted by Galgut, 
AJA, in the Topka case. 
232. At page 33. 
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In making his assumption, Grosskopf, JA considered that, in 
terms of Section 43(a)(ii) of the 1978 Act, care must be 
taken to avoid "creating any copyright which did not subsist 
prior to 11 September 1965". He clearly reasoned that, if 
the scope of the protection granted to an artistic work 
under the 1978 Act exceeded the scope of protection granted 
to an equivalent work under the British 1911 Act, to afford 
a copyright owner the broader scope of protection would 
amount to creating copyright which did not previously exist. 
For this reason he considered it to be necessary to 
determine the scope of the copyright in the relevant draw-
ings in terms of the British 1911 Act. The word "copyright" 
where it appears in Section 43(a) of the 1978 Act, and in 
particular in the context .of "creating any copyright" in 
Section 43(a)(ii), is capable of two interpretations, namely 
"rights under copyright" (i.e. competences). or alterl)a-
tively, to use terminology commonly used in American 
copyright law, "a copyright". It is implicit in Grosskopf, 
JA's judgment that he gave the word "copyright" in this con-
text the first-mentioned interpretation; it is submitted, 
however, for the reasons advanced below that it ought to be 
given the second interpretation. 
(e) Criticism of Klep Valves Approach 
Both the 1965 Act and the 1978 Act .created new categories or 
types of work eligible for copyright which did not exist 
under the preceding Act. For instance, the 1965 Act created 
"television broadcasts and sound broadcasts" while the 1978 
Act created "programme-carrying signals" and "works of 
craftsmanship of a technical nature" which had not been 
recognized in the earlier statutes. Section 43( a) ( ii) is 
intended to obviate that a new class of copyrightable work 
created by the 1965 Act or the 1978 Act (e.g. a television 
broadcast or a programme-carrying signal) should affect 
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works which were made prior to 1965 and which did not enjoy 
any protection at the time of creation nor on 31 December 
1978, and that protection should be granted to such works. 
Granting retrospective protection of this nature would 
entail creating "a copyright" which did not subsist prior to 
11 September 1965. 
There is another way in which Section 43(a)(ii) operates to 
prevent "a copyright" being created in a work made prior to 
11 September 1965. To illustrate the point use will be made 
of an example. In terms of the 1916 Act (incorporating the 
British 1911 Act), for a published artistic work to have 
enjoyed copyright in South Africa it must have been first 
published in South Africa or in a country to the works of 
which the protection of the 1916 Act had been extended 
(hereafter referred to as a "recognized country"). 233 
Under the 1965 Act, a published artistic work enjoyed pro-
tection if the first publication took place in South Africa 
or in a recognized country or, alternatively, the author was 
a qualified person at the time of first publication, or if 
he had died prior to publication, was a qualified person 
immediately prior to his death. 234 The basis for enjoying 
protection was thus broadened by comparison with the 1916 
Act. However, the 1965 Act did not retrospectively grant 
copyright to a pre-1965 published artistic work which had 
not enjoyed copyright under the 1916 Act because, although 
made by a qualified person, it had not been 
South Africa or in a recognized country.235 
published in 
The 1978 Act 
233. Secticn 1(1) of the '1hlrd Sc::h3dule to the 1916 .z>ct. 
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235. see Secticn 4(2) of the 1965 .Act read together with Secticn 1 of 
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confers copyright on an artistic work where the work was 
first published in South Africa or a recognized country or 
where the author was a qualified person at the time that the 
work was made. Accordingly, in the case of an artistic work 
first published in 1950 elsewhere than in South Africa or a 
recognized country, but made by 
not for Section 43 (a) ( ii), 
a qualified person, were it 
the 1978 Act would have 
retrospectively created "a copyright" in that work which did 
not exist in 1950 under the 1916 Act or, indeed on 31 Decem-
ber 1978, under the 1965 Act. As in the case of the new type 
or category of work, the legislature considered it 
undesirable that copyright should be created ex post facto 
in this situation where none had existed before. In particu-
lar, the legislature considered it undesirable to grant 
retrospective protection to a work which antedated the 1965 
Act where that Act had not granted retrospective protection 
to it. 
In many instances the scope of the copyright granted to a 
type of work under the 1965 Act is broader than the scope of 
copyright granted to that type of work under the 1916 Act. 
For instance, to take the example of an artistic work, the 
relevant section of Schedule Three to the 1916 Act, i.e. 
Section 1(2), does not include within the scope of the pro-
tection granted to an artistic work the right to include 
that work in a television broadcast. This right is, however, 
conferred upon an artistic work in Section 4(4) of the 1965 
Act. If one applies the transitional provisions of the 1965 
Act to an artistic work made in say 1950, it is clear that 
the 1965 Act granted that work the broader protection 
afforded by the 1965 Act.236 This means that the right to 
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include an artistic work made in 1950 in a television broad-
cast is a right which at 31 December 1978 was a right under 
copyright which subsisted under the Copyright Act, 1965. 
Thus, even if the word "copyright". in the context in which 
it appears in Section 43(a) of the 1978 Act is to be given 
the interpretation of "rights under copyright" rather than 
"a copyright", it would still be incorrect to assess the 
scope of the copyright in a work made prior to 11 September 
1965 for purposes of current infringements in terms of the 
1916 Act (i.e. the British 1911 Act) because one is at least 
required by Section 43(a)(i) to grant the broader scope of 
protection afforded by the 1965 Act rather than the narrower 
scope of protection afforded by the 1916 Act. 
The policy and effect of the 1965 Act was clearly to regu-
late the subsistence of copyright in pre-1965 works in 
accordance with the provisions of the 1916 Act, but to regu-
late the scope or content of that copyright and the manner 
of its enforcement under the 1965 Act. It is submitted that 
the 1978 Act has a similar policy and this is what Section 
43(a) seeks to attain. It would be incongruous for the 1965 
and 1978 Acts to have different policies in this regard. 
Moreover, a difference in policy would mean that the owner 
of the copyright in a 1950 work would in December 1978 have 
been able to have recourse to the broader protection granted 
by the 1965 Act, but in January 1979 would have had to be 
content with the narrower protection granted by the 1916 Act 
when the 1978 Act regulating the position itself grants at 
least as broad protection as the 1965 Act. If the term 
"copyright" in Section 43(a) of the 1978 Act is given the 
meaning of "a copyright" harmony of approach between the 
1965 and 1978 Acts is achieved. The principle as formulated 
and accepted by Galgut, AJA in the Topka case is consistent 
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with the interpretation of the term "copyright" in Section 
43(a) for which I contend. 
Copyright is frequently referred to as "a bundle of 
rights". 237 This description is consistent with Sections 6 
to llA of the 1978 Act which specify the so-called 
"restricted acts" which are comprised within the copyright 
of the various categories of works which are eligible for 
copyright. In copyright legislation and case law the term 
"copyright" is generally used. to denote the complete bundle 
of rights as a whole and not to denote a component right of 
the bundle or a competence. This approach is highlighted in 
Section 23(1) of the 1978 Act. In the aforementioned sub-
section it is stated that "copyright shall be infringed by 
any person ... who ... does ... any act which the owner of 
the copyright may authorize". Here the copyright as a whole 
is distinguished from a component right. It is submitted 
that the primary meaning of the term "copyright" as used in 
the 1978 Act is that of the bundle of rights or "a 
copyright". The legislature uses alternate terminology to 
refer to a component right. This is further illustrated by 
Section 22( 2) of the 1978 Act which provides that "an 
assignment ... of copyright may be limited so as to apply to 
some only of the acts which the owner of the copyright has 
exclusive right to control ... ". Sub-sections (3) and (4) of 
Section 22 refer to a component right of the bundle of 
rights as "an act which is subject to copyright". Con-
sequently, it is submitted that interpreting the meaning of 
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Enterprises, supra, at 739B where it is said that the restricted acts in 
respect of an artistic ~ "are separate acts, all canprehenjed within 
cowright". 
the word "copyright" as used in Section 43(a) of the 1978 
Act according to the ordinary rules of interpretation of 
statutes leads to the conclusion that what is meant by the 
use of the term is the bundle of rights constituting 
copyright, or "a copyright", and not "rights under 
copyright" or competences, i.e. an act which is subject to 
copyright. In other words, Section 43 (a) ( ii) precludes 
creating any bundle of rights where no bundle of rights 
existed prior to 11 September 1965. The paragraph is not 
concerned with creating or modifying component rights within 
the bundle which constitutes a copyright. 
The point at issue in the Klep Valves case to which 
Grosskopf, JA's above-quoted dicta are relevant was the fol-
lowing: Does reproducing a drawing in a three-dimensional 
form by copying an intermediate three-dimensional version of 
the drawing constitute "reproduction" of that drawing for 
purposes of copyright infringement? The Appellate Division 
had in the Topka case settled the question that the 
copyright in a technical drawing is infringed by the 
unauthorized reproduction of that drawing in a three-
dimensional form, where direct copying takes place, i.e. the 
three-dimensional article is made from the copyrighted draw-
ing itself. However, the Appellate -Division had not yet 
given attention to three-dimensional reproduction of a tech-
nical drawing where the three-dimensional version is pro-
duced by indirect copying, i.e. copying an intermediate 
three-dimensional version of the copyrighted drawing. This 
question has been dealt with in the same way in the law as 
applied under all three South African copyright statutes, 
i.e. the 1916 Act, the 1965 Act and the 1978 Act (prior to 
its amendment in 1983 by Act 66 of 1983). It would have made 
no difference whatsoever to the determination of this issue 
in the case if the court would have considered it under the 
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1978 Act instead of under the 1916 Act. The dictum of 
Grosskopf, AJA amounts in effect to an assumption during the 
course of his reasoning at arriving at, and setting out, the 
critical issue to be decided, which critical issue could 
equally have been arrived at via a different route taking in 
the 1978 Act. The subject of his assumption was not argued 
or canvassed by either party before the court. It is there-
fore submitted that the dicta are obiter in regard to the 
issue of under which Act the scope of the copyright in an 
artistic work made prior to 11 September 1965 is to be 
determined for purposes of current infringements. 
In the final analysis it is submitted with the greatest 
respect (and I accept and propound) that Grosskopf JA' s 
assumption that the scope of copyright in a work made prior 
to 11 September 1965 must for purposes of current infringe-
ments be determined by the provisions of the British 1911 
Act is incorrect and is not binding on future courts. In the 
first place, his views are obiter, and, in the second place, 
they conflict with the principle accepted by Galgut, AJA 
(correctly, so it is submitted) in the Topka case in the 
Appellate Division. It is submitted that the normal rule 
that where there are conflicting decisions of the Appellate 
Division, another court may follow the one which it con-
siders to be correct will apply and that the Topka decision 
should be followed on the relevant point and not the Klep 
Valve decision.238 
(f) Unexploited Works and Cinematograph Films 
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Early unexploi ted literary, musical and artistic works 
(except photographs), and cinematograph films made prior to 
1965 are dealt with specifically in Section 43 but a discus-
sion of these topics will be postponed until Chapter VII 
below. 
(g) Reference to Subsequent Statutes in Regard to Early 
Works 
It is submitted that the principle regarding the application 
of the repealed copyright statutes to works made prior to 1 
January 1979 as accepted in the Topka case is correct except 
to the extent that it might suggest that there are no cir-
cumstances in which one must look to one of the subsequent 
statutes when evaluating whether a work made at a particular 
time enjoys copyright. There are indeed instances where a 
type of work which did not enjoy copyright in terms of the 
statute which was in operation at the time that it was made 
was retrospectively granted protection by the next following 
statute. For instance, published editions did not enjoy pro-
tection under the 1916 Act; however, the 1965 Act retrospec-
tively granted protection to published editions made prior 
to 1965. 239 Similarly, the 1978 Act, as amended, grants 
protection to works of craftsmanship of a technical nature, 
and works of this type made before such protection was 
introduced by the Copyright Amendment Act, 1983, and after 
11 September, 1965, are protected. 240 
The principle that the subsistence of copyright in a work 
and the ownership of that copyright must be determined in 
111. 
239. Section 16 of tre COpyright Act, 1965, read together with tre 
provisicns of the Sixth Sch3dule arrl in particular paragraph 41( 1 ) 
trereof. 
240. See Secticn 43 of tre Copyright Act, 1978, arrl Butt v. Sdulltz & 
Another, supra, arrl Sdulltz v. Butt, supra. 
accordance with the statute which prevailed at the time of 
the making of the work must be broadened to some extent. In 
the case of a pre-1965 work one must, in terms of Section 
43(a)(ii) assess, whether the work was capable of enjoying 
copyright under the 1916 Act. If it was, then it can enjoy 
the measure of protection conferred upon that type of work 
in the 197 8 Act. The ownership of the copyright and the 
duration of the term of the copyright must, however, be 
determined in accordance with the 1965 Act. This point will 
be amplified below. Even if, at the time when the work was 
made prior to 1965, it was not capable of enjoying copyright 
under the 1916 Act, one must have regard to the 1965 Act and 
its transitional provisions to see whether copyright was 
retrospectively created in that work, as in the case of pub-
lished editions. If it was, then that copyright subsists and 
is enforceable under the 1978 Act as Section 43(a)(i) spe-
cifically states that nothirig in the 1978 Act affects the 
ownership, duration and validity of any copyright which sub-
sists under the 1965 Act, and such copyright did indeed 
subsist under that Act. In this respect, Section 43 (a)( i ) 
appears to contradict Section 43(a)(ii) but it is submitted 
that the intention of the legislature in enacting Section 43 
of the 1978 Act was to preserve the status quo of the sub-
sistence of copyright as of 31 December 1978, and this would 
not be achieved if Section 43(a)(ii) was to override Section 
43 (a) ( i). If the alternative interpretation to that which I 
have advanced is adopted then it would mean that, for 
instance, published editions dating from earlier than 1965, 
which on 1 December 1978, enjoyed copyright, would overnight 
cease to enjoy such protection in direct contradiction of 
Section 43(a)(i). 
In the case of a work made between 11 September 1965, and 31 
December 1978, in assessing whether that work enjoys copy-
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right enforceable in terms of the 1978 Act, one must in the 
first instance have regard to the provisions of the 19 65 
Act. If the work in question was capable of enjoying copy-
right under that Act then, in terms of Section 43(a)(i) of 
the 1978 Act, that copyright will continue to subsist and 
the ownership and duration of such copyright will be deter-
mined in accordance with the 1965 Act. If, however, the work 
was not capable of enjoying copyright under the 1965 Act, 
one must still have regard to the provisions of the 1978 Act 
in order to see whether protection in that type of work was 
created retrospectively. Examples of instances where this 
happens are works of craftsmanship of a technical nature and 
programme carrying signals, at least theoretically. Neither 
of these categories of works were protected by the 1965 Act. 
Works of this nature made before 11 September, 1965, will 
not, however, enjoy copyright in view of the provisions of 
Section 43(a)(ii) of the 1978 Act. 
(h) Attempted Simplification in the 1978 Act 
It will be apparent from the aforegoing that questions of 
crucial importance are: exactly what works enjoyed copyright 
under the 1916 and 1965 Acts, who owned such copyright in 
terms of those Acts and what is the term of such copyright 
under those Acts? The answers to these questions are 
exceedingly complex matters and will be dealt with below. It 
is perhaps ironical that one of the objectives of the 1978 
Act was to simplify the law of copyright. The 1965 Act suf-
fered from an excess of detail, particularly as far as its 
transitional provisions were concerned. If one compares the 
1978 Act with the 1965 Act, there is far less detail in the 
first mentioned Act. At first blush, therefore, it may seem 
that the objective of simplifying our law of copyright has 
been achieved. However, as far as the transitional provi-
sions of our current law of copyright are concerned, quite 
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the opposite effect has been achieved and a proper 
understanding and interpretation of our law of copyright now 
requires access to, and a good understanding of, the 1916 
Act (and even its predecessors) as well as the 1965 Act. 
In the ensuing chapters I will deal seriatim with the sub-
sistence, ownership and duration of copyright under the Acts 
of 1916 and 1965, as well as with vested rights in favour of 
third parties deriving from such acts, which vested rights 
are, in my submission, recognized and protected in terms of 
Section 41 of the 1978 Act. My consideration of the sub-
sistence, ownership and duration of copyright under the 1916 
Act will include an analysis of the subsistence, ownership 
and duration of copyright under pre-1911 British legisla-
tion, under the so-called "Provincial Copyright Acts" which 
applied in South Africa prior to 1916 and under the common 
law as rights conferred by this legislation will in certain 
circumstances have been perpetuated under the 1916 Act. The 
scope or enforcement of the copyright which subsisted under 
the 1916 and 1965 Acts will not be dealt with as this is no 
longer relevant in the light of the provisions of Section 43 
of the 1978 Act as interpreted, inter alia, in the Saunders 
Valve and Topka cases. As explained above, this viewpoint 
has been adopted despite the assumption to the contrary made 
in the Klep Valves case. Indeed, even the Klep Valves case 
I , 
seems to envisage that the repealed legislation governs cur-
rent infringements only in the case of pre-1965 works. 
(i) Effect of the Transitional Provisions 
Copyright having the scope and remedies provided for in the 
Copyright Act can, depending upon the circumstances, exist 
and have full force and effect in works made as early as 
during the 19th Century let alone during the currency of the 
1916 and 1965 Acts. As will be shown, for works made during 
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the 19th Century and in the early years of the 20th Century 
to continue to enjoy copyright an early form of copyright 
must have subsisted on 31 December 1916. Such copyright 
could have been derived from British law, from the so-called 
South African Provincial Copyright Acts or from the common 
law and must have been perpetuated by the Act of 1916. 
Generally. speaking 19th Century and early 20th Century 
copyright was of relatively short duration (save for common 
law copyright) and this factor limits the number of works 
made during that period which will have been recognized and 
perpetuated by the Act of 1916. A further limiting factor is 
the categories of works which were protected .at that time. 
In the ensuing chapters the works which were granted sub-
stituted copyright under the Act of 1916 (on the basis of 
pre-existing rights in British and South African law) and 
the ownership of such rights will be examined. 
In short, the effect of the transitional provisions of the 
Copyright Act cannot be fully appreciated and implemented 
without a thorough knowledge and understanding of British 
and South African copyright during the 19th Century and 
early 20th Century and South African copyright since 1916 as 
embodied in three successive copyright statutes. 
As will be shown, 19th Century and early 20th Century South 
African Copyright law was to some extent supplementary to 
the British law and it is therefore necessary to commence 
the examination of earlier copyright legislation which 
granted rights recognized and enforced in the current 




COPYRIGHT UNDER BRITISH LAW PRIOR TO 1917 
The British Copyright Act 1911 came into operation on 1 July 
1912. 1 Section 24 ( 1) of this Act provided that where any 
person was entitled to copyright or a right under copyright 
immediately before the commencement of the Act he would as 
from that date be entitled to a substituted right set out in 
the First Schedule to the Act. It was further provided that 
the substituted right would subsist for the term for which 
it would have subsisted if the Act of 1911 had been in force 
at the date when the work was made and had been entitled to 
copyright under the Act. Existing rights under copyright on 
1 July 1912 were as it were "traded in" for new rights as 
provided for in the 1911 Act. The "new" rights were 
generally referred to as "substituted rights". 
Section 147 of the South African Patents, Designs, Trade 
Marks and Copyright Act, 1916, provided that where copyright 
subsisted in the United Kingdom in respect of any musical, 
dramatic or artistic work before 1 January 1917 the 
copyright would be deemed to have subsisted in South Africa 
as from the ·date of the commencement of the copyright in 
that work in the United Kingdom and to the same extent as 
was conferred upon the work by United Kingdom law. On 1 
January 1917 the British Copyright Act, 1911, had already 
been in force for more than four years and the rights thus 
granted under Section 147(1) of the Act of 1916 included the 
substituted rights which had been granted afresh in pre-1912 
1. Sect,icn 37 ( 2 )(a) • 
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works in the United Kingdom, with effect from 1 July 1912. 
For this reason, and because as it will be shown below, in 
certain instances Imperial British law conferred copyright 
in South Africa, it is necessary to examine what rights were 
granted under British copyright law prior to 1912 and were 
subsisting on 1 July 1912, and what rights were granted 
under that Act. 
1. HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF BRITISH COPYRIGHT LAW IN 
THE 18TH AND 19TH CENTURIES 
The evolution of copyright up to the time of the Statute of 
Anne (the Copyright Act 1709) has been described in Chapter 
I. The Statute of Anne gave authors of books which had been 
printed the sole right of printing them for a period of 21 
years commencing on 10 April 1710; in the case of books 
which at that stage had not yet been printed the Act gave 
the sole right of printing for fourteen years provided that 
after expiration of this term the sole rights of printing 
and distributing copies of the book should revert to authors 
thereof for a further period of fourteen years if the 
authors were still alive. 
Th~ emergence and development of a form of statutory 
copyright law was paralleled by the recognition of a form of 
copyright by the common law. The dangers of unauthorized 
copying of literary works once the printing industry had 
become established gave rise to a form of property right in 
literary works under the common law. The precise scope of 
the common law right was unclear and the subject of con-
siderable debate. However, by 1769 the House of Lords recog-
nized that there existed a right on the part of authors to 
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prevent others from publishing unpublished works. 2 It was 
held that the common law right was not terminated by the 
Statute of Anne and that it continued to be enforceable 
after the expiry of the statutory copyright provided for in 
the Statute of Anne. In 1774 in the case of Donaldson v Bec-
kett3 the House of Lords decided in essence that an author's 
rights in his published works expired at the end of the term 
of statutory copyright and that common law copyright only 
applied to unpublished works in respect of which its dura-
tion was perpetual. 
In 1734 the Engraving Copyright Act, which conferred 
copyright on engravings made by the designers thereof, for a 
term of fourteen years, was passed. A further Engraving 
Copyright Act followed in 1767 which conferred protection on 
an engraving derived from a work made by another. The term 
of protection was extended to twenty-eight years by this 
Act. The Prints Copyright Act of 1777 expanded the scope of 
protection conferred upon engravings. 
In the meantime the universities, which had been disturbed 
by the effect of the decision of the House of Lords in 
Donaldson v Beckett, were instrumental in the passing of the 
Copyright Act of 1775 which granted a special right to them 
in respect of all copies which they had acquired in the past 
and which they might acquire in the future. In 1814 an Act 
was passed "to afford encouragement to literature" which 
changed the term of copyright enjoyed by literary works to a 
term of twenty-eight years from the first publication and if 
the author was still alive at the expiration of this term 
then the copyright endured for the rest of his lifetime. 
2. Millar v Taylor (1769) 4 Burr 2303. 
3. (1774) 4 Burr 24Q8. 
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The next works to be protected were works of sculpture, 
copyright in which was created by the Sculpture Copyright 
Act of 1814. This Act granted a term of protection of four~ 
teen years and if the author was still living at the end of 
that period, a further term of fourteen years. 
The early Copyright Act relating to literary works protected 
musical and dramatic compositions as "books". These Acts, 
however, granted no performing rights. In the Dramatic 
Literary Property Act of 1833, which is commonly known as 
"Bulwer Lytton's Act", an exclusive right of public perform-
ance was conferred. This right endured for twenty-eight 
years but if the author was still living at the time of the 
expiration of that term the copyright was perpetuated for 
the rest of his life, provided the work was printed and pub-
lished. The position of works not printed or published was 
uncertain. The Lectures Copyright Act of 1835 conferred in 
certain circumstances and under certain conditions the 
exclusive right of printing and publishing a lecture even 
where the lecture was delivered orally without any manu-
script. The term of copyright was twenty-eight years from 
the printing and publishing of the lecture. 
All the earlier Acts relating to literary works were 
repealed by the Copyright Act, 1842. This Act, which 
remained the statute regulating literary copyright until the 
passing of the Copyright Act, 1911, extended the term of 
protection to the lifetime of the author and seven years 
after his death, or a per~od of forty-two years, whichever 
was the longer. It also conferred performing rights in both 
musical and dramatic works, which performing right had the 
aforementioned duration. The Act covered "books'.' including 
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pamphlets, music sheets, maps and plans. It operated 
throughout the British dominions. 
Paintings, drawings and photographs were first protected 
under the Fine Arts Copyright Act, 1862. The Act conferred 
protection on works made by authors who were British sub-
jects or were resident in the British dominions. The term of 
copyright was the life of the author and seven years after 
his death. Copyright was lost if a work was sold and the 
copyright was not expressly reserved in writing. 
The Copyright (Musical Compositions) Act of 1882 required 
that reservation of rights of public performances of musical 
works must be printed on the title page of every published 
copy thereof. 
International Copyright Acts were passed in 1844 and 1852. 
During this period Orders-in-Council were made under these 
Acts granting protection to the works of certain European 
countries pursuant to bilateral arrangements. Upon the adop-
tion of the Berne Convention in 1886, the International 
Copyright Act 1886 was passed in order to ratify the Berne 
Convention and to incorporate its provisions in the domestic 
law. The International Copyright Act, 188 6, operated 
throughout the British dominions. The Berne Convention was 
modified by the additional Act of Paris of 1896 and effect 
was given to this amendment by means of an Order-in-Council 
in 1898. 
The effect of the International Copyright Act 1886 was basi-
cally to grant protection to both published and unpublished 
works originating from a.member country on the same basis as 
domestic works provided that the term of protection did not 
exceed the term of protection of the country of origin and 
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that any formalities prescribed by the country of origin 
were complied with. 
Musical copyright owners suffered severe prejudice as a 
result of the practice of street hawkers selling pirated 
copies of songs and music. This practice made it difficult 
to discern any substantial person against whom infringement 
proceedings could be conducted. This problem gave rise to 
the Musical (Summary Proceedings) Act, 1902, and the Musical 
Copyright Act, 1906, which provided summary forms of proce-
dure in terms of which action could be taken against 
infringers of musical copyright. 
Substantial modifications were made to the Berne Convention 
in 1908. These amendments made it necessary for British 
copyright law to be amended to comply with the provisions of 
the revised Convention. This development ultimately gave 
rise to the Copyright Act, _1911. The 1911 Act repealed all 
previous statutes relating to copyright with the exception 
of the Musical Copyright Acts of 1902 and 1906 and one sec-
tion of the Fine Arts Copyright Act 1862. It embodied the 
minimum requirements for protection contained in the Berne 
Convention as modified in 1908. 4 
2. COMMON LAW COPYRIGHT PRIOR TO 1912 
As described previously, the British common law of the 19th 
and early 20th Century granted copyright in unpublished 
4 • In regard to tre atore9oirg see FE Skare Jarres, COpinger & Skale 
James en the Law of Copyright, 8th Editicn, pp 5-14; Whale & Phillips, 
\<bale en Copyright, 3rd Editicn, pp 1-15; Laddie Prescott & Vitoria, 'lbe 
f.tXIem Law of Copyright, pp 193-204; arrl Sterlirg & carpenter, Copyright 
Law in the Ulited Kingdcm, pp 126-159. 
121. 
works. There is, however, some uncertainty as to the precise 
details of common law copyright. 
(1) Classes of Works Protected 
Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria states that common law 
copyright subsisted in books, lectures, engravings, paint-
ings and works of literature, art and science in general, 
including musical and dramatic works.5 
(2) Conditions for Subsistence of Common Law Copyright 
The work must have been unpublished. Publication meant 
making copies available to the public or communicating the 
work to the public generally without discriminating or 
restricting the nature of the group of persons to whom the 
exposure took place. A restriction of the classes of persons 
to whom a work was exposed was readily implied and was con-
trasted with a dedication to the public of the right to 
print copies. To remain unpublished a work was not required 
to be secret in any way as a relatively limited exposure of 
the work to the public such as delivering a lecture to 
university students or the exhibition of a painting in an 
art gallery subject to the restraint that no copying was 
allowed did not destroy the unpublished nature of the work.6 
The question of whether the works of a foreign author 
enjoyed common law copyright is an issue in relation ·to 
which there is no consensus amongst the text book writers. 
Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria and Copinger & Skene James con-
tend that common law copyright was conferred upon non-
resident authors7 while Sterling & Carpenter contends that 
5. Op cit, Page 194. 
6. Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria, op cit, p 194. 
7. Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria, op cit, p 195 and Cc.pinger & Skale 
Janes, op cit, p 253. 
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the works of non-resident authors did not enjoy common law 
copyright unless they were resident in one of the British 
dominions or in countries to which the Berne Convention and 
the Treaty which Britain entered into with the Austro-
Hungarian Empire applied. 8 It is, however, common cause 
amongst the writers t~at common law copyright was conferred 
upon foreigners resident in the British dominions. It is 
submitted that the views of Laddie, Prescott and Vi tori a 
and Copinger & Skone James are to be preferred over those 
of Sterling & Carpenter. This means that unpublished works 
of the abovementioned nature no matter where and by whom 
they were made enjoyed common law copyright in Britain dur-
ing the relevant period. 
(3) Nature and Scope of Copyright 
Common law copyright conferred upon the maker of the work 
the right to prevent unauthorized reproduction of his work.' 
Whale & Phillips describes the right thus: 
"Traditionally it was identified as that right which 
booksellers purported to acquire from the author and 
which constituted their copyright - that is the print-
ing and publishing right".9 
The British courts have not yet determined whether common 
law copyright conferred a performing right. Laddie, Pres-
cott and Vitoria contends that there was such a right and 
that it was also conferred upon the works of non-resident 
foreigners. lO The learned author makes the point that the 
1911 Act appears to contemplate the existence of this right 
in that the notes to the First Schedule to the Act explain 
that the terms "copyright" and "performing right" include 
8. Sterling & Carpenter, op cit, p 136. 
9. \obale & Phillips, op cit, p 11. 
10. Iaddie, Prescott and Vitoria, op cit, footn:Jte 5 on p 196. 
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the common law rights to restrain publication and public 
performance, respectively. It is submitted that the learned 
authors are correct in this respect. Laddie, Prescott and 
Vitoria's aforementioned view is shared by Sterling & Car-
penter.11 
(4) Duration of Rights 
Common law copyright endured from the time that form was 
given to the work and in principle continued indefinitely. 
·It expired, however, upon the authorized unrestricted pub-
lication of the work. The performing right expired on the 
unauthorized unrestricted public presentation or publication 
of the work. 12 The expiry of common law copyright did not 
necessarily mean that the work was no longer protected; on 
the contrary in most instances this protection or continued 
protection was conferred upon the work by statutory 
copyright. 
3. STATUTORY COPYRIGHT PRIOR TO 1912 
Copyright conferred by statute prior to 1912 is a compli-
cated and confused question. The position is summed up as 
follows by the report of the Gorell Committee, 1909: 
"The first observation which a study of the existing 
law suggests is that its form, as distinguished from 
its substance, seems to us bad. The law is wholly 
-destitute of any sort of arrangement, incomplete, often 
obscure, and even when it is intelligible upon long 
study, it is in many parts so ill-expressed that no-one 
11. Sterling & carpenter, op cit, p 132. 
12. Sterling & carpenter, op cit, p 132. 
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who does not give such study to it can expect to 
understand it. The common law principles which lie at 
the root of the law have never been settled. The well-
known cases of Millar v Taylor, Donaldson v Beckett, 
and Jefferys v Boosey (sic), ended in a difference of 
opinion amongst many of the most eminent judges who 
have ever sat upon the Bench. The 14 Acts of Parliament 
which deal with the subject were passed at different 
times between 1735 and 1875 (Several other statutes 
have been passed since 1875). They are drawn in dif-
ferent styles, and some are drawn so as to be hardly 
intelligible. Obscurity of style, however, is only one 
of the defects of these Acts. Their arrangement is 
often worse than their style. Of this the Copyright Act 
of 1842 is a conspicuous instance." 
The early copyright statutes tended to confer copyright of 
relatively short duration. As will appear more fully below, 
early British copyright which no longer subsisted on 1 July 
1912 (or on 1 January 1917 in the case of literary works for 
purposes of South Africa) is of no relevance today and the 
analysis set out below is thus concerned with types of works 
in respect of which the copyright could still have been in 
subsistence at_ the aforementioned date. 
As different considerations apply to the different classes 
of works the analysis of pre-1912 statutory copyright will 
be done on the basis of each of the various categories of 
works eligible for copyright being dealt with separately. 
A. LITERARY WORKS ("BOOKS") 
Copyright in "books" was regulated by the Copyright Act 
1842. 
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(1) Types of Works Protected 
The term "book" meant any volume, part or division of a 
volume, pamphlet, sheet of letterpress, sheet of music, map, 
chart or plan which was separately published. There was no 
definition of "literary work" in the Act but Daisy L.J. in 
Hollinrake v Truswell13 ventured the following definition: 
"A literary work is intended to afford either informa-
tion and instruction. or pleasure. in the form of 
literary enjoyment". 
Dramatic works were dealt with in separate legislation but 
if such a work was printed and published it was considered 
to be a book for purposes of the 1842 Act. Maps, charts and 
plans were in addition capable of enjoying protection under 
other copyright legislation. 
(2) Conditions for Subsistence of Copyright 
Copyright was created by the act of first publication. This 
had to occur in Britain (or in a territory which was recog-
nized by the International Copyright Acts). The works of 
foreign authors first published in the United Kingdom could 
enjoy protection and such authors could be resident in the 
United Kingdom, the British dominions or elsewhere. 14 
The Act required that copies of books must be delivered to 
, Stationer's Hall for registration, the British Museum and 
certain libraries and other institutions but failure to meet 
this requirement did not affect the subsistence of 
copyright; the major implication of lack of registration at 
Stationer's Hall was that no infringement proceedings could 
be instituted until such registration had taken place. 
13. (1894) 3 Ch. 420 
14. Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria, op cit, p 197. 
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It was not required that a work should be original in order 
to enjoy copyright. On the other hand something which was a 
mere copy of a previous book was not entitled to pro-
tection.15 
(3) Authorship and Initial Ownership 
The author of the work was the initial copyright owner 
except in the case of a contribution to a collective work. 
In the case of collective works the ownership of the 
copyright vested in the proprietor of the collective works 
in certain circumstances. In particular the proprietor of 
the collective work was required to establish that he 
employed the writer to compose the article; that the arti-
cles were composed subject to the condition that the 
copyright would belong to the proprietor; and that the pro-
prietor paid for the article. Where the collective work was 
a periodical, after twenty-eight years had elapsed from the 
date of publication. the author was entitled to publish his 
articles in a separate form; during the twenty-eight year 
period the proprietor of the collective work could not pub-
lish the articles "owned" by him separately or singly 
without the author's consent. 16 
Where a work was published posthumously the copyright in the 
work vested in the owner of the manuscript from which the 
published version of the book was taken.l7 
(4) Duration of Copyright 
15. Walter v Lane (1900) A.C. 539. 
16. Copinger & Skale James, op cit, p 16. 
17. Copinger & Skale James, op cit, p 16. 
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Copyright endured for a period commencing with the date of 
publication and lasting for the lifetime of the author and 
seven years thereafter, or for forty-two years from first 
publication, whichever period.was the longer. In the case of 
posthumous works the term of copyright was forty-two years 
from first publication. 
(5) Transmission of Copyright 
Copyright in a work could be assigned in a written document. 
If the work had been registered at Stationer's Hall, assign-
ment could be affected by an entry in the Register. 
(6) Lectures 
"Lectures" were dealt with separately from the 1842 Act but 
for the sake of convenience they will be dealt with as a 
species of "literary work". Protection of the creative 
efforts of lecturers was regulated in the Lecturer's 
Copyright Act, 183 5. This Act dealt with orally delivered 
lectures and "works" . of this nature were prot·ected against 
unauthorized printing and publishing. Protection only arose,. 
however, provided two days prior notice of. the forthcoming 
delivery of a lecture was given to two magistrates living 
within five miles of the place of delivery. No protection 
was given to lectures given at universities, public schools, 
colleges, on any public foundation or in accordance with any 
gift, endowment or foundation. The term of protection con-
ferred upon a lecture by the Act was twenty-eight years. 
If a lecture was reduced to a material form and published as 
a "book" it enjoyed literary copyright as set out above. 
(7) Universities 
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Following on the decision of Donaldson v Beckett18 the 
Copyright Act, 1775, granted to the universities of Oxford 
and Cambridge, the four universities of Scotland and the 
colleges of Eton, Westminster and Winchester copyright in 
perpetuity in books given or bequeathed to them for the 
advancement of useful learning and other purposes of educa-
tion. This right was granted both in respect of books 
obtained in this manner prior to 1775 and thereafter. This 
right only encompassed the institution's own books for as 
long as they were printed for them and for their sole bene-
fit. The institutions were entitled to sell or dispose of 
the copyrights which they acquired in this manner but if 
they delegated, granted, leased or sold the copyright in any 
book or allowed any person to print it this special 
copyright or privilege was extinguished. The same copyright 
was granted to Trinity College in Dublin 1801. These rights 
were perpetuated by the Copyright Act, 1842. 
B. MUSICAL AND DRAMATIC WORKS 
Musical and dramatic works in "book" form were protected as 
"literary works" under the Literary Copyright Act, 1842. 
Protection of these types of works as separate works only 
concerns so-called "performing rights". In this respect the 
works enjoyed protection under the Dramatic Copyright Act, 
1833 ( Bulwer Lytton's Act) and Sections 20 and 21 of the 
Literary Copyright Act, 1842. The effect of Sections 20 and 
21 of the 1842 Act was that that Act as it was took over the 
protection of the performing right from the 1833 Act. 
(1) Types of Works Protected 
18. Supra. 
129. 
Section 2 of the 1842 Act defined "dramatic works" as 
including "every tragedy, comedy, play, opera, farce, or 
other scenic, musical or dramatic entertainment". In Fuller 
v Blackpool Winter Gardens19 it was said that a "mere com-
mon, ordinary musical song, which required neither acting 
nor scenery for its production" was not a dramatic work. 
While the term "musical work" was not defined in the 1842 
Act, it was defined in Section 3 of the Musical (Summary 
Proceedings) Copyright Act, 1902, as "any combination of 
melody and harmony, or either of them, printed, reduced to 
writing, or otherwise graphically produced or reproduced". 
It is submitted by Sterling & Carpenter20 that this defini-
tion is an apt description of what constituted a "musical 
work" in the pre-1912 legislation generally. 
(2) Conditions for Subsistence of Performing Rights 
A work which had neither been published nor performed in 
public was protected by common law copyright irrespective of 
whether the author was a British subject or a foreigner or 
whether he was resident in the United Kingdom or elsewhere. 
In the case of a work which had been either published or 
publicly performed performing rights only subsisted if such 
first publication or performance occurred in the United 
Kingdom or in a country which was recognized under the 
International Copyright Acts. After 10 August 1882 the sub-
sistence of a performing right in a published musical work 
depended upon express reservation of that right being made 
on the title page of each copy released to the public. 21 
19. (1895) 2 QB 429, at p 442. 
20. Op cit, p 131. 
21. Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria, op cit, p 198. 
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No registration was necessary to protect performing rights. 
(3) Authorship and Initial Ownership of Performing Rights 
The author of a dramatic or musical work was vested with the 
initial ownership of the copyright. 
(4) Duration of Performing Rights 
Where a work had not been printed and published the perform-
ing right endured indefinitely. Where a work had been pub-
lished and publicly performed the term of protection endured 
for the lifetime of the author and seven years, or for 
forty-two years, calculated from the date of first public 
performance, whichever was the longer. It would thus seem 
that the term of the performing right endured indefinitely 
in the case of a work which, although published, was not 
publicly performed. If the work had been publicly performed 
but not published, i.e. it existed in manuscript form only, 
the term of the performing right was doubtful because the 
legislation prescribed no term. Copinger & Skene James22 
opines that the term of the right was possibly perpetual but 
was more probably of the same duration as that of a work 
which had been both published and performed. 
(5) Transmission of Performing Rights 
It would seem that the performing right in dramatic and 
musical works could be assigned and presumably such assign-
ment was required to be in writing.23 The assignment of the 
22. Op cit, p 17. 
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23. ~ writers do not deal with this point specifically but there is 
= suggesticn in the 1911 Act where it deals with assigments llade prior 
to its caning into operaticn that certain types of cq;Jyright were not 
capable of being assigned. In gen?ral, in early British cq;Jyright legis-
laticn whenever specific refere~XE is llade to assigment of cq;Jyright it 
is required that such assigments must be in writing. 
copyright in a dramatic or musical work, being a 1i terary 
work, did not convey the performing right unless an entry to 
that effect was made in the Register maintained at 
Stationer's Hall. 
C. ARTISTIC WORKS 
(1) Types of Works Protected 
(a) Prints. 
This class included engravings and etchings and prints 
taken by lithography or any other mechanical process by 
which prints or impressions of drawings or designs were 
capable of being multiplied indefinitely. This class of 
works was protected by the Engraving Copyright Acts 
1734 and 1736, the Prints Copyright Act 1776, and the 
Prints and Engravings Copyright (Ireland) Act, 1836, 
and Section 14 of the International Copyright Act 1852. 
According to Laddie, Prescott & Vitoria24 there was 
some doubt as to whether prints of maps, charts or 
plans were covered under the Engraving Act because they 
could be protected as "books" by the Copyright Act, 
1842; similar doubt existed as to whether a drawing on 
which an engraving or print was based was protected 
under these Acts because they 
the Fine Arts Copyright Act, 
could be protected under 
1862. It was held that 
where engravings formed part of a book and the owner-
ship of the copyright in the book and in the engraving 
vested in the same person, the pictures were considered 
to be part of the book and protected as such. 25 
(b) Sculptures. 
24. Op cit, p 199. 
25. COpinger & Skale Janes, op cit, p 18. 
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This class of work was protected under the Sculpture 
Copyright Act, 1814. 
(c) Paintings, Drawings and Photographs. 
This class of works was protected under the Fine Arts 
Copyright Act, 1862. 
(d) Industrial Designs. 
A measure of protection for what today are regarded as 
designs was granted under the Sculpture Copyright Act, 
1814. The Patents and Design Act, 1907, defined a 
"design" to exclude "not being a design or a sculpture 
or other thing within the protection of the Sculpture 
Copyright Act, 1814". Section 1 of the Sculpture 
Copyright Act, 1814, protected 
"any new and original sculpture, or model, or 
copy, or cast of the human figure or human fig-
ures, or of any bust or busts, or of any part or 
parts of the human figure, clothed in drapery or 
otherwise, or of any animal or animals, or of any 
part or parts of any animal combined with the 
human figure or otherwise, or of any subject being 
matter of invention in sculpture, or of any ulto 
or basso-releivo representing any of the matters 
or things herein-beforementioned, or any cast from 
nature of the human figure, or of any part or 
parts of the human figure, or of any cast from 
nature of any animal, or of any part or parts of 
any animal, or of any such subject containing or 
representing any of the matters and things herein-
beforementioned, whether separate or combined". 
The earlier Engraving Copyright Acts of 1734 and 1766 
extended to designs transferred to articles of manufac-
ture.26 
26. Copinger & Skale Janes, op cit, p 18. 
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(2) Conditions for Subsistence of Copyright 
(a) Prints. 
Unpublished prints or engravings enjoyed common law 
protection. A published print was protected if first 
publication took place in the United Kingdom or in 
another recognized territory (under the International 
Copyright Acts). In regard to first publication in 
Great Britain it was necessary for the work to have 
been made in Great Britain or Ireland. 27 It was a 
requirement for the subsistence of copyright that the 
date of first publication and the name of the proprie-
tor should be engraved on the plate and should appear 
on each print. No registration of the copyright was 
necessary. 
(b) Sculptures. 
The common law protected unpublished sculptures. In 
order to enjoy copyright a sculpture must have been new 
and original. Statutory copyright subsisted in a sculp-
ture provided the "first putting forth or publishing" 
of the work took place in the United Kingdom. In addi-
tion the author must have been a British subject or 
resident in the British dominions at the relevant 
time. 28 Works of foreign origin could, however, enjoy 
copyright under the International Copyright Acts. 
"First putting forth or publishing a work" included 
exhibiting it at a gallery or other public place.29 It 
was a requirement that the name of the proprietor of 
the copyright together with the date of first pub-
27. Laddie, PrescxJtt and Vitoria, op cit, p 198. 
28. Laddie, PrescxJtt and Vitoria, op cit, p 199. 
2 9 • '1\.u:ne:r v ROO:insaJ. ( 1860) 10 I ClJ. R 510 at 516. 
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lication, was placed on the work and on each copy. 
Registration was not required. 
(c) Paintings, Drawings and Photographs. 
Statutory copyright subsisted if the author was a 
British subject or was resident in a British dominion. 
Publication of the work was irrelevant to the sub-
sistence of copyright. 30 Copyright was, however, con-
ferred upon foreign works if the authors of such works 
could derive protection under the International 
Copyright Acts, i.e. they were subjects of a Berne Con-
vention country or of Austria-Hungary. Registration was 
unnecessary for the subsistence of copyright but viola-
tions of copyright were not actionable if committed 
prior to registration. Copyright was forfeited if a 
work was sold without copyright being expressly 
reserved in writing. Unpublished works (as well proba-
bly as works sold without reservation of copyright) 
were protected by common law copyright but such common 
law copyright expired co-terminously with the statutory 
copyright. 3l It was specifically held that the Fine 
Arts Copyright Act did not provide for copyright to 
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30. Sterling & Cal:penter, op cit, p 149 et seq cx:nterrls that first 
publication of a worl!: outside 'the United Kingdon, the British dcminicos 
or a country with which Britain had CDpyright relaticos was divestive of 
CDpyright. The autlxJrs also cx:nterrl that first publication in a Berne 
Ccnvention country was investive of CDpyright. Ncn3 of the other mXIe:rn 
authors share these views. Laddie, Prescott and Vitaria, op cit, p 200, 
footnote 2, counters the first rrenticrro view arrl, with respect, Lad-
die, Prescott and Vitaria's argurrents are to be preferred. The argurrent 
advarald by Sterling & Cal:penter is at variance with the basic principle 
of the Berne Ccnvention that Union worl!:s arrl authors are subject to 
certain cx:nditicos to be trei;!ted as dcmestic 'WOrl!:s = autlxJrs; Sterling 
& Cal:penter' s cx:ntention I-Olld have the effect that f=eign 'WOrl!:s I-Olld 
have been able to ClCX1\]ire CDpyright on an additional grourrl over arrl 
above that on which da!Estic 'WOrl!:s could qualify. These views are rot 
persuasive. 
31. Cqlinger & Skale .James, op cit, p 19. 
subsist in the British dominions; the copyright was 
confined to the United Kingdom. 32 
(3) Authorship and Initial Ownership of Copyright 
Save in the case of photographs the maker of the work was 
the author. Determining the authorship of a photograph was 
sometimes problematical. As a general rule the author was 
the person who took care of the arrangements of the picture 
and the positioning of the object.33 Sometimes, however, the 
proprietor of the photographic business was held to be the 
author. 34 
Generally speaking the author was the first owner of the 
copyright. In the case of engravings, however, where a per-
son caused or procured an engraving or print to be made from 
his own work that person was the initial owner provided his 
name and the date were placed on the engraving beforf3 pub-
lication. Similarly, in the case of a sculpture where a per-
son caused a new and original sculpture to be made he was 
the initial owner provided his name and the date were placed 
on the sculpture before it was published. In the case of 
drawings, paintings and photographs, where a work was made 
for another person pursuant to a commission that person was 
the initial owner of the copyright unless the copyright was 
reserved to the author by a written agreement signed by the 
person giving the commission. 
(4) Duration of Copyright 
(a) Prints. 
32. Graves v Gerrie (1903) PC 496. 
33. Nottage v Jadcscn (1883) 11 Q.B.B. 627. 
34. Melville v Miirar of Life carpany (1895) 2 Ch 531. 
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The copyright in prints endured for a period of twenty-
eight years from the date of first publication. 
(b) Sculptures. 
The term of copyright was fourteen years from the date 
of first publication supplemented by a further period 
of fourteen years if the author was still living at the 
expiration of the initial term provided he had not 
divested himself of the copyright. 
(c) Paintings, Drawings and Photographs. 
The term of copyright was the lifetime of the author 
and seven years after his death. 
(5) Transmission of Copyright 
No specific provisions as to the assignment of copyright 
were made in the Engraving Act and generally speaking it was 
considered to be necessary that an assignment should be in 
writing and should be attested to by two witnesses. 35 The 
aforegoing was made obligatory in the Sculpture Copyright 
Act. In the case of 
copyright could be 
memorandum in writing. 
paintings, drawings 
assigned by means 
D. WORKS OF FOREIGN ORIGIN 
and photographs, 
of any note or 
As previously stated, unpublished works of foreign origin, 
no matter what their country of origin may have been, were 
affor_?ed copyright protection of indefinite duration under 
the common law. As a general proposition foreign works for-
feited their common law protection upon being published any-
where. In order to continue enjoying protection in Britain 
subsequent to being published they must have met the 
35. Copinger & Skcrle .James, op cit, p 18. 
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requirements for statutory protection. Save in certain 
instances where works originating from the British dominions 
enjoyed statutory protection by virtue of individual British 
statutes (e.g. the Fine Arts Copyright Act, 1862), none of 
the statutes themselves conferred protection on works first 
published in foreign countries. 
The aforegoing position was varied in the case of some 
countries by Orders in Council made und~r the various Inter-
national Copyright Acts passed between 1844 and 1875. The 
effect of this legislation was to grant protection to pub-
lished works of certain European countries in terms of 
bilateral agreements entered into between Britain and those 
countries. As these Orders in Council were subsequently 
superseded by the Berne Convention no further attention is 
devoted to them. 
(1) Berne Convention 
In 1885 a meeting of the then great Powers was held in order 
to secure a degree of uniformity in their copyright laws and 
to provide for mutual protection for each other's works. 
This conference gave rise to the Berne Convention of 1887 in 
terms of which the contracting states were "constituted into 
a union36 for the protection of the rights of authors over 
their literary and artistic works". 37 Britain adhered to 
this Convention on 28 November 1887. 
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3 6 . The follc:MiiYJ are the CXJUI'ltries which then c:nsti tut:Erl the Berne 
Union : Belgium, France ( ircl.udir.g Algeria) an:i her =lonies, Germany, 
Haiti, Italy, Spain an:i her =lonies, Switzerlan:i, Tunis, LuxenbcAJrg, 
M:Jnaa:>, Norway, Japan, Demark (arrl Faroe Islarrls). Sweden, Liberia, an:i 
the Gerrran Protectorates ( ircl.udir.g TanJailYika, Sa.lth West Africa an:i 
Pap.Ja). 
37. . Berne Cc.nventicri, 1887, Article 1. 
In the meantime in order to enable Britain to give effect to 
the Berne Convention about to be made, the International 
Copyright Act, 1886, was passed. An Order in Council was 
made on 28 November 1887 which came into force on 6 December 
1887. The Order in Council embodied a translation of the 
Berne Convention in a schedule and provided that it would 
apply in the domestic law and would have effect throughout 
the British dominions. The Berne Convention was later 
modified by the additional Act of Paris of 1896 and this was 
given effect to in Britain by an Order in Council of 7 March 
1898. 
The effect of this legislation was that protection to the 
works of the countries which were members of the union and 
to works first produced in British dominions was granted in 
Britain. In the case of works produced in the dominions the 
provisions were not retrospective, which meant that works 
first published in a colony before 25 June 1886 were not 
granted copyright in the United Kingdom3 8 but the protection 
granted to works originating from members countries of the 
Berne Convention was retrospective in the sense that pro-
tection was granted to pre-existing works provided they had 
not fallen into the public domain in their country of 
origin. The country of origin in terms of the Berne Conven-
tion was the country to which the author belonged (i.e. 
probably the country of which he was a citizen or where he 
was domiciled or resident) in the case of an unpublished 
work. In the case of a published work the country of origin 
was the country in which the work was first published. Where 
a work was simultaneously published in two or more countries 
the country of origin was that country in which the term of 
38. See Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria, op cit, p 205. 
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protection was the shortest. 39 According to Laddie, Prescott 
and Vi toria40 the terms of protection of Berne Convention 
countries were in general the lifetime of the author and the 
following terms of years; Liberia ( 20); Germany, Japan, 
Switzerland ( 30); other countries (50) except Italy which 
had a double forty (40) year term and Haiti a term depending 
on the longevity of the widow and children of the author. In 
terms of s 3(2) of the International Copyright Act, 1886, a 
work which was published in the United Kingdom and another 
union country simultaneously was treated as a foreign work. 
The Berne Convention, as modified by the additional Act of 
Paris, provided in essence that works first published in a 
union country and unpublished works made by a person belong-
ing to a union country were granted protection in the other 
countries of the union as though they were domestic works. 
There were two conditions attached to this protection, 
namely, a work of foreign origin was not protected for a 
longer term than in its country of origin and any for-
malities or conditions prescribed in the law of the country 
of origin must have been met.41 
Special provision was made in the Convention for newspaper 
and magazine articles. 42 Serial stories were granted normal 
protection while political and news items fell into the pub-
lic domain. No protection was granted to other items in 
newspapers and magazines besides the aforegoing unless 
copyright was expressly reserved on publication. 
39. Article 2 of the Berne Ccnventicn. 
40. Op cit, p 203. 
41. Articles 2 an::l. 3 of the Berne Ccnventicn. 
42. Article 7 of the Berne Conventicn read together with Article l(iv) 
of the llclditicnal Act of Paris. 
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The performing rights in published musical works was for-
feited unless an express reservation was made on the title 
page or at the commencement of the work. 43 
In the case of posthumous works the person who was named as 
the author was presumed to be such. These works were other-
wise protected as normal works. 44 In the case of anonymous 
or pseudonymous works the person who was designated as the 
publisher was regarded as the agent of the .author and was 
entitled to enforce the copyright in his own name. 45 
The Berne Convention contained special provisions relating 
to translation rights. In terms of Article 5 a copyright 
owner lost the right to control the making of translations 
of his work ten years after the end of the calendar year in 
which first publication in a Union country took place. This 
provision was revised by the Additional Act of Paris (with 
effect from 7 March 1898 in the United Kingdom). In terms of 
the amended provisions the copyright owner could prevent the 
translation right in a particular language from passing into 
the public domain if he published an authorized translation 
into that language in one of the member countries within ten 
years from the date of publication of the original version 
of the work. Failing this, the translation right in any lan-
guage was excised from the copyright. This position obtained 
in the United Kingdom in regard to all works of foreign 
origin. It did not, however, apply to works of British 
origin in the United Kingdom. 
43 • Article 9 of "ilia Berne Ccnventicn. 
44 . Article 1 ( 1) of "ilia Addi ticnal J\ct: of Paris. 
45. Article 11 of "ilia Berne Ccnventicn. 
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(2) Austria-Hungary Treaty 
Austria-Hungary was not a member of the Berne Convention and 
works emanating from this country consequently did not ini-
tially necessarily enjoy any protection in Great Britain. 
This was rectified by a treaty between the two countries 
which was entered into on 24 April 1893. Effect was given to 
this treaty in the United Kingdom by an Order in Council 
dated 30 April 1894. In terms of the treaty works first pub-
lished in the dominions of one of the parties were granted 
the same protection in the dominions of the other party as 
domestic works. This protection was subject to the condition 
that the foreign work would not enjoy a longer term of 
copyright than that enjoyed in its country of origin. 46 
The Treaty also provided that the works of authors who were 
subjects of or who resided in the dominions of the one party 
would enjoy the same protection as the works of domestic 
authors. 47 This granted protection to unpublished works. The 
enjoyment of protection of unpublished works was not however 
subject to the reciprocity principle regarding term of pro-
tection. The Treaty had retrospective effect and applied to 
works already in existence. Vested rights to use works pro-
tected retrospectively were however preserved.48 
(3) Colonial Works 
Only two of the British Acts conferring copyright on 
specific classes of works granted protection to works made 
in the British Colonies. The Literary Copyright Act of 1842 
granted copyright to works made in the British dominions 
provided first publication took place in the United Kingdom. 
4 6 • Article 1 para 2 of tie Treaty. 
4 7 • Article l para 3 of tie Treaty. 
48. Article 2 of tie Treaty. 
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In Routledge v Low49 it was held that the Literary 
Copyright Act did not confer copyright in the United Kingdom 
The Fine Arts on works 
Copyright 
first published 
Act 1862, on the 
in the colonies. 
other hand, gave copyright in all 
works made in the British dominions and first publication in 
the United Kingdom was not a requirement since this Act did 
not confer copyright on the basis of first publication. 
The International Copyright Acts, 1844 to 1886, did not con-
fer any copyright on works made or first published in the 
dominions over and above the rights granted by the individ-
ual Copyright Acts themselves. This position was changed in 
the International Copyright Act, 1886. Section 8 of this Act 
provided, subject to certain conditions, that the various 
specific Copyright Acts would apply to literary or artistic 
works first produced in a British dominion in the same man-
ner as they applied to works first produced in the United 
Kingdom. The conditio~s subject to which this protection was 
granted were that any provisions in the individual Copyright 
Acts relating to registration of copyright would not apply 
if a particular British dominion maintained its own 
copyright registry and that, in the case of books, provi-
sions of the individual Copyright Acts relating to the 
delivery of copies of the book to libraries and the like 
would not apply. If a particular dominion did not have its 
own registration system then the provisions of the individ-
ual Copyright Acts relating to registration and delivery of 
copies in the United Kingdom were required to be complied 
with. 
According to Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria Section 8 of the 
International Copyright Act, 1886, was not retrospective and 
49. (1868), L.R.3H.L.l00. 
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the Act conferred copyright on works produced in the British 
dominions only after 25 June 1886.5° works produced prior 
to that date therefore could only derive protection under 
the common law and the Fine Arts Copyright Act, 1862, or to 
the limited extent provided for in the Literary Copyright 
Act, 1842. 
E. WORKS NOT PROTECTED 
The following types of works eligible for copyright under 
the South African Copyright Act, 1978, would not have 
enjoyed protection under pre-1912 British copyright legisla-
tion: 
(a) Works of artistic craftsmanship and works of 
craftsmanship of a technical nature, unless they 
qualified as sculptures. 
(b) Works of architecture, being buildings or models for 
buildings. 
(c) Drawings which had no artistic merit or aesthetic 
qualities (save for maps, charts and plans). It would 
seem, however, that a very low level of artistic merit 
was required. 51 
(d) Stories reduced to a material form in a cinematograph 
film or music reduced to a material for·m in a 
gramophone record or other mechanical contrivance. Lad-
die expresses the view that works of this nature would, 
however, probably have enjoyed the performing right. 52 
(e) Sound recordings. 
50. Op cit, p 205. 
51 . See Kalrick & Co v Lawrence & Co ( 1890) 25 QBD 99. 
52. Laddie, Prescott and Vitaria, op cit, p 201. 
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(f) Cinematograph Films. 
(g) Broadcasts. 
(h) Programme-carrying signals. 
4. RIGHTS UNDER THE ACT OF 1911 
A. THE "1912 GATEWAY" 
The British Copyright Act, 1911, in a sense codified British 
copyright law. As mentioned previously, it embodied the 
provisions of the Berlin Text of the Berne Convention dating 
from 1908. It repealed all the existing British copyright 
legislation save for some minor exceptions which are not 
material for the present purposes. 53 It abrogated all common 
law copyright while not in any way affecting the right 
derived from the law of equity to restrain a breach of trust 
or confidence.54 
The Act was retrospective in effect and works made prior to 
1 July 1912 could only enjoy protection to the extent con-
ferred upon them by the Act. The copyright in existing works 
was dealt with in an unusual way. The Act provided for a 
system whereby existing rights under copyright on 1 July 
1912 could as it were be "traded in" for, or be substituted 
by, "new" rights conferred by it. This was achieved in Sec-
tion 24(1) read together with the First Schedule to the Act. 
The First Schedule to the Act read as follows: 
53 • Secticn 24( 1) read to;)etrer with tre First Sc:h:dule. 





Substituted Right Existing Right I 
(a) In the case of works other ~t;:-h;:-a=-n=--;D:;-:r=-a=-m=-a=t-:ri-=c=--a=-n=-d"'--;M-;-:u"'s=-~7· c=a'l 
Works 
Copyright . .................... . Copyright as defined by 
this Act* 
(b) In the case of Musical and 
Both copyright and performing 
right 
Copyright, but not performing 
right 
Performing right. but not 
copyright 
Dramatic works 
Copyright as defined by 
this Act* 
Copyright as defined by 
this Act, except the sole 
right to perform the 
work or any substantial 
part thereof in public. 
The sole right to perform 
the work in public, but 
none of the other rights 
comprised in copyright as 
defined by this Act. 
For the purposes of this Schedule the following expressions, 
where used in the first column thereof, have .the following 
meanings: 
'Copyright' , in the case of a work which according to the 
law in force immediately before the commencement of 
this Act has not been published before that date and 
statutory copyright wherein depends on publication, 
includes the right at common law (if any) to restrain 
publication or other dealings with the work; 
'Performing right', in the case of a work which has not been 
performed in public before the commencement of this 
Act, includes the right at common law (if any) to 
restrain the performance thereof in public. 
* In the case of an essay, art£cle, or portion forming part 
of and first published in a review, magazine or other 
periodical or work of a like nature, the right shall be 
subject to any right of publishing the essay. article, 
or portion in a separate form to which the author is 
entitled at the commencement of this Act, or would, if 
this Act had not been passed, have become entitled 
under section eighteen of the Copyright Act. 1842. 
" 
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The position with regard to literary and artistic works was 
straightforward. An existing copyright was substituted by 
the copyright conferred by the 1911 Act on the type of work 
in question. The position with regard to musical and 
dramatic works was, however, more complicated. A distinction 
was drawn between so-called "copyright", i.e. the right to 
restrain reproduction and publication, and the "performing 
right", i.e. the right to perform the work in public. Where 
a work enjoyed "copyright", full copyright under the 1911 
Act, save for the public performance right, was conferred on 
the work. Where a person merely held the performing right 
the 1911 Act conferred upon him only the right to perform 
the work in public. It could happen·that the "copyright" and 
the performing right were held by different persons under 
the pre-1912 legislation with the result that there could be 
a splitting of the ownership of the copyright conferred by 
the 1911 Act in respect of these types of works. 
Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria refers to the system of grant-
ing substituted rights in lieu of existing rights as the 
"1912 Gateway". 55 This description commends itself and will 
be used below. 
The effect of the transitional provisions of the 1911 Act 
embodied in Section 24 was that if existing rights passed 
through the 1912 Gateway they were transformed into "new" or 
substituted rights and were generally speaking treated in 
the same way as rights conferred by the 1911 Act in works 
made thereafter. If, on the other hand, existing rights did 
not pass through the 1912 Gateway they were extinguished. A 
55. Op cit, p 191. 
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work made prior to l July 1912 could only enjoy copyright 
under the 1911 Act to the extent that substituted rights 
were conferred upon it. Generally speaking this meant that 
if the pre-1912 legislation did not grant protection to a 
type of work that work was not protected under the 1911 Act 
and if rights in a work had fallen into the public domain 
under the pre-1912 legislation whether through the effluxion 
of time, the lack of compliance with formalities or for 
whatever cause, those works were granted no protection under 
the 1911 Act. As will be shown below there were, however, 
some instances where the 1911 Act conferred copyright on 
works which had not previously enjoyed copyright under the 
pre-1912 legislation or the common law. 
Save in the case of foreign works, which will be dealt with 
below, the term of copyright enjoyed by works which passed 
through the 1912 Gateway was that granted to that type of 
work by the 1911 Act. In general terms the substituted 
rights granted by the 1911 Act were equivalent to rights 
granted under that Act to works made after 1 July 1912. In 
many instances this meant that the term of a copyright 
existing under the pre-1912 legislation was extended or 
given a new lease of life. 
B. COPYRIGHTS OF BRITISH ORIGIN WHICH PASSED THROUGH THE 
1912 GATEWAY 
In the ensuing paragraphs the copyrights in works of British 
origin which passed through the 1912 Gateway will be 
examined. Firstly, common law copyright in unpublished and 
unperformed works, and thereafter statutory copyright, which 
regulated copyright in all published works, will be dealt 
with. Generally all formalities under the early law must 
have been complied with to make a work eligible for a sub-
stituted right. 
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(1) Unpublished Works 
Unpublished works were protected by the common law and, save 
in the case of paintings, drawings and photographs, which 
will be dealt with below, the copyright in all unpublished 
works as at 1 July 1912 would have passed through the 1912 
Gateway and were superseded by substituted rights. 
Unpublished works enjoyed common law copyright irrespective 
of the nationality and residence of the author. 
(2) Literary Works ("Books") 
This category, which includes literary rights in musical and 
dramatic works, enjoyed protection for the lifetime of the 
author and for a period of seven years after his death, or 
forty-two years from publication, whichever was the longer. 
Accordingly any work published after 1 July 1870 or any work 
the author of which died on or after 1 July 1905 enjoyed 
copyright on 1 July 1912. Such copyright passed through the 
1912 Gateway and was superseded by a substituted right. 
(3) Performing Rights in Dramatic or Musical Works 
For works published in manuscript form the term of the per-
forming right was the life of the author and seven years 
after his death, or a period of forty-two years from the 
date of the first performance of the work, whichever was the 
longer. 56 Accordingly, performing rights in works first per-
formed publicly after 1 July 1870 or the author of which 
died on or after 1 July 1905 were protected on 1. July 1912 
and, having passed through the 1912 Gateway, were superseded 
by substituted rights, i.e. performing rights under the 
56 . In regard to unpublisrm or unperformed dramatic arrl musical works 
see p 131 supr-a. 
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copyright conferred by the 1911 Act. In the case of musical 
works, however, a notice reserving the performing rights of 
every work published after 1882 had to be printed on the 
title page. Consequently no musical work published after 
1882 which did not have the required notice enjoyed perform-
ing rights in 1912 and no substituted rights could be 
granted in respect of such works. 
(4) Engravings (Prints) 
These works enjoyed copyright for a period of twenty-eight 
years from the date of first publication, provided the name 
of the author and the date of first publication was printed 
on each copy. In order to pass through the 1912 Gateway 
engravings must have been published after 30 June 1884 and 
have had the name of the author and date of first pub-
lication printed on every copy. All engravings which met 
these requirements enjoyed copyright on 1 July 1912 and that 
copyright was superseded by the substituted rights. 
(5) Sculptures 
The term of copyright in respect of these works was fourteen 
years after first publication and a further period of four-
teen years if the author was alive at the expiration of the 
initial period and had not assigned his copyright; provided 
that the author's name and the date of first publication had 
appeared on the work. Accordingly, the following types of 
sculptures enjoyed copyright which passed through the 1912 
Gateway: 
(a) All works published after 1 July 1898; 
(b) Any work of which the author was still alive on 1 July 
1898 and had not assigned his copyright, provided the 
first publication took place after 1 July 1884. 
(6) Paintings, Drawings and Photographs 
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The statutory term of copyright in these works was the 
lifetime of the author and seven years after his death. The 
work was protected from the time of its making and this 
applied irrespective of whether the work was published or 
unpublished. In the event that the work was unpublished, 
common law copyright operated in tandem with statutory 
copyright. According to Copinger & Skene James57 the common 
law copyright terminated at the same time as the statutory 
copyright. The other British textbook writers do not appear 
to share this view but after 1 July 1912 it was of no con-
sequence whether it was correct because in any event the 
common law right in a painting, drawing or photograph did 
not pass through the 1912 Gateway in view of the definition 
of the term "copyright" given in the First Schedule to the 
1911 Act. In terms of those provisions common law rights 
only passed through the 1912 Gateway if the pre-1912 
statutory rights in the type of work in question depended 
upon publication and this was not the case with paintings, 
drawings and photographs. 
Save for works made pursuant to a commission, copyright in a 
painting, drawing or photograph was extinguished upon the 
first sale of the work unless the author reserved the 
copyright to himself in writing. 
Copyright in a painting, drawing or photograph passed 
through the 1912 Gateway in the event that the author was 
alive on or after 1 July 1905 and, if the work was sold or 
disposed of after 29 July 1862 and before 1 July 1912 and 
was not a work made pursuant to a commission, the copyright 
was- expressly reserved by the author at the time of first 
sale of the work. 
57. Op cit, p 251. 
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C. PRE- AND POST-1912 GATEWAY FOREIGN WORKS 
(1) Foreign Works 
Generally speaking the term of statutory copyright granted 
under the laws of the various countries of the Berne Union 
and under the law of Austria-Hungary was the lifetime of the 
author and a specified number of years. 58 It will be 
recalled that in terms of the International Copyright Act, 
1886, foreign works were protected in Britain on the same 
basis as domestic works provided the term of copyright 
granted to a foreign work did not exceed the term of 
copyright granted under the law of the country of origin and 
provided further that any formalities prescribed by the 
country of origin were complied with. Accordingly, subject 
to compliance with foreign formalities, foreign published 
works passed through the 1912 Gateway on the s~me basis as 
British works. In some instances foreign countries pres-
cribed fixed terms of years as in the case where the author 
was a body corporate or the work had been anonymously or 
pseudonymously published. Accordingly in assessing whether 
the copyright in a published foreign work passed through the 
1912 Gateway regard should be had to the duration of the 
copyright in that work and the prescribed formalities in the 
country of origin. As far as unpublished and unperformed 
works are concerned, protection was granted in Britain under 
British common law and these works passed through the 1912 
Gateway on the same basis as British works notwithstanding 
non-compliance with formalities in the country of origin. 
However, common law copyright in paintings, drawings and 
58. See pp 140 arrl 142 supra. 
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photographs did not pass through the 1912 Gateway and for-
eign works of this nature could thus not be vested with sub-
stituted rights. Unpublished paintings, drawings and 
photographs originating from foreign countries could thus 
only be vested with substituted rights if the statutory 
copyright still subsisted on 1 July 1912. 
In terms of the 1911 Act and the Orders in Council issued 
thereunder, where a foreign work had been published before 1 
July 1912 the term of substituted or new copyright granted 
to that work was limited to the term granted under the law 
of the country of origin. 59 Accordingly it is possible that 
in the case of some foreign works the term of substituted 
copyright conferred on them by the British Act of 1911 
expired prior to the expiry of the normal term of copyright 
granted under that Act to British works. This point may be 
of some significance to the question of which works passed 
through the equivalent South African 1917 Gateway which will 
be dealt with below. 60 
The position of a foreign work which was unpublished on 1 
July 1912 and upon which substituted rights were conferred 
by the Act of 1912, but which was thereafter first published 
in a non-Berne Convention country was somewhat complex. Pub-
lication in such a country prior to 1 July 1912 would have 
extinguished the copyright61 but it is not clear what the 
position would have been under the 1911 Act. There is no 
doubt that publication in these circumstances of a work 
" which was made after 1 July 1912 would have extinguished the 
59. S.R. & 0. 1912 No. 913, Article 2, proviso (ii). See also Laddie, 
Pl:esuJlt and Vitoria, op cit, p 206. 
60. see p 359 infra. 
61. Internatict1al Copyright Act, 1844, s 19. 
153. 
copyright. According to Laddie Prescott and Vitoria62 there 
are two alternative points of view. Firstly, it can be con-
tended that once the copyright in a work had passed through 
the 1912 Gateway it could only lose copyright by the expiry 
of the term provided for in the Act and first publication of 
the work in a non-Berne Convention country was of no con-
sequence. The alternative view is that Section 24 ( 1) 
required the term of substituted rights to be treated as 
though the 1911 Act had been in force when the work in ques-
tion was made and on that premise copyright would be 
extinguished by first publication in a non-Berne Convention 
country because such publication was a factor which 
influenced the term of the copyright. The learned authors do 
not indicate any preference for either of these points of 
view. The first point of view is to be preferred because 
publication in a non-Berne Convention country is a factor 
which influences the subsistence (or rather continued sub-
sistence) of copyright and not strictly speaking the term of 
copyright. There is a difference in principle between these 
two concepts and it is felt that the term of copyright 
relates to a number of years and not to the conditions which 
must be met for copyright to subsist at all, leaving aside 
the duration of that copyright if it is found to subsist. On 
this premise the place of first publication of a work which 
had passed through the 1912 Gateway is of no consequence to 
the term of copyright. The place of first publication of a 
work made after 1 July 1912 is, however, of relevance to the 
continued subsistence of copyright in a hitherto unpublished 
work and insofar as that first publication may have taken 
place prior to 1 January 1917 it may have relevance to sub-
stituted rights under the South African Act of 1916 as will 
62. Op cit, p 207. 
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be shown below.63 
Prior to the outbreak of the First World War in 1914 works 
originating from Germany and. from Austria-Hungary were 
granted copyright in Britain by virtue of the international 
provisions of the 1911 Act. The Trading with the Enemy Acts, 
1914 to 1918 provided that the copyright in works made or 
first published prior to the outbreak of the war and belong-
ing to an enemy became vested in the Custodian of Enemy 
Property. In regard to works made or first published after 
the outbreak of the war and belonging to an enemy the Trad-
ing with the Enemy (Copyright) Act, 1916, similarly provided 
that such copyright should vest in the Custodian of Enemy 
Property. According to Copinger & Skene James6 4 a large num-
ber of enemy copyrights were vested in the Custodian during 
the war and licences were granted to use such works. The 
Treaties of Peace caused the copyrights to be revested in 
their former owners subject to certain conditions which as 
far as Germany and Austria were concerned were set out in an 
Order in Council· dated 9 November 1920. However, such 
revesting took place after 1 January 1917, the operative 
date of the South African, 1917 Gateway. The subsequent 
reversion of copyright accordingly did not affect rights 
which had passed through the South African 1917 Gateway. 
The United States of America was not a party to the Berne 
Convention and prior to 1915 no special arrangements as to 
copyright were made between Britain and the United States of 
America. Prior to 1915, therefore, American works enjoyed no 
copyright in Britain save to the extent that prior to 1912 
63. See p 359 infra. 
64. Op cit, p 293. 
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they enj eyed common law copyright while unpublished and 
statutory copyright where the vesting thereof was brought 
about by first publication or first public performance in 
the United Kingdom. By an Order in Council dated 3 February 
1915 made under Section 29 of the 1911 Act, copyright was 
extended in Britain to unpublished works of which the author 
was at the date of the making of the work a United States 
subject or citizen or was resident in the United States. No 
copyright was, however, granted to works first published in 
the United States of America. These works only came to enjoy 
protection in the United Kingdom in 1920 but as this was 
after the time of the South African 1917 Gateway the ques-
tion is of no relevance. 
Works originating from the British Colonies were in· a dif-
ferent category to foreign works and the aforegoing is not 
applicable to them. This question will be dealt with sepa-
rately below. 
(2) Colonial Works 
Works originating from the British Colonies, in the sense 
that their authors belonged to a British Colony or the works 
were first published or performed in a British Colony, in 
which copyright subsisted on 1 July 1912 were treated in the 
same way as British works. However, no such works besides 
paintings, drawings and photographs made prior to 1886 
enjoyed statutory copyright, as distinct from common law 
copyright in view of the fact that the International 
Copyright Act of that year was not retrospective in respect 
of such works. The rules set out above regarding copyright 
in British works which passed through the 1912 Gateway must 
therefore be qualified in the case of colonial works to the 
extent that, save for paintings, drawings and photographs, 
they must have been first published (or first publicly per-
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formed in the case of musical and dramatic works) or first 
made, as the case may be, after 25 June 1886 apart from the 
normal requirements which had to be met. 
In regard to the 1911 Act it is necessary to divide the then 
existing British possessions into two broad categories, 
namely, firstly, the self-governing colonies, i.e. Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and Newfoundland, and 
secondly, the possessions other than the self-governing 
colonies, the protectorates and Cyprus. 65 The 1911 Act 
extended ab initio to the second category of territories but 
empowered such territories to make variations thereto appli-
cable only to works of local origin. In broad terms, 
however, and subject to any local variations, works 
originating from this category of dominions were treated in 
Britain in the same way as works originating from the 
motherland. A different position obtained in the case of the 
first category of territories. 
Section 24(1) of the 1911 Act provided that the Act did not 
extend to a self-governing dominion unless the legislature 
of that dominion declared it to be in force either with or 
without modifications and subject to any modification which 
may be enacted by such a dominion legislature. Newfoundland 
adopted the Act without any modifications while Australia 
and South Africa adopted it with certain modifications. 
Canada and New Zealand, on the other hand, did not adopt the 
Act as such but passed independent Acts along similar lines. 
65. TtE se::x:xrl category o:rnprised CypnJ.s, Bechuanaland Protectorate, 
East Africa Protectorate, Gambia Protectorate, Gilbert and Ellice 
Islands Protectorate, Northem Nigeria Protectorate, Northern Ter-
ritories of thl Gold Coast, Nyasaland Protectorate, Northern Rh:Jdesia, 
Southlrn Rh:Jdesia, Sierra Leone Protectorate, Sanaliland Protectorate, 
Southlrn Nigeria Protectorate, So1cm:n Islands Protectorate, Swazilarrl 
and Uganda Protectorate. 
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The effect of a self-governing dominion adopting the British 
1911 Act, with or without modifications, was that works 
originating from those dominions were treated in the same 
way as if they were works originating from the motherland 
and such works thus enjoyed full copyright in the United 
Kingdom. Both Australia and Newfoundland adopted the 1911 
Act in 1912 and thus from the outset works originating from 
these dominions enjoyed copyright in the United Kingdom. 
Section 25(2) of the 1911 Act provided that if the Secretary 
of State certified by notice published in the London Gazette 
that any self-governing dominion had passed legislation 
under which the works of authors from the United Kingdom or 
other parts of the British dominions enjoyed substantially 
the same protection conferred upon such works by the Act of 
1911, works emanating from that Dominion then enjoyed the 
full benefit of the 1911 Act and were granted copyright in 
the United Kingdom as if they were works emanating from the 
motherland itself. New Zealand passed its Independent Act in 
1913 and works originating from New Zealand were granted the 
aforementioned recognition on 27 March 1914. Canada, 
however, only passed its Independent Act in 1923 and works 
originating from Canada were granted the aforementioned 
recognition in the same year. 
January 1917 no Canadian works 
This means that as at 1 
enjoyed copyright in the 
United Kingdom save those which had been granted substituted 
rights through having passed through the 1912 Gateway. 
South. Africa adopted the 1911 Act with variations in 1916 
and brought it into operation on 1 January 1917. Works 
originating from South. Africa were thus treated in the 
United Kingdom in the same way as works originating from the 
motherland with effect from 1 January 1917. The effect of 
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the adoption of the 1911 Act by South Africa in 1917 was 
that South African works enjoyed copyright in the United 
Kingdom as if they were works emanating from the motherland 
from 1 July 1912. This applies equally to Newfoundland, 
Australia and New Zealand.66 The Irish Free State was deemed 
to be a self-governing dominion for the purposes of the 1911 
Act in 1930, but for the purposes of the South African 1917 
Gateway works originating from this country were in the same 
category as Canada and its post-1912 works were not pro-
tected in the United Kingdom as of 1917. 
D. WORKS PROTECTED IN THE 1911 ACT 
(1) Summary of Works Protected 
This subject will be dealt with in detail in Chapter V and 
for the present a brief summary will be given. 
The 1911 Act conferred copyright on original, literary, 
dramatic, musical and artistic works. Certain cinematograph 
films were treated as a species of the genus "dramatic 
works" and sound recordings were protected as if they were 
musical works. In order to enjoy copyright the aforemen-: 
tioned categories of works must have, if published, been 
first published in the United Kingdom or a territory to 
which the operation of the Act had been extended, or if 
unpublished, the author must have been a British subject or 
a resident or the subject or resident of a terri tory to 
which the operation of the Acts had been extended. The term 
66. See Secticn 1(1) read together with Secticn 25 of the 1911 Act. 
On:::e the daninicn had adopted the 1911 Act = a certificate in terms of 
Secticn 25(2) had been issued the WOiks in questicn fell within the 
provisicns of Secticn 1(i)(a) arrl (b) arrl Secticn 1(i) had retrospective 
effect in the sense that it covered all WOiks made after 1 July 1912. 
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of copyright was generally speaking, the lifetime of the 
author of the work and a period of fifty years after his 
death. 
In conferring copyright on sound recordings and 
cinematograph films, albeit somewhat indirectly, the 1911 
Act created two new categories of works eligible for 
copyright. As will be shown later this may have had a sig-
nificant effect on the approach in the South African legis-
lature in 1916. 
In general terms, the scope of copyright granted under the 
1911 Act was broader than the scope of copyright granted 
under the pre-1912 legislation. Works which passed through 
the 1912 Gateway enjoyed the broadened scope of copyright as 
well as the longer term of copyright granted in the 1911 
Act. This created certain problems which will be adverted to 
below. 
Save with one exception, the 1911 Act did not grant 
copyright retrospectively in works made prior to 1912; it 
granted substituted rights ·for existing copyrights which 
passed through the 1912 Gateway. The exception was in the 
case of sound recordings which were considered to be "musi-
cal works". Section 19( 8) of the 1911 Act provided that, 
where a record, perforated roll or other contrivance by 
means of which sounds may be mechanically produced was made 
prior to 1912, copyright would subsist in such article as if 
the new legislation had been in force at the date of ·the 
making of the original plate from which the contrivance was 
directly or indirectly derived. The person who was the owner 
of the original plate was designated as the first owner of 
the copyright in the "sound recording" . No copyright was, 
however, granted to a contrivance if the making of that con-
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trivance would have amounted to infringement of the 
copyright in another contrivance assuming that such con-
trivance had been protected by copyright at the time of such 
making. 
(2) Inferior Substituted Rights 
In some instances the 1911 Act in conferring substituted 
rights on works made prior to 1 July 1912 derogated from 
rights conferred by the pre-1912 law and certain authors 
were worse off under it than they had been under the earlier 
law. Under the old law a photograph enjoyed copyright during 
the lifetime of the author and for seven years after his 
death. Under the 1911 Act, however, the term of copyright in 
a photograph was fifty years from the making of the nega-
tive. On 1 July 1912 a photograph which had been taken more 
than fifty years earlier lost its copyright even though the 
author may still have been alive or might have died less 
than seven years earlier. 
The 1911 Act made provision for the granting of certain com-
pulsory licences thirty years after the author's death. 
Under the old law an author's copyright was unqualified for 
its entire duration whereas under the 1911 Act it became a 
qualified one thirty years after his death. 
Under the old law a foreign author who was not resident in. a 
country to which the operation of the statutory law had been 
extended could obtain common law copyright which was per-
petual while the work remained unpublished but was 
extinguished once publication took place. Under the 1911 
Act, however, the works of such a person made after 1912 
would enjoy no copyright until he published his work and 
then only if publication took place in the United Kingdom or 
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a country to which the operation of the Act had been 
extended. 
Under the old law the foreign author of a dramatic work 
could acquire statutory copyright in the United Kingdom by 
first performing the work in that country. Under the 1911 
Act, however, performance was not considered to be pub-
lication and was therefore not an act which caused the 
investing of copyright. The performing rights in a dramatic 
work of foreign origin first performed in the United Kingdom 
prior to 1 July 1912 were, however, perpetuated in terms of 
Section 24(1)(i) of the 1911 Act. 
E. PROTECTION OF VESTED INTERESTS IN THE 1911 ACT 
As explained above, the scope of the substituted rights con-
ferred upon works whereof the earlier copyright had passed 
through the 1912 Gateway was in certain instances greater 
than the scope of the old copyright and this had the effect 
of making Acts unlawful after 1 July 1912 which had been 
lawful prior to that date. This problem was catered for in 
proviso (b) to Section 24(1) of the 1911 Act. In terms of 
this provision where a person prior to 26 July 1910 (the 
date when the Bill which gave rise to the 1911 Act was first 
introduced into Parliament) had taken any action whereby he 
incurred any expenditure or liability in connection with the 
reproduction or performance of any work in any manner which 
was at the time lawful, or had taken any lawful preparatory 
action to making such reproduction or performance, the new 
legislation could not prejudice any rights or interest aris-
ing from such action which were subsisting and valuable at 
the specified date, unless the person who became the owner 
of the rights in question paid compensation in an agreed 
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amount, or failing agreement, as determined by arbitration. 
A vested right was thus created in favour of such a person. 
A substantially similar provision was contained in the 
International Copyright Act, 1886. Copinger & Skene James67 
discusses a number of cases dealing with the questions which 
were decided under the International Copyright Act, 1886. On 
the strength of these cases the term "rights" meant, for 
instance, the right of the maker of an original translation 
to restrain others from copying his translation, while the 
term "interest" meant, for instance, the interest of a pub-
lisher who had invested capital in the production of a pub-
lished copy of a work and depended upon sales of the pub-
lished copy to obtain a return on his investment. The inter-
est must, however, have had a commercial value of some sub-
stance at the time of the doing of the act which would in 
principle have been an infringement of the copyright 
embodied in the substituted right. 
The First Schedule to the 1911 Act provided that in the case 
of an essay, article or portion forming part of and first 
published in a review, magazine or other periodical or work 
of a like nature, the substituted right conferred by the 
1911 Act was subject to any right of publishing the essay, 
article or portion in a separate form to which the author 
was entitled at the commencement of the Act or would have 
been entitled in terms of Section 18 of the Copyright Act, 
1842, if the 1911 Act had not been passed. 
F. ASSIGNMENTS OF PRE-1912 WORKS 
67. Op cit, p 254, et seq. 
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Where a substituted right was granted under the 1911 Act in 
the case of a work which existed prior to 1 July 1912 it 
could happen, as explained above, that the term of the sub-
stituted right exceeded the term of the old right. Where the 
copyright in a pre-1912 work had been assigned prior to 1 
July 1912 the substituted right was conferred upon the 
assignee and in principle therefore the assignee enjoyed the 
benefit of the increased term of copyright. However, proviso 
(a) to Section 24(1) of the 1911 Act altered this situation. 
In terms of this provision the ownership of the substituted 
right reverted to the author of the work upon the expiry of 
the term which would have been applicable if the right which 
had existed prior to 1 July 1912 had continued to be in 
operation. If the author of the work was no longer living 
then the rights reverted to his heirs. This situation could, 
however, be amended by agreement by the parties. 
Upon the reversion of the rights to the author of the work, 
the interest of the person who held the rights immediately 
prior to their reversion was terminated. Where such a person 
was, however, the owner of the right in question immediately 
prior to the reversion he was granted the right, after 
giving appropriate notice, to take assignment of the right 
or to be granted a similar interest in the work for the 
remainder of the term of the substituted copyright - a con-
sideration was payable to the owner of the reversionary 
right and if the amount of this compensation could not be 
agreed upon, it could be determined by arbitration; alterna-
tively, such person could continue to reproduce or perform 
the work as he had in the past, subject to payment, if so 
demanded by the author within three years after the date at 
which the existing right would have expired, of royalties to 
the author - the amount of the royal ties could be agreed 
upon, or failing such agreement, could be determined by 
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arbitration. Where the work in question was incorporated in 
a collective work and the reversionary owner was the owner 
of the copyright in that collective work, no compensation 
was payable. 
The aforementioned provisions thus created vested rights in 
favour of a person other than the copyright owner. 
The assignee's vested rights as aforementioned only applied 
where the assignment was for the full term of copyright. If 
the assignment had been for a specified term which was less 
than the full term of the old copyright, the author enjoyed 
the full benefit of the extended term of the new copyright 
unqualified by any vested rights in favour of the assignee. 
The reversion did not occur where the "assignee" had 
acquired the old copyright by a means other than the actual 
execution of a Deed of Assignment by the author, for 
instance, where the author had made the work pursuant to a 
commission and the person giving the commission was the ini-
tial copyright owner from the outset. 
In terms of Section 24(l)(a) the extended copyright did not 
revert to the author if there was an express agreement to 
the contrary between the author and the assignee. In the 
"Redwood case"68 the meaning of this provision was analyzed 
and determined. It was held by the House of Lords, agreeing 
with the Court of Appeal, that "an 'express agreement:' in 
this context is an agreement: which refers to the substiEut:ed 
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68. A series of cases in the Cl1arxJery Division, the Court of Appeal 
an:i culminatin] in the House of lords as <llappel.l & Calpany Limi. ted & 
Others v Re<WxJd Music Limited; Redwood Music Limited v Francis Day & 
Hunter Limi. ted & Another ( 1981) RFC 337. 
rights in terms ... clearly identifying the right by naming 
it ... ". 69 It had been held in the court of first instance 
that an express agreement did not mean an agreement which 
explicitly referred to the new copyright as such but rather 
an agreement which uses express terms wide enough to include 
the new copyright. This view was refuted by the House of 
Lords which held that "there must be an agreement which 
expressly states that this (i.e. the non-reversion of 
copyright) is not to happen and that can be made clear 
beyond all doubt. Wide general words will not, in my view, 
suffice". 70 (Words in parenthesis added) 
Proviso (a) to Section 24( 1) also provided that where an 
individual work is incorporated in a collective work and 
the copyright in such individual work was assigned before 
the commencement of the Act, and the assignee is the owner 
of the copyright in respect of the collective work, the 
·assignee could continue to reproduce the work without pay-
ment to the author during the extended term of the 
copyright. This provision was not applicable to the situa-
tion where an individual \-fOrk was created in such circum-
stances that someone else besides the author was the initial 
owner of the copyright; for instance, where the author was 
employed by another person to write works. 
In the light of the aforegoing it is clear that the term 
"collective work" has a special significance. One of the 
major issues in the Redwood case was the question of what 
constituted a "collective work" under the 1911 Act. The term 
was defined in Section 35(1) as follows: 
69. At p 343. 
70. Per Viscount Dilh::xrne at p 344. 
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"(a) an encyclopaedia, dictionary, year book or similar 
work; 
(b) a newspaper, review, magazine, or similar peri-
odical; and 
(c) any work written in distinct parts by different 
authors, or in which works or parts of works of 
different authors are incorporated;" 
The case related to the copyright in songs comprising both 
lyrics and music. It was contended that a song fell within 
paragraph (c) of the definition of "collective work" and 
therefore constituted a collective work. The court held that 
the music and lyrics of a song each had their own separate 
copyrights and there was no third separate copyright in the 
actual song; a song is thus not a collective work. Lord Rus-
sell of Killowen motivated the point thus 
". . . when the Act speaks of a 'collective work', in my 
opinion it refers to a totality in which copyright 
exists in addition to and apart from any copyright 
which exist in its constituent parts. This is, in my 
opinion, so in the word 'work' in paragraph (c) of the 
definition of 'collective work' where that work first 
appears ... the collective work is something which by 
original collocation or arrangement has a copyright of 
its own and it is the assignment of that copyright 
which is excepted from the proviso ... There being, in 
the case of the song in question, no third and separate 
copyright in the combination of the words and music the 
song is not, in my opinion, a collective work". 71 
Although the point is nowhere mentioned in any of the judge-
ments in the Redwood case it is submitted that the rationale 
applicable to when two or more individual works make up a 
71. At p 348-9. 
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collective work is that the works in question must all be of 
the same category, i.e. two or more literary works, two or 
more musical works, two or more artistic works, etc. A musi-
cal work and a literary work cannot constitute a collective 
·work (as in a song) and similarly a literary work and an 
artistic work cannot constitute a collective work. This is 
logical because copyright law both prior to 1912 and there-
after prescribed different conditions for the subsistence of 
the different categories of works and granted exclusive 
rights in respect of different restricted acts. If a song 
were to be a collective work, which conditions for the sub-
sistence of copyright would have to be met and which 
restricted acts would apply to the collective work, those of 
a literary work or of an artistic work? 
G. GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS AND UNIVERSITY COPYRIGHT 
In terms of Section 18 of the 1911 Act where any work has, 
whether before or after the commencement of the Act, been 
prepared or published by or under the direction or control 
of the sovereign or any government department, the copyright 
in the work vested in the sovereign unless otherwise pro-
vided in an agreement with the author. The term of copyright 
in such works was a period of fifty years from the date of 
first publication of the work. Where a work had been made by 
a private individual and it was subsequently published by or 
under the control of the crown or any government department 
the copyright was transferred to the Crown unless there was 
an express agreement to the contrary. 72 
The Act preserved the copyright enjoyed by universities and 
colleges in terms of the Copyright Act, 1775. 
72. See Copinger & Ska1e .Janes, op cit, p 245. 
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H. WORKS MADE DURING THE CURRENCY OF THE 1911 ACT 
Further and indepth discussions of provisions of the 1911 
Act dealing with or relating to the subsistence of copyright 
and the ownership and duration of such copyright takes place 
in Chapter V below. 
169. 
CHAPTER IV 
COPYRIGHT IN SOUTH AFRICA PRIOR TO 1917 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Prior to the coming into operation of the Patents, Designs, 
Trade Marks and Copyright Act, 1916, on 1 January 1917, 
copyright law in South Africa was in a very confused and 
disjointed state. Its existence and development was greatly 
influenced and determined by constitutional events and 
developments and it is necessary to give a brief outline of 
such developments. 
The 1916 Act, like the British Act of 1911, which it 
incorporated, provided for a "gateway" through which exist-
ing copyrights in South Africa must have passed, whereupon 
substituted rights were conferred upon the works in question 
by the 1916 Act. Save in exceptional circumstances and in 
the case of certain works which enjoyed copyright in Britain 
in 1916, a work which did not enjoy copyright in South 
Africa on 1 January 1917, for whatever reason - whether its 
copyright had expired by that date or whether it had never 
qualified for copyright prior to that date - was in the pub-
lic domain. As in the case of British works made prior to 
1912, it is necessary to ascertain which works enjoyed 
copyright in South Africa prior to 1917, the identity of the 
owner of any such copyright and the duration of such 
copyright. 
Prior to 1917 works could derive copyright from domestic law 
or from pre-1911 British copyright law which operated in 
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South Africa. Furthermore, British copyright in any musical, 
dramatic or artistic work subsisting by virtue of the 
British Act of 1911 and existing in the United Kingdom on 1 
January 1917 was conferred in South Africa to the same 
extent as such copyright subsisted in the United Kingdom. 1 
In this Chapter each of the aforegoing sources of copyright 
which gave rise to post-1917 gateway copyright in South 
Africa will be examined. 
In order to trace the origins of South African copyright in 
domestic law prior to 1917 it is necessary briefly to 
examine the Roman-Dutch common law and as a prelude to this 
the constitutional development of the Cape during the time 
when it was a Dutch possession. 
As was shown in Chapter I I I, to a certain ex tent whether 
works originating from South Africa prior to 1912 enjoyed 
copyright in Britain and by virtue of British copyright law 
enjoyed copyright in South Africa, depended upon whether the 
maker of the work was a British subject or was resident in a 
British dominion. It is thus necessary to analyze which 
individuals residing in South Africa during the 19th Century 
and in the early 20th Century were British subjects or were 
resident in a British dominion. 
2. EARLY HISTORY OF THE CAPE 
(1) Settlement at the Cape 
The Cape of Good Hope was first settled by Whites in 1652 
with the arrival of Jan van Riebeeck and his party in April 
of that year. From that time until 1795 the Cape was a Dutch 
possession. 
1. Section 147(1) of tOO Act of 1916. 
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(2) The Republic of the United Netherlands 
At that time The Netherlands was a republic which comprised 
a number of largely autonomous provinces. The most important 
of these was the Province of Holland which comprised the 
major cities such as Amsterdam and The Hague. The various 
provinces had their own governments which were called 
''Provincial States". The Provincial States had legislative 
power over their respective territories. The provinces were 
virtually autonomous republics. 
The Republic of the United Netherlands, as the country was 
called, had an umbrella body called the "Estates General • 
which comprised representatives of the various Provincial 
States and which had the function of looking after the com-
mon interests of the various provinces. The Estates General 
had very little, if any, internal authority in the 
provinces. The main functions of the Estates General was to 
conduct foreign affairs and matters of defence. The Republic 
incorporated certain territories which did not have the 
status of provinces. These territories were known as the 
"Generality Territories •. The Estates General held author-
ity, including legislative authority, over these Generality 
Territories. The general administration of the republic as a 
whole was undertaken by a type of executive body called the 
Council of States (Raad van Staten). 
(3) The Dutch East India Company 
The Republic's overseas possessions fell under the jurisdic-
tion of the Estates General. The Estates General did not 
itself, or through the Council of States, undertake the 
administration and control of the overseas possessions but 
rather entrusted these functions to two chartered companies, 
namely, the United East India Company ( Vereenigde Oost-
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Indische Compagnie) and the West India Company. The refresh-
ment station established by Jan van Riebeeck at the Cape 
fell under the jurisdiction of the East India Company. In 
terms of its charter, granted in 1602, the East India Com-
pany was given the trade monopoly in the Dutch possessions 
in the East. The control of the East India Company was 
vested in an executive body called the "Heeren Sewentien". 
The Estates General delegated many of its powers in respect 
of the eastern possessions to the East India Company, 
including those of appointing administrative and judicial 
officials. The company was not, however, given any legisla-
tive powers nor any directions as to what laws the judicial 
officials should apply. 
(4) Legislative Authority 
In order to assist the East India Company with the adminis-
tration of the territories under its control, which were 
primarily the territories which subsequently became 
Indonesia (the capital of which was at the time named 
Batavia), an executive committee known as the "Raad van 
India" or "Hoar Regeering" was constituted. In time this 
body exercised quasi judicial and legislative functions over 
the eastern territories, including the Cape. It did not, 
however, have any formal legislative authority over such 
territories. 
The Estates General was the only institution which had 
legislative authority over the territories administered by 
the East India Company and thus over the Cape. None of the 
Provincial States, including that of Holland, had this 
power. 
While under the control of the East India Company the Cape 
was administered by a Governor appointed by the Company 
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together with a body called the "Raad van Poli tie". The 
Governor together with the Raad had widespread powers of a 
localized nature dealing with matters such as local taxa-
tion, the granting of monopolies and issuing of licences and 
the like. In keeping with its position and functions it 
issued local statutes called "placaaten". The placaaten were 
subject to veto from higher authorities in Batavia and in 
The Netherlands. 
(5) First British Occupation 
In 1795 France assumed control of the Republic of the United 
Netherlands and the Batavian Republic was established in The 
Netherlands. In the meantime the United East India Company 
had gone into decline and its charter was terminated early 
in 1796. Britain, which was at war with France, despatched a 
naval task force to the Cape to forestall its being taken 
over by France. The British naval task force was required to 
take the Cape by force which was achieved at the Battle of 
Muizenberg. The British occupation was intended only to be 
of a temporary nature and very few changes were made at the 
Cape during this time. With the conclusion of the Peace of 
Amiens in Europe the Cape was :r;eturned to the Batavian 
Republic. This took place in February 1803. 
(6) The Cape under the Batavian Republic 
During the time of the East India Company the status of the 
Cape was simply that of a halfway station between Europe and 
the East. When it came under the control of the Batavian 
Republic its status was enhanced to that of a fully fledged 
colony. It came directly under the control of the Batavian 
government in The Netherlands and it was regarded as a 
province of the Batavian Republic, albeit an overseas one. 
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During this period the first printing press was established 
at the Cape. This took place in 1800. This occurrence was 
not without significance to the development of the law of 
copyright in South Africa. 
(7) Second British Occupation 
The Batavian Republic was in effect a satellite of France 
and thus inevitably became involved in the resumption of war 
between France and England in May 1803. Against this back-
ground it was merely a matter of time before the British 
would reoccupy the Cape. After the danger that Napoleon 
would invade England had abated a British task force was 
sent to the Cape and on 18 January 1806, after the Battle of 
Blaauwberg, the Cape was surrendered to Britain. This marked 
the end of direct Dutch influence on the Cape and subsequent 
events in Holland such as the codification of Dutch law 
under Napoleon had no direct bearing on the course of events 
at the Cape and in South Africa as a whole. 2 
3. CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA DURING THE 
19TH AND EARLY 20TH CENTURY 
A. BRIEF HISTORY 
2. Tl'e aforegcin;j is derived fron tl"e following works: CFJ Muller, 
500 Jaar Suid-Afrikaanse Geskiedenis; JP van der Marwe, Die Kaap <i1der 
die Bataafse Republiek 1803 tot 1806; 00 Visagie, Regspleging en Reg aan 
die Kaap van 1652 tot 1806; DH van Zyl, Geskiedenis van die Ram:rlns Hol-
landse Reg; HR Hahlo and Ellison Kahn, '!be Union of South Africa -
Develq;:m:nt of its Laws and Ccnsti tutia1 ( !Ereafter referred to as "Ccn-
stitutial"); HR Hahlo and Ellison Kahn, '!be South African Legal Systan 
and its Bad<ground" (!Ereafter referred to as "Legal Systan"). 
175. 
In 1806 the Cape was occupied by the British for the second 
time and it became a Crown colony entirely subject to 
British rule. The British authority over the Cape was 
finally settled or ratified by the Convention of London. At 
that time the colonial boundary stretched far inland to the 
Great Fish River in the north-east and the mountainous 
regions north of Graaff-Reinet. 
Shortly after the British took control of the Cape the 
Colonial Government began to put into effect measures to 
emancipate Coloured slaves and labourers. This caused 
resentment among the colonists. In 1820 British settlers 
arrived at the Cape. This increased the British character of 
the Cape. In 1828 an Ordinance was passed which freed the 
indigenous Hottentots from the vagrancy laws and granted 
them the rights of citizenship. At the same time traditional 
Dutch administrative institutions were abolished and English 
was proclaimed the sole official language of the colony. 
Local administrative autonomy began to develop. In 1834 the 
British parliament enacted legislation freeing the slaves 
and thereafter the slaves also became citizens. 
The Dutch or "Afrikaner" colonists became increasingly dis-
enchanted with British rule. They felt that the British 
government was more concerned about the welfare of the other 
ethnic groups than them. Their resentment was increased by 
the inconsistent and vacillating policy of the British 
towards marauding African tribes on the eastern border. The 
feeling developed among Afrikaners that they should depart 
from the colony and free themselves from British rule; they 
wished to found a new state where there would be no equality 
between Whites and Coloureds. These sentiments gave rise to 
the Great Trek which commenced in 1836. The Trek brought 
about the occupation of the interior which was at that stage 
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virtually uninhabited. White communities were established in 
Natal, in the territory between the Orange and the Vaal 
Rivers and beyond the Vaal River. 
The first Voortrekker Republic to be established was that of 
Natal in 1839. Natal co-existed with Zulu! and which was a 
separate state under its own king or chief. In 1843 Natal 
was annexed by Britain and it became a British Colony and 
thereafter most of the Afrikaners moved out to settle north 
of the Orange and Vaal Rivers but a few hundred remained 
behind in the northern districts of Natal. In May 1844 Natal 
became a district of the Cape Colony. In 1845 an administra-
tion consisting of a Lieutenant-Governor assisted by a Coun-
cil of five members was appointed but this administration 
only had executive powers. Legislative authority was 
exercised by the Cape Government. In the middle of the 19th 
Century the population of Natal was increased by immigration 
from European countries, but mainly from Britain. 
In 1856 Natal was separated from the Cape Colony and it 
became a separate Crown Colony. Provision was made for a 
legislative Council of four officials and twelve elected 
members. The new constitution. came into operation on 24 
March 1857. The Council was empowered to pass legislation 
subject to approval by the Lieutenant Governor or the 
British Sovereign. The Anglo-Zulu war occurred in 1879 and 
it culminated in the defeat of the Zulus. Notwithstanding 
this, Zululand was not annexed to Natal. Instead, Zululand 
was divided into thirteen districts each under the jurisdic-
tion of a chief who ruled under the supervision of a British 
resident. In 1893 Natal was granted responsible government 
and a parliament consisting of two chambers was created. 
Executive authority lay with a Governor and a Cabinet. 
Zululand was annexed by the British on 19 May 1887 and 
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Togoland in 1895. They were not, however, incorporated into 
Natal but instead became separate British colonies. In 
December 1897, however, both Zululand and Togoland were 
incorporated into Natal. 
The Afrikaners who left Natal together with others from the 
Cape settled between the Orange and the Vaal Rivers and 
north of the Vaal.· In February 1848 the British annexed the 
land between the Orange, Vaal and the Drakensberg. This ter-
ri tory was called the "Orange River Sovereignty". The con-
stitutional status of this terri tory was uncertain but in 
1851 a separate government under a Lieutenant-Governor was 
created for it. This terri tory and the terri tory north of 
the Vaal were later recognized as independent states by 
Britain. The independence of the Transvaal, or South African 
Republic, was recognized by Britain in 1852 (by the Sand 
River Convention) and that of the Orange Free State in 1854 
(by the Bloemfontein Convention). 
The official languages of both republics were Dutch. Both 
republics were governed by a Volksraad with an independent 
executive and with an elected president. With the adoption 
of the Sand River and Bloemfontein Conventions all ties 
between the trekkers and Britain were loosened and the two 
republics ceased to be subject in any way to Britain. 
Meanwhile after numerous wars between the Free State and the 
Basuto's on their eastern border, Basutoland was declared a 
British possession in 1868. The Basuto's henceforth became 
British subjects and Basutoland became a British territory. 
In 1871 Basutoland became part of the Cape Colony but in 
1884 it was disannexed from the Cape and it became a British 
Colony. 
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In the Cape Colony, after the departure of the trekkers more 
and more British immigrants arrived, particularly in the 
1850's. This process was accelerated when diamonds were dis-
covered in the 1860's. In 1872 the Colony was granted 
responsible government with a constitution on the British 
model having an elected parliament of two houses and a 
cabinet which was responsible to it. The influx of 
immigrants and the steadily increasing population, together 
with the conflict with the Xhosas on the eastern border 
brought about a series of Kaffir wars and the result was 
that the boundaries of the Colony were extended by annexa-
tions of tribal terri tory. Gradually the borders were 
extended northward and eastward. Other areas such as Gri-
qualand West (in 1871), Fingoland and Griqualand East (in 
1877), Walvis Bay (in 1884), Tembuland, Golekaland and Bom-
vamaland (in 1885) and Pondoland in 1894 were incorporated 
into the Cape. 
In 1847 the terri tory between the Keiskamma and the Kei 
Rivers was annexed to the Cape as a separate British depend-
ency under the name British Kaffraria. In 1860 it became a 
Crown Colony and in 1865 it was incorporated into the Cape. 
Ultimately towards the end of the 19th Century the Cape was 
linked up with Natal. 
The independence of the Free State and the absence of 
British control north of the Orange River did not last long. 
In 1867 diamonds were discovered in the district of Hopetown 
in the west of the Free State Republic. Nicholas Waterboer, 
the Griqua Chief, laid claim to the land on which the 
diamond diggings had arisen. This claim was based on a 
treaty that his father, Andries Waterboer, had entered into 
with Governor D' Urban. These claims led ultimately to 
Britain annexing all the terri tory claimed by Waterboer. 
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This terri tory was thereafter incorporated in the Cape 
Colony and became known as Griqualand West. 
The dispute concerning the diamond fields also had an effect 
on the Transvaal because part of the diamond fields fell 
within the territory of the Transvaal. The Transvaal did not 
accept the British annexation of the area in question and 
the outcome was that Britain tacitly allowed the Transvaal 
to continue exercising control over the disputed area. 
The Transvaal became increasingly involved with difficulties 
with African tribes, more particularly the Bapedi under 
Sekukuni, and war broke out with this tribe. Gold was dis-
covered near the eastern border of the Transvaal and this 
drew attention to the Transvaal, more particularly, from the 
British. One of the problems faced by the Transvaal was that 
it did not have its own link to the sea and it was con-
sidered essential that it should have this faci'li ty so that 
it could become truly independent. In 1875 President Burgers 
began negotiations with the Portuguese with a view to con-
structing a railway line from Pretoria to Delagoa Bay. Pres-
ident Burgers visited Britain and Europe in connection with 
the railway scheme and received a sympathetic reception from 
the European countries. This caused concern amongst the 
British that their influence in Southern Africa might be 
threatened. 
At the time Lord Carnavon, the Secretary for the colonies, 
wished to bring about a federation of the colonies and 
states in South Africa. The proposed railway link between 
Pretoria and Delagoa Bay was seen as a threat to this feder-
ation plan. In 1877 in defiance of the Sand River Convention 
and on the pretext of the Transvaal's financial and military 
weakness, Britain annexed the Transvaal. 
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The annexation of the Transvaal by Britain, far from promot-
ing the ideal of a federation of South African states, 
caused much resentment in the Transvaal and in the Free 
State as well as resistance from the Cape Colony. Deputa-
tions from the Transvaal visited London and Britain was 
urged to undo its annexation of the Transvaal. In 1880 the 
Transvaal rose up against British rule and shortly after the 
defeat of the British at Majuba on 27 February 1881 the 
British government restored the independence of the Trans-
vaal subject to the suzerainty of the Sovereign. This was 
brought about by the Pretoria Convention of 3 August 1881. 
The restoration of independence in terms of the Pretoria 
Convention was subject to several conditions which were 
unfavourable to the Transvaal. The Transvaal found these 
conditions onerous and a deputation under the leadership of 
President Kruger went to London to negotiate with the 
British government. These negotiations resulted in the 
London Convention of 27 February 1884 which restored the 
complete independence of the Transvaal and relinquished most 
of the conditions which had been imposed upon the independ-
ence granted by the Pretoria Convention. In particular, 
British suzerainty over the Transvaal ceased although the 
British retained certain rights such as the power to approve 
all treaties entered into with a foreign country. The London 
Convention was ratified by the Transvaal on 8 August 1884. 
Shortly after the reinstated independence of the Transvaal 
gold was discovered on the Witwatersrand. Although earlier 
discoveries had taken place, the major and significant dis-
covery was that of the main reef at Roodepoort in May/June 
1886. One of the consequences of the discovery of gold was 
that large numbers of foreigners flocked to the gold fields, 
many of whom were British. This ultimately gave rise to what 
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is known as the "uitlander" problem, i.e. the presence in 
the midst of the primarily Afrikaner burgers of the Trans-
vaal of large numbers of aliens to whom the government did 
not wish to grant meaningful voting rights. The "uitlander" 
question was aggravated by the Jameson raid which in later 
times was seen by historians to be a ploy on the part of the 
British government to reimpose their control over the Trans-
vaal. The "uitlander" question along with various other 
questions such as the desire of the British to unite the 
various territories of South Africa, the growing economic 
independence of the Transvaal (inter alia through the crea-
tion of a direct rail link to Delagoa Bay) and growing ties 
between the Transvaal and the German Empire led to the 
threat of a British invasion of the Transvaal. In 1899 after 
consultation with the Orange Free State with which the 
Transvaal had entered into a pact in 1897, an ultimatum was 
given to Britain to withdraw its threats to Transvaal. This 
was reject~d by Britain and on 11 October 1899 the Second 
Boer War broke out. 
Meanwhile in 1890 Swaziland came under the joint government 
of the Transvaal and Brit~in. In 1895 it became a pro-
tectorate of the Transvaal. 
In 1900 while the war was in progress Britain formally 
annexed the Orange Free State and the Transvaal. 3 In 1902 
the war drew to a close and in May of that year peace 
negotiations were conducted at Vereeniging. A Peace Treaty 
was signed on 31 May 1902. Amongst the terms of the peace 
was the recognition of the authority and sovereignty of the 
3 • 'Ih:l Orange Free State was annexed by a Proclamation dated 24 May 
1900 arx:l tie Transvaal on 1 Septe:nber 1900. 
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British Crown. The outcome of the Second Boer War was that 
from 1900, as confirmed in 1902, the Orange Free State and 
the Transvaal joined the Cape and Natal Colonies as being 
British dominions and this status was to continue for a num-
ber of years and until after 1917, when the Patents, 
Designs, Trade Marks and Copyright Act of 1916 came into 
operation. 
In 1905 responsible government was introduced in the Trans-
vaal, as a British Colony, followed by a similar development 
in the Orange Free State in 1907. In 1903 the administration 
of Swaziland passed from the Transvaal to rule as a separate 
territory by the British Governor of the Transvaal. In 1907 
it became a British protectorate. In 1910 the four British 
colonies were forged into the Union of South Africa, a 
unitary self-governing dominion within the British Empire. 
As stated in Chapter III South Africa was accorded this 
status in the British Copyright Act of 1911. 4 
B. SOUTH AFRICAN COMMON LAW 
(1) Roman-Dutch Law at the Cape.Prior to 1795 
When Jan van Riebeeck established a refreshment station on 
behalf of the East India Company in South Africa on 7 April 
1652 Roman-Dutch law was introduced to :the Cape. At that 
time there was no such thing as the Law of The Netherlands 
because, as mentioned above, each of the various provinces 
of the Republic of the United Netherlands was largely 
autonomous and had its own law. However, the best developed 
4 . The aforegoing surrmary of this pericxi of the history of South 
Africa is derived fran Hahlo and Kahn, Ccrurtituticn; CF'J Muller, op cit; 
and rM KrUger, '1he Making of a Naticn. 
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and dominant law of the Republic was that of the Province of 
Holland. This came about because the Province of Holland was 
the wealthiest and most powerful province in the Republic. 
The result was that the Roman-Dutch law which took root at 
the Cape was strongly biased in favour of the law of the 
Province of Holland. A further factor which contributed to 
this was the fact that the bulk of the officials both in the 
East India Company and at the Cape came from Holland. 
Roman-Dutch law as applied at the Cape during the first 150 
years had a multiplicity of sources. These can 
be divided into two basic categories, namely, 
conveniently 
legislation 
and the works of the writers on Roman-Dutch law. Each of 
these sources will be dealt with briefly. 
(a) Legislation 
The most important aspect of the legislation was that the 
only body or institution which had proper legislative powers 
for the territories administered by the East India Company, 
and the Cape in particular, was the Estates General of The 
Netherlands. This body exercised its powers in this connec-
tion very sparingly and very little legislation applicable 
to the Cape emanated from it. The charter which the Estates 
General granted to the East India Company did not confer 
legislative powers on the East India Company and it in turn 
had no power to delegate any legislative authority to the 
Governor General and Council at Batavia, the so-called 
"Batavian Government", or the Governor and Council at the 
Cape. The States of Holland, the most influential legisla-
tive body in The Netherlands at the time, had no power to 
legislate for territories outside the Province of Holland 
and thus for the Cape. Nevertheless; in practice the sub-
stantive Roman-Dutch law· applied in the Cape came to embody 
ordinances and other "legislation" passed by the Batavian 
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Government, the States of Holland and by the Governor and 
Council at the Cape. 
DH van Zyl, Geskiedenis van die Romeins Hollandse Reg, has 
summarized decisions of the Appellate Division of the 
Supreme Court relating to the legislation which was in force 
at the Cape during this period as follows: 5 
(i) All placaaten of the Estates General which were of 
general application and which dated from before 7 
April 1652. 
( ii) Placaaten of the States of Holland dating from 
prior to 1652 insofar as they were specifically 
promulgated at the Cape. 
(iii) All placaaten of the Estates General and of the 
States of Holland issued after 1652 if they were 
intended to be promulgated at the Cape or if they 
were of a general nature and were not directed at 
local circumstances in The Netherlands. In regard 
to the aforegoing criteria the courts have adopted 
a pragmatic approach in terms of which, in the 
case of a placaat which expressly purported to 
apply to the Cape or which has a general nature, 
promulgation at the Cape was presumed. In the case 
of a placaat which on the face of it appears to 
have been directed at local circumstances in The 
Netherlands itself, promulgation is presumed not 
to have taken place and the party alleging that it 
applied to the Cape was required to prove· it. 
(iv) Placaaten which were assimilated by the Roman-
Dutch writers into their works and thus became 
part of the body of Roman-Dutch law. 
5. Page 438. 
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In 1642 the Governor General of Batavia issued a compilation 
of laws which were in operation in the East Indies. This 
compilation was referred to as "The Statutes of Batavia" or 
''The Statutes of India". In 1715 the Governor in Council at 
the·cape resolved that the Statutes of India should serve as 
the basis of Cape law together with the various other 
sources. A revised and updated version of the Statutes of 
India was issued in 1766 in Batavia and these became known 
as the "New Statutes of India". There is uncertainty as to 
whether the New Statutes of India were ever applied at the 
Cape. Neither of the Statutes of India were ever formally 
approved by the Estates General and in strict constitutional 
terms they had no official force or effect at the Cape. 
The Governor and Council at the Cape issued numerous 
placaaten, of a mainly administrative nature and these were 
accepted as binding although strictly speaking they were of 
dubious validity in constitutional terms. 
Certain modern writers hold the view that, save for legisla-
tion made by the Estates General which was clearly applica-
ble to the Cape, the other forms of legislation became part 
of the Roman-Dutch law as implemented at the Cape by means 
of usage or de facto acceptance. 6 
6. See f= instan::e FJ van Zyl and JD van der Vyver, Inleiding tot 
die Regswetenskap, 2rrl Editicn, p 205 et seq; and JC de Wet, "Die Resep-
sie van die Rale.ins li:lllandse Reg in Suid-Afrika" THRHR 21 ( 1958) w 84-
97, ''Nederlandse Reg in Suid Afrika tot 1806", THRHR 21 (1958) W 162-
175, and De Wet en Swanepoel '~Die Suid-Afrikaanse Strafreg, 2de Uitgawe, 
p 20 et seq. My aforegoirg exp::si ticn en the legislaticn awllcab1e in 
the relevant period is derived prin::ipally fran the afruetenticn=d ~ 
and fran 00 van Zyl, op cit, p 423, et seq; Hahlo and Kahn, Legal 
Systan, p 571, et seq; Hahlo and Kahn, Oxlstituticn, p 10, et seq; and 
GG Visagie, "Regspleging en Rec;J aan ili:e Kaap van 1652 tot 1806". 
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(b) Roman-Dutch Writers 
The pre-eminence of the States of Holland and of the dis-
position of the East India Company and its officials towards 
the law of Holland made it both natural and inevitable that 
the Batavian Government and the Governor at the Cape and 
their institutions should have recourse to the common law of 
the Province of Holland, namely the Roman-Dutch law. Because 
the Estates General never prescribed what law should be fol-
lowed by the countries administered by the East India Com-
pany the persons concerned were left to their own devices. 
Accordingly the works of the great Dutch jurists such as 
Hugo de Groot, Johannes Voet, Simon van Leeuwen and the like 
exercised a great influence on the law at the Cape. The 
works of these authors supplemented the legislation dis-
cussed above as the legal system in operation at the Cape 
during the time of the administration of the East India Com-
pany. Although the structure of the courts and the adminis-
tration of justice generally at the Cape lie outside the 
scope of this thesis, it is of significance to mention that 
a right of appeal from the Cape courts and other judicial 
institutions lay to the Raad van Justisie in Batavia and in 
certain circumstances litigants could have recourse direct 
to that court. There was no recourse to the courts of Hol-
land or of The Netherlands generally. This is in keeping 
with the relative roles of the provinces, the Republic of 
the United Netherlands and the East India Company. 7 
(2) The First British Occupation 
Although the Dutch East India Company was on the decline 
towards the end of the 18th Century it had not yet been dis-
7 . The aforegoing is derived fran the sources cited in f=t:oote 6 
above. 
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banded when Britain occupied the Cape on 16 September 1795. 
The East India Company's administration of the cape thereby 
came to an abrupt end. 
A Governor was appointed by Britain to administer the Cape. 
There is no doubt amongst the writers that the Roman-Dutch 
law which was applied at the Cape at the time of the occupa-
tion continued to be applied without interruption. Lack of 
unanimity exists as to whether this was due to the Articles 
of Capitulation signed on 16 September 1795 or to the basic 
principle of English law that where territories are acquired 
by conquest or cession the old law remains in force until it 
is amended by the new government or administration. Be it as 
it may, on 11 October 1795 the Raad van Justisie was specif-
ically perpetuated in a Proclamation issued by the Governor 
on behalf of the British Sovereign. The relevant portion of 
the Proclamation read: 
"We have thought it expedient to re-establish . . . . the 
court of Justice in this country in the same manner as 
the said court has existed on the 16 September last ... 
in order to administer justice, in the name of his said 
Majesty, in the same manner as has been customary until 
now, and according to the laws, statutes, and 
ordinances which have been in force in this colony, 
which we command to be followed in their full tenor and 
effect, as far as the same are not by us or in our 
name, or in that of any Governor or Commander-in-Chief 
for the time being, already altered or in future may be 
altered for the general benefit".a 
8. Quoted in Visagie, op cit, at p 91. 
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No changes of any consequence were made to the Roman-Dutch 
law applied at the Cape during the first British occupation. 
It would seem, however, that at least for the time being the 
Cape was cut off from any further developments to the law 
applied in The Netherlands and in particular in the Province 
of Holland. This follows from the fact that in terms of 
' international law the domestic laws of a conquered territory 
remain in force because of their explicit or implicit adop-
tion by the new political sovereign and not as a result of 
the will of the conquered; the law making power of the con-
quered is extinguished by conquest. 9 As the Cape once again 
became a Dutch colony after 1803 the interlude of the first 
British occupation was largely incidental to the development 
of Roman-Dutch law in South Africa. 10 
(3) The Cape Under The Batavian Republic 
During the period of the first British occupation The 
Netherlands meanwhile underwent a period of dramatic 
reorganization and became the Batavian Republic. The Dutch 
East India Company had been disbanded. Under the Batavian 
Republic the responsibility for the former affairs of the 
East India Company lay with the "Raad van Aziatische Zaken 
en Bezi ttingen" which fell under the "Departement tot de 
Indische Zaken", a government department. In 1801 already 
the government of the Batavian Republic foresaw the pos-
sibility that Britain would return the Cape to it. JA de 
Mist, a member of both the "Raad van Aziatische Zaken en 
Bezi ttingen" and the "Departement tot de Indische Zaken" 
prepared a report in 1802 on what was necessary to be done 
9 • Halleck's Intel:natiooal Law, 3rd Edition by S Baker, Vol II, p 
488. 
10. The aforego:ing is largely derived fran Visagie, op cit, p 91 et 
seq. 
at the Cape when it reverted to being a Dutch possession. De 
Mist's report recommended substantial changes to the admin-
istration of the Cape, including the administration of jus-
tice. 
Article 6 of the Peace of Amiens of 27 March 1802 restored 
the sovereignty of the Cape to the Batavian Republic. In 
Article 12 Sri tain undertook to restore possession of the 
Cape to the Batavian Republic within three months. In May 
1802 the government commissioned De Mist to reorganize the 
administration of justice, finances, police matters and 
defence at the Cape. De Mist departed for the Cape at the 
end of 1802. He was appointed to the position of Com-
missioner General of the Cape while JW Janssens was 
appointed as Governor. Although the two of them were jointly 
responsible for the administration of the Cape, in practice, 
Governor Janssens played a subordinate role. 
On 1 March 1803, after he had taken formal occupation of the 
Cape on behalf of the Batavian Republic, De Mist issued a 
Proclamation in which he provided that the Cape was no 
longer subordinate to the Ho~r Regering in Indi~ or any 
other commercial organization but would henceforth fall 
under the direct control of the Batavian Republic. As men-
tioned above, 1 1 under the Batavian Republic the Cape was 
regarded as an overseas province of the Republic. 
De Mist devoted most of his energies to reorganizing the 
administration of the Cape, including the judicial institu-
tions. He made no changes to the substantive law which 
prevailed. The short duration of the rule of the Batavian 
11. See p 174 supra. 
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Republic at the Cape prevented De Mist from completing all 
his proposed reorganizations at the Cape. The period of 
administration of the Cape by the Batavian Republic endured 
for barely three years and was brought to an end by the sec-
ond British occupation of the Cape at the beginning of 1806. 
Virtually all the South African legal historians devote very 
little attention to the Batavian Republic period of the 
Cape. Virtually nothing is said about the further develop-
ment of the law at the Cape during the Batavian Republic 
period. Roman-Dutch law at the Cape is generally described 
as being the law which prevailed in the province of Holland 
supplemented by enactments by the various bodies and 
institutions concerned with the activities of the Dutch East 
India Company during the 18th Century. The contribution of 
the Batavian Republic to the development of Roman-Dutch law 
is not mentioned. Taking an overview of the matter, this is 
no doubt perfectly justified because Roman-Dutch law blos-
somed during the 18th Century and its further development 
tended to wither with the declining fortunes of The Nether-
lands towards the end of the 18th Century. In The Nether-
lands itself the Napoleonic period which gave rise to the 
codification of Dutch law terminated the development of 
Roman-Dutch law and the period of the Batavian Republic was 
but a short interlude - a sort of transition - between the 
final stages of the progressive period of the law and the 
time of codification. However, the period of the Batavian 
Republic assumes considerable significance for the law of 
copyright because what was in effect the first piece of 
Netherlands copyright legislation dated from July 1803 dur-
ing which time the Cape was an overseas province of the 
Batavian Republic. 
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The following view stated by van Zyl12 is typical of what 
writers in general had to say about the law at the Cape dur-
ing the period of the Batavian Republic: 
"Wat betre£ die reg wat gedurende die Bataa£se tydperk 
toegepas is. was dit diese1£de reg as die wat tydens 
die VOC se bewind bestaan het en wat deur die Britse 
regering aan die Kaap vana£ 1795 tot 1803 aangewend is. 
Hoewe1 daar n hervormde prosedure - ste1se1 beoog was. 
het dit nie tot uitvoer gekom nie, sodat die prosedure. 
sowe1 kriminee1 as sivie1, onveranderd geb1y het. Ten 
spyte van die breek met die Hoer Regering te Batavia, 
is daar steeds na die Statute van Indie as ge1dende reg 
verwys terwy1 Ho11andse en Kaapse p1acaate eweneens 
steeds gei;jerbiedig is. Onder die ou skrywers was die 
name van de Groot, van Leeuwen, Voet. A Matthaeus II. 
van Bijnkershoek en van der Linden prominent in die 
gemeenregte1ike verwysings wat voor die Raad van 
Justisie gedien het, terwy1 die ve1e verdere skrywers, 
wat onder die vroeer bewinde as gesaghebbend aangehaa1 
is. nie vergete geraak het nie." 
The authorities are silent on the question of what effect 
legislation passed by the Batavian Republic, while it was 
the sovereign power in respect of the Cape, had on the law 
which prevailed at the Cape during the Batavian Republic 
period. It is submitted that a law such as the Copyright Act 
of 1803 passed by the Batavian Republic legislature operated 
and had full force and effect at the Cape. Unlike during the 
time of the East India Company when, apart from the Estates 
General, which had a minor legislative function and was not 
really involved in the development of the law, no body or 
12. Op cit, p 447. 
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institution had legislative powers directly over the Cape, 
the legislature of the Batavian Republic had direct legisla-
tive powers in respect of the Cape because .the Cape was 
regarded as an overseas province of The Netherlands, i.e. an 
integral part of The Netherlands . 13 If legislation of the 
Provincial States of Holland could have had force and effect 
in the Cape when the Provincial States of Holland had no 
direct control or legislative authority over the Cape, then 
there can be little doubt that legislation of the Batavian 
Republic of which the Cape was a province must have had 
force and effect at the Cape. One of De Mist's main objec-
tives was to change the Cape from having been subject to the 
control and administration of a commercial company to a 
normal colony with the closest possible links to the mother-
land and the philosophies and attitudes of the Bat avian 
Republic. The "Raad van Justisie" which was the judicial 
authority at the Cape during the period was independent of 
the Governor and the local Cape administration and it was 
answerable to the Batavian government. There was a right of 
appeal against decisions of this body to the Supreme Court 
in The Hague. All the indications were that the application 
of the law at the Cape was closely integrated with the law 
of the Batavian Republic. There is indeed no reason at all 
to reach any conclusion other than that legislation passed 
by the Batavian Republic, and in particular legislation of a 
general nature, had force and effect in its overseas 
province, the Cape. 
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13. JP van cler M=-le, Die I<aap <nder die Bataafse Republiek 1803 tot 
1806 at p 49, says tre foll<Ming, quo~ De Mist: 'Wat die Kaapse 
afhanklikheid van Batawil! aangaan, het De Mist 1r.rn nader toegelig, deur 
te kenne te gee dat die Kaap 'een deei van het Lairl zelve' word, 'gelyk 
cas en Magazijnen hier t:hanis den Eigen:ian van het Lairl zijn, even als 
in Amsterdam of Rotterdam' ". 
De Mist himself was a lawyer. It was a requirement for 
appointment to the Raad van Justisie at the Cape that an 
appointee must have had legal qualifications, which could 
only have been obtained in The Netherlands or at least in 
Europe. This was in contrast ,to the position under the 
administration of the East India Company where legal 
qualifications were not a requirement for appointment to the 
Raad van Justisie. A law degree obtained at a university in 
The Netherlands was also a requirement for admission to 
practice as an advocate before the Raad van Justisie at the 
Cape. These factors would have enhanced the tendency to 
apply the current and up to date Roman-Dutch law at the 
Cape. 
The aforegoing is supported by A Wijpkema, Die Invloed van 
Nederland en Nederlands-Indie op Ontstaan en Ontwikkeling 
van die Regswese in Suid-Afrika tot 1881. 14 The learned 
author mentions examples of legislation passed by the 
Batavian Republic which was applied at the Cape and these 
included placaaten dating from 1798, 1799 and 1802, i.e. 
placaaten dating from the period of the first British 
occupation when the Cape was not even under the jurisdiction 
of the Batavian Republic. Wijpkema goes as far as saying 
that the government of the Batavian Republic had exclusive 
legislative powers over the Cape and local legislation 
adopted during the period of the Batavian Republic only had 
provisional force until enacted by the Batavian Republic. 15 
Support for the aforegoing conclusion can also be found in 
an article entitled "The Sources of South African Law" writ-
14. Pages 84, et seq, an:i in particular pp 88, 104 an:i 108. 
15. Op cit, p 110. 
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ten by CH van Zyl1 6 in which the following is said: "In 
South Africa we follow the law of Holland as it was up to 
1806 . . . at the present day the whole of South Africa is 
governed by the Roman-Dutch law as it was in force in Hol-
land up to 1806". Similar sentiments are expressed by J de v 
Roos in an article entitled "The Statute Law of the Cape in 
Pre-British Days and Some Judicial Decisions in Relation 
Thereto". 17 Roos bases his view on a dictum of Sir Henry de 
Villiers in the case of Seaville'v Colley18 where the fol-
lowing is said: 
"The conclusion at which I have arrived as to the 
obligatory nature of the body of laws in force in this 
Colony, at the date of the British occupation in 1806, 
may be briefly stated. The presumption is that every 
one of these laws, if not repealed by the local legis-
lature, is still in force. This presumption will not, 
however, prevail in regard to any rule of law which is 
inconsistent with South African usages." 
With due respect to the bulk of the writers who tend to pro-
ceed on the assumption that the development of Roman-Dutch 
law in other territories beside South Africa terminated for 
purposes of South Africa in 1795 with the first British 
occupation of the Cape, it is submitted that it is not only 
historically sound but also logical that developments in 
that law between 1795 and 1806 should also have formed part 
of the body of the law for purposes of South Africa. Another 
factor which plays a role in this regard is that sub-
sequently, and particularly in the Orange Free State and 
16. SALJ 19 (1902) p 49. 
17. SALJ 18 (1901) p 242. 
18. 9 sc 39, at p 44, per de Villiers CJ. 
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Transvaal Republics, Johannes van der Linden's book entitled 
Rechtsgeleerd Practicaal en Koopmans Handboek (also referred 
to in South Africa as the Institutes of the Law of Holland), 
which was published in Amsterdam in 1806, being the latest 
of the various works on Roman-Dutch law, was often given 
pre-eminence among the works of the Roman-Dutch authorities. 
The publication of this work coincided with the second 
British occupation and it is submitted that 1806 and not 
1795 marks the true parting of the ways between the develop-
ment of the Roman-Dutch law in South Africa and elsewhere. 
With the adoption of the Napoleonic code in 1809 in The 
Netherlands, indeed the development of Roman-Dutch law 
terminated in The Netherlands itself very shortly there-
after. 
(4) Roman-Dutch Law After 1806 
When the Cape came under British rule in 1806 Roman-Dutch 
law was the common law of the colony. When the British 
occupied the Cape in that year Roman-Dutch law was retained 
as the common law of the colony. There is some dissension 
amongst commentators as to whether this was brought about by 
the Articles of Capitulation of 1806 which provided that 
"the burgers and inhabitants shall preserve all their rights 
and privileges which they have enjoyed hitherto" or whether 
this came about on account of it being a settled principle 
of English law as well as of public international law that a 
conquered or ceded country w j_ th a c1 v11 1zed legal system 
retains j_ ts own laws unless they are altered by the new 
ruler. l9 The Br1 tish government considered introducing 
British common law as the common law of the colony but this 
notion was rejected in favour of a policy of "gradual1sm", 
19. Hahlo am Kahn, Coostituticn, p 17. See also p 188 supra. 
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in terms of which British common law principles would grad-
ually be assimilated into the common law of the colony. 20 
In a report into the state of the laws in the Cape Colony in 
1857 it was stated that "the Roman-Dutch law, which consists 
of the civil or Roman laws as modified by the laws passed by 
the legislature of Holland, and by the customs of that 
country. forms the great bulk of the law of the colony". 21 
With the occupation of the Cape by the British and the 
Roman-Dutch common law being cut off from its roots in The 
Netherlands it was inevitable that the legal system in the 
Cape leaned towards English law. 22 Although principles of 
English law crept into the South African common law, the 
common law remained Roman-Dutch and this has persisted up to 
the present time. A substantial proportion of South African 
statutory law has, however, been derived from or based on 
British statutory law. This is particularly true of the law 
of intellectual property, and specifically the law of 
copyright. 
From the Cape Colony, Roman-Dutch law spread to the Trans-
vaal, the Orange Free State and Natal. All three of these 
territories adopted Roman-Dutch law as their common law. As 
in the Cape, however, principles of English law were assimi-
lated into the common laws of these territories, to a 
greater or a lesser degree.23 
The early constitution of the South African Republic, the 
so-called "Drie-en-dertig Artikels" provided that that con-
20 • Hahlo arrl Kahn, Ccnsti tutiaJ., p 17. 
21. Preface to Statute Law of the Cape of Good Hope, p vi. 
22. Hahlo arrl Kahn, CalstitutiaJ., p 18. 
23. Hahlo arrl Kahn, CcnstitutiaJ., p 21. 
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stitution was to be supplemented by the "Hollandsche Wet". 
This was considered to be a reference to the Roman-Dutch law 
as applied at the Cape. 24 The "Drie-en-Dertig Artikels" was 
replaced by the . Constitution of 1858. In 1859 three "Bij-
lages" were issued. In terms thereof the "Hollandsche Wet" 
would remain the law of the Republic but it was specifically 
provided that van der Linden's Koopmans Handboek would be 
the primary law book. It was further provided that in cases 
of uncertainty recourse could be had to Simon van Leeuwen's 
Roomsch-Hollandsch Recht and Hugo de Groot's Inleidinge tot 
de Hollandsche Rechtsgeleerdheid. Roman-Dutch law in the 
Transvaal survived annexation of the Transvaal by Britain 
and persisted as the basic common law. 
The constitution adopted by the Orange Free State 
in Section 
upon it 
57 that becoming independent in 1854 provided 
"het Romeinsch Hollandsch Regt za1 de grondwet van dezen 
staat zijn alwaar geen andere wet door den Volksraad gemaakt 
is". The term "Romeinsch Hollandsch Regt" was further 
defined in a subsequent ordinance in 1856 to be the law 
which prevailed in the Cape Colony at the time that English 
judges were appointed in the place of the Raad van Justisie 
and did not include any new laws or enactments whether of 
local or general application which were thereafter intro-
duced in Holland and were not based on or were inconsistent 
with Roman-Dutch law as expounded by Voet, van Leeuwen, 
Grotius, De Papegaaij (the name of a work written by Willem 
van Alphen), Merula, Lijbrecht, van der Linden, van der 
Keessel and authorities referred to by them. 
24. Van Zyl, op cit, p 461. 
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The effect of this Proclamation was that the Roman-Dutch law 
as applied at the Cape in 1827 was to prevail and that spe-
cial weight was to be attributed to the writings of the 
authors referred to. Post-1827 Dutch law was not to apply 
save in the circumstances mentioned. There would appear to 
be no doubt that legislation made in The Netherlands in 1803 
was part of the law declared to be applicable in the Orange 
Free State. As in the Transvaal, Roman-Dutch law survived 
British annexation and remained the basic common law of the 
Orange Free State. 
In Natal, shortly after the trekkers settled there, 
"Regulatien en Instructien" were issued in October 1838 
wherein it was provided that the "Hollandsche Rechtspleging" 
would form the basis of the local law. This situation was 
perpetuated after Britain annexed Natal in 1843 and in Natal 
Ordinance No. 12 of 1845 it was provided that 
"The system code or body of law commonly called the 
Roman-Dutch law, as the same has been and is accepted, 
and administered by the legal tribunals of the Colony 
of the Cape of Good Hope, shall be ... established as 
the law, for the time being, of the District of Natal". 
This situation prevailed unchanged thereafter. 
Roman-Dutch law was retained as the basic common law of 
South Africa upon the formation of the Union of South Africa 
in 1910. 
In effect The Netherlands statutory law prior to 1806 ceased 
thereafter in South Africa to be statutory law in the strict 
sense but rather became part of the common law. This is par-
ticularly true of the Transvaal, Orange Free State and Natal 
which adopted that statutory law because it was part of the 
law which had hitherto been applied at the Cape, without 
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there being any suggestion that the bodies or institutions 
which had passed that legislation had any power or jurisdic-
tion over these territories. Accordingly it is submitted 
that a statute such as the Copyright Act of 1803 passed in 
the Batavian Republic must as far as the post-1806 develop-
ment of the law is concerned be regarded as an element of 
the Roman-Dutch common law and not as a creature of statute, 
particularly with regard to the Transvaal, Orange Free State 
and Natal. 
C. BRITISH STATUS OF TERRITORIES AND RESIDENTS OF SOUTH 
AFRICA 
As has been shown above, early British copyright legislation 
in some instances conferred rights upon non-resident British 
subjects or residents of British dominions. Furthermore, 
certain of the early British copyright statutes extended 
their operation to the British dominions. It is thus impor-
tant to establish at what stages parts of South Africa 
became and were British dominions prior to 1912 and which 
residents of South Africa during that period were British 
subjects or residents of British dominions. 
It is perhaps fortunate that in all instances where early 
British copyright legislation confers rights upon non-
resident British subjects it is stated in the alternative 
that being a resident of a British dominion would suffice 
because the British subject status of residents in South 
Africa during the 19th Century is obscure. There is greater 
clarity on the status of territories as British possessions 
than there is on the status of their inhabitants as British 
subjects. Nevertheless, an attempt will be made as far as 
possible to determine the status of residents of South 
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Africa during the 19th Century and early 20th Century as 
British subjects. 
dents of British 
Since the status of individuals as resi-
vant to the 
statutes (i.e. 
dominions or as 
interpretation of 
British law), it 
British subjects is rele-
early British copyright 
is the British law inter-
pretation of the nationality of individuals and of the 
status of territories which is conclusive and not the South 
African law interpretation. It would appear that in particu-
lar in regard to questions of the British subject status of 
an individual in some instances British law and South 
African law manifested different approaches. 25 
(1) Cape Colony 
The Articles of Capitulation of 1806 made no provision as to 
the national status of the inhabitants of the colony. 
According to Parry, Nationality and Citizenship Laws of the 
Commonwealth and of The Republic of Ireland, the Dutch 
settlers and the "free Natives" were unquestionably con-
sidered to be British subjects. 26 "Natives" from outside the 
colony were, however, referred to as "foreigners" while 
slaves prior to their emancipation in 1833 were regarded as 
chattels and were thus probably without nationality. 27 From 
1856 naturalization of aliens resident in the Cape Colony 
became possible. 
The Cape Colony was undoubtedly at all relevant times from 
1806 a British dominion. The annexation of other areas such 
as British Kaffraria and Griqualand West to the Cape Colony 
rendered them as part of the Cape Colony and therefore also 
201. 
2 5 . Parry, Naticnali ty and Citizenship Laws of the Cclmk:n..leal:th and of 
the Republic of Ireland, p 664. 
26. p 657. 
27. Parry, op cit, p 657. 
within the British dominions. In general terms the residents 
of the Cape Colony were British subjects. 
( 2) Natal 
The basic approach of Britain was that the trekkers who left 
the Cape Colony remained British subjects and their settle-
ment outside the borders of the Cape Colony was regarded as 
emigration to a foreign country. 2 8 The British authorities 
initially tolerated the republican regime established in 
Natal. However, in 1844 Natal was annexed to the Cape Colony 
and thereafter it became, and was thereafter at all material 
times, a British dominion. In general terms the residents of 
Natal were British subjects. In short, generally speaking, 
residents of Natal were at all material times, including 
during the republican regime, British subjects and Natal was 
a British dominion from 1844 until after 1917. As Natal was 
subordinate to the Cape Colony at that time, it follows that 
the naturalization system adopted in the Cape Colony in 1856 
applied equally to Natal. 
(3) Orange Free State 
In accordance with the principle that the trekkers were 
British subjects who had emigrated, the trekkers who settled 
in the area which was to become the Orange Free State 
remained British subjects. When the terri tory between the 
Orange and the Vaal Rivers was annexed by the British in 
1848 it became part of the British dominions. The· precise 
constitutional status of the Orange River Sovereignty was 
somewhat unclear. It seems that only the emigrants were 
regarded as British subjects and not the natives. 2 9 
28. Pany, op cit, p 42. 
29. Pany, op cit, p 658 an:1 Hahlo an:1 Kahn, Ccnstituticn, p 63. 
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In 1854 the Orange River Sovereignty was relinquished and 
with the signing of the Bloemfontein Convention on 23 Febru-
ary 1854 the independence of the Orange Free State was 
recognized. The territory thereupon ceased to be a British 
dominion and the inhabitants ceased to be British subjects. 
Griqualand West, however, was assimilated to the Cape Colony 
in 1872 and once again fell within the British dominions and 
its inhabitants became British subjects. 
The Orange Free State continued to be an independent state 
until 1900 when it was annexed by Britain. The further 
development of the Orange Free State will be discussed 
below. 
(4) Transvaal 
The trekkers who settled in what was to become the Transvaal 
were also regarded as British subjects who had emigrated. 
The independence of this terri tory from the British was 
recognized in the Sand River Convention in 1852. This Con-
vention gave the trekker republic "the right to manage their 
own affairs". It terminated the status of the inhabitants as 
British subjects. 
In 1877 the territory was once again declared to be British 
terri tory. A Crown Colony was established. 30 The Pretoria 
Convention of 3 August 1881 restored "compl.ete seLf-
government subject to the suzerainty of her Majesty" to the 
territory. 
Although the position is not clear, it would appear that the 
Transvalers once again b.ecame British subjects from 1879 to 
30. Hahlo and Kahn, Cl:nstituticn, p 89. 
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1881. What became of their status as British subjects after 
1881 is less clear. Hahlo and Kahn31 refer to the effect of 
the Pretoria convention as "retrocession" which seems to 
suggest that although the state was still under British 
suzerainty it once again became independent and presumably 
its inhabitants ceased to be British subjects. The Pretoria 
Convention was superseded by the London Convention of 27 
February 1884 and this Convention made no reference to the 
territory being a suzerainty of Britain. According to Hahlo 
and Kahn3 2 because the London Convention did not specifi-
cally remove British suzerainty it could be argued that it 
remained. The learned authors, however, hold the contrary 
view but state that the bulk of authorities regarded it as 
semi-foreign although they recognized it as a separate 
entity in international law. For purposes of copyright law, 
however, the Transvaal must be regarded as no longer being a 
British dominion and its inhabitants as no longer being 
Brit~sb subjects at least from 1884 if not from 1881. 
In the midst of the Boer War Britain annexed the Orange Free 
State by proclamation dated 24 May 1900 and the Transvaal by 
proclamation dated 1 September 1900. These annexations were 
followed by the Treaty of vereeniging of 31 May 1902 which 
brought an end to the Boer War. With effect from 1900 the 
two territories became British dominions and this was per-
petuated until after 1917. They became known as the Orange 
River and Transvaal Colonies, respectively. 
No specific provision was made respecting the nationality of 
the inhabitants of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal 
31. Calstituticn, p 90. 
32 • Calsti tuticn, p 90. 
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according to Parry. 33 The law officers of the British had 
previously been consulted and advised that after annexation 
"the burgers or citizens of these territories as well as any 
foreigners res.:dent in them who could not claim to be 
nationals of some civilized foreign power, and their chil-
dren, will become British subjects". This situation was 
later qualified with the suggestion that "It has, however, 
been usual in recent times to allow those who do not desire 
to become subjects of the conqueror to leave the conquered 
territory within a reasonable time, and, we think this 
course would probably be followed in the present case". Per-
sons who had become citizens of the two republics and who 
did not wish to become British citizens were permitted to 
make declarations to that effect and to leave the ter-
ritories. Furthermore, citizens of the two republics who had 
withdrawn prior to annexation were not treated as British 
subjects. In general, therefore, after 1900 the inhabitants 
of the Orange River and Transvaal Colonies became British 
subjects and this state of affairs was perpetuated until 
beyond 1917. 
(5) Union of South Africa 
The South Africa Act, which was passed by the British par-
liament and assented to by King Edward VII came into opera-
tion on 31 May 1910. This Act established the Union of South 
Africa and its constitution. The four colonies, i.e. the 
Cape, Natal, Orange River and Transvaal became provinces. 
The status of the inhabitants of South Africa as British 
subjects and of the country as a British Dominion was per-
petuated beyond the creation of the Union and beyond 1917. 
33. 0p cit, p 662. 
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The above exposition relating to the status of individuals 
as British subjects is very generalized and references to 
the inhabitants or residents of a territory are intended to 
be construed as references to persons belonging to or having 
the "citizenship" of that territory. At any given moment 
. people of vastly varying national status were present or 
residing in the various territories. Even while they were 
independent republics the Orange Free State and the Trans-
vaal were hosts to a variety of people of different national 
status. In particular, there were many people of British 
origin - i.e. British subjects in the strict sense - resi-
dent in the Orange Free State and the Transvaal at all rele-
vant times particularly after the discovery of diamonds and 
gold. A large proportion of the "uitlanders" from the Trans-
vaal were Britons. In the circumstances, in assessing the 
nationality of the author of a particular work made in South 
Africa during the 19th and early 20th Centuries the peculiar 
circumstances of the individual in question must be examined 
and taken into account. The a foregoing exposition of the 
status of residents of the various territories during the 
19th Century and early 20th Century is at best a very broad 
and general guideline and serves to make the point that 
authors of works made during that period in South Africa 
could have been British subjects or residents within a 
British dominion. 
(6) British Territories and Subjects 
Subject to what has been said in the preceding paragraph, 
the position regarding the status of the various territories 
as British dominions and of the inhabitants as British sub-
jects can be summed up as follows: 
(a) British Dominions 
206. 
The Cape was a British dominion continuously from 1806 until 
after 1917. When territories such as British Kaffraria and 
Griqualand West were added to the Cape they became from that 
time part of the British dominions until after 1917. Natal 
became a British dominion in 1843 and continued as such 
until after 1917. Similar considerations applied to Zululand 
as applied to areas such as Griqualand west and British Kaf-
fraria. The Orange Free State was a British dominion from 
February 1848 until 1854 and thereafter from 1900 until 
after 1917. The Transvaal was a British dominion from 1877 
probably until 1881 (but possibly until 1884) and thereafter 
again from 1900 until after 1917. From 1900 onwards and 
until after 1917 the whole of South Africa was a British 
dominion. 
(b) British Subjects 
The status of the inhabitants of the various territories as 
British subjects coincided with the status of the ter-
ritories in question as British dominions save that the 
trekkers who settled in Natal, the Orange Free State and 
Transvaal, being considered to be emigrants from a British 
dominion, were British subjects continuously until 1852, in 
the case of the Transvaal, and 18 54, in the case of the 
Orange Free State. Inhabitants of the Orange Free State 
thereafter became British subjects again in 1900 as did 
inhabitants of the Transvaal, with the Transvalers, however, 
being British_ subjects for a brief interlude during the 
period 1877 to 1881 (or possibly 1884). 
4. COPYRIGHT UNDER SOUTH AFRICAN COMMON LAW 
As discussed above in Chapter III the British common law 
recognized common law copyright in unpublished works. There 
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is nothing in the development of the South African law to 
suggest that British common law copyright was ever accepted 
or adopted in South African law. Indeed, the historical 
developments set out above, namely the maintenance 
' 
throughout the time after 1806 of Roman-Dutch law as the 
basic common law of South Africa, albeit supplemented from 
time to time by statute law based on British law and certain 
elements of English common law which were not inconsistent 
with Roman-Dutch common law, is strongly indicative of the 
contrary. Accordingly any search for a form of early South 
African common law copyright must be directed at the Roman-
Dutch law. The relevance of South African common law 
copyright lies in the fact that, as will be shown in Chapter 
V, the 1917 Gateway provided by the South African Act of 
1916 made provision for the granting of so-called "sub-
stituted rights" in the place of any copyright existing in 
South Africa no matter what its origin might have been. 
A. NETHERLANDS COPYRIGHT 
An invaluable analysis of the origins and development of 
copyright in The Netherlands prior to and in the 19th 
Century is to be found in the work Het Auteursrecht in Het 
Nederlandsche en Internationale Recht by HL de Beaufort. 34 
The analysis which follows is derived substantially from 
this work. Early Dutch copyright law can be divided into two 
phases, namely, the period of the granting of privileges or 
letters patent in respect of works and the period of 
copyright legislation. 
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34. A doctoral thesis which served as tiE basis of tiE Degree of Doc-
tor of Laws at tiE University of Utrecht in 1909. 
(1) Privileges or Letters Patent 
Although even in the days of the Roman Empire reproduction 
of books took place (this was done by slaves who rewrote 
books) no economic interest in such reproduction existed. 
Copies were made to order and "publishers" were not required 
to make any financial outlay or investment in advance which 
needed to be protected. Reproduction by rewriting appeared 
in The Netherlands up to and in the time of the middle ages 
as well. It was not until the discovery of the printing 
press that there was any impetus to provide any form of pro-
tection to publishers. The introduction of the use of a 
printing press brought about a · radical change in the dis-
tribution of books because now prior investments which 
needed to be recouped by means of the sale of copies of the 
books in large numbers took place. This economic interest 
gave impetus to the need to acquire some form of protection 
for books against reproduction. 
As in Britain and in other parts of Europe, the earliest 
form of protection granted to the publishers of books was 
that of a privilege or letters patent to a publisher confer-
ring on him the monopoly to reproduce particular books sub-
ject to certain conditions. The first privilege appears to 
have been granted in 1516 by Charles V. Shortly thereafter 
in 1570 a royal decree was issued that no privilege would be 
granted to a printer within three months after the expiry of 
a privilege granted to someone else for the same book. 
After the creation of the Republic of the United Nether-
lands, the constitution of which has been described above,35 
35. See p 172 supra. 
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both the Provincial States and the Estates General continued 
the practice of granting privileges. The Provincial States 
could only grant privileges encompassing their particular 
provinces but the Estates General purported to grant 
privileges for the entire Republic (and possibly the over-
seas possessions). Privileges granted by the Estates General 
were not always recognized in all of the provinces, particu-
larly the Province of Holland, and the practice developed 
for privileges granted by the Estates General to be 
accredited in each of the provinces. As in most other areas 
of endeavour, the Province of Holland played the leading 
role in the granting of privileges. 
While privileges tended to be granted on a somewhat ad hoc 
basis a generalized description of their nature and charac-
ter will be given below. 
(a) Types of Works Protected 
Privileges were granted in the first instance to written 
works of all types, i.e. scientific works, poems, 
travelogues, diaries and even official documents such as 
placaats, ordinances etc, music works, maps, works of fine 
arts (such as pictures, gravures, etchings and paintings), 
works of calligraphy, sculptures and works of artistic 
craftsmanship. At that time no clear distinction was drawn 
between what subsequently became the subject matter of 
copyright, designs and patents. It happened that in some 
privileges inventions as such as well as the written and 
pictorial material in which they were embodied were pro-
tected in the same privilege. 
(b) Grantees of Privileges 
The system of privileges was aimed at affording protection 
to those who incurred a financial outlay and thus a finan-
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cial risk, namely, publishers and the like. The interests of 
authors as such were generally speaking not taken into 
account. Consequently the grantees of privileges were 
usually publishers and the like. Authors only obtained a 
very indirect form of benefit from the privilege system in 
that they could bargain with publishers for the right to 
acquire possession and use of their manuscripts; the pub-
lishers would be able to obtain privileges for the pub-
lication of such manuscripts. Gradually during the time of 
the privileges the notion began to develop that authors were 
entitled to some more direct benefit as a reward for the 
expertise and effort expended on producing works of 
intellectual property. 
In exceptional cases privileges were granted to authors 
themselves but this was mainly in instances where the author 
was himself a publisher. However, there were isolated 
instances of privileges being granted to authors who were 
not publishers. There were also some instances where 
privileges were granted to the children and widow of an 
author. 
As a result of the strong bias in favour of publishers it 
happened that a publisher could obtain a privilege without 
the knowledge of the author or even against his will. 
By way of exception to the general rule, privileges for pic-
tures and gravures were almost always granted to the author 
himself. This was largely due to the technical process by 
means of which these types of works were reproduced at that 
time. Namely, the engraving of a replica in copper or wood 
which was almost invaria.bly done by the original artist and 
he was thus in a position to undertake his own mass 
reproduction of his work. 
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(c) Requirements and Conditions for Privileges 
In order to obtain a privilege it was necessary to make a 
formal written request therefor. The request or application 
was required to state the name and author of the work and 
usually a brief indication of the contents thereof. As a 
rule the authority granting the privilege paid no attention 
to the contents but if it later transpired that a work was 
immoral or gave offence a privilege could be withdrawn. 
Privileges were usually granted but not always in the 
precise terms in which they were requested. Sometimes they 
were granted for a shorter period and only in respect of one 
language whereas the application may have referred to a num-
ber of languages. Privileges were, however, sometimes 
refused and the most common ground was that a privilege had 
already been granted for the same work or a work of the same 
nature. De Beaufort makes mention of the fact that despite 
the fact that privileges were repeatedly sought from both 
the Estates General and the States of Holland in the years 
1628 and 1629 for Hugo de Groot's work Inleidinge tot de 
Hollandsche Rechtsgeleerdheid, no privilege could be 
obtained.36 The learned author expresses the view that this 
was due to the animosity which the members of these institu-
tions had towards the author. 
No payment was required in order to obtain a privilege save 
that the States of Holland required in consideration for the 
granting of a privilege that a copy of the work covered by 
the privilege should be donated to the Library of the 
University of Leiden. 
36. Op cit, p 7. 
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Privileges were only granted to published works or at least 
works in respect of which there was a firm intention of pub-
lication. The ratio of the privilege system was the pro-
tection of published works. 
In the 17th and 18th Centuries the Dutch publishing industry 
was renowned throughout Europe. Many foreign writers chose 
to have their works published in Holland because of the 
relative freedom of expression in Holland. This was particu-
larly true of French writers who sought to evade the 
restraints of censorship imposed in their home country. 
Privileges could thus be obtained by Dutch printers in 
respect of works of foreign origin as well as works of Dutch 
origin. Indeed, the bulk of works published in Holland dur-
ing this era were works of foreign authors. This factor 
played a role in the author being regarded as unimportant 
under the privilege system. _Because publication was a 
criterion for protection it did not matter whether the work 
in respect of which a privilege was sought was a current 
work or had been written or made earlier - even in previous 
centuries. 
(d) Nature of Protection 
The interest protected by a privilege was that of reproduc-
ing and publishing the work. This right was extended to 
cover the reproduction and/or publication of a whole work or 
of a part thereof as well as the importation and distrib-
ution of other versions of the same work produced elsewhere. 
Sometimes privileges included the exclusive right to trans-
late a book but privileges were often granted in one lan-
guage only. 
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A performing right in works was not recognized as being sub-
ject matter for a privilege. To grant such a privilege would 
have been inconsistent with the ratio of the privilege 
system as being for the benefit of the publishing industry. 
This applied to both dramatic works and musical works. 
The privilege system thus granted copyright in the strict 
sense (i.e. not including a performing right) and outside 
the privilege system there was no restriction against works 
being reproduced or published and there was no restriction 
at all against works being performed in public. Dramatic and 
musical works were thus protected only to the extent that 
they were in the form of "books" and were capable of being 
reproduced and/or published. The relief granted to a 
privilege holder was the surrender by the infringer of all 
"infringing copies" of a work covered by his privilege and 
the payment to the privilege holder of a penalty, the amount 
of which was usually determined in the privilege itself. 
(e) Duration of Privileges 
Privileges were of limited duration. The terms of the 
privileges varied from case to case and were sometimes as 
short as two months or two or three years. In general, 
however, privileges were for a term of approximately fifteen 
years. 
(f) Transmission of Privileges 
Although privileges were granted to specific persons, there 
is record of privileges being transmitted to others. De 
Beaufort expresses the view that it was unclear whether 
privileges were generally transmissible. The learned author 
makes reference to an opinion of Hugo de Groot given in the 
year 1632 in the case of letters patent granted in respect 
of an invention (he is of the view that the same principles 
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should apply to a privilege in respect of publication of a 
work). De Groot's opinion was to the effect that because 
letters patent were granted not in respect of a person but 
in respect of an invention it could legally be transferred 
to another. De Groot's view is expressly stated to be "onder 
korreksie". 37 
(g) Territory of Privilege 
As stated above, a privilege only held force in the ter-
ritory over which the grantor had jurisdiction. A privilege 
granted by the States of a province only had force in that 
province while a privilege granted by the Estates General 
purported to have force throughout the republic. In general 
terms there was no question of privileges having interna-
tional effect. What sometimes happened was that a Dutch pub-
lisher would seek foreign privileges in addition to his 
privilege obtained in The Netherlands. For instance, in the 
case of Hugo de Groot's Annales et Historiae de Rebus Bel-
gicis Joan Blaauw was granted privileges by the States of 
Holland, the German Emperor Ferdinand III and by the Estates 
General. 
There were instances of the Estates General granting 
privileges in The Netherlands to works published under 
privileges in other countries at the requests of the 
governments of such other countries. Apart from these excep-
tional instances, however, privileges were only granted in 
The Netherlands to Dutch publishers and the like. Although 
the general principle was that where a privilege had been 
granted in respect of a work in The Netherlands foreign ver-
sions of that same work were "infringing copies", in some of 
37. Op cit, p 22. 
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the privileges granted by the States of Holland in respect 
of Dutch versions of works which were originally published 
elsewhere it was stated that the privilege did not prevent 
the importation and distribution of the original foreign 
version of the work. 
(h) Abolition of the Privilege System 
The era of privileges in respect of the publication of works 
endured from 1516 until the end of the 18th Century. 1796 
marked the end of the era and perhaps coincidentally there-
fore the era of the privilege system corresponded with the 
period of the full flowering of Roman-Dutch law or what is 
termed by Hahlo and Kahn as "the glory of the Roman-Dutch 
law. 38 The privileges made way for the era of Dutch 
statutory copyright law. 
(2) Statutory Copyright 
The era of Dutch statutory copyright must be viewed against 
the background of the systems of privileges out of which it 
developed. Apart, however, from the system of privileges 
there are other factors which are also relevant to the 
development of statutory copyright. 
No protection was granted under the law of The Netherlands 
to unpublished works. In this regard a distinction must be 
drawn between copyright as a right of property with an eco-
nomic va~ue and persona~ity rights which ~ay in certain cir-
cumstances have enabled an author to prevent publication of 
his works because such publication would violate his per-
sonality rights, whether they contained information of a 
private nature or whether because publication would be 
damaging to his reputation. De Beaufort drew this distinc-
38. Hahlo arxi Kahn, Legal System, p 543. 
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tion and confirms that the law of the time granted recogni-
tion to personality rights which could enable and author to 
restrain publication of his works in certain circum-
stances.39 
In dealing with the issue of no "copyright" in unpublished 
works De Beaufort relates an episode which emerged from an 
exchange of letters between Hugo de Groot and some of his 
relatives and friends in 1623 and ensuing years. Reference 
is made in this correspondence to the fact that there were 
several copies of his work Inleidinge tot de Hollandsche 
Rechtsgeleertheid in circulation despite the fact that he 
had originally intended the work to be exclusively available 
to his children and his youngest brother. He was advised by 
his correspondents to publish the work before it was pub-
lished by someone else. He decided to follow this advice and 
indeed published the work. It was, however, clear from the 
correspondence that although he referred to the existence of 
, other copies of his work as plagiarism he did not regard 
this as being anything unlawful. The important point is that 
de Groot proceeded on the assumption that the only way in 
which he could control the circulation of his work would be 
to publish it himself which would then enable it to qualify 
for the granting of a privilege. While it remained 
unpublished no protection was available for it. 
Notwithstanding the aforegoing the Estates General of Hol-
land issued a placaat on 30 April 1728 which conferred upon 
a certain group of authors the right to prevent their works 
being published without their specific authority. This 
placaat provided for this form of protection to be granted 
39. Op cit, p 28. 
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to professors and other members of the teaching staff of the 
University of Leiden. Even this placaat was, however, 
primarily intended to protect the honour and reputation of 
the staff of Leiden University because in the motivation for 
the placaat it was stated that unless they could control the 
publication of their works serious errors and omissions 
could occur in such published works and even incorrect 
statements all of which would bring the good names of the 
professors and lecturers into disrepute. De Beaufort 
propounds the view that the fact that such a placaat was 
issued in favour of the lecturers at Leiden University was 
an exception which proved the general rule; if there was a 
general right available to authors to restrain publication 
of their unpublished works it would not have been necessary 
to pass such a statute in favour of the Leiden lecturers. 
A form of de facto protection which was granted to works 
during the" era of the privileges was a series of pacts 
between various publishers and distributors in the major 
Dutch cities such as Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague and 
Utrecht that they would not copy each other's published 
books. The various city guilds also banded together to com-
bat reproduction of published books. 
Not surprisingly, it was in the· Province of Holland that 
statutory copyright originated in The Netherlands and the 
privilege system was first abrogated. This occurred in 1796 
by which time The Netherlands had undergone considerable 
constitutional changes and the Batavian Republic was in 
existence. The provinces no longer had the autonomy under 
the Batavian Republic which they had enjoyed during the time 
of the Republic of the United Netherlands. In that year the 
provincial administration of Holland issued a "publicatie" 
which provided that no further privileges would be granted 
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because the privilege system was contrary to the fundamental 
principle that every citizen was entitled to the protection 
of his own lawful property. The enactment provided further 
that every bookseller in the province who published an 
original book in respect of which he had acquired the right 
of copying enjoyed the exclusive right to print the book and 
to publish it. This enactment introduced the new principle 
that there existed a right of ownership in a work which had 
its origins in the author; however the exclusive right was 
not granted to the author but instead to the publisher. Thus 
while a measure of recognition was granted to the author the 
basic principle of the privilege system, namely, that it was 
the publisher who warranted protection, was perpetuated. 
The "copyright" granted to publishers in this enactment was 
transmissible to the publishers' heirs and was of perpetual 
duration. The "copyright" included the right to publish 
translations and abridgements of the original work. The 
geographical extent of the right was limited to the Province 
of Holland and it therefore had limited value. It was pos-
sible to acquire a "copyright" in Holland in books which 
were originally published elsewhere and the original and 
other versions of such books were regarded as "infringing 
copies". This principle applied equally to a translation of 
a foreign work. A local publisher could acquire a copyright 
in a foreign work even before he commenced printing it or 
translating it as long as he advertised his intention of 
doing so in newspapers whereupon he was granted a right of 
preference which operated to prevent others from pre-empting 
his endeavours. 
Bibles, wills, church . and school books, calendars and 
diaries were specifically excluded from protection while the 
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"copyright" in official documents vested in the provincial 
administration. 
The first Copyright Act which applied to all the provinces 
of the Bat avian Republic (including it is submitted t!"!.e 
overseas provinces or colonies) was the Publicatie van het 
Staatsbewind der Bataafsche Republiek van 3 Juli 1803. This 
enactment was based on the earlier enactment of the Province 
of Holland. 
In the 1803 Act the publishers were once again the corner-
stone of the system being introduced. Unlike in the earlier 
law of the Province of Holland, references were made in the 
Act of 1803 to the "opstellers" or compilers of books. Sec-
tion 2 of the Act granted copyright automatically to anyone 
who in the Batavian Republic published an original work in 
which he enjoyed the so-called right of copying either be-
cause he was the compiler thereof or because he had acquired 
39A , h that right in some other lawful way. Th~s Act went somew at 
39A. Sections l and 2 of the Act read as follows: 
"l. Dat voortaan geene Privilegien of Octroijen, tot het drukken 
en uitgeven van boeken, op publiek gezag zullen worden verleend, 
als strijdende tegen de grondbeginselen van het maatschappelijk 
verdrag, volgens welk ieder een, zonder eenige bijzondere wet, 
ten zijnen behoeve, aanspraak heeft op de beveiliging van zijnen 
regtmatigen eigendom. 
2. Dat diensvolgens, wanneer iemand in de Bataafsche Republiek 
een oorspronkelijk werk uitgeeft, waarvan hij het gewoonlijk 
alzoo genoemd Regt van Kopij, of bezit, omdat hij zelf daarvan 
de opsteller is, of om niet, of voor geld, of op eene andere, 
mits wettige wijze, bekomen heeft, hetzij dat het werk in eens 
of bij Deelen of Stukken, hetzij jaarlijks, maandelijks, 
wekelijks of dagelijks uitkomt, hij daardoor, zoo voor zich 
zelven als zijne erven, het regt heeft of verkrijgt, om dat werk 
uit te geven in zoodanig formaat en op al zulke wijze als hij zal 
goedvinden: als zijnde het gemelde Regt van uitgave een eigendom, 
waar op niemand, buiten deszelfs toestemming wettige aanspraak 




further than the law of the Province of Holland towards re-
cognizing the author of a work as the origin of copyright. 
Nevertheless this law did not give specific recognition to 
an author's inherent right in a work of intellectual prop-
erty. The purpose of the Act of 1803 remained primarily the 
promotion of the trade in books and thereafter the dis-
semination of information and the promotion of science. 
The Act of 1803 granted the same right of preference in 
respect of the translation of foreign works but did not 
grant such a right in respect of the mere reproduction of 
foreign works. For the rest, the Act of 1803 was substan-
tially identical to the earlier law of the Province of Hol-
land. In other words, it too gran ted perpetual copyright 
which was capable of transmission to the heirs of the pub-
lisher. 
Whereas the privilege system covered a wide variety of works 
including works of fine art and even works of sculpture, the 
law of the Province of Holland of 1796 dealt only with ''het 
drukken en ui tgeven van eenige Boeken of Stukken". The law 
thus protected primarily books but also any type of 1vork · 
which could be printed which category of work would have 
included all the categories of works capable of being pro-
tected by privileges, save for works of sculpture. The law 
of the Batavian Republic of 1803 granted copyright to anyone 
who "een oorspronkelijk werk uitgeeft". This appears to be a 
somewhat wider description of works than was covered by the 
law of the Province of Holland and it could conceivably have 
covered works of sculpture as well. However, as the primary 
objective of the law was to protect the book trade and the 
overall pattern of the law was to take over the earlier law 
of the Province of Holland, the category of works covered 
must perhaps be restrictively interpreted to be limited to 
works which were capable of being reproduced by means of a 
printing process. 
The Batavian law of 1803 and its predecessor the law of 1796 
of the Province of Holland arose out of the privilege 
system. The "copyright" granted by these laws was in effect 
a blanket privilege of unlimited duration granted automati-
cally to any publisher instead of the largely ad hoc dis-
criminatory and somewhat arbitrary system which had hitherto 
been followed. These laws thus conferred a somewhat primi-
tive form of copyright and it was not until much later that 
true copyright which recognized the creative efforts of the 
author as the ratio for 'protection came into being. It was 
at this stage of the development of copyright in The Nether-
221. 
lands that formal ties between Roman-Dutch law in South 
Africa and the law of The Netherlands were severed. 
Ironically, the Batavian law of 1803 only continued in force 
for some six years in The Netherlands because shortly after 
the incorporation of The Netherlands into the French Empire 
in 1809 Dutch law was replaced by French law. The French 
copyright law embodied in the "Decret-Loi des 19-24 Jui11et 
1793" was introduced into Holland. This law was supplemented 
by an Imperial Decree of 1810. The French law brought about 
an immediate change in emphasis because it recognized the 
author as the cornerstone of the protection. It also recog-
nized the other cardinal principle of copyright law, namely, 
that the term of protection should be of limited duration. 
The French law was in turn repealed and replaced by a local 
law in 1814. This law was to some extent a retrogressive 
step because it once again changed the emphasis from the 
author to the publisher. In the meantime in Belgium which 
was at the time part of a unitary state with The Nether-
lands, the French approach to copyright was introduced in 
the same year. The co-existence of two entirely different 
systems of copyright in the same state gave rise to need to 
harmonize the law. A new law was introduced in 1817 which 
followed the French approach and gave due recognition to the 
position of the author. The term of copyright was the 
lifetime of the author and twenty years after his death. The 
law of 1817 gave authors of literary and artistic works the 
exclusive right to reproduce them by means of printing and 
to publish copies. Works of sculpture were excluded from 
protection as they did not fall within the term "artistic 
work" for purposes of the law. 
The law of 1817 was found to be unsatisfactory in many 
respects. In 1860 work was commenced on a new Act and in the 
222. 
drafts which were prepared for the first time copyright in 
The Netherlands came to be referred to as "auteursrecht" 
instead of "kopierecht". Ultimately the "Wet van den 28sten 
Juni 1881 tot rege1ing van het Auteursrecht (Staatsblad No. 
124) " was passed. This Act did not protect artistic works 
.because at the time it was thought that these works .. should 
rather be dealt with in separate legislation. For the first 
time, however, in Dutch law a performing right was recog-
nized. No further discussion of this Act is warranted save 
to mention that it provided the model for the Copyright Act 
adopted by the South African Republic some six years later 
in 1887. The Netherlands Act, which will be discussed below, 
was largely reproduced in the Copyright Act adopted by the 
South African Republic. 
B. ROMAN DUTCH COPYRIGHT IN SOUTH AFRICA 
It is submitted that in the light of the aforegoing analysis 
of the reception of Roman-Dutch law generally in South 
Africa, Dutch copyright law as it existed in The Netherlands 
in 1803 was received into South African law along with the 
general body of Roman-Dutch law. That there has been very 
little mention, if any, of Roman-Dutch copyright law in 
South Africa is hardly surprising because even today with 
the mass utilization of works of intellectual property in 
the media, entertainment industry and the vast proliferation 
of information together with technological developments in 
data processing and storing, copyright remains an esoteric 
branch of the law - how much more was this not the case 
prior to the 20th Century. It may well be that 19th Century 
South African lawyers were in blissful ignorance of the 
availability of copyright protection under the Roman-Dutch 
common law. This does not, however, alter the fact that the 
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law was there and the protection available to be called upon 
if required. 
The extreme esoteric nature of copyright in South Africa 
prior to 1917 is illustrated by pointing out that, despite 
the fact that the British Copyright Act of 1842 operated 
from that year in the Cape Colony and thereafter in the 
other colonies in South Africa there were only eight known 
copyright cases in South Africa prior to 1917. The earliest 
of these was Dickens v "Eastern Province Herald" dating from 
1861. 40 During the hundred year period from 1861 to 1961 
there were only twenty two known copyright cases in South 
Africa. 
None of the great Roman-Dutch writers during the golden era 
of Roman-Dutch law dealt with copyright or with anything 
akin to copyright in their works. It is indeed possible that 
some of the privileges granted by the Estates General may 
have had force at the Cape. The Estates General purported to 
grant privileges for the entire Republic of the United 
Netherlands and it of course is the only body which actually 
had direct legislative authority over the Cape. Apart from 
the esoteric nature of copyright, this is understandable 
because, as pointed out above, the privilege system operated 
during this era and each privilege was by and large to be 
interpreted according to its own terms. As has be,en seen, 
Hugo de Groot certainly had some involvement with the 
privilege system and the interpretation of privileges or 
letters patent as a legal practitioner. Interestingly 
enough, Van der Linden, the latest of the Roman-Dutch 
writers and the writer granted pre-eminence in the Transvaal 
40. Didcens v "Eastem Province Herald" (1861) 4 Searle 33. 
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and the Orange Free State Republics, although not having 
dealt in any way with copyright law, made reference to 
copyright in the preface to the Koopman 1 s Handboek or 
Institutes of the Law of Holland. Van der Linden states in 
the preface that he came to write the book because one Johan 
Allart, a bookseller and the copyright owner in respect of a 
book written by Jacob Loveringh, the translated English 
title of which was Legal, Notarial and Merchantile Manual, 
last published in 1671, approached him to prepare a fresh 
edition of the book. Van der Linden says that upon investi-
gating the proposed task he came to the conclusion that the 
book was so badly written that it would be virtually 
impossible to produce a new edition without substantially 
rewriting it and in that case he would prefer to write his 
own book afresh. Van der Linden 1 s Koopman 1 s Handboek was 
published in 1806, some three years after the passing of the 
law of 1803. Van der Linden was thus clearly aware of the 
existence of copyright but no doubt decided that the subject 
was not worthy of discussion in his book (in this his atti-
tude is no different to non-specialist modern writers) and 
he may well have been influenced by the fact that copyright 
at the time was really only of any particular interest to 
publishers. 
The fact that prior to 1806, when the Cape was occupied by 
the British for the second time, copyright was only of any 
real interest to the publishing trade would also have served 
to make the subject of very little importance at the Cape as 
it existed at the time. Under the Dutch East India Company 
the Cape had operated, as' a refreshment station and very 
little other business or economic activity took place there. 
The first printing press was only established at the Cape in 
1800. It was only with the arrival of De Mist during the 
period of the Batavian Republic that any sort of change in 
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this regard began to take place. During the early days at 
the Cape no doubt very little publishing of books took 
place. By 1842 the British Copyright Act of that date was in 
operation at the Cape and thereafter it is likely that ques-
tions of copyright would have been dealt with primarily by 
reference to that Act. In other words, it is contended that 
the absence of references to Roman-Dutch copyright in our 
jurisprudence is not necessarily due to the non-existence of 
such copyright but rather to the lack of any real cause to 
have had recourse to it. 
It will be submitted below that the adoption of Copyright 
Acts in the Cape in 1873, Natal in 1896 and the Transvaal in 
1887 repealed the Roman-Dutch common law insofar as the 
types of works dealt with in those Acts are concerned. After 
the adoption of these Acts Roman-Dutch copyright law would 
have largely ceased to be of any significance in those three 
territories, but this was not true of ·the Orange Free State 
which never passed any Copyright Act. Roman-Dutch copyright 
law thus continued to operate in undiminished scope in the 
Orange Free State up until 1917. 
The content of South African Roman-Dutch copyright was as 
follows: It protected literary, dramatic, artistic and musi-
cal works once published insofar as they were capable of 
being reproduced by means of printing. The right vested in 
the publisher provided he could show that he had compiled 
the work or had lawfully acquired the right to publish it 
from the author. The right existed automatically and came 
into being upon publication of the work. A work was pro-
tected against copying in whole or in part and against the 
making of translations. The right was of perpetual duration 
and it was capable of being transmitted to heirs. The right 
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was conferred only upon works published in the state in 
question. 
Roman-Dutch common law copyright granted no protection to 
unpublished works. The distinction drawn by De Beaufort 
between the right to restrain publication of a work derived 
from the law dealing with personality rights, on the one 
hand, and copyright, on the other hand, is equally applica-
ble to the Roman-Dutch common law during the 19th Century 
and indeed today. This distinction is aptly drawn and 
described in an article entitled "Outeursreg en Persoonlik-
heidsregte 'n Teoretiese Analise met Verwysing na Out-
eursregbevoegdhede in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg" by J Neethl-
ing.41 Prof Neethling rightly joins issue with Prof A Copel-
ing where he states in his work entitled Copyright Law in 
South Africa, in dealing with Section 44(4) of the Copyright 
Act, 19 6 5, that the au thor's right to privacy is to be 
regarded as a right in the nature of copyright. Neethling 
points out that the right of privacy, being one of the 
species of personality rights, derives from the classic 
Roman law "Acto Iniuriariwn" and has as its object the pro-
tection of the individual's "dignitas"; while copyright law 
is essentially an economic right. As has been shown above, 
in Roman-Dutch law copyright has its origins in the system 
of privileges granted to booksellers to protect their 
investmehts. This distinction has been blurred to some 
extent by the protection under the law of copyright of what 
is termed the author's "moral rights" in the Copyright Act, 
1978. 4 2 Protection for these rights was only introduced into 
South African copyright law in 1978 although a measure of 
41. (1975) 38 THRHR 332. 
42. see p 66 supra. 
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protection was granted to them in the Copyright Act, 1965. 
These rights are, however, essent~a11y rights of copyright, 
albeit of a personal nature to the author, and are distin-
guishable from common law personality rights. Thus, although 
Roman-Dutch common law in the 19th Century enabled an author 
to prevent publication of his works in certain circumstances 
by means of enforcing his personality rights, this could not 
at the time be achieved by means of copyright and these per-
sonality rights were not within the contemplation of the 
legislature 
by the Act 
in 1916 when substituted copyright was conferred 
of 1916 in lieu of a copyright which existed 
under the common law prior to 1917. 
The only reference to a South Africa common law copyright 
which has been found in South African jurisprudence is in 
the Cape case of Boosey & co v Simmonds dating from 1903. 43 
That case dealt with the unauthorized sale of copies of 
musical productions which originated from and had been pub-
lished in Britain. The court held in favour of the applicant 
on the grounds that it could enforce copyright conferred by 
the British Act of 1842. In arguing the case for the appli-
cant, however, Searle KC, the applicant's Counsel, 
that in addition to the applicant's rights under the 
argued 
British 
Act he could rely on common law copyright protection. The 
alternative argument was not, however, pressed and was not 
dealt with at all in the judgement. It is not clear what 
common la~ copyright the learned Counsel had in mind. It was 
certainly not the British common law copyright because such 
copyright protected only unpublished works and the works in 
question had been published. Moreover British common law 
copyright had not been assimilated into the South African 
43. (1903) 20 SC 632; 13 CTR 1138. 
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common law. However, the Roman-Dutch common law copyright 
protected published works but it only conferred protection 
upon works published in the country itself, i.e. the Cape. 
In this instance the works in question had been published in 
Britain. Furthermore, it would only have been correct to 
rely upon Roman-Dutch common law copyright if the Cape Act 
of 1873 was to be construed as not having repealed the com-
mon law copyright. It will be contended below that this is 
not the case. It is submitted that the learned Counsel had 
Roman-Dutch common law in mind because British common law 
copyright would have been well known to protect only 
unpublished works. In the circumstances, the attempt to rely 
upon Roman-Dutch common law copyright appears to have been 
misguided but it is significant that such an attempt should 
have been made. It is submitted that this incident suggests 
an awareness of Roman-Dutch common law copyright although 
the precise nature and scope thereof may have been 
uncertain. 
5. SOUTH AFRICAN WORKS ELIGIBLE FOR EARLY BRITISH 
COPYRIGHT 
It was pointed out in Chapter III that pre-1911 British 
copyright law granted copyright in Britain to certain works 
originating from foreign countries and British dominions and 
that certain of the British statutes of this period granted 
copyright in British dominions. The effect of this body of 
law on South African works and works enjoying copyright in 
South Africa will be examined below. 
In this section of this. thesis the maker of a work who is 
someone who was a British subject residing in South Africa 
or was resident in a territory which was a British dominion 
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at the time of the making of the work will be referred to as 
a "South African qualified author"; a work first published 
in a terri tory in South Africa which was at the time a 
Sri tish dominion will be referred to as a "South African 
qualifying work". 
As the purpose of this thesis is to examine which early 
works enjoy copyright in terms of the transi tiona! provi-
sions of the Copyright Act, 1978, and since works in which 
the copyright did not pass through the 1911 British Gateway 
or the 1917 South African Gateway do not qualify for current 
protection, the present analysis will be confined to works 
which would have passed through either of these gateways. 
(1) Unpublished Works 
Unpublished works enjoyed common law copyright under the 
Sri tish common law irrespective of the nationality and 
residence of the author. Accordingly, all works unpublished 
on 1 July 1912 made by authors who were inhabitants of South 
Africa enjoyed copyright in Britain up to 1 July 1912 and 
all such works passed through the British 1912 Gateway save 
for paintings, drawings and photographs. 44 
(2) Literary Works ("Books") 
Literary works, including literary rights in musical and 
dramatic works, first published in Britain, a Berne Conven-
tion country or Austria-Hungary at any time after 1 July 
1870 enjoyed copyright in the United Kingdom and passed 
through the British 1912 Gateway. This was so irrespective 
of the nationality of the author and a work emanating from 
South Africa which met this condition enjoyed copyright 
44. See p 151 supra. 
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which passed through the British 1912 Gateway. After 25 June 
1886, as a result of the International Copyright Act of that 
year, works produced in a British dominion were placed on a 
par with works produced in the United Kingdom. Accordingly, 
a South African qualifying work produced after that date 
enjoyed copyright in Britain which passed through the 
British 1912 Gateway. 
It will be shown below that the British Copyright Act of 
1842 conferred copyright in British dominions in South 
Africa and was not repealed as far as South Africa is con-
cerned until 1 January 1917. Furthermore it will be shown 
that the South African Act of 1916 did not confer copyright 
in South Africa on literary works which enjoyed copyright in 
Britain in that year, as distinct from other types of works 
eligible for copyright, e.g. dramatic, artistic, etc works. 
Accordingly, the only way in which literary works granted 
copyright under the British Copyright Act of 1842 could pass 
through the South African 1917 Gateway was if they would 
have continued to enjoy copyright under that Act on 1 
January 1917 assuming that the Copyright Act of 1842 had not 
been repealed. In practice this means the work must have 
been first published in Britain or another recognized for-
eign country after 1 January 1875. 
(3) Performing Rights in Dramatic or Musical Works 
British law conferred a performing right which passed 
through the 1912 Gateway in a dramatic or musical work which 
was published in manuscript form if the work was first per-
formed publicly after 1 July 1870 and provided the first 
public performance took place in the United Kingdom or a 
recognized country (or in a British dominion after 1886), or 
the author died on or after 1 July 1905; provided further 
the first publication of the manuscript took place in an 
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aforementioned territory. Certain formalities also had to be 
complied with. A work made by a South African author enjoyed 
the aforementioned protection if it was first performed as 
aforementioned in Britain or a recognized country or was 
first performed in a British dominion in South Africa after 
1886. 
It will be shown below that British performing rights in 
terms of the Copyright Act 1842 also subsisted in British 
dominions in South Africa and for these rights to pass 
through the South African Gateway of 1917 the same condi-
tions as aforementioned must have been met save that the 
first public performance must have taken place after 1 
January 1875 and the author must have died after 1 January 
1910. 
(4) Engravings (Prints) 
British copyright law conferred copyright which passed 
through the 1912 Gateway in engravings which were first pub-
lished in Britain or in another recognized country after 30 
June 1884. After 1886 first publication could have taken 
place in a British dominion. An engraving of any South 
African author enjoyed these rights provided it was first 
published in accordance with these conditions. 
(5) Sculptures 
Bri t:!.sh copyright law conferred copyright in a sculpture 
which passed through the 1912 gateway if it was first pub-
lished after 1 July 1898 or was published after 1 July 1884 
where the author was still alive on 1 July 1898 and had not 
assigned his copyright. Where reliance was placed on first 
publication after 1 July 1884 and the author being alive on 
1 July 1898 the first publication must have taken place in 
the United Kingdom and the author must have been a British 
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subject or resident in a British dominion; where reliance 
was placed on first publication after 1 July 1898 such first 
publication could have taken place in the United Kingdom or 
in a British dominion provided the author was a British sub-
ject or was resident in the United Kingdom or a British 
dominion. South African sculptures which satisfied these 
conditions enjoyed the aforementioned rights. 
(6) Paintings, Drawings and Photographs 
Pre-1912 statutory copyright subsisted if the author was a 
British subject or was resident in a British dominion. Such 
copyright passed through the 1912 gateway subject to certain 
conditions if the author was alive on or before 1 July 1905 . 
• The works of South African qualified authors enjoyed the 
aforementioned rights if they met the aforementioned condi-
tions. 
6. BRITISH COPYRIGHT IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Only two of the pre-1911 British copyright statutes applied 
to British dominions in the sense that they conferred 
copyright in the British dominions upon works in respect of 
which they granted copyright. These Acts were the Copyright 
Act, 1842, and the International Copyright Act, 1886. The 
"British dominions" to which the Copyright Act 1842 applied 
by virtue of Section 15 were defined as follows in Section 2 
"All parts of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Ireland, the Islands of Jersey and Guernsey, all parts of 
the East and west Indies, and all the colonies, settlements 
and possessions of the Crown which are now or are hereafter 
may be acquired". This definition covers all the colonies of 
South Africa, from the time when, and for as long as, they 
were colonies, and the Union of South Africa. 
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The effect of the Copyright Act 1842 read together with the 
International Copyright Act, 1886, was that literary, 
dramatic and musical works ("books") enjoying copyright in 
the United Kingdom, and dramatic and musical works enjoying 
performing rights in that country (irrespective of their 
origin and thus including those originating from South 
Africa), enjoyed copyright and performing rights, respec-
tively, in the British dominions in South Africa. A South 
African literary, dramatic or musical work which met the 
requirements of the Copyright Act of 1842 enjoyed protection 
in South Africa (or in those parts of South Africa which 
were British dominions at any· given time) in terms of 
British legislation. 
The British Copyright Act, 1842, and the Dramatic Copyright 
Act, 1833, as applied by and extended by the 1842 Act, were 
given effect in the CapE;! Colony in Dickens v "Eastern 
Province Herald"; Searelle & Gilbert & Sullivan v Bonameci & 
Perkins "Proprietors of the Lyric Opera Company"; Marsh v 
Bevan, Edwardes v Pollard & Chester; Wheeler & Another v De 
Jong & Walton; Boosey & Co v Simmonds; and Koenig v 
Landes hut. 45 These cases all dealt with the performing 
rights in the Cape Colony of British dramatic and/or musical 
works. In the Marsh case relief was refused on account of 
the fact that insufficient evidence of the subsistence of 
copyright was adduced. In the Boosey case the court 
expressed the view that no registration of British copyright 
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Gilbert & Sullivan v Ba1ameci & Perkins "Proprietors of the Lyric Opera 
C'.altJanY" ( 1893 ) 3 CI'R 171; Marsh v Bel1an ( 1893 ) 3 CI'R 220; F.ci;,m:des v 
Pollard & a.ester (1899) 9 ern 31; l<b!eler & Arx>ther v De Joog & waltcn 
(1901) 11 CI'R 3; Boosey & Co v Simmonds (1903) 20 SC 632; 13 CI'R 1138; 
arrl Koenig v Landesbut ( 1904) }.4 CI'R 97. 
in the Cape Colony was necessary and that "the English Act 
protects the holders of such copyright through the British 
dominions, and under the 15th section of that Act, where 
there is an infringement by any one of such copyright, an 
action on the case can be brought by the holder of the 
copyright". 46 In the Koenig case relief was refused on 
account of the fact that, although the plaintiff had taken 
assignment of the relevant copyright and was registered as 
the proprietor (in the United Kingdom), he had in fact been 
acting as the agent 
the copyright and 
of the defendant when he had acquired 
the copyright accordingly properly 
belonged to the defendant. Relief was accordingly refused on 
the basis of copyright infringement. 
Section 36 of the British Copyright Act of 1911 provided 
that, although the Act repealed the earlier legislation in 
Britain, the repeal would not take effect and the early 
legislation would continue to apply in any part of the 
British dominions until the act came into operation in that 
territory. This only came about on 1 January 1917 in South 
Africa. Accordingly, the British Copyright Act of 1842 and 
the International Copyright Act of 1886 continued after 1912 
and until 1917 to have effect in South Africa as though they 
had not been repealed in Britain. British, foreign and South 
African works first published or performed in circumstances 
which would have conferred copyright or performing rights· on 
them in the United Kingdom during the period 1 July 1912 
until 1 January 1917, but for the repeal of these Acts in 
Britain, had copyright and/or performing rights conferred 
upon them in South Africa. This would have affected 
literary, musical and dramatic works. By the same token, 
4 6 • Per Maasdol:p J, at p 633. 
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however, 1 i terary works which acquired copyright in the 
United Kingdom under the British Copyright Act of 1911 dur-
ing the period of 1 July 1912 to 1 January 1917, but which 
would not have acquired copyright under the Copyright Act of 
1842 if it had remained in operation, did not necessarily 
acquire copyright in South Africa. The same is.not, however, 
true of dramatic and musical works. This point will be 
reverted to below in Chapter V. 
As the British common law in general and the common law 
relating to copyright in particular was not adopted in any 
part of South Africa, no copyright in any works came into 
existence in South Africa by virtue of the British common 
law. 
7. EARLY SOUTH AFRICAN COPYRIGHT LEGISLATION 
The Cape, Natal and Transvaal each adopted their own 
copyright legislation from the second half of the 19th 
Century onwards. The Orange Free State, on the other hand, 
adopted no copyright legislation. To the extent that these 
territories were British dominions this legislation was in 
part supplementary to the British Copyright Act, 1842, and 
the International Copyright Act, 1886. The copyright legis-
lation of each of the aforementioned territories, insofar as 
such legislation deals with the subsistence, duration and 
ownership of copyright, will be.dealt with below. 
Early South African copyright legislation left much to be 
desired. The comments of the British Gorell Committee, 1909, 
on the state of early British copyright legislation47 are 
47. Seep 124 supra. 
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equally apposite to early South African copyright legisla-
tion. In many instances the British statutes, which were 
themselves imperfect, were imperfectly taken over and 
adopted apparently without a proper understanding of the 
subj eat matter and the background to the British leg isla-
tion. As a result interpretation of the statutes is a com-
plex and difficult matter. 
The Transvaal took over The Netherlands Copyright Act of 
1881, which differed widely in approach to British legisla-
tion, incompletely. 
A. THE CAPE 
(1) Act No. 4 of 1854 
The earliest item of copyright legislation in the Cape was 
Act No. 4 of 1854 which had the title "Act for Authorizing 
the Importation into the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope of 
Books, being Foreign Reprints of Books First Composed, or 
Written, or Printed, or Published in the United Kingdom, and 
in which there shall be Copyright". The effect of this Act 
was to mitigate the prohibition provided for in the British 
Copyright Act of 1842 against importation of foreign made 
copies of British copyrighted works into the British 
dominions and allowed for the importation of such foreign 
produced books in certain circumsta~ces. As it had nothing 
to do with the creation or subsistence of copyright in the 
Cape no further attention will be devoted to it. 
(2) Act No. 2 of 1873 - Copyright Act of 1873 
Copyright in "books" was. regulated by the Act of 1873. 
(a) Types of Works Protected 
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The Act defined "book" to mean and include "every 
volume, part or division of a volume, pamphlet, sheet 
of letter press, sheet of music, and map, chart or plan 
separately published". 48 
This definition is identical to the corresponding 
definition in the British Copyright Act of 1842. 
Dramatic works and musical works were protected insofar 
as they were published in book form. Maps, charts and 
plans were also protected. 
Section 1 of Act 4 of 1888 amplified the definition of 
"book" by stating that it did not include 
"any publication which consists merely of a price 
list, sale catalogue, annual report, trade cir-
cular or trade advertisement or any volume, 
pamphlet, sheet of letter-press, sheet of music, 
map, chart or plan intended for private circula-
tion, and not for sale, and of which not more than 
fifty copies shall be printed". 
(b) Conditions for Subsistence of Copyright 
Copyright was created by the act of first publication. 
No specific requirement of original! ty was imposed. 
However, as in the case of the British Copyright Act of 
1842, no doubt something which was a mere copy of a 
previous book was not entitled to protection. 49 This 
had to take place in the Cape Colony. The preamble to 
the Act provided that "whereas it is expedient to pro-
tect the rights of authors in this colony in respect of 
4 8 • Secticn 9 • 
49. See p 127 supra. 
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their works and to afford encouragement to the produc-
tion of literary works of lasting benefit to the 
colony". No further reference is made in the Act to the 
nationality or place of residence of the author but it 
would seem that the Act only applied to the publication 
of works of authors resident in the colony. Accor-
dingly, for. copyright to subsist in the work it must 
have been first published in the Cape Colony and the 
author must have been a resident of that colony. It was 
not necessary that the author was alive at the time of 
first publication.50 
Section 3 of the Act made provision for a registry book 
to be kept by the Registrar of Deeds in Cape Town and 
for the proprietorship and assignments of copyright to 
be registered in that book. A certified copy of an 
entry in the .register issued by the Registrar of Deeds 
wa-s admissible evidence in the court and constituted 
prima facie proof of the proprietorship or assignment 
of copyright as reflected in the certificate but such 
prima facie evidence could be rebutted by other evi-
dence. Section 5 provided that any person aggrieved by 
any entry made in the register could apply to the 
Supreme Court for the entry to be expunged or varied. 
It is not clear whether registration was a formal 
requirement for the subsistence of copyright. In Boosey 
& Co v Sirnmonds5 1 ' it was argued that the work in ques-
tion, which was a British work, enjoyed no copyright in 
the Cape because it had not been registered in terms of 
the 1873 Act. Maasdorp J expressed himself as follows: 
50 . Secticn 2. 
51. SUpra, at p 633. 
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"Now it seems to me upon reference to the Act of 
1873 that the registration therein required is of 
books which are published and brought out in this 
colony, and without reference to publications in 
England, but it is not necessary now to decide 
that point". 
He went on to hold that British copyright could be 
enforced without registration in the Cape but he left 
open the question of whether a work which derived its 
protection from the 1873 Cape Act was required to be 
registered either as a pre-condition for the sub-
sistence of copyright or for the enforcement of 
copyright. 
The 1873 Act is clearly modelled on the British Act of· 
1842. That Act required that copies of books must be 
delivered to Stationers Hall for registration but the 
consequence of lack of registration was that copyright 
infringement proceedings could not be brought. 
Copyright subsisted in the work irrespective of 
registration. It is submitted that at worst under the 
Cape Act a work must have been registered before the 
copyright could be enforced; registration was not a 
condition precedent for the subsistence of copyright. 
Any person aggrieved by any entry made in the Registry 
book maintained by the Registrar of Deeds could apply 
to the Supreme Court for such an entry to be expunged 
or varied. 52 
From 1886 onwards - after the International Copyright 
Act, 1886, came into operation in Britain - first pub-
52. Section 5. 
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lication of a book in the Cape was sufficient to create 
copyright in the United Kingdom under the British Act 
of 1842 and registration in the Deeds Registry had the 
same effect as registration at Stationers Hall in the 
United Kingdom and made the taking of this formal step 
unnecessary. Consequently, after that date first pub-
lication in the Cape and registration at the Deeds 
Registry conferred copyright in a work not only in the 
Cape but also in Britain and in all places to which the 
British Copyright Act of 1842 extended, including the 
Cape, as well as in all the countries of the Berne Con-
vention and Austria-Hungary.53 
The term "copyright" was defined in the Act to mean 
"the sole and exclusive liberty of printing or other-
wise multiplying copies of any book". 54 Consequently, 
the Act did not create any performing right in musical 
or dramatic works as did the British Act of 1842. This 
meant that, since first publication in the Cape 
simultaneously caused copyright to be vested in the 
work in both the Cape and in Britain, the British 
copyright (which extended back to the Cape) granted a 
wider right, including the performing right, than the 
Cape Act. 
Section 1 of the Act, in dealing with the subsistence 
and duration of copyright in a work published in the 
lifetime of its author read "the copyright in every 
book which shall after the passing of this Act be pub-
lished in the lifetime of its author" (emphasis added). 
53. See p 143 supr-a. 
54. Section 9. 
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This wording is taken from the British Act of 1842. By 
contrast, Section 2 which deals with the subsistence 
and duration of copyright in works published posthu-
mously does not contain this phrase. This section too 
is taken verbatim from the British Act of 1842. The 
British Act of 1842 was preceded by earlier copyright 
legislation. This legislation conferred statutory 
copyright on living authors upon the printing of their 
works. The term of such copyright was twenty-eight 
years after publication or, if the author survived this 
period, his lifetime. The legislation conferred no 
statutory copyright upon works first published 
posthumously. Accordingly, when dealing with the pub-
. lished works of living authors, the Act of 1842 had a 
built in transitional provision and it only gave the 
longer period of copyright provided by the 1842 Act to 
works which were first published by living authors 
after it had come into operation. In the case of works 
published posthumously, copyright was created 
retrospectively because these works had previously not 
enjoyed copyright. When the Cape adopted the Copyright 
Act of 1873 there was no existing statutory copyright 
and it may appear anomalous to have adopted in the case 
of works published during the lifetime of the author 
the wording of a British section which had a built in 
transitional provision. However, under Roman-Dutch com-
mon law copyright, perpetual copyright subsisted in a 
published work. Accordingly Section 1 is perfectly 
logical viewed against the background of the common law 
copyright. The Roman-Dutch common law copyright also 
protected works published posthumously and there is 
therefore no justification for making a distinction in 
the Cape Act between works first published during the 
lifetime of the author and those first published 
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posthumously. This distinction is an anomaly but it is 
of no practical importance. It is submitted that it was 
not the intention of the legislature to make this dis-
tinction and the anomaly which it has created was due 
to the adoption of the wording of the British Act of 
1842 which applied to a different historical situation. 
The effect of Sections 1 and 2 of the Act was to make 
provision for the Act to regulate the copyright in all 
published books and to provide that the copyright had a 
limited duration. Since the Act clearly contemplated 
that published. books could only enjoy copyright in 
accordance with its provisions55 and allotted the 
ownership of the copyright to the author, in contrast 
with the common law which allotted it to the publisher, 
it is submitted that it effectively repealed the common 
law copyright and, in the case of existing works, it in 
principle changed the ownership of the copyrig~t from 
the publisher to the author. Of course, in terms of the 
common law copyright the publisher was required to 
acquire the right to publish a work from the author, 
unless the publisher had compiled the work, and it is 
possible that in some cases the mode of acquisition of 
the publication right might have constituted an assign-
ment of copyright recognized under the Act. 




The author of the work was the initial owner56 provided 
that where a work was first published posthumously the 
initial owner of the copyright was the proprietor of 
Both Secticns 1 arrl 2 read "The COP:Jright in every book which 







from which the first published version 
In this respect the Act was also modelled on the 
British Act of 1842 but, unlike that Act, the Cape Act 
made no special provision regarding the authorship and 
initial ownership of collective works. In the case of 
these works the British Act made exceptions to the gen-
eral rule that the ownership of copyright vested ini-
tially in the author. In these exceptional circum-
stances the ownership of the Cape copyright and the 
British copyright might have vested in different per-
sons. 
(d) Duration of Copyright 
Where the work was published during the lifetime of the 
author, the term of copyright was his natural life and 
a further period of five years, or thirty years from 
the first publication of the book, whichever was the 
longer.58 In the case of posthumous works, the term of 
copyright was thirty years from the first publication 
thereof. 59 
The corresponding periods under the British Act of 1842 
were the lifetime of the author and seven years there-
after, or forty-two years from first publication, 
whichever was the longer, or, in the case of posthumous 
works, forty-two years from the date of first pub-
lication. Accordingly, in the case of works first pub-
lished after 1886 the British copyright which was con-
57. Secticn 2. 
58 . Secticn 1. 
59. Secticn 2. 
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ferred upon the work simultaneously was of longer dura-
tion than the Cape copyright. 
(e) Transmission of Copyright 
Copyright could be assigned by means of a written 
agreement or by means of making an entry in respect of 
an assignment in the Registry book maintained by the 
Registrar of Deeds. Partial assignments of copyright 
were possible.60 The British copyright in a work could 
be assigned in the same way as the Cape Copyright and 
it would seem to follow that unless a distinction was 
drawn in an assignment between the Cape copyright and 
the British copyright, an assignment would cover both 
copyrights simultaneously. 
The right to claim copyright in a work, which came into 
existence upon first publication, could be transferred 
prior to publication and ownership of copyright could 
be passed by legacy or by operation of law in addition 
to formal assignment as described above. 61 As stated 
above the acquisition by the publisher of the right to 
publish a book from the author in terms of common law 
copyright could in some cases be construed as a trans-
fer of the right to claim copyright referred to above. 
The aforementioned provision was thus compatible with 
the position under the common law. 
(3) Act 4 of 1888 - The Books Registry Act, 1888 
This Act was entitled "To Provide for the Preservation of 
Copies of Books Printed in this Colony and for the Registra-
60. Secticn 4. 
61. Secticn 4. 
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tion of Such Books". Section 1 of the Act amplified the 
definition of "book" in the Copyright Act of 1873, as men-
tioned above. 
For the major part the Act was concerned with requiring the 
deposit of four copies of the first edition of any book 
printed or lithographed in the Cape, irrespective of whether 
such work was produced before or after the Act came into 
force, with a government officer. Provision was made for a 
copy of each of such books to be delivered to the librarian 
of the South African Public Library and to the Grahamstown 
Public Library. The government officer receiving the copies 
was required to prepare a memorandum of the particulars 
required for registration of copyright under the Act of 1873 
and to transmit that memorandum to the Registrar of Deeds 
who was in turn required to enter the relevant particulars 
in respect of the book in the Registry book maintained by 
him in terms of the Act of 1873. The entry of such particu-
lars in the Registry book by the Registrar had the same 
effect as registration of copyright by the proprietor under 
the 1873 Act. Failure to deliver the requisite copies of a 
book gave rise to criminal proceedings but had no bearing on 
the subsistence of copyright in the book. Similar require-
ments were made in respect of imported books. This Act was 
described as being "to amend the law relating to the pro-
tection of copyright against the importation of foreign 
reprints int:o t:his colony and t:o t:he regist:rat:ion of books". 
(4) Act 18 of 1895 - The Copyright Protection and Books 
Registration Act, 1895 
This Act repealed the 1854 Act and reimposed the prohibition 
against importation of .foreign editions of books enjoying 
British copyright. It extended this prohibition to foreign 
printed editions of works registered under the Cape Act of 
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1873 and books registered in any state or colony in South 
Africa. 
(5) Act 45 of 1905 - Copyright in Works of Art Act, 1905 
(a) Types of Works Protected 
The Act defined "work of art" (sometimes called "work") to 
mean "a painting or drawing and the design thereof, a 
photograph and the negative thereof, and any positives or 
copies made therefrom, an engraving or a piece of sculp-
ture".62It is clear from Section 4, which deals with 
registration of copyright, that the term "photograph" 
included "a series of photographs commonly known as living 
pictures, cinematographs, or bioscopes". 
Effectively the Act covered the same types of works as the 
British Engravings Copyright Acts, 1734 and 1736, the Prints 
Copyright Act, 1776, the Prints and Engravings Copyright 
(Ireland) Act, 1836, the Sculpture Copyright Act, 1814, and 
the Fine Arts Copyright Act, 1862. Insofar as the British 
Sculpture Copyright Act, 1814, protected industrial designs 
as sculptures, the same applied to the Cape Act. In this 
respect the definition of "copyright" in Section 1 is sig-
nificant; it states that "copyright" means "the sole and 
exclusive right of copying, reproducing, repeating or other-
wise multiplying copies of any work of art and of the design 
thereof in any size, in the same or any other material, or 
by the same or any other kind of art". In order to be 
eligible for copyright a work of art must have been original 
and it must have been "produced in the colony". 63 No 
qualification is made in the Act as to the nationality or 
6 2 • Secticn 1. 
63. Section 2. 
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any other status of the author of the work and as long as it 
was produced in the Cape it qualified for copyright no mat-
ter who the author might be. 
(b) Conditions for Subsistence of Copyright 
The Act made provision for registration of copyright. The 
proprietorship of every copyright in a work of art and any 
assignments thereof were required to be recorded in the 
Register. Any certified copy of an entry in the Register 
issued by the Registrar (an official specifically appointed 
for this purpose) constituted prima facie proof of the pro-
prietorship or assignment of the relevant copyright, but 
could be rebutted by other evidence. Any person aggrieved by 
an entry in the Register could apply to court for the entry 
to be expunged or varied.64 Section 11 of the Act provided 
that no proprietor of copyright in a work of art first pro-
duced in the colony "shall be entitled to the benefit of 
this Act until he shall have registered his copyright, nor 
shall any prosecution or action be competent for anything 
done before registration". Registration is nowhere in the 
Act stated to be a condition precedent for the subsistence 
of copyright and, bearing in mind that none of the British 
statutes dealing with copyright in works of art require 
registration, and that the British statutes doubtless 
inspired the Cape Act, it is submitted that registration was 
no more than a requirement for the enforcement of copyright 
which subsisted automatically provided the work was produced 
at the Cape. The wording of Section 11 is consistent with 
this interpretation. The section speaks of proprietor of the 
copyright in a work of art first produced in the colony who 
is not entitled to the benefit of the Act until registra-
64 • Sectic:n 4. 
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tion. This pre-supposes that the copyright subsists before 
the act of registration had occurred. 
The effect and implications of registration of copyright was 
considered in the case of Moore v Argus Printing & Pub-
lishing Co. Limited & Another. 65 In that case one P assigned 
the copyright in a photograph to the plaintiff and this 
assignment of copyright was recorded in the Register. 
However, prior to effecting the assignment P had granted a 
licence to the defendant in respect of the publication of 
the photograph. The scope of the licence which was granted 
was in dispute. The plaintiff sought to enforce the 
copyright against the defendant and restrict publication of 
the photograph. The registration of the photograph in the 
name of the plaintiff was unqualified by any entries in the 
Register. Ex facie the Register the plaintiff had the 
unqualified right to restrain publication of a photog_raph by 
the defendant. Maasdorp, J.P. had the following to say: 
"But it appears that under section 4 this certified 
copy of the entry is only prima-facie proof of the pro-
prietorship or assignment, and is subject to be 
rebutted by other evidence. The question now is whether 
the defendants have produced any evidence to rebut the 
unrestricted title of the plaintiff in the copyright. I 
am inclined to think that the defendants have not chal-
lenged the plaintiff's right in the proper manner. They 
should, in my opinion. considering the nature of the 
claim set up by them, have proceeded under the provi-
sions of Section 4, clause 2 of the Act, and have asked 
for an order varying the entry in favour of the 
plaintiff, in _accordance with the right claimed by 
them. " 
65. 1911 CPD 174. 
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It is submitted that registration of copyright was a 
mechanism for creating certainty regarding the subsistence 
of and title to copyright and it. did no more than record an 
existing factual situation. At the same time it was an 
evidential tool for establishing the subsistence of and 
title to copyright in court proceedings. Failure to register 
copyright or to record an assignment did not as a question 
of substantive law affect the subsistence of and/or title to 
copyright in a work, but merely had a bearing on the 
enforceability of the copyright at any given time. In this 
regard it is. significant that Section 11 of the Act, in 
prescribing that registration is necessary before a proprie-
tor of copyright is entitled to the benefit of the Act, 
states that "nor shall any prosecution or action be com-
petent for anything done before registration". It is not 
stated that no copyright subsists before registration but 
simply that registration is a condition precedent before any 
act could become an infringing act. 
Section 6 of the Act provided that if copyright was infrin-
ged the infringer was "liable to an action for damages for 
infringement of the copyright, and all such copies shall be 
forfeited to such proprietor". In terms of this section the 
primary remedies available to a copyright owner were a claim 
for damages and deli very-up of infringing copies. These 
reme~ies were required to be sought by way of action pro-
ceedings. This provision was amplified by Section 10 which 
provided that in any action for infringement of copyright it 
was competent for the court, on the application of the 
plaintiff or defendant, respectively, to grant an order for 
an interdict, inspectiol) or an account. This power of the 
court was made subject to the proviso that the work on which 
the proceedings were based must have borne on it a mark or 
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notification showing that it had been copyrighted. This was 
an unusual provision in that it made marking of a work a 
condition precedent for obtaining an interdict, inspection 
or account but not for an award of damages or an order of 
delivery-up of infringing copies. Marking was only a 
requirement for the form of primarily interlocutory relief 
' provided for in Section 10 and not for the main action for 
damages in terms of Section 6. In the circumstances, marking 
of the work was clearly no more than a requirement for the 
enforcement of copyright in certain respects and was 
irrelevant to the subsistence of copyright in the work. This 
was in contrast to the British legislation dealing with art-
istic works which made marking of the work a condition for 
the subsistence of copyright. 
On a proper construction of the Act it is submitted that it 
conferred copyright on works made both prior to its coming 
into operation as well as works made thereafter. It is 
couched in terms wide enough to cover both existing works 
and works made thereafter and specific reference is made in 
Section 2, which deals with the subsistence and initial 
ownership of copyright as well as its duration, to works 
sold or disposed of for the first time after the passing of 
the Act. Such a reference would have been unnecessary if the 
Act was to be construed as applying only to works made after 
it came into operation. The effect of this reference is, 
however, that the exception to the normal rule of vesting of 
copyright (i.e. that copyright vested initially in the 
author of a work) made in favour of a purchaser of the work, 
applied only to works made and sold after the Act came into 
operation and not to existing works which had already been 
sold. The aforementioned exception will be discussed below. 
(c) Authorship and Initial Ownership of Copyright 
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The Act defined the author of a work as follows: "The 
inventor, designer, engraver, sculptor or maker of any work 
of art: Provided that the author o£ a work of art made by 
the employee of any person or firm in virtue of his employ-
ment shall mean the person or firm under whose orders, or in 
the course of whose business, the work of art was made by 
such employee.66 
Ownership of the copyright in a work vested initially in the 
author save that where the work was made or executed for, or 
on behalf of, any other person for a good or valuable con-
sideration, or was sold or disposed of for the first . time 
after the passing of the Act the maker or seller of the work 
was not the proprietor of the copyright but the copyright 
vested in the purchaser or assignee or the person for or on 
behalf of whom the work was executed, as the case may be. 
This position could be varied by an agreement entered into 
between the author and the other person at or before the 
time of the sale or disposition of the work by the author in 
which provision was made for the copyright to remain vested 
in the author. 
(d) Duration of Copyright 
The term of copyright for paintings and sculptures was the 
lifetime of the person in whom the copyright initially 
vested (i.e. not necessarily the author) and thirty years 
after his death. In the case of engravings not published in, 
or forming part of, a book and photographs the copyright 
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66. Section 1. This positicn was in sharp ccntrast to later South 
African copyright legislaticn which in the anployer/anployee relaticn-
ship ccnferred the initial ownership of copyright en the anployer while 
retaining the anployee as the auth:lr. In this regard see p 34 supra. 
endured until thirty years after the end of the year in 
which the works or any copies thereof were first offered for 
sale, delivered to a purchaser or advertised or exposed as 
ready for sale to the public or for delivery to a purchaser, 
or the work was registered. 67 This provision emphasizes the 
fact that registration was not a condition precedent for the 
subsistence of copyright as it is clear that copyright could 
have subsisted from a time prior to the date of registration 
if any of the other aforementioned events occurred prior to 
registration. The term of the copyright in the aforemen-
tioned engravings and photographs was determined by 
whichever of the aforementioned events happened first. 
Although it is not specifically stated in the Act, 
presumably the term of the copyright in an engraving which 
was published in or formed part of a book was determined by 
the Copyright Act, 1873, which dealt with copyright in 
"books". 
The term of copyright differed substantially both in length 
and manner of determination from the corresponding British 
legislation. 68 
(e) Transmission of Copyright 
Copyright could be assigned in whole or in part in a written 
document executed by the assignor and attested by two wit-
nesses. On production of a Deed of Assignment for and on 
behalf of the assignee the Registrar was required to record 
such assignment. After registration an assignment was effec-
tive in law to all intents and purposes. Only the registered 
proprietor of copyright could enter into a valid Deed of 
67. Secticn2(1). 
68. See p 137 supra. 
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Assignment which suggests that no assignment took effect 
unless it was recorded in the Register of Copyright. On the 
question of assignments of copyright the Register therefore 
went somewhat further than merely recording an existing fac-
tual situation. This explains the attitude of Maasdorp J.P 
in the Moore case69 in insisting that the defendant should 
have sought to rectify the Register before it could make any 
challenge to Moore's unqualified title to the copyright in 
that case. On the other hand, the term "assigns" is defined 
in the Act as including "every person in whom the interest 
of an author is vested, whether derived from such author 
before or after publication or registration, and whether 
acquired by sale, donation, legacy or by operation of law, 
or otherwise". 70 In the final analysis the true construction 
appears to be that a person could acquire title to copyright 
by any of the aforementioned means referred to in the 
definition of "assigns" but could not exercise any of the 
rights or powers of ownership of the copyright until he had 
been recorded as such in the Register. 
(f) Sole Source of Copyright 
The Act was the only source of copyright in artistic works 
in the Cape Colony because although Cape authors could 
qualify for British copyright in their artistic works in 
some circumstances, the British Act dealing with copyright 
in artistic works did not extend to the Cape Colony. As will 
be shown below, however, such British rights were sub-
sequently granted recognition in South Africa in certain 
circumstances after 1917. The Roman-Dutch common law 
copyright did not cover artistic works save to the extent 
69. M:lare v Argus Printing & Publishing Co Ltd & Another, supra. 
7 0 • Section 1. 
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that they were published in a printed form e.g. as part of 
books. 
B. NATAL 
(l) Ordinance No. 14 of 1856 
This Ordinance was entitled "Ordinance for authorizing the 
importation, into the Colony of Natal, of books, being for-
eign reprints of books, first composed or written, or 
printed or published, in the United Kingdom, and in which 
there shall be copyright". This Ordinance was mutatis 
mutandis identical to Act No. 4 of 1854 of the Cape Colony 
and what is said above in connection with the latter Act 
applies equally to this Ordinance. 7l It had no bearing on 
the creation or subsistence of copyright in Natal. 
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(2) Act No. 9 of 1896 - The Copyright Act, 1896 
This Act was dated 1 June 1896 and it appears to have been 
regarded as a mistake as it was repealed a year later by Act 
No. 17 of 1897 which was somewhat confusingly called "The 
Copyright Act, 1896", despite being an Act of 1897.72 It 
71. See p 2:37 supra. 
72. The debate en tre Bill in questien took place in tre Leg'islative 
Assanbly of tre Colcny en 22 arrl 29 April arrl 5 May 1897. The Bill was 
proposed by the Prime Minister and he spoke in very guarded arrl 
~stic terms. It transpired that tre Act of 1896 had been referred 
to tre appropriate authorities in Englarrl arrl that as a result tre Act 
had to be repealed. The sh=t:cx:rnings of tre Act were said to be of a 
"highly technical character. " In all~ to tre necessity f= tre rew 
Act tre Prine Minister said "llrrl when the Bill was referred Haoo it was 
fourrl that, in trying to do too much, we had overleaped ourselves over 
it, an:l we had to cane bact .to a I!Dre m:Jdest Bill, narrely, the present 
Bill. we are very anxious for the Bill to go through in its present 
form, because we krDN it will satisfy the people at Haoo. . • • I am ter-
ribly afraid the matter is so technical an:l difficult that if we begin 
to deal with it :rav we may n:Jt be acting in consonance with people at 
Haoo, an:l we shall have a=ther miscarriage." 
thus appears as though the intention was to obliterate the 
earlier Act completely but nevertheless, as will be shown 
below, the repeal of this Act was made subject to the saving 
of any copyright brought into existence by it. It can thus 
not be disregarded. This Act repealed Ordinance No. 14 of 
1856. 
(a) Types of works Protected 
The Act protected "literary and artistic work". This term 
was defined to mean "every book, print, lithograph, article 
of sculpture, dramatic piece, musical composition, painting, 
drawing, photograph and other work of literature or art".73 
The term "book" comprised in the aforementioned definition 
was in turn defined "to mean and include every volume, part 
or division of a volume, pamphlet, sheet of letter-press, 
sheet of music, a map, chart or plan separately pub-
lished". 74 This definition coincided with the Cape defini-
tion in the Copyright Act of 1873 and with the British Act 
of 1842. 
The term "copyright" was defined to mean "the sole and 
exclusive liberty of multiplying copies of any literary or 
artistic work". 75 Consequently, although dramatic works and 
musical works were protected, they were only protected 
against copying and no performing right was granted. 
(b) Conditions for Subsistence of Copyright 
Copyright in literary and artistic works was created by the 
act of first publication. No qualification was made as to 
73. Section 3. 
74. Section 3. 
75. Section 3. 
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where first publication must have taken place or as to 
national status of the authors of the works. Accordingly 
publication anywhere in the world of the works of authors of 
whatever nationality created copyright in Natal. This was 
probably the major reason why it was decided to obliterate 
this Act as far as possible because Act 17 of 1897, which 
repealed this Act, specifically provided in Section 4 that 
it would only apply to the copyright in Natal of works first 
produced in Natal, and in Section 5 that neither the Act of 
1897 nor the Act of 1896 would have the effect of limiting 
any copyright which would have been conferred in Natal by 
the British Act of 1842; this was the unmitigated effect of 
the 1896 Act by virtue of it applying, inter alia, to works 
first published in Britain or in other countries with which 
Britain had copyright relations. 
Sections 4 and 5 of the Act were substantially identical to 
Sections 1 and 2 of the Cape Act of 1873 insofar as their· 
effect on works first published prior to the date of the Act 
is concerned. For the reasons advanced in discussing the 
Cape Act of 1873, it is submitted that this Act also con-
ferred copyright on works first published prior to its 
effective date, irrespective of whether the authors were 
living or deceased at the time of first publication and it 
also repealed the common law copyright. 7 6 Copyright was thus 
conferred in Natal on all literary and artistic works pub-
lished anywhere in the world prior to 1897. 77 The generosity 
of the Natal legislature has, as will be shown below, had 
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76. See p 242 supra. Like the cape Act, Section 7 also catered for 
registration of ~ published before the date of the Act as well as 
tOOse published thereafter. 
77. The ~ which were covered were tOOse first published in such 
circ::umstarx:e that their term of copyright ~d rot have expired on 31 
August 1897 when Act No. 17 of 1897 came into operation. 
important implications upon the copyright in works which 
passed through the 1917 Gateway. 
The Act made provision for registration of copyright by the 
Registrar of Deeds in Pietermaritzburg. A registry book was 
required to be maintained by the Registrar of Deeds and the 
proprietorship in copyright in literary and artistic works 
as well as assignments thereof could be recorded in that 
book. Registration constituted prima facie proof of the 
ownership of copyright and of any assignment thereof. This 
evidence could be rebutted by other evidence. 78 As stated 
above, copyright in an artistic or literary work could be 
registered notwithstanding the fact that the work had been 
published prior to the date of the Act.79 
Any person aggrieved by an entry in the Register could make 
application to the Supreme court to expunge or vary such 
entry. 80 
Registration was not a condition precedent for the sub-
sistence of copyright and was no more than a requirement for 
the enforcement of copyright.81 
(c) Authorship and Initial Ownership of Copyright 
The term "author" was defined in Section 3 of the Act to 
mean "the author, inventor, designer, engraver or maker of 
any literary or artistic work: and includes any person 
78. Section 6. 
79. Section 7. 
80. Section 8. 
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81. See Section 9 arrl Section 10. The latter section states "any 
literary or artistic work wherein there shall be COP.Jright, arrl of which 
an entry shall have been made in the said registry book". This passage 
clearly acntanplates that cnpyright subsists pri= to registration. 
claiming through the author, and in the case of a posthumous 
work means the proprietor of the manuscript, plate or design 
of such work and any person claiming through him". The 
inclusion of the expression "includes any person claiming 
through the author" in the definition of author is a very 
strange provision and it was not repeated in the 1897 Act. 
If the definition is interpreted literally it would have 
been extremely difficult to distinguish between a work pub-
lished during the lifetime of the "author" and one published 
posthumously. In the event that a person 
the author (would this have included his 
the "author", a work could only be 
claiming through 
heirs? ) could be 
first published 
posthumously if not only the actual author was deceased but 
also all claimants through him. 
Section 4 of the Act provided that the copyright in a work 
first published in the lifetime of its author "shall be the 
property of such author and his assigns". The term "assigns" 
was defined in Section 3 of the Act to mean and include 
"every person in whom the interest of an author of copyright 
shall be vested, whether derived from such author before or 
after publication, and whether acquired by sale, donation, 
legacy, or by operation of law or otherwise". This was an 
interesting provision because, although the act of first 
publication was what gave rise to the subsistence of 
copyright, it is clear that the spes of copyright to be 
created by subsequent publication could be assigned and when 
the work was published thereafter the assignee was the ini-
tial owner of the copyright which was created by pub-
lication. This provision ties in with the inclusion of the 
phrase "includes any person claiming through the author" in 
the definition of "author". The result was that if the spes 
of copyright had been transmitted from the actual author to 
another person prior to publication, upon publication that 
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other person was the initial owner of the copyright. 82 He 
could perhaps even be argued to be the "author" in view of 
the fact that the definition of this term says that it 
"includes any person claiming through the author". However, 
it is submitted that this could not have been the intention 
of the legislature. In the case of a work first published 
posthumously the copyright created upon first publication 
vested initially in the proprietor of the author's manu-
script or the design from which such work in its published 
form was derived, or the assigns of such person. 83 
(d) Duration of Copyright 
The copyright in any literary or artistic work published 
during the lifetime of its author endured for the natural 
life of such "author" and for five years after his death. 
If, however, the work was a "book" and the aforementioned 
five year period expired within thirty years from the date 
of first publication of such book, the copyright endured for 
a period of thirty years after first publication. In other 
words, the term of copyright in a book was the same as the 
term under the Cape Act of 1873.84 
In the case of a work first published posthumously the term 
of copyright was thirty years from the date of first pub-
lication.85 
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(e) Transmission of Copyright 
82. The p::>sition outlined above is entirely consistent with Ronan-
Dutch mma1 law mpyright, arrl as it differed fran ~ corresporrling 
British legislaticn, it is perl1aps not witlxlut significarx::e. Perllaps ~ 
legislature had ~ Reman-Dutch mma• law p::>sition in mirrl! 
83. Section 5. 
84. Section 4. 
85. Section 5. 
Copyright could be assigned by means of a deed or other 
instrument or by means of registration in the registry book, 
either in whole or in part. 86 Apart from being assigned, 
copyright could be transmitted by testamentary disposition, 
by operation of law or otherwise in any way in which owner-
ship of property could be transferred.87 
(f) Parallel British Copyright 
As in the case of the Cape, first publication of books in 
Natal after 1886 gave rise to British copyright under the 
British Copyright Act of 1842. This copyright extended to 
Natal, as a British dominion. A Natal copyright owner thus 
enjoyed two parallel copyrights in his book. The British 
copyright had a longer duration than the Natal copyright. An 
assignment of copyright entered into in respect of the 
copyright in a book first published in Natal after 1886 
would have covered both copyrights unless the assignment 
stated the contrary. The British Act of 1842 made certain 
exceptions to the rule that copyright in books vested ini-
tially in the author. These exceptions were not embodied in 
the Natal Act of 1896. This meant that where the exceptions 
applied in the case of the British copyright, such copyright 
and the Natal copyright might have been owned by different 
persons. The same position could have obtained as a result 
of the unusual definition of "author" in the Natal Act. 
Unlike the Cape Act, the Natal Act, as stated above, did not 
only confer copyright in Natal upon works first published in 
Natal but also on works first published anywhere in the 
world. This meant that a book first published in Britain or 
86. Secticn 7. 
87. Definiticn of "assigns" in Secticn 3. 
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in a country with which Britain had international copyright 
relations enjoyed copyright in Natal not only under the 
British Act of 1842 but also under the Natal Act. As will be 
shown below in dealing with the Natal Act of 1897, doubt 
arose as to whether the Natal Act of 1896 had the effect of 
limiting or qualifying the British Act of 1842 as it applied 
to Natal. It could have done this for instance by shortening 
the duration of the British copyright to that of the shorter 
term granted by the Natal Act. This unintended consequence 
of the Natal Act and the uncertainty about it was one of the 
major factors in bringing about the attempted obliteration 
of the Natal Act of 1896. Section 5 of the Natal Act of 1897 
specifically provided that nothing in the Act of 1896 shall 
have been deemed to lessen, or to have lessened, any rights 
in respect of copyright in Natal which subsisted in Natal 
prior to its adoption by virtue of the British legislation, 
more particularly, the Copyright Act of 1842. 
Natal authors of paintings, drawings and photographs enjoyed 
British copyright under the British Fine Arts Copyright Act, 
1862. Prints and sculptures first published in Natal after 
the date of the British International Copyright Act, 1886, 
also in principl_e enjoyed copyright under the British 
copyright legislation dealing with these works. It was, 
however, a formality for the subsistence of copyright in 
published prints and sculptures that the name of the author 
and the date of first publication appeared on the work and 
each copy issued. If this formality was not complied with 
the work would have fallen into the public domain in terms 
of British copyright. The aforementioned copyright did not, 
however, extend to Natal. As will be shown below, however, 
such British rights were subsequently granted.recognition in 
South Africa in certain circumstances after 1917. The owner-
ship and duration of a British copyright would have depended 
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entirely on the British legislation and the British and 
Natal copyrights might have had a different duration and 
ownership in any particular case. 
(g) Far Reaching Consequences of the Natal "Error" 
Although the Natal Act of 1897 obliterated the.l896 Act as 
far as possible, it nevertheless, as stated above, pres.erved 
copyright created by that Act. This has, as will be shown 
below, had far· reaching consequences for South African 
copyright law because copyright was conferred in Natal on 
all works first published anywhere in the world prior to 31 
August 1897, including in the Orange Free State and in 
Transvaal, not to mention countries which were not members 
of the Berne Convention at the time (or Austria-Hungary) , 
works originating from which did not enjoy copyright in 
Natal by virtue of the British Act of 1842. Many of these 
works in which copyright was so generously granted by Natal 
would have enjoyed copyright in 1917 which passed through 
the South African 1917 Gateway. 
It must be borne in mind that registration was not a condi-
tion precedent for the subsistence of copyright under the 
Natal Act of 1896 and the fact that many of the extremely 
wide range of works which were eligible for copyright in 
Natal were never registered by the Registrar of Deeds did 
not for the purposes of the 1917 Gateway make any difference 
to, or detract from, the subsistence of copyright in those 
works. The error made by the Natal legislature in 1896 no 
doubt made little difference at the time because, for 
instance, few, if any, American authors registered their 
works in Natal. Copyright in such works would thus not have 
been enforceable at the. time, although it subsisted. None-
theless such unregistered copyright in many instances passed 
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through the 1917 Gateway. This renders the error significant 
for modern South African copyright law. 
(3) Act No. 17 of 1897 - The Copyright Act, 1896 
As stated above, although this Act was passed in 1897 it was 
given the name "The Copyright Act, 1896" in Section 1 in 
consistency with the approach of obliterating the Copyright 
Act of that specific year. The Act amounted to an attempt on 
the part of the Natal legislature to "put the record 
straight". However, by virtue of the fact that the 1897 Act 
preserved copyright granted by the 1896 Act it did not quite 
have this effect. 
Section 2 of the Act repealed the Act of 1896. It provided 
that such repeal did not affect any copyright then existing 
under that Act, and further that such copyright should con-
tinue as if it had been created by the 1897 Act and 
registrations of such copyright were deemed to have been 
registrations effected under the 1897 Act. It is significant 
that the 1896 copyright continued to subsist "as if created" 
by the 1897 Act. This must be taken to mean that the provi-
sions of the 1896 Act dealing with the types of works pro-
tected, the conditions for subsistence of copyright, the 
authorship and initial ownership of copyright, the duration 
of copyright and the validity of assignments entered into 
prior to its repeal continued to govern works upon which 
1896 copyright was conferred. On the other hand, it is sub-
mitted that the remedies available to owners of 189 6 
copyright, the procedures for effecting and recording 
copyright and assignments made after 1897 and procedural and 
administrative provisions generally of the 1897 Act applied 
to works in which 1896 copyright subsisted after 31 August 
1897, the commencement date of the 1897 Act. It is submitted 
that the aforementioned division gives effect to the purport 
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of Section 2 in not affecting any existing copyright but at 
the same time continuing such copyright as if created by the 
1917 Act. 
The inter-relationship between the 1896 and 1897 Acts is 
fraught with difficulties and the distinct impression is 
gained that the whole question was not properly thought out 
by the legislature. In what follows an attempt will be made 
to reconcile the two Acts as best possible and to interpret 
the 1897 Act in a way which leads to the fewest anomalies. 
(a) Types of works Protected 
The Act protected 
art. 88 The term 
so-called "books" and original works of 
"book" was defined in Section 1 to 
"include[s] every volume, part or division of a volume, 
pamphlet, sheet of letter-press, sheet of music and map, 
chart or plan separately published". Allied to this defini-
tion is the definition of "serial work" which meant 
"includes encyclopaedia, review, magazine, periodical work, 
or work published in a series of books or parts·". "Serial 
works" were a species of "book" - in effect they were col-
lective works, the term used in the British Act of 1842 on 
which this Act was based. 
As in the case of the Cape Act of 1873, dramatic and musical 
works were protected insofar as they were published in book 
form. 
The term "work of art" was defined in Section 1 to mean "a 
painting or drawing and the design thereof, or a photograph 
and the negative thereof, or an engraving". This definition 
88. Sections 6, 7 arrl 8. 
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covered the same works as those covered by the British 
Engraving Copyright Act, 1734 and 1736, the Prints Copyright 
Act, 1776, and the Prints and Engravings Copyright (Ireland) 
Act, 1836, and the Fine Arts Copyright Act, 1862. It did 
not, however, cover sculptures as protected by the British 
Sculpture Copyright Act, 1814. Industrial designs, insofar 
as they were protected under the pre-1912 British legisla-
tion, were protected under the Sculpture Copyright Act and 
this means that industrial designs enjoyed no protection 
under the Natal Act of 1897. By contrast, the Natal Act of 
1896 did confer protection upon sculptures. However, Natal 
passed an Act to provide for the registration of designs in 
1899 (Act No. 19 of 1899). 
As previously mentioned the Act of 1897 perpetuated the 
copyright in works of the type granted protection under the 
Act of 1896. 
(b) Conditions for Subsistence of Copyright 
Copyright in a book was created by the act of first pub-
lication in Natal. Copyright in a work of art subsisted if 
that work was made in Natal coupled together with registra-
tion of the copyright in terms of Section 13.89 In the case 
of a book it did not matter whether the work was published 
during the lifetime of the author or posthumously. 
Unlike the Act of 1896 and the Cape Act, subject to what is 
said below, this Act did not appear to grant copyright 
retrospectively. In the case of artistic works registration 
was a condition precedent for the subsistence of copyright 
and this obviously could not take place until the passing of 
89. Sectioos 6, 7 arrl 8. 
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the Act. The Act, however, specifically stated in Section 8 
that an artistic work made after the passing of the Act of 
1896 was eligible for copyright. 90 In the case of books, 
works published before the date of the Act were granted 
copyright by the Act of 1896 and this copyright was per-
petuated in the Act. 
Section 6 of the Act, which dealt with the subsistence and 
duration of copyright in books published during the lifetime 
of the author, made reference to books published "after the 
passing of this Act". The reasoning advanced in discussing 
the corresponding provision in the Cape Act of 187391 is 
not applicable here as in Natal there was already subsisting 
statutory copyright, i.e. the copyright conferred by the Act 
of 1896, and common law copyright had already been repealed. 
It is submitted that in this Act the relevant wording must 
be interpreted as indicating that the substantive provisions 
of the Act only related to works which were first published 
during the lifetime of the author after the coming into 
operation of the Act. 
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Section 7, which dealt with books first published 
posthumously, must be interpreted in a like manner notwith-
standing that there is no specific reference to works pub-
90. This is an unusual proVl.s~co. because the Act of 1896 granted 
copyright to artistic \\Ol:ks first published before 1896 and as well as 
during and after that year until 31 August 1897. The effect of this 
provisico. was that an artistic 1-.mk first published before 1896 enjoyed 
copyright under "tUl Act of 1896; en; made pri= to or durin] 1896 and 
first published in that year or prior to September 1897 enjoyed 
copyright under "tUl Act of 1896; and en; made durin] 1896 = ~fter 
enjoyed copyright (cn::e regiStered) under "tUl Act of 1897, and if pub-
lished durin] 1896 = "tUl first eight mco.ths of 1897, enjoyed copyright 
under "tUl Act of 1896 as well, i.e. n.u separate copyrights with n.u 
separate terms and possibly different ~. 
91. Seep 242 supra. 
lished after its coming into operation. Any other inter-
pretation to Sections 6 and 7 would lead to anomalous 
results as to the duration and first ownership of copyright 
in books first published prior to August 1897. 
The Act made provision for the Registrar of Deeds to main-
tain registry books entitled "Register of Copyright in 
Books" and "Register of Copyright in Works of Art", respec-
tively, in which copyright in books and works of art, 
respectively, could be registered. 9 2 Certified copies of 
entries in the Register constituted prima facie proof of the 
proprietorship of copyright and other matters stated 
therein. 93 Any person aggrieved by any entry in the 
Registers could apply to the Supreme Court for such entry to 
be expunged or varied.94 
The proprietor of the copyright in any serial work could 
register such work in the Regist"er of Copyright in Books and 
that serial work thereupon enj eyed all the benefits of 
registration. 95 
In the case of books, registration of copyright was not a 
condition precedent for the subsistence of copyright but 
merely for the enforcement of that copyright. This point was 
specifically dealt with in Section 28 of the Act. which 
stated that "provided that the omission to register shall 
not affect the copyright of any book •. but' only the right to 
92. Sections 10, 11 and 13. 
93. Secticn 16. 
94. Secticn 18. 
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95. secticn 22. It is rot clear wtetrer a serial wrk first publisrect 
prior to 31 August 1897 OJUld be registered. It is trnught rot in view 
of the o:xclusicn that the Act of 1897 cnly applied to =rks first pub-
lished after 1897. 
sue as aforesaid". By contrast, Section 29 provided that the 
proprietor of copyright in a work of art first made in Natal 
was not entitled to the benefit of the Act until he had 
registered his copyright. In conformity with this principle, 
Sections 24 and 25 which dealt with remedies available to 
the owner of copyright in an artistic work made specific 
reference to works of art "in which there shall be regis-
tered copyright". The corresponding provisions which dealt 
with the remedies available to the owner of the copyright in 
a book (Section 23) by contrast made reference to "any book 
in which there shall be subsisting copyright". Registration 
was thus a condition precedent for the subsistence of 
copyright in an artistic work in Natal under the 1897 Act 
but no time constraints were placed upon registration of 
copyright in an artistic work subsequent to the making 
thereof which meant that once the work had been made 
copyright could at any time thereafter be acquired by meet-
ing the formal requirement of registration. After the making 
of a work of art and prior to registration thereof there was 
thus a spes of copyright. 
As previously stated, the Copyright Act of 1896 conferred 
copyright upon every artistic work first published anywhere 
and registration was not a condition precedent for the sub-
sistence of copyright in such a work. The Act of 1897 per-
petuated that copyright although it did not become enforce-
able until registered either under the 1896 Act or under the 
1897 Act. 
In order to qualify for copyright, an artistic work must 
have been origina1. 96 On the other hand, it was not specifi-
9 6 • Section 8 which l1\3kes refererx:e to "every original ~>XJrk of art". 
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cally stated that a book must have met this requirement in 
order to be eligible for protection. However, on the 
strength of British author! ty something which was a mere 
copy of a previous book was not .entitled to protection. 97 
Unlike the Cape Act of 1873, which stated in its preamble 
that 1 ts purpose was to protect the rights of authors in 
that colony, the Act of 1897 was silent on the question of 
the national status of authors of works seeking protection. 
Accordingly, it would seem that as long as a book was first 
published in Natal or a work of art was made in Natal it was 
eligible for protection irrespective of the national status 
of the author. 
After the passing of British International Copyright Act of 
1886 first publication of a book in Natal was sufficient to 
cause copyright to subsist in the United Kingdom under the 
Copyright Act of 1842. Registration of such copyright in 
Natal was the equivalent of registration of copyright at 
Stationers Hall. In consequence, first publication of a book 
in Natal conferred upon that book not only copyright in 
Natal by virtue of the Natal Act of 1897 but also by virtue 
of the British Act of 1842, which extended to Natal. 
The term "copyright" was defined in the Act of 1897 to mean 
"the sole and exclusive right of multiplying copies of any 
work, whether by printing, copying. engraving or otherwise". 
The Act did not create any performing right in dramatic or 
musical works whereas the British Act of 1842 did confer 
such a right. Accordingly, 
upon a book of Natal origin 
the British copyright conferred 
had a wider scope than the Natal 
copyright conferred upon. the same work. 
97. See p 127 supra. 
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Artistic works originating from Natal could in certain cir-
cumstances enjoy British copyright but such copyright did 
not extend to the colonies and therefore did not operate in 
Natal. The value of this British copyright was that, as will 
be shown below, it could pass through the 1917 Gateway and 
thereafter confer South African copyright on works originat-
ing from Natal. 
(c) Authorship and Initial Ownership of Copyright 
The term "author" was defined in Section 1 of the Act to 
mean "the author, inventor, designer, engraver, or maker of 
any work, and in the case of a posthumous book means the 
proprietor of the manuscript". This definition did not, as 
pointed out previously, include the expression "includes any 
person claiming through the author", as was the case in the 
Act of 1896. This was a distinct improvement on the cor-
responding definition in the Act of 1896. Attention is drawn 
to the fact that, as was the case in the Act of 1896, the 
author of a book first published posthumously was the pro-
prietor of the manuscript. This did not, however, apply to 
artistic works.but then copyright in artistic works was not 
dependent upon first publication, otherwise than under the 
Act of 1896. 
Copyright vested initially, in the case of a book first pub-
lished during the lifetime of the author, in that author (or 
in certain circumstances his assigns). 98 Copyright in a book 
first published posthumously vested in the proprietor of the 
author's manuscript from which the first published version 
98. section 6. 
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of the book was derived, and thereafter in ·his assigns. 99 
The position was the same as under the Act of 1896. 
In terms of Section 19, where a publisher or any other per-
son (for the purposes of Sections 19, 20 and 21 both these 
classes are collectively referred to as a "publisher" - 'Per-
haps "employer" would have been a more appropriate term) 
"projected, conducted or carried on, or is the proprietor 
of" any serial work, or of any book whatever, and employed 
any person to compose a serial work or book, or any volumes, 
parts, essays, articles or portions thereof for purposes of 
publication in, or as a part of any such serial work or 
book, the publisher was in certain circumstances the owner 
of the copyright in such a serial work or book and in all 
works composed for inclusion therein. The aforementioned 
circumstances were that the work must have been composed 
under such employment on the terms that the copyright in it 
would have belonged to the publisher, and must have been 
paid for by the publisher. In principle the copyright vested 
in the publisher for the full term save in the case of 
essays, articles or portions forming part of, and published 
in, serial works. In the case of these works, after the 
expiration of twenty-eight years from the first publication 
of the serial work incorporating them, the right of pub-
lishing such essays, articles or portion in a separate form 
reverted to the author for the balance of the term of 
copyright. During the twenty-eight year term before the 
reversionary rights came into operation the publisher was 
not entitled to publish any such essay, article or portion 
separately or singly without the prior consent of the author 






The aforegoing provisions relating to works made under 
employment had their origins in Section 18 of the British 
Copyright Act of 1842. Under that Act it was held that 
actual payment by the publisher to the author was required 
before copyright vested in the publisher; a contractual 
obligation to make payment was insufficient. 101 In terms of 
Section 21, the aforegoing did not affect any right of sepa-
rate publication reserved by a contributing author and he 
was in this instance entitled to the copyright in his indi-
vidual work for purposes of publication in a separate form. 
This was, however, without prejudice to the copyright of the 
publisher in the collective work. 
The aforementioned exception to the general principle appli-
cable to the initial ownership of copyright was specifically 
stated in Section 19 to apply "either before or after the 
passing of this Act". The Act of 1896 contained no similar 
provision. If this section is to be interpreted as applying 
to works first published prior to 31 August 1897, then it 
would mean that the initial ownership of some existing 
copyrights would ex post facto have been changed. This would 
have been in conflict with the provisions of Section 2 of 
the Act of 1897 which provided that the substitution of the 
Act of 1897 for the Act of 1896 did not affect any copyright 
subsisting under the earlier Act. Accordingly it is sub-
mitted that Section 19 applied to works made prior to 31 
August 1897 but first published after that date; if such a 
work was first published prior to the aforementioned date 
the exception did not· apply. The exception related to the 
circumstances of the making of the work and not of its first 
publication. 
101. R:i.dlardsoo v Gilbert 1 SIM.N.S. 336. 
273. 
The author was the initial owner of an artistic work made in 
Natal (or in certain circumstances his assigns). An excep-
tion to the aforegoing principle was made in the case of a 
painting, drawing or a negative of a photograph sold, dis-
posed of or made or executed for or on behalf of another 
person, for a good or valuable consideration after the pass-
ing of the Act. In the aforementioned circumstances the pur-
chaser, assignee or commissioner of such a painting, drawing 
or negative of a photograph was the owner of the copyright 
unless the seller or maker of the work expressly reserved 
the copyright to himself in a written agreement entered into 
at or before the time of the transaction in question. 102 
This exception applied to the copyright under the Act of 
1897 which depended upon the making of the work but it did 
not apply to the possible concurrent copyright under the Act 
of 1896 which depended upon the publication of the work 
prior to 31 August 1897. Consequently the two separate 
copyrights could have been owned by different persons. 
The term "assigns" was defined in Section 2 as including 
"every person in whom the interest of an author in copyright 
shall be vested, whether derived from such author before or 
after publication, and whether acquired by sale, donation, 
legacy or by operation of law or otherwise". As in the case 
of the Act of 1896, it is apparent from this definition 
that, in the case of a book, the spes of the copyright to be 
created subsequently by first publication could prior to 
publication be assigned and upon first publication the 
copyright would then have vested initially in the assig-
102. Section 8. 
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nee. 103 The same principle applied in essence to artistic 
works in which copyright was conferred upon and by registra-
tion. The spes of copyright to be created subsequently by 
registration could also be assigned and, upon registration, 
the copyright would have initially vested in the assignee. 
The authorship and initial ownership of works granted 
copyright under the Act of 1896 was determined by that Act 
and perpetuated by the Act of 1897. As stated above the Act 
of 1897 did not ex post facto alter any ownership of 
copyright subsisting under the earlier Act. To have done so 
would have meant that vested rights would have been 
abrogated and it is submitted that the legislature must not 
be assumed to have done this unless the Act of 1897 con-
tained specific provisions in that regard. 
(d) Duration of Copyright 
The term of copyright of a book published during the life-
time of the author was the natural life of such author and a 
period of seven years after his death, or a period of forty-
two years from first publication of such book, whichever was 
the longer. In the case of a book first published post-
humously, the term of copyright was forty-two years from the 
date of first publication of such book. The aforementioned 
terms of copyright were the same as those provided in the 
British Act of 1842. They were longer than the equivalent 
terms provided for in the Natal'Act of 1896 and the Cape Act 
of 1873. As stated above, the Act of 1897 must be construed 
as not applying to works first published before 31 August 
1897 and consequently the term of copyright provided for in 
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103. This contemned with the positicn un:3er the mmcu law anj un:3er 
the 1\ct of 1896. 
the Act only applied to works first published after the 
aforementioned date.l04 
Copyright in a work of art endured for the lifetime of the 
author and for seven years after his death.lOS This term of 
copyright applied to all works of art made in Natal after 
the passing of the Act of 1896. As stated above106 parallel 
copyrights in certain works could have subsisted under the 
Act of 1896 and the Act of 1897. The term of copyright 
granted by the Act of 1897 was longer than the term of 
copyright granted by the Act of 189 6. This meant that the 
1896 copyright would have expired two years earlier than the 
1897 copyright. As pointed out above it was possible that 
the two copyrights could have vested in different persons. 
(e) Transmission of Copyright 
Copyright could be assigned as a whole or in part. Such 
assignment could be effected by means of an entry in the 
Register of Copyright. 107 In terms of the definition of 
"assigns" in Section 3, the copyright in a book could be 
assigned either before or after publication. A person 
qualified as an "assign" whether he acquired the copyright 
by means of sale, donation, legacy, or by operation of law 
or otherwise. The definition of "assigns" in the Act was 
identical to the corresponding definitions in the Cape Act 
276. 
104. See Sections 6 arrl 7 arrl in partia..!lar p 267 supra. See also the 
specific referen::e to "after the passing of this l!ct" in section 6, read 
together with Secticn 2 which provided that the ~ of the Act of 
1896 did not affect any copyright existing un:'ler that Act. To have 
granted the 1~ tenn of copyright to books first published pri= to 






See p 267 supra. 
Secticn 17. 
of 1873 and the Natal Act of 1896. However, whereas both the 
aforementioned Acts, in making provision for an assignment 
of copyright to be effected by means of an entry in the 
Register of Copyright, stated that such an entry had the 
same effect as a written deed of assignment, Section 17 of 
the Act of 1897 contained no such similar provision. The 
question therefore arises whether copyright could be 
assigned by means of a written deed of assignment. 
In the proviso to Section 8, 
ownership of copyright in 
which dealt with the initial 
sold or commissioned artistic 
works, provision was made for the author to avoid the 
copyright initially vesting in the purchaser or the com-
missioner by expressly reserving the copyright to himself 
"by agreement in writing, signed at or before the time of 
such sale or disposition". This is one instance of what is 
in effect an assignment of copyright being made possible by 
means of a written agreement. As copyright was transmissible 
by sale or donation it was clearly possible for a transfer 
of the ownership of copyright to take place other than by 
registration. The British legislation on which the Act of 
1897 was based allowed for the assignment of copyright to be 
effected by means of a written agreement. In the circum-
stances, it is submitted that copyright under the Act of 
1897 could be assigned by means of a written agreement. The 
question then arises whether, apart from by ·means of 
registration and a written agreement, copyright could be 
assigned without compliance with any formalities at all. If 
copyright could be transmitted by sale or donation and no 
specific reference was made to the necessity of a written 
agreement of assignment, it could be argued that even an 
informal disposition of _copyright could transfer the owner-
ship of copyright. By contrast to Section 8, which required 
the author of an artistic work to make an express reserva-
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tion of copyright in a written agreement, Section 21, which 
dealt with the rights of authors of works incorporated in a 
collective work and made during the course of employment, 
made reference merely to the "right of separate publication 
reserved by the composer of any such composition" without 
any specific r~ference being made of the reservation having 
to be in writing. 
The Act made provision for a rebuttable presumption that the 
registered proprietor of copyright was the owner of such 
copyright. It would probably have been extremely difficult 
for the actual proprietor of copyright to rebut the presump-
tion created by registration in another's name in the 
absence of his being able to adduce evidence of his acquisi-
tion of copyright in a written document. There was every 
incentive for a copyright owner, more particularly one who 
might have acquired copyright otherwise than by means of a 
written document, to record his title to copyright and 
facilitate proof thereof by means of registration. In prac-
tical terms, if ownership of copyright could be transferred 
by an informal transaction it is probable that such transfer 
of ownership would have been recorded in the ·Register and 
that act itself would have placed the transfer of the owner-
ship of the copyright beyond all doubt. In purely practical 
terms, therefore, the transfer of ownership of copyright 
would have been effected either by means of a written agree-
ment or· by registration. Nevertheless, the possibility 
exists that an assignment of copyright might validly have 
taken place by means of an informal transaction. 
It is submitted that the Act of 1897 regulated assignments 
of both 1896 and 1897 copyright which were effected after 31 
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August 1897. 108 
(f) Parallel British Copyright 
After the passing of the British International Copyright Act 
of 1886 first publication of books in Natal gave rise to 
British copyright under the British Copyright Act of 1842. 
This copyright extended to Natal, as a British dominion. As 
in the case of 1896 copyright, under the Act of 1897 a Natal 
copyright owner thus enjoyed two parallel copyrights in his 
book, viz Natal copyright under the Act of 1897 and British 
copyright under the Act of 1842. An assignment of copyright 
entered into in respect of the copyright in a book first 
published in Natal after 1886 would have covered both 
copyrights unless the assignment stated the contrary. 
By virtue of the fact that the Act of 1897 contained the 
same exceptions as the British Act of 1842 to the general 
rule that copyright in books vested initially in the author, 
in the exceptional circumstances both the Natal copyright 
and the British copyright would have vested in the same per-
son, unlike the position under the Act of 1896 and under the 
Cape Act of 1873. This, of course, only applied to books 
first published in Natal after 31 August 1897. 
Reference has been made to the point that the Natal Act of 
1896 might have given rise to the interpretation that it 
qualified and limited British copyright subsisting in Natal 
by virtue of the provisions of the British Act of 1842. Sec-
tion 5 of the Act of 1897, however, specifically provided 
that 
"nothing in this Act, or in the Copyright Act of 1896, 
shall be deemed to lessen or to have lessened any 
108. See p 264 supra. 
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rights in respect of copyright in Nata~ which existed 
prior to the passing of the Act of ~896 in virtue of 
any Act of the Imperia~ Par~iament or any order of her 
Majesty in Counci~ made thereunder". 
It is strange that this section appears on the surface only 
to preserve· rights under the British Copyright Act which 
existed in Natal prior to 1896 and not British rights exist-
ing during the currency of the 1896 Act. However, it is sub-
mitted that the provision must be interpreted as covering 
such rights as well as it would have been absurd to 
preserve British rights existing prior to 1896 and after 31 
August 1897 but not during the interim period. The effect of 
Section 5 was that the British copyright which subsisted in 
Natal in terms of the British Act of 1842 was a par~llel 
copyright and was unaffected by any Natal legislation. 
Natal authors of paintings, drawings and photographs enjoyed 
British copyright under the.British Fine Arts Copyright Act, 
1862, and engravings and sculptures first published in Natal 
after 1886 in principle enjoyed British copyright under the 
relevant British copyright provided the relevant formalities 
were complied with. Such copyrights were discussed above in 
relation to the Natal Act of 1896; the same considerations 
are applicable in relation to this Act. 
(g) Case Law 
There are no known or reported cases dealing with either of 
the Natal Acts of 1896 or 1897. 
(h) Recognition of "Foreign" Copyright 
Certain of the enforcement provisions of the Act of 1897 
were available to Cape copyright owners in respect of books 
or any other work in respect of which there was registered 
copyright. In order to avail himself of this protection, a 
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Cape copyright owner must have registered his copyright in 
the Cape Colony and must have given to the Collector of 
Customs of Natal a written notice together with a certifi-
cate confirming the existence of registered copyright in the 
Cape Colony. 
(4) Act No. 44 of 1898 - Play Rights Act, 1898 
(a) Types of Works Protected 
This Act came into operation on 28 March 1899 and was 
clearly intended to emulate the British Dramatic Copyright 
Act of 1833 read together with the Copyright Act of 1842 
which provided for a performing right in dramatic and musi-
cal works. 
The Act dealt with rights in works which it called "play 
right" as distinct from "copyright" or from the performing 
-right granted by the British legislation. It was perhaps 
unfortunate that the Natal legislature chose to use a dif-
ferent term, and in fact granted a wider right than, that 
contained in the British legislation because the British Act 
of 1911, which created the 1912 British Gateway, and the 
South African Act of 1916, which created the South African 
1917 Gateway drew a sharp distinction between copyright on 
the one hand and performing rights on the other hand. As 
will be shown the Natal play right does not fit easily into 
this distinction. 
The term "play right" was defined in the Act to mean: 
" (a) The sole and exclusive right to represent, per-
form, act, play or exhibit any dramatic, operatic 
or musical work, being a tragedy, comedy, play, 
opera, farce, scene, pantomime (or its class) 
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song, dance, or other scenic or musical or 
dramatic production or representation registered 
under this Act: 
(b) The sole and exclusive right of converting or 
adapting any work registered under this Act into 
any form, whether dramatic or otherwise". 
Paragraph (a) of the above definition corresponds basically 
with the performing right granted to dramatic and musical 
works in the British legislation. Paragraph (b), on the 
other hand, goes beyond anything contained in the British 
legislation and creates a wider right than a mere performing 
right. 
The definition of "play right" must be read in conjunction 
with Section 13 of the Act which provided that an infringe-
ment of a play right occurred if any person, without the 
consent in writing of the proprietor or his agent, copied 
(which term was defined in the Act to mean "to repeat or 
colourably imitate") any play right work, either by 
dialogue, scenic effect, or composition, or in any manner 
whatsoever, or if any person shall adapt, multiply, or pub-
lish, or expose for hire, sell, or import any imitation of 
any play right work, or any portion of any play right work". 
It must be borne in mind that dramatic, musical and 
dramatico-musical works, insofar as they were published in 
book form, were granted copyright, in the normal sense of 
the word, by the British Act of 1842 and the Natal Act of 
1897. To the extent that this Act protected such works in 
the manner outlined in Section 13 it appeared to create an 
overlap with the Act of 1897. 
282. 
For the present purposes it is not necessary to define the 
•scope of the infringement right in respect of a play right; 
all that is necessary, for purposes of the 1917 Gateway, is 
to determine whether the play right conferred upon a work 
anything more than a performing right, because if it did, 
then, upon passing through the 1917 Gateway, the play right 
would have been substituted by full copyright rather than 
simply by a performing right. It is submitted that in the 
light of the extended definition of the term "play right" in 
Section 2 of the Act, read together with Section 13, the 
play right was indeed something more than the performing 
right and that it qualified for substitution by a full 
copyright under the Act of 1916. 
Section 15 of the Act specifically provided that play rights 
were deemed to be personal property. 
(b) Conditions for Subsistence of Play Right 
In order to qualify for protection under the Act, a work 
must have been "first produced" in Natal. The use of the 
term "produced" is unfortunate because it is capable of 
being interpreted as meaning either "created" or "per-
formed". It is submitted that the latter is the correct 
interpretation of the term because the British legislation 
on which the Act was based utilized first performance as the 
criterion for protection and Section 6 of the Natal Act, 
which specified the information required to be inserted in 
the Registry Book, makes reference to the date of first per-
formance in Natal. 
In addition to being first performed in Natal, in order to 
qualify for protection under the Act a work was required to 
be registered in the Book of Registry maintained by the 
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Registrar of Deeds.l09 Section 17 of the Act provided that 
no proprietor of play right first produced in Natal was 
entitled to the benefit of the Act until his play right had 
been registered and that the play right could not be 
enforced prior to registration. This and other provisions of 
the Act make it perfectly clear that registration was a con-
dition precedent for the subsistence of play right in a 
work. Prior to registration the author or his successor in 
title had no more than a spes of play right. No time limits 
were laid down in the Act for registration to take place and 
the play right could thus be registered at any stage after 
first performance of a work in Natal. 
The proprietorship and any assignments of play right could 
be entered in the Register and a certified copy of an entry 
in the Register constituted prima facie proof of the sub-
sistence of a play right and of the proprietorship thereof. 
Strangely enough, unlike in the case of all the other 
colonial registration systems considered thus far, the Act 
made no provision for a person aggrieved by an incorrect 
entry in the Register to rectify such entry. It did, 
however, provide that any person who made a false entry in 
the Register was guilty of an offence. It seems inconceiv-
able that a false entry could not be rectified and possibly 
it was considered that the Supreme Court had inherent powers 
to rectify the Register. 
After the coming into operation of the British International 
Copyright Act of 1886, a dramatic or musical work first per-
formed in Natal would have enj eyed a performing right in 
Britain under the British legislation and such performing 
109. Sections 4 am 5. 
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right would have extended to Natal by virtue of 
sions of the British Copyright Act of 1842. 
the provi-
This was, 
however, subject to the proviso that any relevant for-
malities prescribed by British law were complied with. As in 
the case of books under the Natal Act of 1897, parallel 
British and Natal rights would have subsisted in works first 
performed and registered in Natal. In this regard Section 18 
of the Act provided that nothing in the Act lessened any 
rights in respect of play right in Natal which existed in 
Natal prior to the passing of the Act by virtue of Imperial 
legislation. The Natal rights and the British rights thus 
co-existed in parallel, although, as has been stated above, 
the scope of the Natal right was broader than that of the 
British right. 
It was nowhere provided in the Act that the author of a work 
must be a Natal resident or citizen for the work to be 
eligible for play right under the Act and it would thus 
seem that as long as the first performance of the work took 
place in Natal, it qualified for protection and the national 
status of its author was of no consequence. 
There is nothing in the Act to suggest that it only applied 
to, and conferred protection upon, works first performed 
after it came into operation. Section 10 of the Act men-
tioned that it confers protection upon works whether "com-
posed before the passing of this Act or not" but the Act is 
silent on the question of works first performed prior to its 
commencement. Section 3 of the Act, read together with Sec-
tion 18, says that the Act will apply to play right in Natal 
of works first produced in Natal save that it shall not be 
deemed to lessen any British rights which existed in Natal 
prior to its being passed. This is one instance at least 
when it was contemplated that the Act had some application 
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to works first performed in Natal prior to the date of the 
Act. Bearing in mind that the other Natal copyright legisla-
tion applied to works made before the dates thereof, and 
taking all the circumstances into account, including the 
unqualified statement in Section 3 that "this Act shall 
apply to play right in Natal of works first produced in 
Natal", it is submitted that works first performed in Natal 
prior to 28 March 1899 qualified for registration under the 
Act and therefore were eligible for play right. 
(c) Authorship and Initial Ownership of Play Right 
The term "author" was defined in Section 2 of the Act to 
mean 
"the inventor or 
work capable of 
writer or adaptor of any and every 
registration under this Act, and in 
the case of a posthumous work, means the proprietor of 
the manuscript". 
The term "assigns" was defined in Section 2 of the Act to 
mean 
"every person in whom the interest of an author or pro-
prietor in play right shall be vested, whether derived 
from such author or proprietor, before or after the 
publication of any play right work, and whether 
acquired by sale, gift, bequest, or by operation of 
law, or otherwise". 
This definition coincided with the corresponding definition 
in the Natal Act of 1897. 
When a work had been first performed in Natal a spes of play 
right came into being. Play right as such was not created 
until the work was registered. The spes vested in the author 
as defined but such spes was freely transmissible 
(apparently without formalities) prior to registration of 
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the work taking place and play right coming into existence. 
The "holder" or "owner" of the spes at any given time could 
register the work and become the proprietor of the 
registered play right. 110 
There· were no exceptions to the general principle that the 
author was the initial claimant in respect of play right. 
This coincided with the position under British legislation. 
(d) Duration of Play Right 
The term of play right registered during the lifetime of the 
author of the work endured for the lifetime of such author 
and for a period of seven years after his death, or for a 
period of forty-two years from the date of registration of 
the work, whichever was the longer. Where a work was 
registered after the death of the author, the term of play 
right was a period of forty-two years from the date of 
registration. Bearing in mind that a work could be 
registered for play right any time after its first perform-
ance (there could thus have been a lapse of many years 
between first performance and registration) it was strange 
to calculate the term of protection on the basis of the date 
of registration; this meant that works could have enjoyed 
play right for a very long term - far longer than in the 
case of copyright in books. 
The term of the performing right granted by British law was 
determined on a different basis to that of the Natal Act. 111 
The result was that the parallel British and Natal rights 
could have terms of different length. 
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110. Section 4 read together with the definitions of "aut;]'X)r" and 
"assigns". 
111. Seep 131 supra. 
(e) Assignment of Play Right 
Once registered, play right could be assigned by making an 
entry in the Book of Registry. 112 Unlike in the case of the 
Act of 1897, it was provided that an assignment effected by 
making an entry in the Register had the same effect as an 
assignment effected by means of a deed. Accordingly, the 
ownership of registered play right was also capable of being 
transferred by means of a written Deed of Assignment. 113 
An assignment of play right effected by means of an entry in 
the Register would not have had the effect of transferring 
the British performing right 
could only be transferred by 
as it appears that such right 
. 
a written deed. An assignment 
of the performing right embodied in a written deed could, 
however, have transferred the ownership of both the British 
and Natal rights unless otherwise specified. 
C. TRANSVAAL 
(1) Act No. 2 1887 - Copyright Act 
Roman-Dutch common law copyright subsisted in the Transvaal 
from the outset of its existence as a separate state. 114 
During the period 1877 to 1881 (or possibly 1884) the Trans-
vaal was a British dominion, and the British Act of 1842 
would thus have conferred British copyright in the Transvaal 
112 . Section 9. 
113. See also the definition of "assigns" in Section 2. 
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114. See p 197 supra in regard to the reo::gnition of the Ronan-Dutch 
law in the Transvaal. It is subnitted that such law included mlilOil law 
cnpyright. 
(but such copyright would only have been enforceable for as 
long as the 1842 Act was operative in the Transvaal - i.e. 
whilst the Transvaal was a British dominion). The Transvaal 
passed its first copyright law on 23 May 1887. The Act pro 
vided in Section 24 that it would come into operation three 
months after publication in the Staatskoerant. Such pub-
lication took place on 1 June 1887 which means that the Act 
came into operation on 1 September 1887. Unlike the Cape Act 
of 1873 which was already in existence and the Natal Acts of 
1896 and 1897 which were to follow, the Transvaal Act was 
not derived from British legislation. It was derived from 
the Copyright Act of The Netherlands of 1881 and it adopted 
much of the wording of that Act verba tim. The style and 
basic approach differed substantially from that of the 
British, Cape and Natal legislation. 
(a) Types of Works Protected 
The Act conferred copyright on "writings, engravings, maps, 
musical works, plays and oral lectures". The copyright owner 
was given the right to control the publication of such works 
and to perform or exhibit dramatic-musical works and plays 
in public. Accordingly, in respect of dramatic, musical and 
dramatic-musical works "copyright", within the meaning of 
this term as understood in the 19th Century, as well as the 
performing right were covered by the copyright, while in the 
case of the balance of works the protection consisted simply 
of copyright in the strict sense. 115 
The Act recognized collective works as separate works as 






Unless otherwise provided by the Government, there was no 
copyright in laws, resolutions, ordinances or any other 
notifications, both oral or in writing, made on behalf of 
any public authority.117 
The Act made special provision for translations. As a gen-
eral principle a translation was treated as being equivalent 
to any other verbal work. ll8 However, where a work was 
simultaneously issued in several languages, only one version 
was considered to be the original work and the other ver-
sions were deemed to be translations. The author was 
entitled to designate on the title page, or failing that the 
cover, of the work which of the versions he considered to be 
the original version. If he failed to give any such indica-
tion, the version in the mother language of the author was 
deemed to be the original version. The question of whether 
or not a work or a version.of it was the original work or a 
translation had relevance to the conditions for the sub-
sistence of copyright and the duration of copyright, and 
will be dealt with below. 
(b) Conditions for the Subsistence of Copyright 
The Act was mainly 
It, 
concerned with works published by means 
however, contemplated the existence of of printing. 
copyright in unpublished works - more by way of pre-
supposing that such copyright existed than by way of making 
provision for it - but in the absence of any copyright law 
protecting unpublished works existing in Transvaal prior to 






created copyright in unpublished works. No conditions were, 
however, prescribed for the subsistence of copyright in 
unpublished works and the only requirement seems to have 
been that they should have been in existence, not neces-
sarily in a material form as evidenced by the fact that it 
recognized oral lectures as a type of work eligible for pro-
tection. Nothing is said in the Act about the national 
status of the authors whose works fell within the compass of 
the Act or about where the works must have been made. Accor-
dingly, it would seem that the unpublished works of foreign 
authors as well as domestic authors were protected. In this 
and other respects the protection granted to unpublished 
works under the Act showed a large measure of similarity to 
British common law copyright in unpublished works. 
The fact that the Act protected unpublished works of both 
foreign and domestic origin is of considerable significance 
to the 1917 South African Gateway because all unpublished 
works which enjoyed copyright in the Transvaal at the time 
of the 1917 Gateway would have passed through that Gateway 
and would have been granted substituted rights under the Act 
of 1916. The works of foreign origin which would have 
qualified for substituted rights under the 1916 Act in this 
way would have included works originating from all parts of 
South Africa as well as abroad. 
The Act protected works made before it came into operation 
although it laid down formal requirements in respect of pub-
lished works. These will be dealt with below. In the case of 
unpublished works, however, no qualifications were made to 
the protection which they enjoyed under the Act. In the case 
of published works the Act perpetuated the common law 
copyright provided the' formalities laid down in the Act 
were complied with. By making the continued subsistence of 
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copyright in existing published works and the creation of 
copyright in future works conditional upon the compliance 
with formalities, the Act in effect repealed the common law 
copyright. 
Where a work was published by means of printing, the current 
copyright owner, the publisher or the printer was required 
to lodge with the Registrar of Deeds within two months after 
the issue of the published version of the work, three copies 
of the work all signed on the title page, or failing that on 
the cover. The aforementioned endorsement was required to 
, mention the place of residence of the person signing the 
copies and the date of issue of such copies. The Registrar 
of Deeds issued a certificate stating the date of the first 
issue of copies of the work. 119 It is not clear whether the 
three copies of the work lodged with the Registrar of Deeds 
were required to be signed by the author or by the person 
lodging them with the Registrar (i.e. an assignee, the pub-
lisher or the printer). There is nothing in the Act to sug-
gest that it did not protect works first published in 
printed form posthumously (the common law protected such 
works) and in this instance the copies lodged . with the 
Registrar of Deeds could obviously not have been signed by 
the author. Accordingly the correct interpretation appears 
to be that the copies must have been signed by the person 
lodging them. 
- The three copies lodged with the Registrar of Deeds were 
required to be accompanied by a sworn declaration made by a 
printer with a place of business in the Transvaal stating 
that the copies in question had been· printed at his estab-
119. Secticn 10. 
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lishment in the Transvaal. 120 This provision was later 
relaxed by a resolution of the Second Volksraad dated 1 June 
1895 (Article 296) which provided that the State President 
could by proclamation confer the benefits of the. Act on all 
works eligible for copyright printed or published in any 
state or colony which granted reciprocal protection to works 
issued and printed in the Transvaal. This provision did not 
appear to have any practical effect since neither the Cape 
nor Natal granted such reciprocal protection to Transvaal 
·works. 121 
The copyright in a work comprised the right to issue printed 
publications of that work. Where the original work was pub-
lished by means of printing in order to perpetuate the 
exclusive right of publishing printed translations in other 
languages the author was required to specifically reserve to 
himself the exclusive right in specified languages at the 
time of first publication. This had to be done by means of 
an endorsement on the title page, or failing that on the 
cover, of the original issue of the. work. Thereafter, trans-
lations in the reserved languages must have been published 
within three years after the issue of the original version 
of the work. In the case of works which consisted of sepa-
rate volumes or numbers the three year term was calculated 
separately in respect of each volume or number. 122 The man-
ner of determining which version of a work published in 
120. Secticn 10. 
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122. Secticn 5. 
several languages was the original version is described 
above. 123 
The performing rights in dramatic works and dramatic-musical 
works were required to be specifically reserved upon first 
publication, and if they were not they fell into the public 
domain. Such reservation must have appeared on the title 
page, or failing that the cover, of the original issue of 
the work. 124 
Upon receipt of the required copies lodged with him, the 
Registrar of Deeds issued a certificate. Unlike in the case 
of the other provincial statutes, the Transvaal Act did not 
specifically provide that a certificate issued by the 
Registrar constituted prima facie proof in court pro-
ceedings. On the other hand, the system provided for in the 
Act was in essence a deposit system rather than a registra-
tion system. The Registrar of Deeds was not required to keep 
a register and no further record was kept of the ownership 
of the works after the initial deposit. Presumably the fact 
of deposit, a necessary formality for the continued sub-
sistence of copyright in works published in a printed form, 
could be proved by means of a certificate issued by the 
Registrar of Deeds. 
It is significant that Section 10, which deals with the 
requirement of the deposit of copies of the published ver-
sion of a work with the Registrar of Deeds, makes reference 
to the copyright "lapsing" in the event of failure to comply 
with the post-publication formalities. This confirms the 
123. 
124. 
See p 290 supra. 
Section 12. 
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existence of common law copyright in published works. The 
Act recognized the common 1 aw copyright for an initial 
period but provided for it to lapse if the prescribed for-
malities were not complied with. 
Although the Transvaal Act makes reference to "original" 
works, the term is used in the context of the initial ver-
sion of a work rather than in the context of "originality" 
as a condition for the subsistence of copyright. This 
approach would have been consistent with the development of 
copyright in The Netherlands. 
The Act was retrospective in effect and it recognized 
copyright in works made before its passing. This principle 
was subject to the qualification in the case of works pub-
lished in printed form that the copyright owner, the pub-
lisher or the printer must within six months of the Act com-
ing into operation have lodged with the Registrar of Deeds 
three copies of the work, which copies were required to com-
ply with the same formalities as those in respect of works 
first published in printed form after the coming into opera-
tion of the Act. The copies lodged were required to state 
the date of first publication of the work and that date was 
regarded as the date of commencement of the term of 
copyright.l25 Lodging of copies as aforementioned was con-
firmed by the Registrar of Deed by means of a certifi-
cate.126 Any common law copyright not registered in this 
way thus lapsed on 1 March 1888. 
The concept of publication in a printed form was not 






of the Act, it is submitted that it took place when a 
freshly printed type set version of a work was multiplied 
and copies so produced were issued to the public. This is an 
important issue because if a work was unpublished in print-
ing copyright subsisted in it without compliance with any 
formalities. 
(c) Authorship and Initial Ownership of Copyright 
Ownership of copyright under the law vested initially in the 
author. 127 The compiler of a collective work consisting of 
separate individual works was regarded as the author and 
initial copyright owner of the collective work but the 
authors of the component works retained the ownership of the 
copyright in their individual works unless otherwise agreed 
to the contrary. Translators were considered to be the 
authors and initial owners of their translations of works of 
others. 128 
Section 2 (b) of tne Act provided that "public institutions, 
associations, establishments and partnerships" were the 
authors and initial copyright owners "in respect of the 
works provided by them". This provision in effect states 
that juristic persons and quasi-juristic persons were con-
sidered to be the authors and initial owners of works made 
by their employees. The sub-section did not, however, apply 
to employers who were individuals, as distinct from partner-
ships. It must be pointed out that the sub-section must not 
be construed as simply making the relevant employers the 
initial copyright owners, but as actually constituting them 






In the case of anonymous or pseudonymous works published in 
a printed form the publisher was considered to be the author 
and initial copyright owner provided his name was mentioned 
on the title page or failing that on the cover of the work. 
If not, the printer was deemed to be the author and initial 
copyright owner. This position obtained unless and until the 
name of the author was disclosed, whereupon he became 
entitled to the copyright provided the provisions relating 
to the deposit of three signed copies were complied with 
afresh, save that the two month time limit for lodging such 
copies after first publication no longer applied. 129 
The term "author" was not defined in the Act and it must 
therefore generally be given its ordinary meaning, namely, 
the maker of the work. 
(d) Duration of Copyright 
The copyright in works which were not published in a printed 
form (including oral lectures) endured for the lifetime of 
the author and for thirty years after his death.130 
The performing rights in dramatic-musical works or plays 
which were published in printed form and in which the per-
forming right was reserved enjoyed protection for ten years 
after the date of lodgement of the required copies with the 
Registrar of Deeds.l31 
The right to publish translations in printed form where the 








a period of five years from the date of the lodgement of the 
required copies with the Registrar of Deeds.l32 
Save for the a foregoing, the copyright in all works pub-
lished in a printed form endured for fifty years from the 
date stated in the certificate issued by the Registrar of 
Deeds as being the date of the first issuing of copies of 
the work. In the event that the author was still alive at 
the expiration of this term and had not assigned the 
copyright, the term of copyright was prolonged up to the 
death of the author. This exception, however, applied only 
in the case of authors who were natural individuals and in 
addition did not apply in the case of compilers of collec-
tive works. 133 
In the case of works first published in printed form before 
the Act came into operation, the fifty year term of 
copyright dated from the date of actual issue of the 
original printed versions of the work. 134 
In the case of works consisting of different volumes or num-
bers, the term of copyright was calculated separately in 
respect of each volume or number. 135 
(e) Transmission of Copyright 
Copyright was deemed to be movable property and it could be 
ceded or assigned in whole or in part. It could also be 














No formalities were laid down for a cession or assignment of 
copyright. As the Act is not based on any of the British 
copyright statutes in which generally speaking an assignment 
of copyright was required to be in writing, it cannot neces-
sarily be assumed that there was any such requirement under 
the Transvaal Law. Copyright may thus have been assignable 
otherwise than in writing. For instance, the acquisition of 
the ownership of the original manuscript of a work may by 
implication have included the acquisition of the ownership 
of the copyright in the work in question. 
(f) Parallel British Copyright 
As has been shown, after the passing of the British Interna-
tional Copyright Act of 1886, works first published in a 
British dominion were treated under British copyright law in 
the same way as works first published in Britain. This only 
became a factor in the Transvaal after 1 September 1900 when 
Britain formally annexed the Transvaal. From that time 
onwards and until after 1917 Transvaal was a British 
dominion. 
After 1 September 1900 any "book" first published in Trans-
vaal enjoyed protection under the British Act of 1842. Lodg-
ing of copies of the book with the Registrar of Deeds in 
terms of the Transvaal Act, although not registration in the 
strict sense, probably was deemed to be the equivalent of 
registration at Stationers Hall. In any event, registration 
at Stationers Hall was not a condition for the subsistence 
of copyright, but simply for the enforcement thereof in 
Britain. The British copyright in a book first published in 
the Transvaal also extended to the Transvaal after 1 Septem-
ber 1900, the Transvaal then being a British dominion. 
Accordingly, after the aforementioned date a book first pub-
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lished in the Transvaal enjoyed parallel copyright under 
both the Transvaal Act and the British Act of 1842. The 
ownership and duration of such separate copyrights were 
determined by the individual Acts from which they were 
derived and they thus had different durations and could have 
vested in different persons. An assignment of copyright in 
the Transvaal executed after the aforementioned date, if in 
writing, would have operated to transmit the ownership of 
both copyrights unless a contrary indication appeared there-
from. An unwritten assignment, if valid under Transvaal law, 
would not have operated to transmit the ownership of the 
British copyright because a written deed was necessary to 
assign British copyright. 
The same considerations applied to performing rights in 
musical and dramatic works and these works would likewise 
have enjoyed British copyright under the Dramatic Copyright 
Act, 1853, read together with Section 20 and 21 of the 
Copyright Act of 1842. British law at the relevant time only 
granted a performing right in a published musical work if 
express reservation of that right was made on the title page 
of each copy released to the public. This formal requirement 
went further than the equivalent formalities under the 
Transvaal Act which merely required that the name of the 
copyright owner should appear on the three copies of a work 
lodged with the Registrar of Deeds. It is thus possible that 
many musical works first published in the Transvaal during 
the relevant time did not comply with the aforementioned 
British formality and they would thus have fallen into the 
public domain ·as far as their performing rights under 
British law were concerned, after first publication in the 
Transvaal. 
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Prints or engravings first published in the Transvaal after 
1 September 1900 in principle will have enjoyed copyright in 
Britain under the British legislation granting copyright in 
such works, namely, the Engraving Copyright Acts, 1734 and 
1736, the Prints Copyright Act, 1776, the Prints and Engrav-
ings Copyright · (Ireland) Act, 1836 and Section 14 of the 
International Copyright Act, 1852. It was, however, a 
requirement for the subsistence of copyright under British 
law that the date of first publication and the name of the 
proprietor should be engraved on the plate and should appear 
on each print. In some circumstances compliance with the 
Transvaal formalities of having the name of the copyright 
owner and the date of first publication appear on the three 
copies lodged with the Registrar of Deeds might have led to 
works complying with the British formalities as well. The 
British formalities required the relevant information to 
appear on all copies of the work issued whereas the Trans-
vaal formalities only required that this information should 
appear on the three copies lodged with the Registrar of 
Deeds. In the event that the British formalities were not 
complied with the print or engraving would have fallen into 
the public domain as far as British copyright law was con-
cerned. The British legislation dealing with prints did not 
extend to the British dominions with the result that any 
British copyright subsisting in a Transvaal work would not 
have extended to the Transvaal. However, as will be ·shown 
below, such copyright could have passed through the British 
1911 Gateway and the South African 1917 Gateway and could 
have become operative in South Africa after 1917. The owner-
ship and duration of any British copyright subsisting in a 
Transvaal print or engraving would obviously have been 
determined by the British legislation and such duration and 
ownership might have differed from the duration and owner-
ship of the Transvaal copyright. 
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(2) First Volksraad Resolution, 20 June, 1895 -Article 420 
As stated above, the Copyright Act was amended by a Resolu-
tion of the Second Volksraad dated 1 June 1895 which made 
provision for published works printed outside the Transvaal 
to enjoy protection under the Transvaal Act provided the 
territory of origin of the works granted reciprocal pro-
tection to Transvaal works. This Resolution of the Second 
Volksraad was confirmed by the First Volksraad on 20 June 
1895 in Article 420. 
(3) Proclamation No. 24 of 1902 - Copyright in Military 
Maps 
This Proclamation was made on 19 April 1902, after the 
Transvaal had been annexed by Britain in 1900 and 
immediately prior to the Treaty of Vereeniging signed on 31 
May 1902. It dealt with copyright in the Transvaal in 
British military maps. It is doubtful whether the Proclama-
tion was strictly speaking necessary save to the extent that 
the maps might have been published in the Transvaal prior to 
1 September 1900, the date of formal annexation of the 
Transvaal by Britain. Maps were classified as "books" under 
the British Copyright Act of 1842 and any maps first pub-
lished in the Transvaal after 1 September 1900 would have 
enjoyed copyright in Britain and that copyright would in 
terms of the British Act of 1842 have extended to South 
Africa. As long as the maps remained unpublished they would 
have been protected under the Transvaal Law of 1887, despite 
being British. Perhaps it was considered to be politically 
expedient to claim copyright in both published and 
unpublished military maps of the Transvaal under Transvaal 
legislation rather than under British legislation. Another 
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possible explanation is that a simple and unambiguous form 
of protection- which did not involve the niceties of con-
stitutional law and the annexation of the Transvaal by 
Britain in the middle of the Second Boer War, was desired. 
(a) Types of works Protected 
Maps and 
copyright 
the like types 
under the Act of 
of works were eligible 
1887. Nevertheless the 
for 
1902 
Proclamation conferred copyright "in all maps of His 
Majesty's South African Dominions made and compiled by the 
Field Intelligence Department of His Majesty's forces in 
South Africa. and published in this Colony". 137 
(b) Conditions for the Subsistence of Copyright 
The maps were required to be published in the Transvaal and 
within two months of such publication three copies thereof 
signed by someone authorized by the General Officer Command-
ing in Chief His Majesty's Forces in South Africa must have 
been deposited with the Registrar of Deeds in Pretoria. No 
transitional provisions were incorporated in the Proclama-
tion and this suggests that it only applied to maps pub-
lished after the date of the Proclamation or within two 
months prior to the date of the Proclamation. The maps were 
exempted from compliance with any further formal! ties laid 
down in the Law of 1887. The maps were, however, regarded as 
enjoying all the benefits of the Act of 1887 - in other 
words they were deemed to have been duly copyrighted under 
that Act. 138 
(c) Authorship and Initial Ownership of Copyright 
13 7 • Secticn l. 
138. Secticn 2. 
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The General Officer Commanding-in-Chief his Majesty's Forces 
in South Africa was deemed to have been the author of any 
map covered by the Proclamation and he was the initial 
copyright owner.139 
(d) Duration of Copyright 
Copyright in a map covered by the Proclamation enjoyed the 
normal term of copyright prescribed for a published map in 
the Act of 1887. 
(e) Transmission of Copyright 
No provision was made in the Proclamation for the transmis-
sion of the copyright in a map covered by it but presumably 
the ownership of such copyright could have been transferred 
in the manner in which the copyright in other maps protected 
by the Act of 1887 could have been disposed of. 
(f) Parallel British Copyright 
As stated above, the maps would have enjoyed parallel 
copyright in the Transvaal in terms of the British Copyright 
Act of 1842 and such parallel copyrights had different 
terms. At least in theory the ownership of the separate 
copyrights could have vested in different persons, depending 
upon the provisions in that regard of the two pieces of 
legislation. 
D. ORANGE FREE STATE 
Although no copyright legislation was adopted by the Orange 
Free State while it had a separate existence, after 1842 the 
139. Secticn 1. 
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British Copyright Act of that year would have applied in the 
territory at all times when it was a British dominion. Fur-
thermore, the Roman-Dutch common law copyright continued 
unabated in the Orange Free State until 1917 when it was 
terminated by the Act of 1916. 
E. UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA 
After the creation of the Union of South Africa in 1910 
copyright in South Africa desperately required reformation 
and consolidation. Three of the four provinces each had 
their own copyright legislation and the provisions of such 
provincial legislation were not easily reconcilable. The 
Orange Free State had no copyright legislation although 
works originating from the Orange Free State enjoyed 
copyright in certain circumstances, as outlined above, in 
Natal and the Transvaal, and common law copyright prevailed. 
Shortly after the formation of the Union the British 
Copyright Act of 1911 was passed and it repealed the early 
British Copyright legislation in Britain, although not in 
the self-governing dominions, including South Africa. The 
British Act of 1911, known as the "Imperial Act", was not 
automatically operative in South Africa although it was 
eligible for adoption with or without qualifications. 
It took six years after the formation of the Union of South 
Africa before the Union legislature devoted its attention to 
consolidating and modernizing intellectual property law, 
including copyright, in South Africa. With the aftermath of 
the formation of the Union and the immense task of con-
solidating and standardizing the laws of 'the unified 
country, taken together with the outbreak of the First World 
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War in 1914 it is hardly surprising that this hiatus period 
occurred. With the passing of th~ Patents, Designs, Trade 
Marks and Copyright Act, 9 of 1916, which came into force on 
1 January 1917, South African copyright law was properly 
eonsolidated. The coming into operation of this Act marked 
the commencement of modern South African copyright law. 
8. TYPES OF WORKS NOT PROTECTED IN SOUTH AFRICA PRIOR TO 
1917 
The following types of works eligible for copyright under 
the South African Copyright Act, 1978, did not enjoy pro-
tection under any of the laws in operation in South Africa 
prior to 1917: 
(a) Works of artistic craftsmanship and works of 
craftsmanship of a technical nature, unless they 
qualified as sculptures. 
(b) Works of architecture, being buildings or models for 
buildings. 
(c) Stories reduced to a material form in a cinematograph 
film or music reduced to a material form in a 
gramophone record or other mechanical contrivance. As 
in the case of early British legislation, however, 
these types of works probably enjoyed a performing 
right. 140 
(d) Sound recordings. 
(e) Cinematograph films. 
( f ) Broadcast's . 
(g) Programme carrying signals. 
140. See p 144 supr-a. 
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The balance of the types of works enjoyed copyright under 
one or more of the pieces of legislation in operation in 
South Africa but not necessarily in all the territories, 
However, as will be shown below, for a copyright to pass 
through the 1917 Gateway and to be substituted by a "new" 
copyright under the Act of 1916 with countrywide force and 
effect it was sufficient that it subsisted in only one of 




COPYRIGHT UNDER THE PATENTS, DESIGNS, TRADE MARKS AND 
COPYRIGHT ACT 9 OF 1916 
1. INTRODUCTION 
With the coming into being of the Union of South Africa on 
31 May 1910 there was a distinct need to unify the laws of 
the Union and the legal institutions as well as the practice 
of law. In May 1911 a Commission was appointed to undertake 
the consolidation of the laws. This Commission consisted of 
Lord de Villiers, the then current Chief Justice, Sir James 
Rose Innes and Mr W. Schreiner. Amongst the laws which this 
Commission was required to consolidate were the laws relat-
ing to patents, trade marks, designs and copyright. The work 
of the Commission gave rise to the Patents, Designs, Trade 
Marks and Copyright Act, 9 of 1916 which came into operation 
on 1 January 1917. 
The Act of 1916 was divided into five chapters of which 
r 
chapter IV dealt with copyright. The passing of this Act 
marked the beginning of the modern era of South African 
copyright law. Although this Act was subsequently followed 
by two further Copyright Acts the foundations of the basic 
principles and concept of modern South African copyright law 
were laid in this Act. Insofar as these basic principles and 
concepts are set forth in Chapter II of this work they apply 
equally to copyright under the Act of 1916 unless the con-
trary is stated. 
In 1916 South Africa was a self-governing dominion within 
the British Commonwealth. The Imperial British Parliament 
had in 1911 passed the Copyright Act of that year, the so-
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called "Imperial Copyright Act" . This Act consolidated the 
British copyright law and at the same time complied with the 
minimum requirements of the Berlin text of the Berne Conven-
tion dating from 13 November 1908. Section 25 of the British 
Act of 1911, while providing in principle that the Act 
extended throughout the British dominions, stated that it 
would not extend to 
of that 
a self -governing dominion unless the 
dominion declared it to be in force legislature 
either with or without modifications or additions, or with 
such modifications and additions relating exclusively to 
procedure and remedies or as may be necessary to adapt it to 
the circumstances of that dominion. 
Section 26 of the British Act of 1911 empowered the legisla-
ture of any self-governing dominion to repeal at any time 
all or any of the enactments relating to copyright passed by 
the British parliament to the extent that such enactments 
were operative within that dominion. This power was subject 
to the proviso that no such repeal would prejudicially 
affect any rights existing at the time of the repeal. There-
after the dominion would cease to be a terri tory to which 
such an enactment extended. 
Section 26(2) of the British Act of 1911 provided that, 
insofar as prior legislation repealed by the British Act of 
1911 extended to a self-governing dominion, such prior 
legislation remained in force until such time as it was 
repealed by the legislature of that self-governing dominion. 
When the aforementioned consolidation commission commenced 
its work it was thus faced with the situation that the 
legislature of the Union of South Africa had a discretion to 
introduce the British Act of 1911 with or without modifica-
tions. Until such time as it did so the British Copyright 
Act of 1842 and the International Copyright Act of 1886 
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would continue to apply in all four provinces along with the 
domestic laws of each of those provinces. As has been shown 
in Chapter IV the domestic laws of the four provinces varied 
considerably and in the case of the Cape and Natal consisted 
of statutory law based on some but not all of the various 
early British Copyright Acts, while in the Transvaal there 
existed legislation based on the Dutch Copyright Act of 1881 
and in the Orange Free State there was no legislation at 
all, only Roman-Dutch common law copyright. This amounted to 
a true melee of different copyright laws. The Commission 
opted for the course of adopting the British Act of 1911 
with a few relatively minor variations to cater for local 
circumstances. The way in which this was put into effect was 
that the British Act of 1911 was incorporated in its 
entirety as the Third Schedule to the Act of 1916 and this 
Schedule was made applicable to South Africa subject to the 
variations introduced in Chapter IV of the Act of 1916. 
Amongst the special provisions made in Chapter IV of the Act 
of 1916 were transitional provisions relating to the 
domestic laws of the four provinces - the statutory laws of 
such provinces were referred to as the "Provincial Copyright 
Acts". All the Provincial Copyright Acts (i.e. all the Acts 
dealt with in Section 7 of Chapter IV above, save for the 
first of the two Natal Acts of 1896) were specifically 
repealed by the Act of 1916. The various registers main-
tained under the Provincial Copyright Act were incorporated 
into the central register for which provision was made in 
the Act of 1916. 
In terms of Section 160 of the Act of 1916 no person was 
entitled to copyright or any other similar right in any 
literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work, whether pub-
lished or unpublished, otherwise than in accordance with the 
Act or any other statutory enactment for the time being in 
force. This provision repealed any common law copyright 
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which was in existence at the time of the coming into opera-
tion of the Act of 1916 but it was specially provided that 
this repeal of common law copyright was not to be construed 
as abrogating any right to restrain a breach of trust or 
confidence. This remedy to restrain ·a breach of trust or 
confidence has been held by the South African courts to be a 
principle of the English common law which has no application 
in South Africa.l 
In the light of the provisions of Sections 41 and 43 of the 
Copyright Act 1978, which deal with the transitional provi-
sions of the current law, the following discussion of the 
Act of 1916 will be limited to those provisions which are 
relevant to the ownership, duration and subsistence of 
copyright under it. Attention will first be given to the 
provisions of the Act of 1916 as they applied to works made 
after the Act came into operation and thereafter attention 
will be devoted the transitional provisions of the 1916 Act 
and to the complexities surrounding the 1917 Gateway. 
In terms of Section 43 of the 1978 Act, strictly speaking it 
is only necessary to determine which works were capable of 
enjoying copyright under the 1916 Act as, although the 1978 
Act is retrospective, subject to certain exceptions, it can-
not create a copyright in a pre-1965 work which did not 
exist under the 1916 Act. Strictly speaking the ownership, 
duration and continued subsistence of works made prior to 
1965 is determined by the Copyright Act, 1965. However, it 
will be shown in Chapter VI that where it deals with the 
1. See f= i.nstarx:s Northern Office Micro Colprters (pty) Limited & 
others v Rosellstein, 1981 (4) Sl\ 123 (C). See also "Die Derde Maal is 
Sl<eepsxeJ", HJ van der Westhuizen, ( 1979) 4 TRW 2 an:i "OUt:eursreg en 
Persoonlikheidsregte 'n Teoretiese Analise met Vawysing na Out-
wrsregbevoegdhe in die SUid-Afrikaanse Reg", J Neethling ( 1975) 38 
THRHR 332. 
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ownership, duration and continued subsistence of copyright 
in works made prior to 19 65, the 19 65 Act substantially 
preserves the position which obtained under the 1916 Act. It 
is therefore necessary in addition to analyze the provisions 
of the 1916 Act as to the ownership, duration and continued 
subsistence of copyright regulated by it . 
• 
2. COPYRIGHT IN WORKS MADE AFTER 1 JANUARY 1917 
A. CLASSES OF WORKS PROTECTED 
The British Copyright Act granted protection to original 
literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works. 2 Certain 
cinematograph films were treated as a species of the genus 
"dramatic works" and sound recordings were protected as if 
they were musical works. 
In view of the provisions of Sections 43(a) and (c) of the 
1978 Act, the precise definitions of the aforementioned 
classes of works are very relevant. They are discussed 
below.3 
(1) Literary Works 
The term "literary work" was defined to: "include[s] maps, 
charts, plans, tables and compilations". The term "literary 
work" was used and interpreted in the same sense as is dis-
cussed in Chapter II in dealing with the meaning of this 
term under the Copyright Act, 1978. 4 Lectures and other 
works which did not exist in tangible form but were pro-
2. Section 1(1) of the Third Schedule. 
3. Section 35(1) of the Third Schedule ~ises the definitions of 
the various categories of works . 
. 4. See p 14 S"tJpra. 
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tected under the old British legislation were no longer pro-
tected. 
(2) Dramatic works 
The term "dramatic work" was defined to: 
"include[s] any piece for recitation, choreographic 
work or entertainment in dumb show, the scenic arrange-
ment or acting form of which is fixed in writing or 
otherwise, and any cinematograph production where the 
arrangement or acting form or the combination of inci-
dents represented give the work an original character". 
The distinction between "copyright" in the strict sense and 
"performing right" which existed under the pre-1912 British 
legislation was done away with in the British Copyright Act 
of 1911 and the copyright in a dramatic work under the Act 
comprised both these rights. 
(3) Artistic works 
The term "artistic work" was defined to: 
"include[s] works of painting, drawing, sculpture and 
artistic craftsmanship, and architectural works of art 
and engravings and photographs". 
A number of terms in the aforegoing definitions were them-
selves defined in the Act: 
(i) "works of sculpture" "includes casts and 
models"; 
(ii) "architectural works of art" - "means any building 
or structure having an artistic character or 
design, in respect of such character or design, or 
any model for such building or structure, provided 
that the protection afforded by this Act shall be 
confined to the artistic character and design, and 
shall not extend to processes or methods of con-
struction"; 
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(iii) "Engravings" "include etchings, lithographs, 
wood cuts, prints, and other similar works not 
being photographs". Maps, charts and plans had 
been capable of protection as engravings under the 
pre-1911 legislation, as an alternative to being 
protected as literary works, but this ambiguity 
was elimi~ated in the Act of 1911 which ceased to 
regard these types of works as artistic works in 
general or engravings in particular. 
( iv) "Photograph" - "includes photo lithograph and any 
work produced by any process analogous to 
photography". The individual frames of a 
cinematograph film were considered to be and were 
protected as photographs. 
As in the case of literary works, the term "artistic works" 
were understood in the same sense as currently used in the 
Copyright Act, 1978, and as discussed in Chapter II above. 
The question of artistic works which corresponded to indus-
trial designs is disqussed below. 
(4) Musical works 
There was no definition of this category of work. It will be 
recalled that the Musical (Summary Proceedings) Act, 1902 
contained a definition of musical work, namely "any combina-
tion of melody and harmony, or either of them, printed, 
reduced to writing, or otherwise graphically produced or 
reproduced". 5 Copinger and Skene- James on the Law of 
Copyright, 8th Edition, 6 contends that the term "musical 
works" should be given this same definition in the Act of 
1911. This seems logical and the effect would have been that 
a musical work must have existed in a printed or written 
5. Seep 130 supra. 
6. at p. 65. 
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form, which is consistent with the position today, save that 
under the Act of 1978 the work can be embodied in any 
material form, which would include embodiment in a magnetic 
tape. 
In the so-called "Redwood case" 7 it was held that a song 
which consists of words and music is a composite work con-
sisting of a separate and distinct musical work and literary 
work and not a single dramatic-musical work as would have 
been the case under pre.:.l912 legislation. The same would 
apply to an opera or a so-called "musical production". 
As in the case of dramatic works, the copyright in a musical 
work under the Act of 1911 comprised both "copyright" in the 
strict sense and the performing right. 
(5) Cinematograph Films 
As mentioned above in the definition of "dramatic work", re-
cognition was given to "any cinematograph productions where 
the arrangement or acting form o£ the combination o£ inci-
dents represented give the work an original character". The 
• 
term "cinematograph" was defined as "includ[ing] any work 
produced by any process analogous to cinematography". In 
terms of the aforegoing definition a documentary film which 
did not have a plot and actors would not have constituted a 
cinematograph film qua dramatic work although the individual 
frames would nevertheless have constituted "photographs" and 
thus "artistic works" . In the case of a so-called "feature 
film" two copyrights would have subsisted, namely, a 
7. Red.lcod M.Jsic Ltd v Francis, Day and Hunter Ltd ( 1978) RR.: 429 
(QBD); Red.lcod M.Jsic Ltd v Felctnan (B) & Co. Ltd (1979) RR.: 1 (QBD); 
Red.lcod M.Jsic Ltd v Felctnan (B) and Co (1979) RR.: 385 (CA); culminating 
in Olappell and Co. Ltd v Redwcxxl Music Ltd; Redwood Music Ltd v 
Francis, Day and Hunter Ltd ( 1981) RR.: 337 (HL). 
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copyright qua dramatic work and a copyright in the sequence 
of frames qua "photographs" and thus "artistic works". 
(6) Sound Recordings 
Provision was made for sound recordings in Section 19(1) of 
the Third Schedule, the relevant part of which read 
"copyright shall ·subsist in sounds, perforated rolls and 
other contrivances by means of which sounds may be mechan-
ically reproduced". These "sound recordings" were, in terms 
of the Section, protected "in like manner as if such con-
trivances were musical works". 
B. CONDITIONS FOR SUBSISTENCE OF COPYRIGHT 
For copyright to subsist in one of the categories of works 
recognized by the 1916 Act, in the case of a published work, 
the work must have been first published in South Africa or 
in a terri tory to the works of which the 1916 Act was 
extended, and in the case of an unpublished work, the author 
must at the date of the making of the work have been a 
British subject or resident in South Africa or a person who 
was the citizen of or was resident in a country to the works 
of which the operation of the Act had been extended. 8 For a 
protected unpublished work to continue enjoying protection 
after first publication, first publication must have taken 
place in South Africa or an appropriate country. A work 
which might have been made by an appropriate person and thus 
enjoyed protection wh_ile unpublished ceased to enjoy pro-
tection if first publication did not take place in South 
Africa or an appropriate country. The question of which for-
eign works enjoyed protection in South Africa will be dealt 
with separately below. 
8 . secticn 1 ( 1) of t:re Third SChedule •. 
316. 
The 1916 Act, read together with the Third Schedule, con-
ferred upon the Governor-General powers to extend the opera-
tion of the Act to various countries and various proclama-
tions were made from time to time dealing with the extension 
of the Act to other countries. It is beyond the scope of 
this treatise to deal with all these various proclamations 
but a list of them is conveniently set out in the Third 
Schedule to Proclamation No. R73, 1966 published in 
Government Gazette No. 1402 dated March 18, 1966, in terms 
of Section 32 of the Copyright Act, 1965. The Second 
Schedule to such Proclamation conveniently sets out a list 
of the countries to which the 1916 Act was extended together 
with the date in each case upon which the extension took 
effect. 9 The only omission from this table of countries, 
which consists basically of countries which were at the time 
members of the Berne Convention and/or were British 
dominions, is the United States of America. South Africa 
entered into a bilateral agreement with the United States of 
America in 1924 and a Proclamation extending protection to 
works emanating from the United States of America was pub-
lished under the 1916 Act in Proclamation No. 118 of June 
13, 1924. 10 
The term "publication" or "publish" was defined in Section 
1(3) of the Third Schedule read together with Section 35(2) 
and (3) thereof. "Publication" meant in relation to any work 
the issue of copies of the work to the public. The perform-
ance in public of a dramatic or musical work, the delivery 
in public of a lecture, the exhibition in public of an art-
istic work, or the construction of an architectural work of 
9. See p 363 infra. 
10. See p 364 infra. 
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art did not constitute publication. Nor did the issue of 
photographs and engravings of sculptures and architectural 
works constitute publication of those works. A work was not 
deemed to have been published or performed in public and a 
lecture was not deemed to have been delivered in public if 
this occurred without the authority of the copyright owner. 
In terms of Section 35(3) of the Third Schedule a work was 
deemed to be published simultaneously in more than one place 
if such publications took place within fourteen days of each 
other. A work was considered to have been first published in 
South Africa or in an appropriate country notwithstanding 
the fact that it had been simultaneously published in South 
Africa or that appropriate country and some other place 
simultaneously provided the publication which took place in 
South Africa or the other appropriate country was not merely 
colourable and was intended to satisfy the reasonable 
requirements of the public. Section 35( 4) of the Third 
Schedule provided that, where the making of a work extended 
over a considerable period, the author would have been con-
sidered to have been an appropriate person if he met the 
qualifications therefor during a substantial part of that 
period. Section 35(5) of the Third Schedule provided that an 
author was deemed to be resident in South Africa or an 
appropriate country if he was domiciled in any of those ter-
ritories. 
Insofar as it is relevant to the place of residence of an 
author, the Third Schedule provided in Section 19(1), deal-
ing with "sound recordings" and "photographs", that a body 
corporate was deemed to reside in a territory if it had 
established a place of business within that territory. 
In addition the general requirements described in Chapter II 
above applied to works under the Act of 1916. Furthermore, 
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specifically in the case of a cinematograph film qualifying 
as a "dramatic work", the film must have comprised an 
arrangement or acting form of the combination of incidents 
represented to give the work an original character. 11 
The pattern of the extension of the 1916 Act to other ter-
ritories was to make the provisions of the Act applicable to 
a particular country as from a specified date. The effect of 
such a measure was that, as from the specific date, 
copyright was extended to works emanating from that country 
whether made before or after that specified date. 12 
C. AUTHORSHIP AND INITIAL OWNERSHIP OF COPYRIGHT 
Save in the case of photographs and "sound recordings", nei-
ther the 1916 Act nor the Third Schedule defined or 
specified the identity of the author of a work. The general 
principles relating to authorship of works set forth in 
Chapter II in regard to the author applied equally under the 
Act of 1916. In the case of a photograph, the person who was 
the owner of the negative at the time when it was made was 
deemed to be the author, 13 while in the case of a "sound 
recording" · the person who was the owner of the original 
plate from which the sound recording contrivance was made at 
the time when such plate was made was deemed to be the 
author. 14 Insofar as a "cinematograph film" was a "dramatic 
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11. See definition of "dramatic =rk" in Section 35(1) of the Third 
Sctaiule. 
12. See f= instan:e para 1(b)(iv) of the Prcx::lamation exterrling the 
protection of the Act to the United States of America - see p 366 
infra. This did rot, rowever, apply to =rks made prior to 1917 - see p 
367 infra. 
13. Section 21 of the Third Sclaiule. 
14. Section 19(1) of the Third Sclaiule. 
work" the individual producer of the film was usually con-
sidered to be the author while insofar as it consisted of a 
series of photographs, 
defined above. There 
the identity of the author was as 
could thus be two authors of a 
cinematograph film and i.ndeed there were two parallel 
copyrights. The authorship of so-called "collective works" 
is dealt with below. 
Section 5(1) of the Third Schedule provided that the author 
of a work was the first owner of the copyright in that work. 
Exceptions to that general rule in the case of certain com-
missioned works (i.e engravings, photographs and portraits) 
and works made in the course of employment were made in the 
proviso to the aforementioned Section. In the case of the 
commissioned works, the person giving the commission, 
although not the author of the work, was the first copyright 
owner, and in the case of works made in the course of 
employment, the employer, though not the author, was the 
first copyright owner; provided that where the work was an 
article or other contribution to a newspaper, magazine or 
similar periodical, although the employer was the first 
owner of the major part of the copyright, the author 
retained the right to restrain the publication of the work 
otherwise than as part of a newspaper, magazine or similar 
periodical. In the case of all the aforementioned excep-
tions, the position could be varied by agreement between the 
parties. The first ownership of the copyright in works 
prepared or published by or under the direction of the State 
will be dealt with below. 
Where any work was prepared or published by or under the 
direction of the State the copyright vested in the State. 15 
15. Section 18 of the Third Schedule. 
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A "work of joint authorship" was defined in Section 16(3) of 
the Third Schedule to mean a work produced by the collabora-
tion of two or more authors in which the contribution of one 
author is not distinct from the contribution of the other 
author or authors. In order to enjoy copyright in South 
Africa it was sufficient if any one of the joint authors was 
an appropriate person. 
Sections 152 to 159 of the Act of 1916 made provision for 
registration of copyright. Registration served to record the 
proprietorship of the copyright in any work registered and 
the existence of licences under that copyright. Assignments 
and other transmissions of copyright could be recorded 
therein. Provision was made for the Register to be rec-
tified. Section 159 specifically provided that registration 
shall not in any case be deemed to be a condition for the 
subsistence of copyright or the exercise of any rights under 
copyright. In terms of Section 144(e) of the Act of 1916 
read with Section 8 of the Third Schedule, registration con-
stituted constructive knowledge of the subsistence of 
copyright in a work for purposes- of establishing liability 
for damages upon infringement of the copyright. The 
Registers kept under the Provincial Acts were incorporated 
into the Register kept under the 1916 Act. Such Registers 
thus lost their significance under the Provincial Acts 
although, where registration was a condition precedent for 
the subsistence of copyright under a repealed Act, it 
retained this historical significance. 
D. DURATION OF COPYRIGHT 
The term of copyright under the 1916 Act was, generally 
speaking, the lifetime of the author of the work and a 
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period' of fifty years after his death. 16 In the case of a 
"sound recording" the term was fifty years from the making 
of the original plate from which the contrivance was 
directly or indirectly derived, 17 and in the case of a 
photograph, the term of the copyright was fifty years from 
the making of the original negative from which the photo-
graph was directly or indirectly derived. 1 8 The enforce-
ability of the copyright in a work for the full period of 
its duration was tempered by the proviso to Section 3 of the 
Third Schedule which created a form of compulsory licence in 
the case of published works after the lapse of a certain 
period. Such a licence did not, however, affect the duration 
as such of the copyright but it did create a vested right in 
favour of the "compulsory licensee". 
Special provisions regarding works of joint authorship and 
posthumous works, and in particular the determination of the 
term of copyright enjoyed by such works, were contained in 
Sections 16 and 17 of the Third Schedule. In the case of a 
work of joint authorship the term of copyright was the 
lifetime of the author who died first and fifty years after 
his death, or the lifetime of the author who died last, 
whichever period was the longer. Where it was necessary to 
calculate a period of years after the death of the "author" 
for any purpose other than the term of the copyright, the 
calculation commenced with the earlier of the two deaths. 
Where a copyrighted literary, dramatic or musical work, or 
an engraving, had at the time of the death of the author (or 
the longest surviving author in the case of a work of joint 
authorship) not been published, nor, in the case of a 
dramatic or musical work, been performed in public, nor in 
16. Section 3 of the Third Schedule. 
17 . Section 19 ( 1) of the Third Schedule. 
18. Section 21 of the Third Schedule. 
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the case of a lecture, been delivered in public, the 
copyright endured until publication, performance or delivery 
in public, as the case may be, whichever happened first, and 
for a period of fifty years thereafter. 
The copyright in a work prepared or published by or under 
the direction of the State endured for a period of fifty 
years from the date of first publication of the work. The 
ownership of the copyright was, however, subject to varia-
tion by agreement with the author. 19 
E. TRANSMISSION OF COPYRIGHT 
The copyright in any work was freely assignable, either in 
whole or in part, for the full territory of the copyright or 
for particular geographical areas such as provinces, and for 
the whole term of the copyright or any part thereof. Unlike 
under the subsequent South African legislation, it was not 
stated in the Act of 1916 that future copyright could be 
assigned, i.e. the copyright in a work which was not yet in 
existence. In the circumstances, it must be concluded that 
no such assignment was possible. This view is . shared by 
Copinger and Skene James.20 
No assignment was valid unless it was in writing and signed 
by the assignor or by his duly authorized agent. 21 An excep-
tion to this rule was that, in terms of Section 17(2) of the 
Third Schedule, the ownership of an author's manuscript 
after his death, where such ownership has been acquired in 
terms of a testamentary disposition made by the author and 
19 . Section 18 of t:re Third Schedule. 
20. Op cit, p 105. 
21. Section 5(2) of t:re Third Schedule. 
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the manuscript was of a work which had not been published 
nor performed in public, nor delivered in·public, was prima 
facie proof of the ownership of the copyright in the work 
embodied in the manuscript being vested in the owner of the 
manuscript. 
Although, as stated above, specific provision was made as to 
the situation where ownership of a manuscript was acquired 
by the heirs of an author, the Act did not specifically pro-
vide that copyright was transmissible by testamentary dis-
position or by operation of law as was provided in the later 
statutes. Copinger and Skene James, however, is of the view 
that copyright was personal property and that upon the death 
of the copyright owner it passed to his heirs. Similarly, 
upon the bankruptcy of the proprietor ownership of the 
copyright passed to the trustee of his insolvent estate. The 
learned authors also submit tha~ copyright could be taken in 
execution by a judgement creditor of the proprietor of the 
copyright. 22 All these issues were specifically dealt with 
and provided for in the later copyright statutes. 
In the South African case Boshoff v Art Metal and Elec-
troplating Works (Pty) Limited, dating from 1939, 23 the 
court was called upon to decide whether the sale of the 
physical object embodying a copyrighted artistic work in 
terms of a written Deed of Sale (which made no specific men-
tion of a transfer of the copyright) operated as an assign-
ment of the copyright in addition to the transfer of the 
ownership of the physical object. In this regard Schreiner, 
J said 
"It seems to me that where what is sold by a written 
document (this, of course, is essential) is in terms a 
22. Op cit, p 104. 
23. 1939 WID 198. 
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physical object, it must in all cases be a question of 
inference whether the transaction was intended to pass 
the copyright. This inference might conceivably be 
drawn in appropriate cases from the sale of a mould or 
other tool where the original is no longer in exist-
ence. At any rate, I assume that might be the position. 
But I do not see why any such inference should be drawn 
in this case as a matter of inference therefore I 
see no reason to come to the conclusion that the appli-
cant passed his copyright to Hoffman by the transaction 
of 9th February". 24 
The provisions of the 1916 Act regarding the transferring of 
ownership of copyright by assignment were subject to the 
limitation that, where the author of the work was the first 
owner of the copyright in it, no assignment of copyright 
could vest in the assignee any rights in respect of the 
copyright beyond the expiration of twenty-five years from 
the death of the author; after the expiry of that period, 
the copyright reverted to the executor of the author as part 
of his estate. Any agreement entered into by the author as 
to the disposition of his aforementioned reversionary right 
was declared null and void. These provisions did not, 
however, apply to the copyright in a collective work. 25 The 
aforementioned reversionary right did not apply where the 
author was not the initial owner of the copyright, i.e. in 
the cases of the exceptions as to initial ownership of 
copyright discussed above. Copinger and Skene .James 
expresses doubt as to whether the aforementioned reversion 
of copyright applied to photographs and "sound recordings", 
the terms of copyright in which were not calculated from the 
24. At pp 205-6. 
2 5 • 'Ire proviso to Section 5( 2) of the Third Schedule. 
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death of the author but rather from the making of the nega-
tive or the plate, as the case may be. The learned authors 
contend that the relevant provisions of the Act should be 
interpreted so as to exclude from their. operation 
photographs ;;md "sound recordings". 2 6 The learned authors 
base their view on the fact that the reversion of copyright 
was closely related to the provisions of Section 3 of the 
Act which provided for compulsory licences to be obtained in 
respect of works twenty-five years after the death of the 
author. These compulsory licence provisions were considered 
by the authors not to apply to photographs and "sound 
recordings" . Furthermore, the authors point out that it was 
possible (and indeed likely in many instances) for a jur-
istic person to be the author of a photograph or a "sound 
recording" and it would obviously be impossible to calculate 
a period of twenty-five years after the "death" of these 
authors. Neither the South African nor British courts were 
ever called upon to decide the issue but it is submitted 
that the views of the learned authors are persuasive. The 
learned authors also point out that although there was a 
restriction against the author disposing of the reversionary 
right, no such restriction applied to the trustee or 
executor of his deceased estate.27 The views of Copinger and 
Skone James in regard to the non-applicability of the rever-
sionary right to photographs and "sound recordings" are 
shared by Laddie Prescott and Vi tor ia, The Modern Law of 
Copyright. 28 
In the Redwood case29 it was held that in the case of a col-
lective work the non-applicability of the reversionary right 
26. Op cit, p 112. 
27. Op cit, p 113. 
28. At p 349. 
29. SUpra. 
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to that type of work was confined to the separate copyright 
which subsisted in the work as a compilation and not to the 
individual copyrights in the various component works. Con-
sequently, the reversionary right would apply to, for 
instance, an article in an encyclopaedia but would not apply 
to the .encyclopaedia as a whole. It was also held in this 
case that the reversionary right applied to any assignment 
made after the coming into operation of the British Act of 
1911 no matter when the work was made. 
F. INDUSTRIAL DESIGNS 
One of the categories of "artistic works" protected by the 
Act was "works of drawing". Drawings were protected by the 
Act irrespective of whether they had artistic quality or 
whether they were made with any artistic intent. Con-
sequently such drawings included engineering or technical 
drawings. 30 The copyright in a drawing was infringed by the 
unauthorized reproduction of the drawing in a three-
dimensional form and it did not matter whether the infringer 
copied the original drawing or an intermediate reproduction 
of the drawing. Such an intermediate reproduction could be 
in a three-dimensional form.3 1 
By virtue of the aforegoing there was a potential for an 
overlap of protection to exist between protection indirectly 
given to the design of articles through copyright subsisting 
in drawings from which the articles were derived and the law 
of designs. The design of an article could potentially be 
30. Klep Valves (pty) Ltd v Saunders Valve Q) Ltd 1987 ( 2) SA 1(A). 
31. King Features Syndicate Inc. & Segar v o & M Kleeman Ltd, (1940) 
Ch 806 (CA), (1940) 2 All ER 355 (Ch), (1941) l>C 417; arrl Klep Valves 
(pty) Ltd v Saunders Valve Q> Ltd, supra. 
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protected by relying on the copyright in an underlying draw-
ing. It was considered undesirable by the British legisla-
ture that there should be an overlap in the protection given 
to designs under the Copyright Act and under designs legis-
lation. An attempt was made to demarcate between the two 
types of protection. 
Section 22(1) of the Third Schedule, read together with Sec-
tion 144(c) of the 1916 Act, provided that the Act would not 
apply to designs capable of being registered under Chapter 
II of the 1916 Act, save where such designs, though being 
capable of being registered as such, were not Used nor 
intended to be used as models or patterns to be multiplied 
by any industrial process. Designs were dealt with in Chap-
ter II of the Act of 1916. In terms of Section 76 a "design" 
was defined as follows: 
"'Design' shall mean any design applicable to any arti-
cle whether for the pattern. for the shape or con-
figuration, or £or the ornament thereof or £or any two 
or more such purposes and by whatever means it is 
applicable whether by printing. painting, embroidering, 
weaving, sewing. modelling. casting. embossing. engrav-
ing. staining. or any other means whatever. manual. 
mechanical, or chemical. separate or combined, not 
being a design for sculpture". 
In the case of Allen-Sherman-Hoff Company v Registrar of 
Designs32 Tindall, J held that, in deciding whether certain 
features constituted a design, 
"one has to see whether that which it is desired to 
register is something which can be treated as a design 
appealing to the eye. or whether the shape is obviously 
32. 1935 TPD 270, a decisicn of the Full Bench of the Transvaal 
~al Divisicn of the Supce:~e Court. 
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nothing more than part and parcel of the function 
without any appeal to the eye as a design, in which 
case there should be no registration". 
This dictum was confirmed by the Appellate Division in the 
,Klep Valves case.33 
In consequence, if a design of an article was purely func-
tional it was not inherently capable of registration as a 
design. In that case a drawing corresponding to such a 
design was not disqualified from enjoying copyright in terms 
of the aforementioned sections. 
In terms of Section 22 of the Third Schedule, even if a 
design embodied in a drawing was inherently capable of 
registration as a design it could still be spared dis-
qualification for copyright protection if the design in 
question was not used nor intended to be used as a model or 
pattern to be multiplied by an industrial process. 
Section 8( 3) of the Sixth Schedule to the Copyright Act, 
1965, gave a description of the circumstances in which a 
design is deemed to be used as a model or pattern to be mul-
tiplied by an industrial process. 3 4 The question of which 
designs were excluded from registration and thus neverthe-
less eligible for copyright as artistic works was fully can-
vassed in the Klep Valves case. 35 It was held in this case 
that technical drawings constituted artistic works and that 
artistic intent on the part of the maker of the drawing was 
not a requisite for the work to be eligible for copyright. 
33. Klep Valves (pty) Ltd v Saunders Valve Co. Ltd, supra, at p 28. 
34. See p 330 infra. 
35. Klep Valves (pty) Ltd v Saunders Valve Co Ltd, supra • 
• 
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This provision of the Sixth Schedule to the 1965 Act repeats 
an earlier provision contained in regulations issued under 
the 1916 Act. In terms of this provision a design was deemed 
to be used as a model or pattern to be multiplied by an 
industrial process: 
(a) when the design was reproduced or was intended to be 
reproduced on more than fifty single articles, unless 
all the articles on which the design was reproduced or 
was intended to be reproduced together formed a single 
set of articles, or 
(b) when the design was applied to the following: 
(i) printed paper hanging; 
( ii) carpets, floor cloths or oil cloths manufactured 
or sold in lengths or pieces; 
(iii) textile piece goods, or textile goods manufactured 
or sold in lengths or pieces; or 
(iv) lace not made by hand. 
The crucial time for determining whether the disqualifica-
tion contained in Section 22 of the Third Schedule applied 
was the time when the work was made. Unless it could be said 
at that time that the design was used or intended to be used 
as a model or pattern to be multiplied by an industrial 
process the disqualification would not apply no matter what 
happened afterwards. The material intention was that of the 
author of the drawing.36 
It is important to emphasize that when Section 22 of the 
Third Schedule applied to a drawing no copyright subsisted 
in that drawing. This point is of considerable significance 
for purposes of Section 43 of the 1978 Act as will be shown 
below. 
36. King Features Syndicate Inc. v 0 & M Kleeman (pty) Ltd, supra. 
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G. COLLECTIVE WORKS 
The term "collective work" was defined in Section 35( 1) of 
the Third Schedule to mean: 
"(a) an encyclopaedia, dictionary, year book or similar 
work; 
(b) a newspaper, review, magazine or similar peri-
odical; and 
(c) any work written in distinct parts by different 
authors, or in which works. or parts of works. of 
different authors are incorporated." 
A distinction must be drawn between a collective work and a 
"work of joint authorship" which was defined to mean "a work 
produced by the collaboration of two or more authors, in 
which the contribution of one author is not distinct from 
the contribution of the other author or authors". 
In terms of the aforegoing definitions a song consisting of 
lyrics and music written by separate authors constituted a 
collective work while if two or more authors contributed 
both to the writing of the music and of the lyrics it was a 
work of joint authorship. 
In the case of a collective work two categories of copyright 
subsisted, 
tained in 
namely, copyrights in the component works con-
the collective work and copyright in the collec-
tive work per se, as a compilation. The reversionary right 
to the heirs of the author of a work which came into opera-
tion twenty-five years after his death took effect upon the 
death of each of the authors of each of the component 
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works. 37 The question of the assignment of the copyright in 
collective works, and of the copyright in the component 
works, has been discussed above. 
3. COPYRIGHT IN WORKS MADE PRIOR TO 1 JANUARY 1917 
A. THE "1917 GATEWAY" 
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As explained in Part 3 of Chapter III above, the British 
Copyright Act of 1911 was a codification of British 
copyright law and it applied to works made prior to 1912 as 
well as to works made thereafter. It repealed all the then 
existing British copyright legislation (save for minor 
exceptions) as well the common law copyright and it provided 
for a system in terms of which pre-1912 rights, or "old" 
rights could be replaced by "new" or "substituted" rights 
conferred by it. This was brought about in Section 24 ( 1) 
read together with the First Schedule of the Act. This 
system of providing substituted rights with the critical 
date being 1 July 1912 is referred to as the "1912 Gateway". 
The incorporation of the British Act of 1911 as the Third-
Schedule to the Act of 1916, read together with Section 151 
of that Act and the Fourth Schedule thereto, created the 
same system but with the operative date being 1 January 
1917. Section 151 of the South African Act and the Fourth 
Schedule are substantially identical to Section 24 and the 
First Schedule of the British Act. The First Schedule to the 
British Act is reproduced on page 146 above. For the sake of 
convenience and clarity, however, the Fourth Schedule to the 
Act of 1916 is reproduced below. 
37. See tOO Redl.xxxi case, supra. 
Fourth Schedule 
EXISTING RIGHTS IN WORKS THE SUBJECT OF COPYRIGHT UNDER 
CHAPTER IV 
Existing Rights I 
----
Substituted Right 
(a) In the case of works other than Dramatic and Musical 
Works 
Copyright ..................... . 
(b) In the case of Musical and 
Both copyright and performing 
right 
Copyright, but not performing 
right 
Performing right. but not 
copyright 
Copyright as defined in 
the British Copyright Act 
Dramatic Works 
Copyright as defined in 
the British Copyright Act. 
Copyright as defined in 
the.British Copyright Act, 
except the sole right to 
perform the work or any 
substantial part thereof 
in public. 
The sole right to perform 
work in public, but none 
of the other rights 
comprised in copyright as 
defined in the British 
Copyright Act. 
For the purpose of this Schedule the following expressions, 
where used in the first column thereof, have the following 
meaning: 
'copyright ' , in the case of a work which according to the 
law in force immediately before the commencement of Chap-
ter IV has not been published before that date and 
statutory copyright wherein depends on publication, 
includes the right at common ~aw (if any) to restrain 
publication or other dealing with the work; 
'performing right', in the case of a work which has not been 
performed in public before the commencement of Chapter 
IV, includes the right at common law (if any) to restrain 
the performance thereof in public. 
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The only material difference between the First Schedule to 
the British Copyright Act and the Fourth Schedule to the Act 
of 1916 is the omission from the Fourth Schedule to the 
South African Act of the saving in favour of third parties 
of a right of publication of an essay, article or portion 
forming part of and first published in a review, magazine or 
other periodical. or work of a like nature which existed at 
the time of the commencement of the British Act or which 
would have existed under the Copyright Act of 1842 if the 
1911 Act had not been passed.38 For the rest, the only dif-
ferences are that references to "this Act" in the British 
Schedule have been substituted by references to "the British 
Copyright Act" in the South African Schedule and references 
to the commencement of the British Act have been substituted 
by references to the commencement of Chapter IV of the South 
African Act. 
Accordingly, what is said above on pages 145 to 148 in 
regard to the 1912 Gateway applies mutatis mutandis to the 
1917 South African Gateway. 
The British 1912 Gateway catered only for works which had 
previously enjoyed copyright in Britain, whether under the 
common law or under early British copyright statutes. The 
South African 1917 Gateway similarly catered for works which 
had enjoyed copyright under early South African copyright 
statutes or under the British Copyright Act of 1842 and the 
International Copyright Act of 1886. The position of South 
African common law copyright will be dealt with below. 
However, the South African 1917 Gateway had a wider scope 
than the British equivalent because in terms of Section 
147(1) of the Act of 1916 copyright which existed in any 
38. See p. 163 supra. 
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musical, dramatic or artistic work in the United Kingdom 
prior to 1 January 1917 also passed through the South 
African 1917 Gateway. It must be noted that Section 147(1) 
did not refer to literary works and this category of work 
protected in Britain was excluded from the wider ambit of 
the 1917 Gateway. This was presumably as a result of the 
fact that British literary works enjoyed copyright in Sou.th 
Africa prior to 1917 by virtue of the extra territorial 
operation of the British Copyright Act of 1842. It must be 
appreciated, however, that the British works which passed 
through the South African 1917 Gateway were works which 
already enjoyed substituted rights under the British Act of 
1911 and not copyrights in British works which existed prior 
to 1 July 1912. On the other hand, the copyrights in British 
literary works which passed through the South African 1917 
Gateway were the copyrights which subsisted under the 
Copyright Act of 1842 on the assumption that this Act 
remained in force until 1 January 1917. This came about, 
beca~se, in "the first place, the critical date for assessing 
"old" rights under the South African Act of 1916 was 31 
December 1916, and in the second place, as stated above the 
British Act of 1911, while repealing the earlier British 
legislation as far as Britain was concerned, did not repeal 
such legislation as far as the self-governing dominions were 
concerned and left such repeal to the legislatures of the 
self-governing dominions; such repeal only took place in 
South Africa with the passing of the Act of 1916, with 
effect from 1 January 1917. 
As has been shown in Chapter IV above, no common law 
copyright in unpublished works existed in South Africa. The 
reference in the Fourth Schedule to the 1916 Act to the 
terms "copyright" and "performing right" including common 
law rights to restrain publication and to restrain public 
performance, respectively, was misguided, unless the legis-
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lature had in contemplation British common law copyright in 
musical, dramatic or artistic works which had passed through 
the British 1911 Gateway and had been converted into sub-
stituted rights under the British Act of 1911 and thereafter 
passed through the South African 1917 Gateway by virtue of 
the provisions of Section 147(1). It is, however, not 
strictly speaking correct to refer to these copyrights or 
performing rights as "common law" rights because by the time 
they passed through the South African 1917 Gateway they were 
statutory rights, having been converted to same by virtue of 
the British 1912 Gateway. 
Clearly what happened was that the South African legislature 
in enacting the Fourth Schedule simply slavishly reproduced 
the British First Schedule making only essentially editorial 
changes to cater for the fact that the British Act was a 
Schedule to the South African Act. Perhaps the legislature 
took consolation from the fact that all references in both 
Schedules to common law rights were followed by the words 
"if any" in parenthesis which meant that the legislature was 
not committed to a definitive statement that common law 
rights existed at all. However, the difficulty which arises 
is that, as has been shown in Chapter IV, there was a Roman-
Dutch common law copyright in published works to which no 
reference is made in the Fourth Schedule despite the fact 
that the issue of common law rights was addressed. The ques-
tion must be asked; did this common law copyright qualify 
for substituted rights? It is submitted that this question 
must be answered in the affirmative as these rights were 
"copyright" and the purpose and intent of the Act of 1916 
was to recognize any existing copyright but to transform it 
into copyright provided for in the Act of 1916. Moreover, 
the definition of "copyright" in the Fourth Schedule states 
that it "includes common law copyright in unpublished works 
(if any)" and it is thus capable of being interpreted as 
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being not exhaustive of the various forms of copyright com-
prised in the term in question. 
There is no immediately obvious reason for the South African 
Schedule omitting the savings provision in respect of rights 
of publication of essays etc. in a separate form. The rele-
vant rights under the Copyright Act of 1842 which were being 
preserved existed in South Africa to the same extent that 
they existed in Britain and one would have thought that the 
rights in question were equally deserving of being preserved 
in South Africa. However, unlike in Britain, in South Africa 
copyright conferred upon British literary works by the Act 
of 1842 existed in tandem with copyright conferred by the 
Provincial Copyright Acts on South African works and these 
Provincial Acts contained no similar provisions. 
Before going on to analyze in detail which copyrights passed 
through the South African 1917 Gateway it must be emphasized 
that the criterion for an "old" copyright to qualify for a 
"new" or "substituted" copyright under the Act of 1916 was 
that the "old" copyright must have subsisted on 31 December 
1916 under the law from which it was derived. The owner of 
the substituted right was the owner of the "old" right which 
subsisted on 31 December 1916 and that was in turn 
determined by the law from which the "old" right was 
derived. Generally speaking in all other respects the sub-
stituted copyright, having once arisen, was regulated by the 
Act of 1916. 
B. BRITISH AND SOUTH AFRICAN COPYRIGHT WHICH PASSED 
THROUGH THE 1917 GATEWAY 
Neither Section 151 of the Act of 1916 nor the Fourth 
Schedule thereto confined a substituted right under the Act 
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of 1916 to any province or any other area to which the cor-
responding "old" right might have been limited by virtue of 
the law from which it was derived. As the 1916 Act was part 
of the process of consolidation of the laws of the former 
colonies and one of the purposes of such process was to do 
away with distinctions and differences between the laws of 
the various colonies it must be assumed that no matter what 
the origin of an "old" right might have been, 
sti tuted right extended throughout the Union 
the sub-
of South 
Africa. This would have been in keeping with the policy of 
the British Act of 1911 which was to recognize the existence 
of an "old" right and its ownership and to transform it into 
a "new" right having the content, ambit and force of the 
copyright provided for in the Act of 1911. In other words, 
the shell of the "old" right was taken, drained of its con-
tents, remodelled and replenished with the content of the 
copyright provided for in the Act. There was certainly no 
suggestion that copyright as conferred by the British Act of 
1911 in Britain was in any way limited territorially and in 
terms of the Fourth Schedule to the Act of 1916 the sub-
stituted right which was granted was that of the copyright 
conferred by the British Act of 1911. In other words, the 
effect of the South African 1917 Gateway was, for instance, 
to take a Cape copyright and transform it into a copyright 
as conferred by the British Act of 1911 having force and 
effect throughout South Africa. 
In dealing below with the copyrights which passed through 
the 1917 Gateway it must be emphasized that a substituted 
copyright could only be conferred upon a work if that work 
had met all the requirements, both substantive and formal, 
for the enjoyment of an "old" copyright under the relevant 
legislation. 
(1) Literary Works 
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In pre-1917 South Africa literary works derived protection 
from a number of different sources, namely, the British Act 
of 1842, the Cape Act of 1873, the Natal Act of 1896, the 
Natal Act of 1897, the Transvaal Act of 1887 and Roman-Dutch 
common law. As British common law copyright in unpublished 
literary works neither applied in South Africa nor did sub-
stituted rights granted under the British Act of 1911 in 
respect of such copyrights fall within the ambit of Section 
147 of the 1916 Act, no British copyrights in unpublished 
literary works passed through the 1917 Gateway. The Trans-
vaal Act of 1887, however, granted copyright in unpublished 
works without any limitation as to the origin of such works 
and thus unpublished works qualified for passing through the 
1917 Gateway on this account. "Old" copyright under each·of 
the aforementioned laws which qualified for substituted 
rights under the 1916 Act will be dealt with seriatim below. 
(a) Roman-Dutch Common Law Copyright 
Roman-Dutch common law copyright subsisted in published 
literary works and was perpetual. In the Cape, Natal and the 
Transvaal the common law copyright was effectively repealed 
in respect of literary works by the Cape Act of 1873, the 
Natal Acts of 1896 and 1897 and the Transvaal Act of 1887, 
respectively. After the passing of these Acts common law 
copyright ceased to apply in respect of literary works. In 
the Orange Free State no copyright legislation was enacted 
with the result that the common law copyright continued 
unabated until 1917. 
A work published in the Orange Free State any time after 
185439 enj eyed copyright on 1 January 1917 and such 
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3 9 • TOO date of the Consti tuticn of the Orange Free State Republic 
which made provision for the existence of Ronan-Dutch law. 
copyright passed through the 1917 Gateway and was superseded 
by a substituted right. 
(b) British Act of 1842 
This Act protected literary works for the lifetime of the 
author and a period of seven years after his death, or 
forty-two years from publication, whichever was the longer. 
Accordingly, provided it enjoyed protection in South Africa 
under this Act, 40 any work published after 1 January 1875, 
or any work the author of which died on or after 1 January 
1910, enjoyed copyright on 1 January 1917 and such copyright 
passed through the 1917 Gateway and was superseded by a sub-
stituted right. 
It must be remembered, however, that a work first. published 
in a British dominion in South Africa could only qualify for 
protection in Britain (and therefore also in South Africa) 
by virtue of the British Act of 1842, read together with the 
International Copyright Act of 1886, if such first pub-
lication took place after 1886. 41 
(c) The Cape Act of 1873 
This Act granted protection for the lifetime of the author 
and five years after his death, or for a period of thirty 
years, whichever was the longer. Accordingly, provided it 
enjoyed copyright under the Act, 42 any work published after 
1 January 1887 or any work the author of which died on or 
after 1 January 1912 enjoyed copyright on 1 January 1917 and 
such copyright passed through the 1912 gateway and was 
superseded by a substituted right. 
40. See p 230 supra. 
41. See p 143 supra. 
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42. See p 238 supra. Tte J\ct cnly applied to the works of Cape autlx:lrs 
or works first published in the Cape. 
(d) The Natal Acts of 1896 and 1897 
The earlier Act provided for a term of copyright of the 
lifetime of the author and five years after his death or a 
period of thirty years from first publication, whichever was 
the longer, while the later Act provided for a term of 
copyright of the lifetime of the author and seven years 
after his death or a period of forty-two years after first 
publication, whichever was the longer. The 1896 Act applied 
to works published prior to 31 August 1897 while the 1897 
Act applied to works made thereafter. Thus in the case of a 
work first published in Natal, any work first published 
after 1 January 1887 or any work the author of which died on 
or after 1 January 1912, in the case of a work made prior to 
31 August 1897, and 1 January 1910, in the case of a work 
made subsequent to 31 August 1897, enjoyed copyright on 1 
January 1917 and such copyright passed through the 1917 
Gateway and was superseded by a substituted right. 
The Act of 1897 only conferred copyright on works first pub-
lished in Natal whereas the Act of 1896 conferred copyright 
on works no matter where they were published, including in 
other territories of South Africa and indeed overseas. 43 In 
the case of a work first published somewhere else besides in 
Natal any work published after 1 January .1887 or any work 
the author of which died on or after 1 January 1912 enjoyed 
copyright on 1 January 1917 (provided in both instances the 
first publication took place prior to 31 August 1897) and 
such copyright passed through the 1917 Gateway and was 
superseded by a substituted right. The a foregoing was 
obviously subject to a particular work qualifying for pro-
tection under the Act in question. 44 
43. See p 257 supra. 
44. See p 256 supra. 
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(e) The Transvaal Act of 1887 
In terms of this Act a work published by means of printing 
was required to be registered and the date of first issue of 
printed copies of the work was to be stated in the applica-
tion for registration. The work must have been printed in 
the Transvaal or in another recognized territory. A certifi-
cate of registration was thereafter issued stating the date 
of first issue of copies of the work. The term of copyright 
was a period of fifty years from the date of issue so stated 
in the certificate of registration or, if the author was 
still alive after the expiration of that period and had not 
assigned the copyright, the duration of the author's life. 
If a work had been published by means of printing prior to 
1887, registration was required within six months of the 
coming into operation of the Act. The date of first issue of 
printed copies was to be stated in the application. The term 
of copyright in respect of such a work was a period of fifty 
years from the date of first issue of copies as stated in 
the registration. In all instances registration was a condi-
tion precedent for the subsistence (or continued sub-
sistence) of copyright. The Act came into operation on 1 
June 1887. 
In the event that a work was not published by means of 
printing the copyright endured for the lifetime of the 
author and for thirty years after his death. The formalities 
regarding registration did not apply to such works. 
In the case of a work published by means of printing, pro-
vided the formalities of registration were complied with, 
any work first published by means of printing after 1 
January 1867 enjoyed copyright on 1 January 1917 and such 
copyright passed through the 1917 Gateway and was superseded 
by a substituted right. Works meeting all the above require-
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ments and published prior to 1 January 1867 could also be 
the subject of subsisting copyright on 1 January 1917 if the 
author was still alive and had not assigned the copyright. 
In the case of a work not published by means of printing any 
work the author of which died on or after 1 January 1887 
enjoyed copyright on 1 January 1917 and such copyright 
passed through the 1917 Gateway and was superseded by a sub-
stituted right. 
(2) Dramatic Works 
In the case of dramatic works a distinction must be drawn 
between the reproduction and publication right, on the one 
hand, and the performing right, on the other hand. 
(a) Reproduction Right 
Dramatic works insofar as their reproduction and publication 
were concerned, were treated by the various laws in exactly 
the same way as literary works. Accordingly, what is said 
above in regard to literary works applies equally to the 
reproduction and publication of dramatic works. 
The aforegoing is subject to the provisions of 147(1) of the 
1916 Act. It will be recalled that in terms of this Section 
British copyright in dramatic, musical and artistic works45 
also passed through the South African 1917 Gateway. The 
copyrights involved included pre-1912 copyrights which had 
passed through the British 1912 Gateway and copyrights in 
post-1912 works which enjoyed copyright in Britain under the 
British Act of 1911. In the case of pre-1912 copyrights the 
343. 
45. By this is rreant works of trese types which enjoyed c:qJyright in 
Britain by virtue of British cx:>pyright legislation, which thus included 
oot cnly dcrrestic British works rut also all foreign works which ~ 
enti tied to protection uiXle.r British law. 
critical dates must be calculated in accordance with the 
British 1912 Gateway. In dealing with the British Act of 
1842 above under "Literary Works" the critical dates were 
calculated on the basis of the South African 1917 Gateway 
because the British Act of 1842 continued in existence until 
1 January 1917 and continued to regulate copyright in 
British works in South Africa until that date notwithstand-
ing its repeal in Britain in 1912. Section 147(1) of the Act 
of 1916 did not apply to literary works and consequently a 
British literary work could only pass through the South 
African Gateway of 1917 as a result of protection which it 
derived from the application of the British Act of 1842 in 
South Africa and not because of the protection which it 
derived from that Act in Britain together with the 1911 Act. 
The position was, however, different in regard to dramatic, 
artistic and musical works and copyrights in these works 
passed through the South African 1917 Gateway via a South 
African route and a British route. 
Insofar as the reproduction right in works which enjoyed 
copyright in Britain by virtue of British law is concerned, 
the term of such rights under the British Act of 1842 was as 
described under Literary Works in Chapter III above46 and, 
calculating the critical dates in terms of the 1912 British 
Gateway, any work published after 1 July 1870 or any work 
the author of which died on or after 1 July 1905 enjoyed 
copyright (i.e. the reproduction right) in Britain on 1 July 
1912. Such copyright passed through the 1912 Gateway and was 
superseded by a substituted right. It must be remembered, 
however, that a work first published in a British dominion 
only enj eyed "British" copyright in Britain under the 
British Act of 1842 (read together with the International 
46. See p 128 supr-a. 
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Copyright Act of 1886) if such first publication took place 
after 188 6.. Accordingly, the aforementioned dates, while 
being applicable to works first published in the motherland 
and in a foreign country to which the operation of the Act 
of 1842 by virtue of the International Copyright Act of 1886 
had been extended, are only applicable to works first pub-
lished in a British dominion in South Africa after 1886. 47 
The Natal Play Rights' Act, 1898, while dealing primarily 
with performing rights in dramatic and musical works also 
granted the right to control the conversion or adaptation of 
any dramatic or musical work into any form, whether dramatic 
or otherwise. 48 In terms of the Fourth Schedule to the Act 
of 1916 these rights would have been a component of the 
"copyright" as opposed to the "performing right" and the 
holder of these adaptation rights would have been entitled 
to obtain the full substituted right of "copyright" provided 
for in the British Act of 1911 (Third Schedule to the 1916 
Act). The effect of the Fourth Schedule was that any right 
of modern "copyright" which was not a "performing right" was 
a component of "copyright" and it could be substituted for 
full copyright, excluding the performing right, in the case 
of a dramatic or musical work, under the British Act of 1911 
(Third Schedule to the 1916 Act). 
The Natal Play Right Act, 1898, protected dramatic works 
which were first produced in Natal (as distinct from the 
Natal Act of 1897 which protected works first published in 
Natal) provided they were registered. The term of copyright 
was the life of the author and seven years after his death 
or forty-two years from the date of registration, whichever 
47. Seep 143 supra. 
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48. See Section 2(b) of tm definition of "play right" and p 282 
supra. 
was the longer. Accordingly, 
March 189 9 (when the Act 
any work registered after 28 
came into operation) or any 
registered work the author of which died on or after 1 
January 1910 enjoyed a right of adaptation on 1 January 
1917. Such right passed through the 1917 Gateway and was 
superseded by a substituted full copyright. 
(b) Performing Right 
Performing rights were not protected by the Roman-Dutch com-
mon law. They were, however, protected by the British Act of 
1842, the Natal Act of 1898 and the Transvaal Act of 1887. 
Each of these Acts will be dealt with seriatim below. 
(i) The British Copyright Act of 1842 
Performing rights granted by this Act also passed through 
the South African 1917 Gateway via two routes, namely, the 
direct route applicable to British literary works (i.e. 
directly through the South African 1917 Gateway by virtue of 
the extra-territorial operation of the British Act of 1842) 
and the indirect route through the British 1912 Gateway and 
Section 147(1) of the Act of 1916, which route was also 
applicable to reproduction rights in dramatic works. 
In the case of both routes the term of the performing right 
in a dramatic work published in manuscript form was the life 
of the author and seven years after his death, or a period 
of forty-two years from the date of the first performance of 
the work, whichever was the longer. Accordingly, via the 
direct route a performing right in a work first performed 
publicly after 1 January 1875 or the author of which died on 
or after 1 January 1910 were protected on 1 January 1917 
and, having passed through the 1917 Gateway, was superseded 
by a substituted right, i.e. a performing right under the 
copyright conferred by the Act of 1916. Via the indirect 
route through the British 1912 Gateway a performing right in 
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a work first performed publicly after 1 July 1870 or the 
author of which died on or after 1 July 1905 was substituted 
on 1 July 1912, and having passed through the British 1912 
Gateway, was superseded by a substituted right, i.e. a per-
forming right under the copyright conferred by the ,British 
Act of 1911. From there the performing right passed through 
the South African 1917 Gateway by virtue of the provisions 
of Section 147(1) of the Act of 1916. In both instances, 
however, it must be remembered that works first performed in 
a British dominion in South Africa could only obtain British 
copyright under the Act of 1842 if such first performance 
took place after 1886. 
(ii) Natal Act of 1898 
As stated above, 49 this Act conferred primarily a performing 
right in dramatic works although it also conferred a right 
of adaptation. The performing right was treated in exactly 
the same way as the right of adaptation which has been 
described above50 and what is said in relation to the right 
of adaptation is equally applicable to the performing right 
save that the substituted right which was granted after pas-
sage through the 1917 Gateway was a "performing right" as 
contemplated in the Fourth Schedule to the 1916 Act and not 
a "copyright". 
(iii) Transvaal Act of 1887 
This Act protected the performing right in dramatic works in 
principle in exactly the same way as it protected literary 
works. Accordingly, what is said above in connection with 
the protection of literary works under this Act51 is equally 
applicable to the performing right in dramatic works save 
49. See p 282 supra. 
50. See p 345 supra. 
51. See p 342 supra. 
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that the duration of the terms of protection of the two dif-
ferent types of works differed. 
For works published in printing the term of the performing 
right was ten years from the date stated in the certificate 
of registration provided the performing right had been 
reserved at the time of first publication; in the case of 
works not published in printing the term of the copyright 
was the lifetime of the author and thirty years after his 
death. Accordingly, performing rights in dramatic works pub-
lished with reservation of rights and registered on or after 
1 January 1907, and performing rights in unpublished 
dramatic works of which the author died on or after 1 
January 1887 were protected on 1 January 1917 and, having 
passed through the 1917 Gateway, were superseded by sub-
stituted rights, i.e. performing rights under the copyright 
conferred by the Act of 1916. 
(3) Musical Works 
The position of musical works was the same as that of 
dramatic works and what is said above in regard to dramatic 
works applies mutatis mutandis to musical works. It must be 
borne in mind, however, that the Transvaal Act of 1887, 
while protecting musical works per se in respect of 
reproduction and publication, only protected dramatic-
musical works in respect of performing rights. Accordingly 
only musical works which formed component parts of operas, 
musical productions, etc. were eligible for substituted per-
forming rights under the Act of 1916. 
(4) Artistic Works 
(a) British Legislation 
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Copyrights in artistic works which passed through the 
British 1912 Gateway were discussed in Chapter III above.52 
They are briefly engravings published after 30 June 1884; 
sculptures published after 1 July 1898 or of which the 
author was still alive on 1 July 1898 and had not assigned 
his copyright (provided first publication took place after 1 
July 1884); and paintings, drawings or photographs of which 
the author was alive on or after 1 July 1905, and if the 
work was sold or disposed of after 29 July 1862 and was not 
made pursuant to a commission, the copyright was expressly 
reserved by the author at the time of first sale of the 
work. 
Artistic works of South African origin could in certain cir-
cumstances have qualified for protection in Sri tain under 
British legislation and copyrights in such works would thus 
have passed through the British 1912 Gateway provided the 
aforementioned requirements were met. The circumstances in 
which works of South African origin enjoyed British 
copyright were discussed in Chapter IV above. 53 
All copyrights whether in works of South African origin, 
British origin or foreign origin which passed through the 
British 1912 Gateway as aforementioned, passed through the 
South African 1917 Gateway in terms of Section 147 of the 
Act of 1916. 
(b) Roman-Dutch Common Law 
Roman-Dutch common law copyright protected artistic works 
against being published in printing and the copyright was 
perpetual. However, this common law copyright was repealed 
52. See pp 150 et seq supra. 
53 . See p 232 supra. 
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in the Cape, Natal and Transvaal by the Acts mentioned 
below. Roman-Dutch common law copyright continued to operate 
in the Orange Free State until 1917 and all artistic works 
published in printing made in the Orange Free State after 
185454 enjoyed copyright on 1 January 1917. These copyrights 
passed through the 1917 Gateway and were superseded by sub-
stituted rights. 
(c) The Cape Act of 1905 
This Act protected various types of works of art55 for the 
following terms: paintings and sculptures - the life of the 
initial owner of copyright and thirty years after his death; 
engravings not published in, or forming part of, a book and 
photographs - thirty years after the end of the year in 
which the work or any copy thereof was first offered for 
sale, delivered to a purchaser or advertised or exposed as 
ready for sale to the public or for delivery to a purchaser, 
or was registered, whichever happened first; and engravings 
published in or forming part of a book - the same term as 
for books under the Act of 1873. 
Accordingly, copyrights in works of art passed through the 
1917 Gateway in the following circumstances: paintings and 
sculptures - the initial copyright owner was still living on 
or after 1 January 1887; engravings not published in or 
forming part of a book, and photographs - the works were 
first offered for sale, delivered to a purchaser or adver-
tised or exposed as ready for sale to the public or for 
delivery to a purchaser, or was registered on or after 1 
January 1887; and engravings published in or forming part of 
a book - the author was alive on or after 1 January 1912 or 
the work was first published a'fter 1 January 1887. 
54. See footJIOte 39 supra on p 339. 
55. See p 247 supra. 
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(d) The Natal Acts of 1896 and 1897 
The Act of 1896 granted a term of copyright in an artistic 
work of the lifetime of the author and five years after his 
death. Although the Act made provision for registration, 
registration was not a condition precedent for the sub-
sistence of copyright. The Act of 1897, on the other hand, 
granted copyright for a term of the lifetime of the author 
and for seven years after his death and prescribed registra-
tion as a condition precedent for the subsistence of 
copyright. 5 6 The Act of 1897 only conferred copyright on 
works made after it came into operation; it preserved the 
copyright in works which had been conferred by the Act of 
1896. 
Accordingly, a work which was made prior to 1897 and of 
which the author died on or after 1 January 1912 enjoyed 
copyright on 1 January 1917 and such copyright passed 
through the 1912 Gateway and was superseded by a substituted 
right. This was the case irrespective of whether the work 
had been registered. On the other hand, a work made after 
1897 of which the author died on or after 1 July 1910 and 
which was registered enjoyed copyright on 1 January 1917 and 
such copyright passed through the 1917 Gateway and was 
superseded by a substituted right. 
(e) The Transvaal Act of 1887 
This Act protected artistic works in exactly the same manner 
in which it protected literary works and consequently what 
is said above in regard to copyrights in literary works 
which passed through the 1917 Gateway applied equally to 
artistic works.57 
56. See pp 258, 260, 268 arxi 275 supra. 
57. See p 342 supra. 
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(5) Cinematograph Films 
Cinematograph films were not protected as such in either 
British pre-1911 registration nor in South African pre-1916 
legislation. In both the aforementioned categories of legis-
lation they were regarded as series of photographs, each 
individual frame being a photograph and thus an artistic 
work, their musical scores were treated as musical works and 
their scripts were treated as dramatic works. Accordingly, 
what is said above regarding these types of works applies 
equally to the relevant component parts of cinematograph 
films. 
It must, however, be remembered that in Britain from 12 July 
1912 cinematograph films which had an original dramatic 
character were protected as such as a species of dramatic 
work and such dramatic work/cinematograph film passed as 
such through the 1917 South African Gateway by virtue of the 
provisions of Section 147 of the Act of 1916. Accordingly, 
"British" dramatic works/cinematograph films made after 12 
July 1912 were protected as such in South Africa (via the 
1917 Gateway) while other dramatic works/ cinematograph 
films were only protected as such if made after 1 January 
1917. 
(6) Sound Recordings 
The Act of 1916 granted protection retrospectively to sound 
recordings as a species of musical work. Accordingly, sound 
recordings made prior to 1 January 1917 were granted 
copyright by the Act of 1916, no matter when they were 
made. 58 As in the case of cinematograph films, however, it 
58 . As lc:og as the term of copyright prescribed f= these works in the 
Act of 1916 (i.e. fifty years after the making of the master version) 
had mt yet expired, which was an ext:rarely Le1ote possibility. 
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must be remembered that "British" sound recordings made 
prior to 12 July 1912 had already been clothed with actual 
existing copyright from that date and copyrights in such 
sound recordings passed as such through the South African 
1917 Gateway by virtue of the provisions of Section 147(1) 
of the Act of 1916. This factor is not without significance 
because the British Act of 1911 provided that copyright 
would not be conferred retrospectively in a sound recording 
made prior to the coming into operation of the Act if the 
making of that sound recording infringed the copyright in 
another sound recording. This disqualification did not apply 
under the 1911 Act which means that a "British" sound 
recording made after 12 July 1912 and before 1 January 1917 
would not have been disqualified from enjoying copyright 
even though its making had infringed the copyright in 
another sound recording, while any other sound recording 
made during this period would have been subject to such a 
disqualification. 
C. ASSIGNMENTS OF PRE-1917 WORKS 
The provisions of the British Act of 1911 in regard to 
assignments of "old" copyright was discussed above in Chap-
ter III.59 It will be recalled that, if the term of a sub-
stituted right exceeded the term of the "old" copyright, and 
the "old" copyright had been assigned for the· full term 
thereof prior to that copyright passing through the Gateway, 
upon the expiry of the "old" term, the substituted copyright 
reverted to the author or his heirs for the balance of the 
term of the "new" copyright. Certain vested rights were 
created in favour of the person who was the copyright owner 
59. See p 164 supr-a. 
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immediately prior to the reversion of ownership taking 
place. The reversion did not occur where the "assignee" had 
acquired ownership of the "old" copyright by means other 
than an express Deed of Assignment nor did it apply where 
there had been an express agreement to the contrary between 
the author and the assignee. 
The position as set out in Chapter III and as summarized 
briefly above applied equally to pre-1917 assignments under 
the Act of 1916. In general the same vested rights were 
created in the Act of 1916 as were created in the British 
Act of 1911. There was, however, one exception to this gen-
eral rule. Whereas the First Schedule to the 1911 Act pro-
vided that in the case of an essay, article or portion form-
ing part of and first published in a review, magazine and 
other periodical or work of a like nature, the substituted 
right conferred by that Act was subject to any right of pub-
lishing the essay, article or portion in a separate form to 
which the author was entitled at the commencement of the Act 
or would have been entitled in terms of Section 18 of the 
Copyright Act, 1842, if the 1911 Act had not been passed, 
the Fourth Schedule to the Act of 1916 contained no such 
· provision. The vested right created in the British Act in 
terms of this provision was thus not created in the Act of 
1916. As the works in question were literary works and were 
thus not covered by the provisions of Section 147(1) of the 
Act of 1916, the British provision did not even apply 
indirectly to "British" works which passed through the South 
African 1917 Gateway in terms of that Section. 
It could have happened that a copyright in a British 
dramatic, musical or artistic work passed through the 
British 1912 Gateway and a substituted copyright was con-
ferred upon an assignee who was the then current owner of 
the "old" copyright and thus of the substituted right; sub-
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sequen tly, and prior to 1 January 1917, the term of the 
"old" copyright expired and the ownership of the "new" 
copyright reverted to the author or his heirs with a vested 
right being granted in favour of the person who was the 
copyright owner immediately prior to the reversion taking 
place. On l January 1917 in terms of Section 147(1) of the 
Act of 1916 that copyright owned by the author or his heirs 
passed through the South African Gateway and was superseded 
by a substituted right under the South African Act. That 
South African substituted right would have been owned by the 
author and his heirs free of any vested right in favour of 
the owner of-the British substituted right immediately prior 
to the reversion taking place because the South African Act 
made no provision for perpetuating the aforementioned vested 
right in these circumstances. The position of "British" 
copyrights which passed through the South African 1917 
Gateway was greatly complicated by the five year time dif-
ference between the British 1912 Gateway and the South 
African 1917 Gateway and the fact that "old" British 
copyright passed successively (with a time lag) through both 
these Gateways. 
D. INFERIOR SUBSTITUTED RIGHTS 
While generally speaking the substituted rights granted in 
the Act of 1916 were superior to those granted under the 
"old" laws, more particularly, in that the scope of the 1916 
copyright was wider than the "old" copyright and the term 
of copyright was longer, there were some instances where the 
substituted rights were inferior to the "old" rights. 
Under the 1916 Act the term of copyright in a photograph was 
fifty years from the making of the negative. This term was 
shorter than the term granted under the old British legisla-
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tion and under the so-called "Provincial Statutes" and the 
Roman-Dutch common law. Indeed, as the Roman-Dutch common 
law granted a perpetual term of copyright in published works 
the substituted right granted in lieu of Roman-Dutch 
copyright was inevitably inferior insofar as duration was 
concerned. Insofar as pre-1912 "British" works qualified for 
substituted rights under the Act of 1916 the inferiorities 
of substituted rights granted in lieu of British copyrights 
which passed through the British 1912 Gateway60 applied 
equally to substituted rights in respect of copyrights in 
such works granted by the Act of 1916. 
' 
The Transvaal Act of 1887 provided for a term of copyright 
in works published by means of printing of fifty years after 
first publication. Such publication could take place 
posthumously and consequently the term of the substituted 
right generally granted under the Act of 1916, namely, fifty 
years after the death of the author, was shorter than that 
which would have been enjoyed by a work published 
posthumously under the Transvaal Act. 
4. COPYRIGHT IN FOREIGN WORKS 
A. COPYRIGHT UNDER PRE-1916 LEGISLATION 
Prior to 1917 foreign works enjoyed copyright in South 
Africa basically in two ways, namely, as a result of South 
African legislation and British legislation. 
(1) South African Legislation 
The Natal Act of 1896 granted copyright in literary, 
dramatic, musical and artistic works published anywhere in 
60. See p 161 supra. 
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the world prior to 31 August 1897. 6l The Transvaal Act of 
1897 granted copyright in the same categories of works which 
had not been published in print without any qualification as 
to the country of origin of the works. Accordingly, foreign 
works which qualified for protection of this nature under 
the aforementioned Acts qualified for substituted rights 
under the Act of 1916 in the same way as domestic works and 
such substituted copyrights enjoyed the full term of pro-
tection under the Act of 1916. Section 151 of the Act of 
1916, which makes provision for the South African 1917 
Gateway refers simply to "any person" who is entitled to an 
"old" copyright in South Africa without in any way qualify-
ing the national status of such person. 
For the rest the South African Provincial Statutes made no 
provisions for protection of foreign works in South Africa 
save that the Transvaal Act of 1887, as amended in 1895, 
made provision for the State President to issue proclama-
. tions conferring protection in the Transvaal upon works 
first printed in some other state or colony provided 
reciprocal protection was given to works first published in 
the Transvaal. No record can be found of any such proclama-
tions having been issued and the acquisition of Transvaal 
copyright by foreign works in this manner can be discounted. 
(2) British Legislation 
The British Copyright Act of 1842 and the International 
Copyright Act of 1886 had force and effect in territories in 
South Africa which were British dominions. After 1900 this 
meant all four of the colonies which were to become 
provinces of the Union of South Africa in 1910. The effect 
of this was that books (i.e. literary, dramatic, and musical 
61. See p 257 supra. 
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works) and performing rights in dramatic and musical works 
not only of British origin but also originating from 
countries with which Britain had entered into copyright 
relations prior to 1912 enjoyed copyright in South Africa. 
The terms of copyright of non-British foreign works was, 
however, limited to the terms of copyright enjoyed by works 
in their own countries of origin.62 Any British and foreign 
copyrights which were still in existence on 1 January 1917 
on this basis also passed through the South African 1917 
Gateway and were granted unqualified substituted rights. The 
foreign works which enjoyed copyright in Britain prior to 
1912 were described in Chapter III above. 63 
The fact that the British Copyright Act of 1842 and the 
International Copyright Act of 1886 were repealed in Britain 
on 12 July 1912 had no effect on the foreign copyrights 
which existed in South Africa by virtue of these Acts 
because, as stated above,64 these two British Acts remained 
in force in South Africa notwithstanding their repeal in 
Britain until 1 January 1917 when they were repealed by the 
Act of 1916. 
By virtue of the provisions of Section 147(1) of the Act of 
1916, musical, dramatic and artistic works of British origin 
and of foreign origin which on 1 January 1917 enjoyed pro-
tection under the British Act of 1911 and the Orders in 
Council in respect of foreign works issued under that Act 
qualified for substituted rights under the South African Act 
of 1916. These substituted rights were also unqualified. The 
foreign countries involved were effectively countries which 
had prior to 1917 subscribed to the Berne Convention. In 
62. See p 140 supra. 
63. See p 137 et seq supra. 
64. See p 235 supra. 
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terms of the international provisions of the British Act of 
1911 those foreign works did not enjoy copyright of any 
longer duration in the United Kingdom than they enjoyed in 
their countries of origin. However, this qualification would 
have been cured or removed as far as South Africa was con-
cerned when the copyright in question passed through the 
1917 Gateway because substituted rights granted in respect 
of works which passed through the 1917 Gateway were not 
qualified in any way as to duration. It must be appreciated 
that foreign and British literary works did not qualify for 
substituted rights in this way. 
Works originating from prior to 1917 from British dominions 
were in a slightly different category to other British or 
foreign works. Prior to 12 July 1912 such work qualified for 
protection in Britain under British copyright laws in 
exactly the same way as works originating from South Africa 
qualified for protection in Britain under those laws. 
Copyrights subsisting in Britain in this way prior to 12 
July 1912 passed through the British 1912 Gateway and were 
superseded by substituted British rights. After 1912 a dis-
tinction must be drawn between self-governing dominions and 
non-self-governing dominions. Works originating from non-
self~governing dominions enjoyed protection in Britain under 
the Act of 1911 in the same way as works originating from 
the motherland. For all practical purposes and for the pur-
poses of this discussion such works can be regarded as 
"British" works. In regard to the self-governing British 
dominions, i.e. Australia, New Zealand, Newfoundland and 
Canada, the position is somewhat more complicated. 
As discussed in Chapter rrr 65 works originating from the 
self~governing dominions after 12 July 1912 did not automat-
65. See p 156 et seq supra. 
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ically' enjoy protection in Britain. It was necessary that 
notification to this effect must first have been given by 
the British Secretary of State. Prior to 1 January 1917 such 
notification was given in the case of all the self-governing 
dominions save Canada. In the case of Canada this only 
occurred in 1923. Accordingly, while post-1912 works 
originating from the self-governing dominions save Canada 
enjoyed British copyright on 1 January 1917, this was not 
the case with Canadian works. 
In terms of Section 147(1) of the Act of 1916 copyrights 
subsisting under the Act of 1912 in dramatic, musical and 
artistic works (but not literary works) originating from 
British dominions (save for post-1912 Canadian works) passed 
through the South African 1917 Gateway and were granted 
unqualified substituted rights under the Act of 1916. 
B. COPYRIGHT UNDER THE ACT OF 1916 
Section 145 of the Act of 1916 conferred upon the Governor-
General the power to extend the Act to any British dominions 
to which the British Act of 1911 did not itself au to rna ti-
cally extend, while Sections 29 and 30 of the British Act of 
1911 read together with Section 144(g) of the Act of 1916 
empowered the Governor-General to extend the Act to foreign 
countries. The Berlin Revision of the Berne Convention was 
adopted on 13 November 1908. An Additional Protocol thereto 
was adopted at Berne on 20 March 1914. Britain acceded to 
both the Berlin Revision and the Berne Additional Protocol 
on behalf of South Africa. 
The Act was immediately with effect from 1 January 1917 
applicable to Britain, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and 
British India (subsequently India and Pakistan). In 1920 
the Governor-General issued a Proclamation which made the 
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Act applicable to works originating from the then member 
countries of the Berne Convention.66 More particularly, the 
Proclamation provided that the Act would apply to works 
first published in a Berne Convention country, to authors 
who at the time of the making of works were subjects of a 
Berne Convention country or authors who were resident in a 
Berne Convention country, in the same way as it applied to 
works first published in South Africa, works made by British 
subjects within the Union and persons resident in the Union, 
as the case may be. The Proclamation was retrospective in 
effect as it was construed as forming part of the Act of 
1916. In regard to "sound recordings" the critical date for 
the assessment of the ownership of the copyright in "sound 
recordings" made in the past and for disqualifying a "sound 
recording" from protection if its making infringed the copy-
right in another "sound recording" was the date of the Proc-
lamation, i.e. 3 May 1920, and not 1 January 1917. In the 
case of all foreign works the reversionary right of the 
author or his heirs after the expiry of the term of "old" 
copyright came into operation on the date of ·the Proclama-
tion and not on 1 January 1917. 
The most important qualification made to the protection con-
ferred upon foreign works originating from Berne Convention 
countries was that the term of copyright granted to such 
works in South Africa did not exceed the term of copyright 
conferred upon such works by their countries of origin. 
The Proclamation repealed any Orders in Council which the 
British Government had previously made extending copyright 
66. Belgium, ~ an:l tre Faroe Islan:ls, Fran::e, Germany, Haiti, 
Italy, Japan, Liberia, I..uxeml:iurg, M:lnam, that part of l<DL= under 
Freirll protecticn, tre Netrerlan:ls with tre Netrerlan:ls East Inlies an:l 
tre Colcnies of Surinam an:l Curacao, Nol:way, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerlan:l an:l Tunis. See Proclarration N:J. 1048 dated 3 May 1920. 
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protection in South Africa to foreign works. This repeal 
was, however, made subject to the preservation of vested 
rights under any such Proclamation. 
By virtue of the fact that the Proclamation was retrospec-
tive in effect, it was possible that certain acts which at 
the time they had been done had been lawful retrospectively 
became unlawful. The Proclamation catered for this situation 
by providing that where, before the commencement of the 
Proclam.ation any person who had taken any action whereby he 
had incurred any expenditure or liability in connection 
with, or for the purpose of, or with a view to, the 
reproduction or performance of any work which at the time 
was lawful or would have been lawful but for the passing of 
the Proclamation, the Proclamation did not diminish or 
prejudice any rights or interests arising from or in connec-
tion with such action which were subsisting and valuable at 
the date of commencement unless the relevant copyright owner 
agreed to pay compensation in an amount determined by agree-
ment or in accordance with the provisions of the Act. A 
vested right was thus granted in favour of third parties. 
After 1920 certain countries were added to the list of Berne 
Convention countries, works originating from which were pro-
tected in South Africa. In 1936 a further major Proclamation 
was passed. The Rome version of the Berne Convention had in 
the meantime been adopted in 1928 and South Africa had 
acceded to that Convention on 27 May 1935. 
The purpose of the 1936 Proclamation was to apply the provi-
sions of the Rome text of the Berne Convention. The 1936 
Proclamation repealed the earlier Proclamation but preserved 
the vested rights which had been acquired under those 
Proclamations. 
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The 1936 Proclamation, like the 1920 Proclamation, operated 
retrospectively as though it had formed part of the Act in 
1916. Certain of the provisions of the Proclamation were, 
however, made applicable to foreign countries at different 
dates. 67 The critical dates for the assessment of the 
ownership of the copyright in "sound recordings" and the 
disqualification for protection on account of a "sound 
recording" reproducing a previous "sound recording", as well 
as for the operation of the reversionary right in favour of 
the author or his heirs at the expiration of the term of 
"old" copyright was the date stipulated for a particular 
country and as given in footnote 67. 
As in the case of the 1920 Proclamation, the vested rights 
of persons who had taken steps which retrospectively became 
unlawful by virtue of the Proclamation were protected unless 
they were compensated. 
The 1936 Proclamation too granted no longer term of 
copyright to foreign works than that which was conferred 
upon such works by the laws of the country of origin. 
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6 7 • TOO countries which enjoyed the benefit of the Proclamation arrl 
the relevant dates for certain of the p.rovisions are as fall=: 
(a) Belgium, Derrnark, FranCE, Germany, Haiti, Italy, Japan, 
Luxemburg, Monaco, Morocco ( French Zone), Nether lams, 
Netherlands East Indies and Curacao, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Surinam, Sweden, Switzerlarrl, Tunis - operative date 
1 May 1920; 
(b) Austria, Brazil, Bulgaria, Czecho-Slovakia, Free City of 
Danzig, Greece, Hungary, Poland - operative date 6 July 
1923; 
(c) Estc:nia, Finlarrl, French Colonies arrl Protectorates U!Der 
the authority of the French Ministry of the Colonies, 
Liechtenstein, Korea, Formosa, Japanese Saghalien, arrl. 
Kwantung leased TeiTi tory, Portugese Colonies arrl Spanish 
Colonies, Roumania, Siam, Syria-Lebanon, Yugo-Slavia -
operative date 13 April 1934; 
(d) 1-brcx::co (Spanish Z<:Jre), Vatican City - operative date 14 
February 1936. 
See Goverment Gazette No. 2335 dated 14 February 1936. 
Subsequent to 1936 further Proclamations were issued in 
respect of particular countries and works originating from 
these countries were by and large granted protection under 
the same conditions and circumstances as the 1936 Proclama-
tion.68 
As America was never a member of the Berne Convention, South 
Africa entered into an agreement with it in terms of which 
reciprocal protection was granted in each country to works 
originating from the other country. American works were pro-
tected on the same basis as works originating from Berne 
Convention countries save that in addition American works 
were required to have complied with the formalities for pro-
tection in the United States of America laid down by United 
States law. In practice this amounted to registration at the 
Library of Congress in Washington. The Proclamation extend-
ing protection to works originating from the United States 
of America, which was dated 13 June 1924, was not repealed 
by the aforementioned 1936 Proclamation. 
It must be remembered that all the aforementioned interna-
tional Proclamations applied the Act of 1916 to foreign 
works originating from the relevant countries. In doing so 
they effectively applied the 1917 Gateway to such works. 
This was done subject to the replacement of the critical 
date for the operation of the author's reversionary interest 
and the saving of vested rights in favour of third persons 
being the date of the relevant Proclamation and not 1 
January 1917. For a work of foreign origin made before 1917 
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6 8 . Protection was ext:en::led to \>Uiks =iginating fran the following 
countries on the following dates: Letlani - 5 May 1939; Sarawak and 
l'brth Borneo - 26 July 1940. WJrks =iginating fran Haiti were dis-
allowed protection fran 20 August 1923. 
to enjoy an "old" copyright and therefore qualify for a sub-
stituted right it must have enjoyed copyright under pre-1917 
legislation which was operative in South Africa. Alterna-
tively, in the case of dramatic, musical and artistic works, 
it could have enjoyed copyright in Britain under the Act of 
1911 on 1 January 1917. Copyrights which meet these condi-
tions have been discussed above. However, such copyrights 
passed through the 1917 Gateway of their own accord in any 
event and did not require any international Proclamations 
under the Act of 1916 to do so. Section 151(1) states 
"where any person is immediately before the commence-
ment of this Chapter entitled to any such right in any 
work as is specified in the first column to the Fourth 
Schedule to this Act, or to any interest in such a 
right, he shall as from that date be entitled to the 
substituted right set forth in the second column of 
that Schedule, or to the same interest in such a sub-
stituted right ... " (emphasis added). 
The owner of a copyright in a work of foreign origin which 
subsisted in South Africa on 1 January 1917 was a person 
such as is contemplated in the aforementioned quotation. 
Furthermore, a right which passed through the 1917 Gateway 
was superseded by a substituted right free of any qualifica-
tions such as to duration of the term of the "old" copyright 
in contrast to both the position under the old law (whether 
British or South African) and under the international 
Proclamations issued under the Act of 1916. This was, 
however, subject to the qualification that in the case where 
the author had assigned the "old" copyright for the whole 
term, the ownership of the copyright would have reverted to 
him or his heirs after the expiry of the normal term of the 
particular "old" copyright, which being in respect of a work 
of foreign origin would have been of no longer duration than 
under the law of the country of origin of the work. 
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Subject to what is said below, there appeared to be no cir-
cumstances in which a work of foreign origin made before 
1917 qualified for a substituted right under the Act of 1916 
by virtue of an international Proclamation issued under the 
Act of 1916. Accordingly, the effects of the international 
Proclamations were retrospective only to the extent that, no 
matter when they were passed, they conferred protection in 
South Africa on works of foreign origin made on 1 January 
1917 or thereafter. The exception to this rule was the case 
of "sound recordings" which were retrospectively granted 
protection by the Act of 1916. This exception did not, 
however, apply to American works because the 1924 Proclama-
tion which conferred copyright on American works required 
that the works must meet the formalities prescribed by 
American law (i.e. registration) and American law did not 
protect sound recordings at that time which meant that no 
American sound recording could comply with such require-
ment. 69 The provisions in the various proclamations which 
dealt with the author's reversionary right and the preserva-
tion of vested rights in favour of third parties accordingly 
only had relevance in relation to foreign works made prior 
to 1 January 1917 to "sound recordings" of foreign origin 
(except those of American origin). 
In dealing with the operation of the 1917 Gateway in respect 
of works of foreign origin a distinction must be drawn 
between, on the one hand, literary works which enjoyed pro-
tection under British legislation, and on the other hand, 
dramatic, musical and artistic works which enjoyed pro-
tection under British legislation. As stated above, foreign 
dramatic, musical and artistic works made prior ·to 1917 
69. 1-Blville B. Nirrner and David Nirrner, Ninmer en Copyright, para-
graph 2.10[B]. 
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could have enjoyed substituted rights under the British Act 
of 1911 (if made prior to 12 July 1912) or copyright de novo 
under that Act (if made after 12 July 1912) and such 
copyright could have passed through the South African 1917 
Gateway generally speaking free of any limitation, by virtue 
of the provisions of Section 147(1) of the Act of 1916. On 
the other hand, literary works [which were not dealt with in 
Section 147(1)] of foreign origin which enjoyed protection 
in Britain (and in South Africa) by virtue of the Copyright 
Act of 1842 and the International Copyright Act of 1886 
could only qualify for substituted rights under the Act of 
1916 if they passed directly through the South African 1917 
Gateway, whereafter the substituted rights generally free of 
any qualifications, were conferred upon them. The Interna-
tional Copyright Act of 1886 only conferred copyright on 
works originating from countries which subscribed to the 
original text of the Berne Convention, as varied by the 
Additional Protocol of Paris, and Austria-Hungary, and not 
on countries which acceded to the Berne Convention after the 
adoption of the Berlin text. This was in contrast to the 
position under the Act of 1911. Furthermore, unpublished 
foreign literary works enjoyed copyright under the "old" 
British law by virtue of the British common law, and the Act 
of 1842 only protected published foreign works. As British 
common law copyright did not apply in South Africa, the only 
foreign literary works which would have qualified for sub-
stituted rights under the South African 1917 Gateway by 
virtue of the British Act of 1842 and the International 
Copyright Act of 1886 were published literary works. This 
factor was mitigated to some extent by the fact that the 
Transvaal Act of 1887 granted protection to all unpublished 
literary works (including foreign works) for a limited dura-
tion and certain unpublished literary works of foreign 
origin could have gained access to the 1917 Gateway via this 
route. Of course, dramatic and musical (but not artistic) 
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works of foreign origin could in addition have gained direct 
access to the South African 1917 Gateway via the British Act 
of 1842 and the International Copyright Act of 1886 over and 
above the access which they gained through passing through 
the British 1912 Gateway and then the South African 1917 
Gateway. 
Prior to 1917 American works only enjoyed copyright in the 
United Kingdom to a very limited extent. 70 Generally speak-
ing very few, if any, American dramatic, musical or artistic 
works would have passed through the British 1912 Gateway and 
gained access to the South African 1917 Gateway in this man-
ner. Accordingly, broadly speaking American works made prior 
to 1917 could only have gained access to the South African 
1917 Gateway via laws which operated in South Africa prior 
to 1917 e.g. the Natal Act of 1896 and the Transvaal Act of 
·1887 (in regard to unpublished works). 
5. PROTECTION OF VESTED INTERESTS IN THE ACT OF 1916 
Generally speaking the Act of 1916, like the British Act of 
1911, contained provisions protecting vested interests held 
by third parties whenever it granted copyright retrospec-
tively or whenever it granted a greater measure of pro-
tection than had been granted under previous legislation. 
The scope of the substituted rights which emerged from the 
1917 Gateway was in certain respects broader than the scope 
of the corresponding "old" rights. To compensate for this 
Section 15l(l)(b) of the Act of 1916, which was the equi-
valent of Section 24(l)(b) of the British Act of 1911, pro-




vided that where a person prior to 1 January 1917 took any 
action whereby he incurred any expenditure or liability in 
connection with the reproduction or performance of any work 
in any manner which was at the time lawful, or had taken any 
lawful preparatory action to making such reproduction or 
performance, the Act could not prejudice any rights or 
interest arising from such action which were subsisting .and 
valuable at the specified date, unless the person who became 
the owner of the rights in question paid compensation in an 
agreed amount, or failing agreement, as determined by arbi-
tration. These provisions were discussed above in Chapter 
II I. 71 Substantially the same savings provisions applied 
where substituted rights were conferred upon musical, 
dramatic or artistic works made prior to 1917 which enjoyed 
copyright in Britain on 1 January 1917 and thus qualified 
for substituted rights in terms of Section 147(1) of the Act 
of 1916. 
Vested rights were also preserved where works of foreign 
origin were retrospectively granted protection in terms of 
an International Proclamation or an International Proclama-
tion repealed an earlier International Proclamation. 
6. WORKS NOT PROTECTED IN THE ACT OF 1916 
The following types of works eligible for copyright under 
the South African Copyright Act, 1978, did not enjoy pro-
tection under the Act of 1916: 
(a) Drawings and other artistic works which embodied 
designs capable of being registered under Chapter II of 
71. Seep 162 supra. 
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the Act, save where such designs, though being capable 
of being registered as such, were not used nor intended 
to be used as models or patterns to be multiplied by 
any industrial process. 
(b) Works of craftsmanship of a technical nature. 
(c) Cinematograph films as such, although each frame of a 
cinematograph film was protected as a photograph and 
"any cinematograph productions where the arrangements 
or acting form of the combination of incidents 
represented give the story an original character" were 
protected as dramatic works; documentary films were not 
treated as "dramatic works" on this basis. 
(d) Broadcasts. 
(e) Programme carrying signals. 
(f) Published editions. 
In view of the provisions of Section 43 of the Act of 1978, 
which generally speaking caused the Act of 1978 not to grant 
copyright retrospectively to works made during or before the 
currency of the Act of 1916 the fact that the abovementioned 
categories of works did not enjoy protection under the Act 
of 1916 is of considerable significance. 
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CHAPTER VI 
COPYRIGHT UNDER THE COPYRIGHT ACT, NO. 63 OF 1965 
1. INTRODUCTION 
(1) Historical Developments 
During the first half of the 20th Century considerable tech-
nical innovation which had a profound effect on communica-
tions and the media took place. These innovations created 
new opportunities for the creators of intellectual property, 
particularly in the field of entertainment and dissemination 
of information. Cinematograph films and sound recordings 
which were in · their infancy at the time of the passing of 
the British Act of 1911 became well established "art" forms 
and their exploitation enjoyed considerable commercial suc-
cess. Broadcasting, both in the media of television and 
sound, also came to the fore and not only provided vehicles 
for exploitation of existing art forms such as literary, 
dramatic and musical works but also provided opportunities 
themselves for the expression of creative works. 
The Berne Convention, which had become the fountainhead of 
copyright throughout the developed world, underwent major 
revisions at Rome in 1928 and Brussels in 1948. Moreover, a 
further International Copyright Convention sponsored by the 
United States of America, which had refrained from subscrib-
ing to the Berne Convention because its system of registra-
tion of copyright was incompatible with the requirement of 
the Berne Convention that there should be no formalities for 
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the enjoyment of copyright, namely the Universal Copyright 
Convention dating from 1952, was brought into being. 
All these factors contributed to the necessity for the revi-
sion of British copyright law and in 1956 a new copyright 
law was passed. The Act of 1956 repealed the British Act of 
1911 and, subject to its having been amended from time to 
time, is still in force today. 
Nine years after the passing of the British Copyright Act of 
1956, the South African legislature followed suit and passed 
the Copyright Act 63 of 1965. 
(2) Repeal of Previous Legislation 
The Copyright Act, 1965, came into operation on September 
11, 1965, 1. and it repealed Sections 149 to 160 (i.e. Chapter 
IV) of the 1916 Act, as well as the Third Schedule to that 
Act, provided that any Proclamation, Regulation or Rule 
having effect under a provision of the 1916 Act continued in 
force as if it had been made under the 1965 Act pending 
amendment or repeal by fresh regulations or other sub-
ordinate legislation. 2 The Copyright International Conven-
tion's Proclamation, 1966, published in Government Gazette 
No. 1402 dated March 18, 1966 repealed all previous regula-
tions dealing with the extension of the effect of the 1916 
Act to other countries, save in the case of the United 
States of America. The 1924 proclamation relating to the 
United States of America was repealed in Proclamation No. 
R231, 1973, published in Regulation Gazette 1850 dated 
October 5, 1973. The 1965 Act was very closely modelled on 
1. See Proclama.ticn No. 224 ccntained in Gov&nrent Gazette No. 1223 
of ~ 10, 1965. 
2. Secticn 48(2) of the 1965 Act. 
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the British Copyright Act of 1956. Unlike the 1916 Act, 
however, the 1965 Act did not actually declare the 1956 
British Act to be in force in South Africa; it did no more 
than adopt the form and a substantial part of the language 
of the 1956 British Act. 
(3) Transitional Provisions 
The transitional provisions of the 1965 Act were dealt with 
in Section 48, read together with the Sixth Schedule to that 
Act. In terms of Section 41(1) of the Sixth Schedule, the 
provisions of the 1965 Act applied, except insofar as was 
otherwise expressly provided in that Schedule, in relation 
to things existing at the commencement of the Act in 1965 in 
the same way as they applied in relation to things which 
came into existence after 1965. In other words, it was 
envisaged under the 1965 Act that no reference, or very 
little reference, was necessary to the 1916 Act and that the 
law of copyright was regulated, both in regard to existing 
and future works, by the provisions of the 1965 Act. In 
essence, however, the essential provisions of the 1916 Act, 
particularly those relating to the subsistence, duration and 
ownership of copyright, were embodied in the 1965 Act, read 
together with the provisions of the Sixth Schedule. It was 
virtually a case of the relevant provisions of the 1916 Act 
being re-enacted in the 1965 Act for application to pre-1965 
works. 
In general terms the Act of 1965 embodied the same princi-
ples and general policies as the Act of 1978. On the whole, 
the law as regulated by the Act of 1965 differed from the 
law as regulated by the Act of 1978 only as to matters of 
detail. In general terms the principles of South African 
copyright law set forth in Chapter II of this thesis apply 
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equally to the Act of 1965 save to the extent where specific 
differences are discussed below. 
In terms of Section 43 of the Act of 1978 the law as regu-
lated by the Act of 1965 must be analyzed primarily to 
ascertain which works enjoyed copyright and the duration and 
ownership of those works. The Act of 1978 preserved these 
elements of the law in respect of works made prior to 1 
January 1979. It is also necessary to analyze to what extent 
the Act of 1965 created copyright retrospectively in works 
made prior to 1965 and in what respect it did not. Further-
more, the question of what vested rights derived from the 
Act of 1916 were protected in the Act of 1965 and what 
vested rights were created by the Act of 1965 must be 
examined. The discussion of the 1965 Act which follows will 
be focused on these issues. 
2. CLASSES OF WORKS PROTECTED 
The Act distinguished between so-called "original works", 
i.e. literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works, and so-
called "other subject matter", i.e. sound recordings, 
cinematograph films, broadcasts and published editions. 
Nothing turned on this distinction and it was abolished in 
the 1978 Act. In this thesis no such distinction will be 
made and all the aforegoing will be dealt with as "works". 
(1) Literary Works 
The 1965 Act conferred copyright upon all original 
literary, dramatic, musical3 and artistic works, 4 and upon 
3 . Secticn 3. 
4 • Secticn 4. 
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sound recordings, 5 cinematograph films, 6 television and 
sound broadcasts, 7 and published editions8 of works. As com-
pared to the 1916 Act, television broadcasts and sound 
broadcasts, and published editions of works were res nova, 
while cinematograph films and sound recordings were recog-
nized as sui generis categories of work. 
In terms of Section 47(4) a literary, dramatic, musical or 
artistic work was not made, or did not come into existence, 
until it was reduced to writing or some other material form. 
The term "literary work" was defined in the 1965 Act as 
"includ[ing] any written table or compilation". 9 If this 
definition is compared with the definition of "literary 
work" in the Third Schedule to the 1916 Act, it will be 
observed that "maps, charts, plans" were ami tted from the 
definition in the 1965 Act. These types of works were, 
however, included in the definition of "drawing" in the 1965 
Act, lO and the term "drawing" was incorporated in the 
definition of "artistic work" in the 1965 Act. 11 In other 
words, in the 1965 Act these works were changed from being 
species of the genus "literary work" to species of the genus 
"artistic work". Nothing really turns on this change as the 
conditions for the subsistence of copyright, and the sub-
stance of copyright, in literary and artistic works both 
under the 1916 Act and under the 1965 Act were essentially 
the same. However, this change must be borne in mind when 
interpreting assignments etc. executed under the 1916 Act. 
5 • Section 13. 
6. Section 14. 
7 • Section 15. 
8. Section 16. 
9. Section 1(1). 
10. Section 1(1). 
11. Section 1(1). 
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(2) Dramatic Works 
The term "dramatic work" was defined to 
"include[s] a choreographic work or entertainment in 
dumb show if reduced to writing in the form in which 
the work for entertainment is to be presented, but 
exclizde[s] cinematograph film as distinct from a 
scenario or script for a cinematograph film". 12 
Save for the exclusion of "cinematograph productions" and 
"any piece for recitation" from the corresponding definition 
in the 1916 Act, this definition was substantially the same 
as the definition of "dramatic work" in the 1916 Act. While 
cinematograph films as such were excluded from the category 
of "dramatic work", the scenario or script was retained as a 
"dramatic work". 
(3) Musical Works 
As under the 1916 Act, there was no definition of "musical 
work" in the 1965 Act and this term must thus be given its 
ordinary meaning. The 1965 Act, however, in contra-
distinction to the 1916 Act, did not deem sound recordings 
to be musical works and protected such works as a sui 
generis category. 
(4) Artistic Works 
The term "artistic work" was defined in the 1965 Act to 
mean -
" (a J paintings, sculptures, drawings, engravings and 
photographs irrespective of the artistic quality 
thereof; 
(b) works of architecture, being either buildings or 
models for buildings; or 
12. Section 1(1). 
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(c) works of artistic craftsmanship, not falling 
within paragraphs (a) or (b)". 13 
The term "drawing" was defined as "includ[ing] any diagram. 
map, chart or plan" . 14 The term "engraving" was defined as 
"includ[ing] any etching, lithograph, wood cut, print or 
similar work, but does not include a photograph". 15 The term 
"photograph" was defined as "any product of photography or 
of any process akin to photography, but does not include any 
part of a cinematograph film". 16 The definition of 
"photograph" approximated to the corresponding definition 
under the 1916 Act, save that, as previously mentioned, 
under the 1916 Act, a cinematograph film could be protected 
as a sequence of photographs. 
The definition of "artistic work" in the 1965 Act was sub-
stantially the same as the corresponding definition under 
the 1916 Act, save that the amplifying phrase, "irrespective 
of the artistic quality thereof" used in connection with 
category (a) of the definition of "artistic work" in the 
1965 Act did not form part of the definition of "artistic 
work" in the 1916 Act. 
(5) Sound Recordings 
The term "sound recording" was defined in the 1965 Act as 
meaning "the aggregate of the sounds embodied in and capable 
of being reproduced by means of a record of any description, 
other than a soundtrack associated with a cinematograph 
13. Secticn 1( 1). 
14. Secticn 1(1). 
15. Secticn 1(1). 
16. Secticn 1(1). 
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film" . 17 The term "record" was also defined in the Act and 
meant: 
"any disc, tape, perf ora ted roll or other device in 
which sounds are embodied so as to be capable of being 
automatically reproduced therefrom with or without the 
aid of some other instrument; and references to a 
record of a work or other subject matter shall be con-
strued as references to a record as herein defined by 
means of which it can be performed".l8 
Musical works which constituted "sound recordings" under the 
1916 Act were regarded as sound recordings as defined in the 
1965 Act, and Section 13 of the 1965 Act, which dealt with 
sound recordings, was, subject to certain qualifications, 
applicable to sound recordings made during the currency of 
the 1916 Act. Section 13 of the Sixth Schedule, however, 
specifically provided that copyright did not subsist in a 
sound recording made before 1 January 1917, unless a sub-
stituted right had been granted to the work in question by 
virtue of Section 19(8) of the Third Schedule to the 1916 
Act. In other words, for pre-1917 "sound recordings" one 
must have regard to the 1916 Act to ascertain whether 
copyright subsisted in the work, but for sound recordings 
made after 1917 one has regard to the 19 6 5 Act and not to 
the 1916 Act. 19 Such sound recordings were retrospectively 
given the sui generis status of sound recordings and under 
the 1965 Act and were no longer treated as "musical works". 
(6) Cinematograph Films 
The term "cinematograph film" was defined in the 1965 Act as 
17. Section 1(1). 
18. Section 1(1). 
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19. See Section 13 of ~ 1965 llct, read toge~ with Sections 11-13 
of ~ Sixth Scredule. 
"any sequence of visual images recorded on material of 
any description (whether translucent or not) so as to 
be capable, by the use of that material - (a) of being 
shown as a moving picture; or (b) of being recorded on 
other material (whether translucent or not) by the use 
of which it can be shown".20 
Section 14 of the 1965 Act, read together with Sections 14-
16 of the Sixth Schedule, provided that the sui generis 
status of cinematograph films provided for in the 1965 Act 
did not apply to "cinematograph films" made prior to 1965. 
Such "cinematograph films" retained their status as dramatic 
works and fell within the provisions of the 1965 Act relat-
ing to dramatic works. The author of the "cinematograph 
film" for purposes of the 1916 Act, (i.e. the author of the 
dramatic work) was deemed to be the author of the "dramatic 
work" protected under the 1965 Act. The photographs com-
prised in a pre-1965 film continued to be protected as 
photographs under the 19 65 Act, notwithstanding the fact 
that the 1965 Act excluded single frames of cinematograph 
films from the definition of "photograph". 21 A cinematograph 
film included the sounds embodied in any soundtrack associ-
ated with the film.22 
Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria contends that the definition of 
"cinematograph .film" in the British Act of 1956, which 
definition corresponds with the above definition, includes a 
recorded video tape. 23 It is submitted that the question is 
not beyond doubt but that the learned authors are probably 
correct. 
20. Section 1(1). 
21. Section 16 of ~ Sixth Sch3dule. 
22. Secticn 14(9). 
23. See '1he M:ldern Law of Copyright, p 277. 
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(7) Broadcasts (Television and Sound) 
The term "television broadcast" was defined in Section 1 of 
the 1965 Act as "visual images broadcast by way of televi-
sion, together with any sounds broadcast for reception along 
with those images"; the term "sound broadcast" was defined 
as "sounds broadcast otherwise than as part of a television 
broadcast"; and the term "broadcasting" was defined as 
"broadcasting by means of a broadcasting service as defined 
in Section 1 of the Radio Act, 1952 (Act No. 3 of 1952)". As 
mentioned, television broadcasts and sound broadcasts were a 
new category of work created by the 1965 Act. In terms of 
Section 15, read together with Section 17 of the Sixth 
Schedule, the 1965 Act did not apply to broadcasts made 
prior to 1965. Such broadcasts were thus not the subject of 
copyright although, of course, certain of the material cov-
ered by such broadcasts, e.g. musical works, literary works, 
dramatic works, etc. could be the subjects of copyright. 
(8) Published Editions 
The 1965 Act contained no definition of the term "published 
editions of works". Section 16(1) of the Act, however, 
s·tated that copyright subsisted in every published edition 
of any one or more literary, dramatic or musical works pro-
vided that no copyright was conferred upon an edition which 
reproduced the typographical arrangement of a previous edi-
tion of the same work or works. Consequently, it is obvious 
that a published edition was constituted by an original 
typographical arrangement (i.e. involving fresh typesetting) 
of a literary, dramatic or musical work. In contrast with 
all the other categories of works which were the subject of 
copyright, published editions were not dealt with specifi-
cally in the Sixth Schedule to the 1965 Act. Consequently, 
in terms of Section 16 of the 1965 Act, read together with 
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Section 41(1) of the Sixth Schedule, published editions made 
prior to 1965 were granted copyright retrospectively. In 
practice, this retrospective protection only extended back 
to 1940 since, as we shall see below, the term of copyright 
granted to a published edition was twenty 
which means that 
five years from 
works published the date of publication, 
earlier than 1940 would in any event have been out of 
copyright in 1965 even though copyright was granted 
retrospectively by the 1965 Act. 
(9) Industrial Designs 
It will be recalled that Section 22 of the Third Schedule to 
the 1916 Act provided that copyright would not subsist in 
designs capable of being registered under Chapter II of the 
1916 Act. This position was perpetuated in the case of pre-
1965 works in Section 8(2) of the Sixth Schedule to the 1965 
Act. The 1965 Act itself adopted a different approach to 
artistic works, designs corresponding to which were 
registrable as designs. Like the 1916 Act, the intent of the 
1965 Act was to prevent there being an overlap in protection 
for an artistic work/design under both designs legislation 
and the Copyright Act. The 1965 Act, however, did not pro-
vide that no copyright subsisted in artistic works which 
were capable of registration as designs but rather imposed 
limitations on the right of the owner of the copyright in a 
relevant artistic work to sue for infringement of copyright 
in certain circumstances. These circumstances were set out 
in Section 11 of the 1965 Act read together with the First 
Schedule to that Act. In terms of this Section copyright 
continued to subsist in the artistic work but that copyright 
became partially unenforceable. In a long series of British 
cases culminating with, and summed up in, British Leyland 
Motor Corporation & Others v. Armstrong Patents Company Ltd 
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& Others, 24 the British courts held that the "forfeiture" of 
protection which occurred as aforementioned did not apply 
where a corresponding design would not have been registrable 
under the designs legislation. This point was never specifi-
cally decided by the South African courts although the 
indications are that they would have followed the approach 
of the British courts. 25 As will be shown below the dif-
ference in the treatment of artistic works which embodied 
designs registrable as such under designs legislation in the 
Act of 1965 as compared with the Act of 1911 is of con-
siderable importance to the protection of this type of work 
made prior to 1979 conferred by the Act of 1978. 
In the cases Pan African Engineers ( Pty) Limited v Hydro 
Tubes (Pty) Ltd & Another26 and Ehrenberg Engineering (Pty) 
Ltd v Topka, t/a Topring Manufacturing & Engineering27 the 
court enforced copyright in drawings embodying functional 
designs, while in Weetabix Ltd v Eet-Rite Natural Foods 
(Pty) Ltd2 8 the court applied the provisions of the 
aforementioned Section 11 and held that the relevant part of 
the copyright had become unenforceable. The Weetabix case 
did not, however, deal with drawings embodying a registrable 
design which had been copied in a three-dimensional form but 
rather with a photograph which was applied in a two-
dimensional form to the outer surface of a package (in the 
nature of a label) which was found by the court to be a 
registrable design notwithstanding the exclusion of the 
24. 1986 FSR 221. 
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25. See f= instange Scaw Metals Ltd v. Apex Foundry (pty) Ltd & 
Another, 1982 (2) SA 377 (D), at 385D. 
26. 1972 (1) SA 470 (W). 
27. case NJ. I 8652/77 in tre TPD - unreported. 
28. 1974 (1) SA 230 (T). 
registration of certain designs provided for in regulations 
issued under the Designs Act, 1967. 
(10) Reconciliation of 1916 and 1965 Acts as to Works 
Protected 
In general, and save to the extent specifically dealt with, 
the effect of the provisions of the 1965 Act, read together 
with the Sixth Schedule, was that works as defined in the 
1965 Act, but made prior to 1965, were protected under the 
1965 Act. Insofar as any definition under the 1965 Act might 
have been broader in scope than a corresponding definition 
under the 1916 Act, the 1965 Act retrospectively created 
copyright in any works falling within the broader definition 
in the 1965 Act and falling outside the narrower definition 
in the 1916 Act, but applied the provisions of the Sixth 
Schedule (effectively the 1916 Act) to those works. In other 
words the Act retrospectively protected such works but pro-
ceeded on the assumption that they had been protected under 
the 1916 Act. 
3. CONDITIONS FOR SUBSISTENCE OF COPYRIGHT 
A. PRELIMINARY CONCEPTS 
Before going on to deal with the conditions for the sub-
sistence of copyright under the Act of 1965 it is necessary 
to discuss the concepts of "qualified person" and "pub-
lication" under that Act. 
(a) Qualified Person 
A so-called "qualified person" under the 1965 Act was - (a) 
in the case of an individual, a person who was a citizen of 
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or was domiciled or resident in South Africa or a country to 
which the operation of the 1965 Act had been extended; and 
(b) in the case of a body corporate, a body which was 
incorporated under the laws of South Africa or of a country 
to which the operation of the Act had been extended. 29 For 
the purposes of a qualified person in relation to a pre-1965 
photograph or "sound recording", in the case of a corporate 
body, the definition was extended to include a corporate 
body which had established a place of business in the rele-
vant place. 30 
(b) Publication 
Publication under the 1965 Act took place, generally speak-
ing, when reproductions of the work were issued to the pub-
lic but no regard was taken of such issuing of reproductions 
to the public as was merely colourable and not intended to 
satisfy the reasonable requirements of the public. 3l The 
copies issued to the public must have been of the work as a 
whole and not merely of a substantial part of the work. 3 2 
Specifically in regard to a cinematograph film, publication 
meant the sale, letting on hire or offer for sale or hire of 
copies of the film to the public. 33 
The performance or the issue of records of a literary, 
dramatic or musical work, the exhibition of an artistic 
work, the construction of a work of architecture and the 
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29. See definition of "qualified person" in Section 1(1) read together 
with Section 32 arrl the Regulations published thereunder in Proclama-
tion No. R73, 1966 in Goverrrrent Gazette No. 1402 dated March 18, 1966 -
the so-called "CoP:Jright International CorNentions r>r=lamatian". 
30. Section 37(4) of the Sixth Schadule. 
31. See Section 47(2)(b) arrl (c). 
32. Section 47(1). 
33 • See definition of "p;blicatian" in Section 1 ( 1) . 
issue of photographs or engravings of a work of architecture 
or a sculpture did not constitute publication of such 
works. 34 Publication in South Africa and another country was 
considered to be simultaneous if the two publications took 
place within thirty days of each other. 35 
For purposes of publication, if copyright subsisted in the 
unpublished work then no account was taken of an 
unauthorized publication, which meant an act done otherwise 
than by or with the licence of the owner of the copyright; 
if the work did not enjoy copyright as an unpublished work, 
then no account was taken of any unauthorized publication 
which meant an act done otherwise than by or with the 
licence of the author or his successor in title.36 
B. CONDITIONS FOR CLASSES OF WORKS 
(1) Literary, Dramatic, Artistic and Musical Works 
In the case of literary, dramatic, artistic and musical 
works copyright subsisted therein in the following circum-
stances:37 
(a) In the case of an unpublished work, the author was a 
qualified person at the time when the work was made or, 
if the making of the work extended over a period, for a 
substantial part of that period. 
(b) In the case of a published work, -
( i) the first publication of the work took place in 
South Africa or in a country to which the opera-
tion of the Act had been extended; or 
34. Section 47(2)(a). 
35. Section 47(2)(d). 
36. Section 47(3). 
3 7 • Section 3( 1) arrl Section 4( 1) • 
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(ii) the author of the work was a qualified person at 
the time when the work was first published; or 
(iii) if the author had died before the first pub-
lication of the work, he was a qualified person 
immediately before his death. 
It is important to note that a published work could not con-
tinue to enjoy copyright simply by virtue of the fact that 
the circumstances of paragraph (a) above applied; it was 
necessary that in addition the circumstances of paragraph 
(b) should apply. Sub-paragraphs (b)(ii) and (iii) above did 
not apply to pre-1965 works. 38 This brought the provisions 
for subsistence of copyright in the 1965 Act, read together 
with the Sixth Schedule, into conformity with the position 
which obtained under the 1916 Copyright Act. Paragraph 
(b)(i) only applied to pre-1917 works if a substituted right 
applied to those works under the 1916 Act.39 
In regard to dramatic or musical works made prior to 1917 
Section 35 of the Sixth Schedule laid down specific provi-
sions relating to the situation where there had been a 
splitting of the copyright into one component comprising the 
right to perform the work in public and another component 
comprising the balance of the normal copyright. The effect 
of this paragraph of the Schedule was that in any given case 
the copyright subsisting in a pre-1917 dramatic or musical 
work by virtue of Section 3 of the 1965 Act could be a par-
tial copyright. 
(2) Sound Recordings 
Copyright subsisted in every sound recording which was made 
in South Africa or in a country to which the operation of 
38. See Secticn 1 of tre Sixth Schedule. 
3 9 • See Secticn 34 of tre Sixth Schedule. 
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the Act was extended or of which the maker or author was a 
qualified person at the time when the recording was made. 40 
Copyright did not subsist by virtue of Section 13 in a 
"sound recording" made prior to 1917 unless Section 19(8) of 
the Third Schedule to the 1916 Act had granted copyright to 
that sound recording. 41 The principle of reciprocity was, 
however, applied to the protection of foreign sound record-
ings.42 
(3) Cinematograph Films 
Copyright subsisted in every cinematograph film, whether 
published or unpublished, of which the maker or author was a 
qualified person for the whole or a substantial part of the 
period during which the film was made, or in every 
cinematograph film which had been published and of which the 
first publication took place in South Africa or in a country 
to which the operation of the Act had been extended. 43 As 
stated previously, the provisions of the Act relating to 
cinematograph films as a sui generis type of work, did not 
apply to pre-1965 films. Such films were dealt with by the 
1965 Act as dramatic works. 
(4) Broadcasts 
Copyright subsisted in every television or sound broadcast 
made by the SABC. 44 As previously stated, the copyright 
granted in this category of work did not apply to pre-1965 
works. 
40. Secticn 13( 1). 
41 . Secticn 13 of the Sixth Schedule. 
42. See p 399 infra, 
43. Secticn 14( 1). 
44. Secticn 15(1). 
387. 
(5) Published Editions 
Copyright subsisted in every published edition of a 
literary, dramatic or musical work if the first publication 
of the edition took place in South Africa or in a country to 
which the operation of the Act had been extended or if the 
publisher or the author 
son at the date of 
of the edition was a qualified per-
first publication. 45 As stated 
previously, copyright was granted retrospectively to pub-
lished editions first published prior to 1965. As in the 
case of sound recordings, the principle of reciprocity was, 
however, applied to the protection of foreign published edi-
tions.46 
4. AUTHORSHIP AND INITIAL OWNERSHIP OF COPYRIGHT 
(1) The Author 
The 1965 Act, read together with the Sixth Schedule, pro-
vided that the maker of a literary, dramatic, musical or 
artistic work was the author of that work. The position was 
different in the case of cinematograph films, being dramatic 
works, made prior to 1965, and photographs. The author of a 
dramatic work, being a pre-19 65 cinematograph film, was 
deemed to be the author of that cinematograph film. The 
author of a photograph, in keeping with the equivalent 
provision of the 1916 Act, was designated as being "the per-
son who at the time when the photograph is taken, is the 
owner of the material on which it is taken". 47 The maker of 
a sound recording was designated as being the author of that 
45. Section 16( 1). 
46. See p 400 infra. 
4 7. See the definition of "autlXJr" in Section 1(1). 
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sound recording. 48 This was in conformity with the position 
under the 1916 Act. Similarly, the maker of a cinematograph 
film was designated as being the owner of the copyright in 
that cinematograph film. 49 The "maker" of a cinematograph 
film was defined as "the person by whom the arrangements 
necessary for the making of the film are undertaken". 50 The 
1965 Act contemplated that only the South African Broadcast-
ing Corporation would make broadcasts which would be the 
subject of copyright. 51 Thus the author of a broadcast was 
invariably the SABC. The publisher of a published edition 
was designated as the author of that category of work. 52 
(2) Initial Ownership of Copyright 
The general rule applicable to the first ownership of 
copyright under the 1965 Act was that the author or maker of 
the work was initially entitled to the copyright. 53 This 
rule was, however, subject to certain exceptions, namely, 
the following: 
(a) Where a literary, dramatic or artistic work was made by 
the author in the course of his employment by a media 
publishing business under a contract of service or 
apprenticeship and was made for the purpose of pub-
lication in written media, the media publishing busi-
ness owned the copyright in the work in regard to pub-
lishing it in any written media, but the author owned 
the copyright in all other respects.54 
(b) Where a person commissioned the taking of a photograph, 
the painting or drawing of a portrait, the making of a 
48. Secticn 13(3), read together with Section 13(6). 
49. Section 14(3). 
50. See definiticn of "maker" in Se.cticn 1(1). 
51. See Secticn 15(1) aro. (2). 
52. Section 16(1) aro. (2). 
53. Section 5(1), 13(3), 14(3), 15(2) aro. 16(2). 
54. Secticn 5(2). 
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gravure, the making of a cinematograph film or the 
making of a sound recording and paid or agreed to pay 
remuneration for the making of the work, and the work 
was made pursuant to that commission, the person giving 
the commission ~as the first copyright owner. 55 
(c) Where in a case not falling within either (a) or (b), a 
work (i.e. a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic 
work and not the other categories of works) was made in 
the course of the author's employment by another person 
under a contract of service or apprenticeship, that 
other person was the first copyright owner. 56 
All the aforement.ioned exceptions could be varied or 
excluded by agreement between the parties. 57 The exceptions 
did not apply to works made prior to 1965 but the provisions 
of Section 5(1) of the Third Schedule to the 1916 Act con-
tinued to apply. 58 The ef feet of the provisions of the 
aforesaid Section of the Third Schedule to the 1916 Act was 
substantially the same as the aforementioned provisions, 
although the types of works to which they applied differed 
to some extent from the equivalent provisions under the 1965 
Act. The upshot was that the 1965 Act preserved ownership of 
copyright existing under the 1916 Act. It must be 
appreciated that none of the aforementioned exceptions 
altered the identity of the author of the work - what they 
did was to vest the ownership of the copyright initially in 
someone else besides the author. 
5. DURATION OF COPYRIGHT 
55. se::rt:ian 5( 3), 13( 3) arrl 14( 3). 
56. se::rt:ian 5( 4). 
57. se::rt:ian 5( 5), 13( 3) arrl 14( 3). 
58. se::rt:ian 3 of the Sixth Schedule. 
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Copyright in a literary, dramatic or musical work subsisted 
until the end of a period of fifty years from the end of the 
calendar year in which the author of the work died. 59 The 
same term applied to artistic works besides photographs. In 
the case of a photograph, the copyright subsisted until the 
end of the period of fifty years from the end of the 
calendar year in which the photograph was first published.60 
The aforementioned provisions did not apply to pre-1917 
works unless a substituted right had been granted under the 
1916 Act. In the absence of such a substituted right having 
been granted, no copyright subsisted in such works. 61 In 
the case of pre-1965 photographs the aforegoing provisions 
relating to photographs did not apply and the term of 
copyright in such a photograph subsisted until the end of 
the period of fifty years from the end of the calendar year 
in which the photograph was taken. 62 The copyright in a 
sound recording, whether made before or after 1965, sub-
sisted until the end of the period of fifty years from the 
end of the calendar year in which the recording was made. 63 
The copyright in a cinematograph film subsisted, in the case 
of a film which had been approved by the censorship author-
ities, until the end of the period of fifty from the end of 
the .calendar year in which it was so approved, and in the 
case of a film which had not been so approved, until the 
film was published and thereafter until the end of the 
period of fifty years from the end of the calendar which 
included the date of the first publication, or if copyright 
59. Section 3(3). 
60. Section 4(3). 
61. Section 34 of the Sixth Schedule. 
6 2 . Section 2 of the Sixth Schedule. 
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63. Section 13(2) read together with Section 11 of the Sixth 
Scta:lule. 
in the film subsisted by virtue only of it having been first 
published in South Africa, as from the date of first pub-
lication until the end of the period of fifty years from the 
end of the calendar year which included that date. 64 Pre-
1965 films were, as previously stated, treated as dramatic 
works and the term of the copyright in such works was thus 
determined by the provisions of the 1965 Act relating to 
dramatic works. 
The copyright in a television or sound broadcast subsisted 
until the end of the period of fifty years from the end of 
the calendar ye~r in which the broadcast was first made.6 5 
This provision did not apply to sound or television broad-
casts made before 1965, which broadcasts were not the sub-
ject of copyright. 
The copyright in a published edition of a literary, dramatic 
or musical work subsisted until the end of the period of 
twenty five years from the end of the calendar year in which 
the edition was first published. 66 As previously stated, 
this provision applied to pre-1965 published editions as 
well. 
6. TRANSMISSION OF COPYRIGHT 
Copyright subsisting under the 1965 Act was transmissible by 
assignment, by testamentary disposition, or by operation of 
law as personal or movable property. 67 An assignment could 
64. Secticn 14(2). 
65. Secticn 15(2). 
66. Secticn 16(2). 
67. Secticn 36(1). 
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be limited so as to apply to one or more, but not all, of 
the classes of acts comprised in the copyright; to any one 
or more, but not all, countries in relation to which the 
copyright subsisted; or to part, but not the whole, of the 
period of copyright; the assignment could also be limited to 
any combination of two or more of the a foregoing. Any 
assignment which did not relate to the full copyright in a 
work, was termed a partial assignment. 68 In order to be 
valid, an assignment must have been in writing and it must 
have been signed by or on behalf of the assignor. 69 Assign-
ments and bequests made prior to 1965, will be dealt with 
below. 
In contrast to the position under the 1916 Act, under the 
1965 Act an assignment of copyright could be entered into in 
respect of future copyright not held by the assignor at the 
date of the execution of the assignment. Such an assignment 
could be in respect of the full copyright or it could be 
partial. When the copyright came into existence, if the 
assignor would in normal circumstances have been the 
copyright owner, then the copyright vested immediately in 
the assignee or his successor in title. 70 This provision did 
not apply to assignments made prior to 1965. 71 Where 
copyright came into existence after the death of a person, 
if the ownership of that copyright would have vested in that 
person if he was still alive, the copyright devolved as if 
it had subsisted immediately before his death and he had 
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6 8 • Section 36 ( 2) . In regard to partial assigments see Kinekor Films· 
(pty) Ltd v Parade Hate M:lvies; Kinekor Films (pty) Ltd v Botma 1976 ( 1) 
SA 647 (W). 
69. Section 36(3). 
70. Section 37(1). 
71. Sections 27(1) arrl (2) of tha Sixth Schedule. 
been the owner of the copyright.72 This provision applied to 
situations which occurred prior to 1965.73 
Where, under a bequest, a person was entitled to the manu-
script of a literary, dramatic or musical work, or to an 
artistic work, and the work was not published prior to the 
death of the testator, unless the testator had provided to 
the contrary, the bequest included the copyright in the work 
insofar as the testator was the owner of the copyright 
immediately before his death. 74 This provision did not apply 
where a person died prior to 1965 and in that situation the 
provisions of Section 17(2) of the Third Schedule to the 
1916 Act applied as if they had been re-enacted in the 1965 
Act. 75 
7. WORKS MADE FOR THE STATE 
Section 39 of the 1965 Act contained provisions relating to 
works made by or under the direction or control of the 
Government. The Section provided, firstly, that even when 
copyright would not normally have subsisted in any literary, 
dramatic, musical or artistic work, sound recording or 
cinematograph film, because it did not meet the requirements 
laid down in the Act for subsistence of copyright, copyright 
was conferred upon such a work purely and simply because it 
was made by or under the direction or control of the 
Government; secondly, that the copyright in any literary, 
72. Section 37(2). 
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73 . Unlike in the case of Section 37 ( 1), the Sixth Scredule did IX>t 
specifically state that this sub-section I-.O.Ild not apply. 
7 4 • Section 38. 
75. Section 28 of the Sixth Scredule. see p 323 supra. 
dramatic, musical or artistic work, sound recording or 
cinematograph film made by or under the direction or control 
of the State vested in the State; and, thirdly, that the 
State was the owner of the copyright in every literary, 
dramatic, musical or artistic work first published in South 
Africa where such first publication was undertaken by or 
under the direction or control of the State. The aforegoing 
provisions were also applicable to pre-1965 films both as 
dramatic works and as sequences of photographs. 76 The provi-
sions of Section 39 relating to the initial ownership of 
copyright were subject to variation by agreement between the 
State and the author of the work in question and such agree-
ment could provide that the copyright would vest in the 
author or maker or in some third party. The Government 
Printer was designated by the State President as the officer 
in whom copyright owned by the State vested for administra-
tive purposes. 77 
In terms of Section 39, the term of copyright in respect of 
State owned copyright as set out above was as follows: 
(a) In the case of an unpublished literary, dramatic or 
musical work, the copyright subsisted so long as the 
work remained unpublished. 
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(b) In the case of a published literary, dramatic or musi-
cal work, the copyright subsisted until the end of the 
period of fifty years from the end of the calendar year 
in which the work was first published. 
(c) In the case of an artistic work, other than an engrav-
ing or a photograph, copyright subsisted until the end 
76. Section 30(2) of the Sixth Schedule. 
7 7 • Section 39 ( 8) • 'fue pr=lamation referred to was =t revoked during 
the curreoc:y of the 1965 Act. 
of the period of fifty years from the end of the 
calendar year in which the work was made. 
(d) In the case of an artistic work, being an engraving or 
a photograph, the copyright subsisted until the end of 
the period of fifty years from the end of the calendar 
year in which the work was fir9t published. This provi~ 
sian did not apply to photographs, either individually 
or as part of a cinematograph film, made before 1965. 
The term provided for in paragraph (c) above applied to 
such photographs.78 
(e) In the case of sound recordings and cinematograph films 
copyright subsisted for the normal period. This did 
not, however, apply to pre-1965 cinematograph films; 
insofar as such films were dramatic works under the 
1916 Act, paragraphs ( a) and (b) above applied and 
insofar as such a cinematograph film was a sequence of 
photographs, paragraph (c) above applied. 7 9 
Paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) above applied also to pre-1965 
works, save where otherwise indicated. 
8. ANONYMOUS, PSEUDONYMOUS AND JOINT WORKS 
Section 12, read together with the Second and Third 
Schedules of the 1965 Act, dealt with the questions of the 
duration of copyright in anonymous and pseudonymous works 
and with works of joint authorship. 
78. Secticns 29 am 30(2)(c) of tre Sixth Sch:rlule. 
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79. Secticn 30(2) of tre Sixth Sch:rlule. Secticn 30(1) of tre Sixth 
Sch:rlule purports to make an exoepticn in tre case of tre term of a pre-
1965 sound rea:>rdinJ but tre alternative period specified in that sec-
ticn is tre sarre period specified in Secticn 13 of tre 1965 l'ct to which 
Secticn 39(5) of tre 1965 l'ct refers. 
The term "work of joint authorship" was defined in the Act 
as "a work produced by the collaboration of two or more 
authors in which the contribution of each author is not 
separable from the contribution of the other author or 
authors". 8° For the purposes of the subsistence of copyright 
in a work of joint-authorship it was sufficient if any one 
of the joint authors was a qualified person.8l 
Special provisions applied to the duration of copyright in 
works of joint-authorship and/or works of anonymous or pseu-
donymous authors. A work was considered to be pseudonymous 
if the author had adopted a pseudonym or, if he had used 
more than one name in relation to the work, all the names 
were pseudonyms. If he used a pseudonym and his own name 
then the work was not pseudonymous. For these purposes a 
work could not be considered to be anonymous or pseudonymous 
if at any stage before the expiration of the term of 
copyright for anonymous or pseudonymous works it became pos-
sible for a person without previous knowledge of the facts 
to ascertain the identity of the author by reasonable 
enquiry.82 The term of copyright for this type of literary, 
dramatic, musical and artistic works was, notwithstanding 
other terms provided in the Act for normal works, a period 
of fifty years from the end of the calendar year in which 
the work was first published. 83 Save in the case where one 
or more of the authors of a work of joint authorship was 
anonymous or pseudonymous, the term of copyright for a work 
of joint-authorship was determined by the death of the 
author who died last. 84 Where a work of joint-authorship was 
80. See definiticn of "lrork of joint autmrship" in Secticn 1(1). 
81 . Secticn 1 of th:l Third Scl'aiule. 
82. Secticns 2 and 3 of th:l Secxn:i Scl'aiule. 
83. Secticn 1 of th:l Secxn:i Scl'aiule. 
84. Secticn 2 of th:l Third Scl'aiule. 
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partially pseudonymous (i.e. one or more of the authors were 
pseudonymous but at least one of the authors used his actual 
name, or if all of the authors were pseudonymous but it 
became possible to ascertain the identity of one or more of 
them without previous knowledge of the facts but pursuant to 
reasonable enquiry) the term of copyright was determined by 
reference to the death of the known author or if the 
identity of two or more of the authors was known, by the 
death of the one who died last.85 
The aforegoing applied to pre-1965 works as well save that, 
in terms of Section 10(1) of the Sixth Schedule, copyright 
did not subsist in a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic 
work which was a work of joint authorship if it was first 
published prior to 1965 and the period of copyright enjoyed 
by that work under the 1916 Act had expired before September 
11, 1965. The "period of copyright" referred to was the 
longer of the following periods: - i.e. the life of the 
author who died first and a term of fifty years after his 
death, or the life of the author who died last. 86 The 
aforementioned "period of copyright" conformed with the term 
of copyright conferred upon a work of joint authorship under 
the 1916 Act. 87 
9. INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT 
Section 32 of the 1965 Act made provision for the State 
President to provide by way of Proclamation in the 
Government Gazette that protection under the Act could be 
85. Sectic:n 3 of the Third Schedule. 
86. Sectic:n 10(2) of the Sixth Schedule. 
87. Sectic:ns 16 arrl 17 of the Act of 1916. 
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extended to works emanating from specified other countries. 
The State President provided in Proclamation No. R73, 1966, 
published in Government Gazette No. 1402 dated March 18, 
1966, the so-called "Copyright International Conventions 
Proclamation", inter alia, that the provisions of the Act 
would apply to literary, dramatic, musical or artistic 
works, cinematograph films or published editions first pub-
lished, and sound recordings first made, in the specified 
countries as they applied in relation to such works first 
published or first made, as the case may be, in South 
Africa; to persons who at a material time were citizens or 
subjects of, or were domiciled or resident in, the specified 
countries as they applied in relation to persons who at such 
time were nationals of, or domiciled or resident in, South 
Africa; and to bodies incorporated under the laws of the 
specified countries as they applied in relation to bodies 
incorporated under the laws of South Africa. 
There were certain provisos to these general provisions, of 
which mention can be made that in the case of sound record-
ings and published editions, protection was only granted to 
foreign works to the extent that protection in the nature 
of, or related to, copyright was granted under the laws of 
the foreign country to sound recordings first made, or pub-
lished editions first published, in South Africa; and no 
such foreign work would enjoy any wider protection in South 
Africa than was enjoyed in that country by a South African 
sound recording or published edition, as the case may be. 
In Gramophone Co Ltd v Music Machine (Pty) Ltd88 the court 
was required to interpret the meaning of the aforementioned 
88. 1973 (3) SA 188 (W). 
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proviso as it applied to sound recordings. The sound record-
ings in question were of British origin. The court examined 
British law and concluded that in terms of an Order-in-
Council issued under Section 12( 1) of the British Act of 
1956 South Africans were regarded as "qualified persons" 
under 'Br:i tish law and therefore South Afri.can sound record-
ings were protected under British law. British law provided 
that a sound recording first published in a Berne Convention 
country enjoyed copyright in the United Kingdom to the same 
extent as a sound recording first published in Britain. On 
the other hand the South African Proclamation provided that 
a sound recording made in a Berne Convention country enjoyed 
copyright to the same extent as a sound recording made in 
South Africa. It was contended on behalf of the Respondent 
that South African sound recordings would not enjoy pro-
tection in Britain because Britain protected sound record-
ings (as an alternative to those made by a "qualified per-
son") on the basis of the place of first publication of 
sound recordings and not on the basis of the making of sound 
recordings. In other words it was contended that the making 
of a sound recording in South Africa would not under British 
law have been sufficient to cause that sound recording to 
enjoy copyright in the United Kingdom. The court held that 
it was sufficient for sound recordings to meet the 
reciprocity requirements of the South African Proclamation 
if both countries protected sound recordings emanating from 
the other country on the basis ·that the makers were 
qualified persons. The fact that the sound recordings did 
not also meet the requirements of making and first pub-
lication, respectively, was of no consequence. In this 
regard Moll J said the following: 
"The words 'only to the extent that' in the first part 
of the proviso and the words 'any wider protection' in 
the second part thereof are of importance, and I agree 
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with the submission made by counsel for the applicant 
in his reply, that in each case where one seeks to 
invoke the provisions of the Proclamation one must. 
regard being had to the said words in their context, 
ask the question 'to what extent do the laws of the 
country of origin of this recording protect a recording 
first made in South Africa?' From what I have sai'd 
above the answer in the present case would be only to 
the extent that it is made by a South African qualified 
person or company. A United Kingdom recording, there-
fore, only enjoys protection to the extent that it is 
made by a United Kingdom qualified person or company. 
It, therefore, does not enjoy 'any wider protection' 
than is enjoyed in the United Kingdom by a recording 
first made in the Republic."89 
The Copyright International Conventions Proclamation 
repealed the equivalent Proclamations issued under the 1916 
Act, but provided that copyright which subsisted in a work 
in terms of such a repealed proclamation, and was not con-
ferred once again under paragraph 3 of the new Proclamation, 
continued to subsist notwithstanding the repeal of the 
Proclamation under which it was derived. 90 Here the 1965 Act 
recognized a vested right. 
The Copyright International Conventions Proclamation, 1966, 
specified the member countries of the Berne Copyright Union 
as at 1966 as being the countries to which the operation of 
the 1965 Act was extended. Those countries were listed in 
the First Schedule. This list was subsequently extended in 
89. At p 203 line F. 
9 0 . Secticn 5 of tiE Copyright Intei:naticnal Ccnventions Proclamation. 
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later Proclamations as further countries joined the Berne 
Copyright Union. 91 The Second Schedule to the Proclamation 
listed those countries to which the operation of the 1916 
Copyright Act had been extended, together with the dates 
upon which such extension had taken place. Sections 37(2) 
and (3) of the Sixth Schedule to the 1965 Act provided that 
the effect of the extension of the operation of the Act to a 
certain country on a specified date was retrospective. In 
other words, to take the example of Austria, the Second 
Schedule specified the date 6 July 1923 as the relevant 
date; as from 6 July 1923 the operation of the 1965 Act was 
extended to Austrian works made before that date and after 
that date. 
In relation to any work made before the commencement of the 
Proclamation, the provisions of the Act applied by virtue of 
the Proclamation subject to certain modifications specified 
in the Second Schedule to the Proclamation. 92 The. only 
modification ·which is relevant to the present discussion is 
that contained in Section 4 of the Second Schedule. This 
section dealt with soun.d recordings made prior to the com-
mencement of the Proclamation, i.e. 18 March 1966. It will 
be recalled that in terms of Section 19 ( 8) of the British 
Act of 1911 (the Third Schedule to the Act of 1916) the 
retrospective protection granted to "sound recordings" under 
the Act of 1916 did not a.pp1y where the making of a sound 
recording prior· to 1 January 1917 would have infringed the 
copyright in another sound recording - one could refer to 
such a disqualified sound recording as a "non-original" 
sound recording. Section 13 of the Sixth Schedule of the Act 
402. 
91. Pr=J.amations Nos. Rl55 of 1966, Rl71 of 1966, Rl65 of 1968, R331 
of 1970. 
92. Secticn 3 of the COpyright Internaticnal Conventions Pr=lanJi,'l.tion. 
of 1965, in consistency with the aforementioned provisions 
of the Act of 1916, did not retrospectively create copyright 
in non-original sound recordings made prior to 1 January 
1917. The effect of Section 4 of the Second Schedule to the 
International Proclamation, read together with the table 
incorporated in that Schedule, was that, in the case of for-
eign sound recordings, the critical date in respect of which 
the Act of 1965 did not retrospectively create copyright in 
non-original sound recordings was the date specified in the 
table for works originating from a particular country and 
not 1 January 1917. In other words, to take the example of 
Austria once again, non-original Austrian sound recordings 
made prior to 6 July 1923 did not retrospectively become 
clothed with copyright by virtue of the Act of 1965. This 
was in keeping with the provisions of the Act of 1916 and 
its subordinate legislation because in terms of the Interna-
tional Proclamations issued under that Act the same critical 
date was prescribed in the·relevant Proclamation. In other 
words the 1966 Proclamation did no more than perpetuate the 
position which existed under the Act of 1916 and its sub-
ordinate legislation. In relation to foreign sound record-
ings which had never enjoyed copyright under the Act of 1916 
and its subordinate legislation (because the Act of 1916 had 
never been extended to works of the country of origin) the 
Second Schedule provided that the critical date f.or the Act 
of 1965 not conferring copyright retrospectively on non-
original sound recordings was the date of the proclamation 
itself, i.e. 18 March 1966. This was consistent with the 
principle applicable under the Act of 1916 and perpetuated 
under the Act of 1965 and the 1966 Proclamation, as 
aforementioned. 
In short, in terms of the 1966 Proclamation, subject to 
certain exceptions which have been discussed above, the Act 
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of 1965 applied to foreign works no matter when they were 
made with the qualification, however, that works made prior 
to 1966 were governed by the Act as varied by the Sixth 
Schedule. This had the important effect that the term of 
copyright in respect of foreign works was that provided for 
South African works. This brought about a change in the case 
of pre-1965 works because, as was shown above, 93 the Inter-
national Proclamations under the 1916 Act provided that the 
term of copyright which applied to a foreign work was to be 
no longer than the term of copyright applicable to that work 
in its country of origin. In the case of countries which 
gave shorter terms than South Africa, the 1965 Act thus 
retrospectively lengthened the term of copyright. The posi-
tion of foreign works made prior to 1917 will be discussed 
below. 
The Copyright International Conventions Proclamation, 
1966, did not repeal the United States Proclamation of 1924 
(Proclamation No. 118 of 1924 which extended the operation 
of the 1916 Act to the United States of America). This 
Proclamation was, however, repealed and replaced by 
Proclamation No. R231, 1973, published in Regulation Gazette 
No. 1850 dated October 5, 1973. This Proclamation declared 
that the Copyright International Conventions Proclamation, 
1966, would apply to the United States of America in the 
same manner as it applied to the countries listed in the 
First Schedule thereof provided that, inter alia, the term 
of copyright in the Republic of South Africa would not 
exceed that conferred by the law of the United States of 
America. The effect of this Proclamation was that as from 
October 5, 1973, all United States works made after 1 
93. See p 363 supr-a. 
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January 1917 were granted the copyright conferred upon for-
eign works by the Copyright International Conventions 
Proclamation, 1966. It will be recalled that the 1924 
Proclamation required that American works should have com-
plied with the formalities of United States law before they 
were entitled to protection under South African law. This 
requirement was dropped in the 1973 Proclamation and as it 
was retrospective it meant that American works which might 
have been disqualified from protection during the currency 
of the Act of 1916 because, although entitled in principle 
to protection in South Africa, they had not complied with 
the applicable American formalities, were now retrospec-
tively granted protection. 
The number of countries specified in the Copyright Interna-
tional Conventions Proclamation, 19 66, and in subsequent 
Proclamations extending the operation of the 1965 Act to 
foreign countries exceeded the number of countries to which 
the 1916 Copyright Act had been extended. In the case of 
~ny country to which the 1916 Act had not been extended, but 
to which the 1965 Act had been extended, copyright was con-
ferred retrospectively on works which were made during the 
currency of the 1916 Act. Works emanating from such 
countries are further instances where pre-1965 works enjoyed 
copyright under the 1965 Act but did not enjoy copyright 
under the 1916 Act. 
The Copyright International Conventions Proclamation pro-
vided that where, before its commencement, any person had 
taken certain action which was lawful at the time that it 
was taken and but for the making of the Proclamation would 
have remained lawful, nothing contained in it would diminish 
or prejudice any rights which arose from or in connection 
with such action and which subsisted and were valuable 
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immediately before the commencement of the Proclamation, 
unless the copyright owner by virtue of the Proclamation 
paid compensation in an agreed amount, or failing such 
agreement, compensation determined by arbitration. The 
action contemplated was action which resulted in incurring 
any expenditure or liability in connection with, for the 
purpose of, or with a view to, the reproduction or perform-
ance of any work.9 4 In this manner, vested rights in favour 
of third parties were created. 
Section 33 of the 1965 Act empowered the State President to 
extend the operation of the Act to works made by, or under 
the direction or control of, specified international organi-
zations. In terms of Section 26 of the Sixth Schedule any 
such extension of the operation of the Act would not apply 
to works made prior to 1965. However, the State President 
never utilized these powers at all during the currency of 
the 1965 Act. Similarly, the State President was empowered 
by Section 34 to extend the operation of the Act., insofar as 
it related to sound and television broadcasts, to such 
broadcasts made by persons other than the South African 
Broadcasting Corporation; these powers were never utilized 
by the State President during the currency of the 1965 Act 
either. Section 45 of the Act empowered the State President 
to disqualify the works of certain countries from protection 
under our Act if it appeared to him that the laws of the 
countries in question failed to give adequate protection to 
South African works. This power too was never utilized by 
the State President during the currency of the Act. 
9 4 . Secticn 4 of the Copyright Intematicnal Ccnventicns Proclamaticn. 
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10. TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS 
As explained above, the 1965 Act repealed the copyright 
provisions of the Act of 1916 and those provisions no longer 
applied to works which were already in existence in 1966. 
The Act of 1965 applied to works no matter when they were 
made_ but its application to existing works were subject to 
the provisions of the Sixth Schedule which by and large had 
the effect of bringing about a continuation of the provi-
sions of the law of 1916 applying to works made prior to 
1966. In broad terms the Act of 1965 together with the Sixth 
Schedule re-enacted the provisions of the Act of 1916 for 
purposes of works made prior to 1966. For the major part 
these transitional provisions of the Act of 1965 have 
already been dealt with during the course of the above dis-
cussion on the Act of 1965. In what follows those relevant 
aspects of the transitional provisions which have not 
already been dealt with will be discussed. 
Section 27 of the Sixth Schedule to the 1965 Act contained 
important provisions regarding the interpretation of assign-
ments and licences entered into during the currency of the 
1916 Act. Basically, the Section provided that documents 
executed under the 1916 Act and expressions used in such 
documents would have the same effect and meaning as they 
would have had under the 1916 Act. Two exceptions to this 
general rule were, firstly, in the case of sound recordings, 
references to copyright under the 1916 Act would be con-
strued as references to the copyright under that Act in 
records embodying the recording and, secondly, in the case 
of cinematograph films, references to the copyright in such 
works would be construed as references to any copyright 
under that Act in the film insofar as it consisted of a 
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dramatic work accorded copyright by the 1916 Act, or to the 
copyright in photographs forming part of the film. This lat-
ter provision is interesting as it was nowhere specifically 
provided in the 1916 Act that a cinematograph film would be 
protected as a sequence of photographs, although this is 
perhaps a logical deduction from the fact that individual 
photographs were protected. The fact that a cinematograph 
film could be protected under the 1916 Act either as a 
sequence of photographs or as a dramatic work gave rise to 
the problem that the two different forms in which the work 
could be protected could have separate copyright owners. The 
author of the photographs would be the person who owned the 
negatives, while the author of the dramatic work would be 
the author in the normal sense of the word, who would not 
necessarily be the owner of the negatives. Moreover, in 
terms of Section 5(l)(a) of the Third Schedule to the 1916 
Act, where the making of a photograph was commissioned, the 
person giving the commission was the first copyright owner. 
This provision did not apply to dramatic works and thus to 
cinematograph films as dramatic works. 
There was a proviso to Section 27(1) of the Sixth Schedule 
which was to the effect that if a pre-1965 assignment was 
limited to a particular term, copyright in terms of the 1965 
Act was only included in that assignment to the extent that 
the end of the term provided for in the assignment extended 
beyond the date of the commencement of the Act of 1965: 
The following terms had different meanings under the Acts of 
1916 and 1965 (albeit very slight differences in some 
instances): Copyright, 95 publication, 96 dramatic work (the 
408. 
9 5 . Secticn 1 ( 2); Secticn 24, read togetrer with Schedule Farr, of the 
1916 J\ct and Secticn 1 of the 1965 J\ct. 
96. Secticn 1(3) of the Third Schedule to the 1916 J\ct, Secticns 1 and 
47 of the 1965 J\ct. 
1916 definition includes cinematograph films which are not 
included in the 1965 definition), 97 photograph (the 1916 
definition covered cinematograph films while the 1965 
definition excludes cinematograph films) 98 and perform-
ance.99 These differences in meanings of terms must be borne 
in mind when interpreting assignments made prior to 1965. 
It will be recalled that under the 1916 Act where the author 
of the work was the initial owner of the copyright and he 
had assigned that copyright, after the expiry of twenty five 
years from his death the ownership of the copyright reverted 
to his executor and heirs; any agreement entered into by the 
author in respect of that reversionary interest was null and 
void. The aforegoing provision did not apply to the assign-
ment of the copyright in a collective work (i.e. the 
copyright in the composite work as distinct from the com-
ponent works) . Section 2 7 ( 3 ) of the Sixth Schedule of the 
1965 Act perpetuated this provision in respect of assign-
ments entered into in respect of copyright derived 
originally from the Act of 1916. Section 27(6) of the Sixth 
Schedule introduced slight variations in the wording of the 
relevant provision but such variations had no material 
effect for the present purposes. 
It will be recalled further that, in terms of Section 151 of 
the Act of 1916, if an author had prior to 1 January 1917 
assigned his then subsisting copyright for the full term to 
409. 
97. Sectic.n 35(1) of the Third Schedule to the 1916 Act am Sectic.n 1 
of the 1965 Act. 
98. Sectic.n 35(1) of the First Schedule to the 1916 Act am Sectic.n 1 
of the 1965 Act. 
99. Sectic.n 35(1) of the Third sctafule to the 1916 Act arrl Sectic.n 1 
of the 1965 Act. 
another person, to the extent that the "new" copyright con-
ferred upon the work of 1916 had a longer term than the 
"old" copyright which was superseded, the balance of the 
term of the "new" copyright which remained after the "old" 
copyright would have expired fell to the benefit of the 
author or his heir, in the absence of an express agreement 
to the contrary, and the ownership of the copyright reverted 
to them; the erstwhile copyright owner was granted certain 
residuary interests set out in the Section. 10° Section 36 
of the Sixth Schedule to the 1965 Act perpetuated the 
aforementioned provisions and if the date for the coming 
into operation of the reversionary interest was after 11 
September 1965 the ownership of the copyright nonetheless 
reverted to the author or his heirs. If the reversionary 
date occurred prior to 11 September 1965 the residuary 
interests created in favour of the erstwhile copyright owner 
in Section 151 of the 1916 Act were perpetuated. These 
residuary interests included the right of the erstwhile 
copyright owner to give notice to the copyright owner of his 
wish to take assignment of the copyright for the extended 
term. If the operative date of the residuary interest 
occurred or if the erstwhile copyright owner gave notice of 
his wish to exercise his option to acquire the copyright fo~ 
the balance of the term prior to 11 September 1965, the 
position was exactly the same as it would have been under 
the 1916 Act. 101 If after 11 September 1965 any residuary 
interest was exercisable by the erstwhile copyright owner 
that interest remained exercisable under the 1965 Act. 1 0 2 
If the operative date of the residuary interest was after 11 
September 1965 the ownership of the copyright still reverted 
100. See p 353 supra. 
101. Section 36(2) of tOO Sixth Sc::ta:l.ule. 
102. Section 36(3) of tOO Sixth Sc::ta:l.ule. 
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to the author or his heirs. Any residuary interest which 
would, however, have existed by virtue of any document made 
prior to 1917 was however terminated. 103 The aforementioned 
residuary interests are thus vested rights preserved under 
the 1965 Act. 
Section 34 of the Sixth Schedule specifically provided that, 
notwithstanding the retrospective effect of the 1965 Act, 
copyright would not be conferred upon a work made prior to 1 
January 1917 by it unless a copyright derived from the 1916 
Act subsisted on 11 September 1965. In other 'words if the 
substituted right conferred upon such a work by the 1916 Act 
had already expired by 11 September 1965 (and the work had 
thus fallen into the public domain) that copyright was not 
resuscitated by the 1965 Act. Of course, where a work made 
prior to 1 January 1917 had enjoyed no copyright under the 
Act of 1916 no copyright was retrospectively created. This 
'point is 
above, 104 
relevant to foreign works because, as stated 
the International Proclamations issued under the 
Act of 1916 could not retrospectively confer copyright on 
foreign works made prior to 1 January 1917. Whether foreign 
works made prior to 1 January 1917 qualified for substituted 
rights under the Act of 1916 depended entirely on the 
British and South African laws which were in force at that 
time and if a foreign work had not enjoyed protection in 
South Africa under any of those laws prior to 1917 no sub-
stituted copyright was granted in respect of that work by 
the Act of 1916 and nothing in the 1965 Act could serve to 
create that copyright retrospectively. 
103. 
104. 
Secticn 36( 4) of the Sixth Schedule. 
See p 366 supr-a. 
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It is contended in Laddie, Prescott & Vi toria "The Modern 
Law of Copyright" 105 that under the British Act of 1911 
foreign works published prior to July 1912 could, if they 
enjoyed British copyright prior to 1912, qualify for a sub-
stituted right under the Act of 1911 but such substituted 
right was limited in duration to the term provided by the 
law of the country of origin. This came about by virtue of 
the provisions of proviso (vi) to Section 29(1) of the Act 
of 1911 which made provision for an Order-in-Council extend-
ing the protection of the Act to foreign works to provide 
for variations in the protection afforded to existing for-
eign works, thereby affecting the operation of Section 24 of 
the Act which provided for the British 1912 Gateway. It 
would appear that Order-in-Council No. 913 of 1912 made 
provision for such a limitation. Although by virtue of the 
provisions of Section 30(2) of the British Act of 1911 read 
together with Section 144(g) of the Act of 1916, similar 
provisions could be made in South African International 
Proclamation this did not happen with the result that for-
eign works which passed through the 1917 Gateway enjoyed an 
unqualified term of copyright as provided for in the Act of 
1916. 
The distinction drawn in the operation of the South African 
1917 Gateway between copyright (excluding performing rights 
in musical and dramatic works) and performing rights in 
musical and dramatic works per se and the separate 
copyrights created in this respect was preserved by the 1965 
Act in regard to works made prior to 1917. The ambit of the 
"performing right" was, however, extended to 
forming an adaptation of the work in public, 




the work or an adaptation, or causing the work or an adapta-
tion to be transmitted in a diffusion service. 106 Accor-
dingly references to "copyright" in dramatic and musical 
works in deeds of assignment dating from prior to 1917 
should be construed in accordance with the aforementioned 
distinction between "copyright" and the performing rights. 
11. SAVING OF VESTED RIGHTS 
Section 44(1) of the 1965 Act stated that nothing in the Act 
would affect any right or privilege of the State subsisting 
otherwise than by virtue of any law, or any right or 
privilege of the State or of any other person under any law 
not expressly repealed, amended or modified by it. For the 
reasons advanced in Chapter II in dealing with the provi-
sions of Section 41(1) of the 1978 Act, 107 it is submitted 
that the Section must be interpreted so as to preserve 
rights in the nature of copyright which were not expressly 
repealed, amended or modified by the 1965 Act. Accordingly 
it is submitted that the effect of this provision was to 
preserve any vested rights in favour of third parties 
created under the 1916 Act. 
The vested rights which existed under the 1916 Act which 
were preserved by the 1965 Act were the following: 
(a) In terms of Section 147(2) of the 1916 Act, British 
copyrights in any musical, dramatic or artistic works 
passed through the 1917 Gateway. Copyrights were thus 
106. 
107. 
Secticn 35 of the Sixth Scla:l.ule. 
See pp 94 et seq supr-a. 
413. 
conferred retrospectively on works which had not neces-
sarily enjoyed copyright in South Africa previously. 
Where a person prior to 1917 took any action whereby he 
incurred any expenditure or liability in connection 
with the reproduction of such a work in a manner which 
was at the time lawful, or had taken any lawful 
preparatory action to making such a reproduction, no 
rights or interests arising from such action were 
prejudiced unless the person who became the owner of 
the rights in question paid compensation in an agreed 
amount, or failing agreement, as determined by arbitra-
tion.108 
(b) Section 15l(l)(b) of the 1916 Act provided that where 
copyrights under legislation in operation in South 
Africa prior to 1917 passed through the 1917 Gateway 
similar vested rights to those described in the preced-
ing paragraph were preserved.l09 
(c) In terms of Section 15l(l)(a) of the 1916 Act where the 
reversionary right in respect of any longer term of 
copyright comprised in a substituted right as compared 
to the "old" right reverted to the author or his heirs, 
the erstwhile copyright owner was given an option to 
take assignment of the right subject to payment of a 
consideration or alternatively to obtain a form of com-
pulsory licence. The erstwhile copyright owner thus had 
vested rights. 110 
108. Seep 369 supra. 
109. See p 368 supra. 
llO. See p 164 supra. 
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(d) Where in terms of any of the International Proclama-
tions issued under the 1916 Act copyright was conferred 
retrospectively on a work of foreign origin similar 
vested rights to those described in paragraph (a) above 
were granted to third parties. 111 
(e) The proviso to Section 3 of the British Copyright Act 
of 1911 created a form of compulsory licence in the 
case of published works twenty-five years after the 
death of the author in the case of works made during or 
after 1917, or thirty years after the death of the 
author in the case of works made prior to 1917. 112 
These vested rights were preserved but subject to a 
modification. Section 9(3)(a) of the Sixth Schedule to 
the 1965 Act brought about changes in the operation of 
the aforementioned proviso. The 1916 Act had provided 
that for the purposes of this compulsory licence the 
relevant 
was 
period in respect of a work of joint author-
calculated from the death of the author who ship 
died last. In the case of a posthumous work the rele-
vant period was calculated from the date of the first 
exploitation of the work. The aforementioned provision 
of the Act of 1965 provided that, in the case of a work 
of joint authorship the compulsory licence should 
become available after the expiration of the relevant 
number of years from the death of the author who died 
first or upon the death of the author who died last, 
whichever was the shorter. 
111. See p 362 supra. 
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112 . The oper:aticn of this proviso must be read toget::h:rr with Section 
16(1) ani 17(1) of tie British J\ct of 1911 as regards =rks of joint 
aut:OOrship ani posthunous =rks. 
.. 
12. CONCLUSION 
The Act of 1965 had a life-span of a mere fourteen years and 
it was repealed by the Act of 1978. It is doubted whether 
such repeal was either necessary or justified. The cor-
responding British Act of 1956 has been successfully in 
operation for some thirty-two years and its repeal is only 
now being contemplated. Our legislation has shown too great 




COPYRIGHT UNDER THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 1978 
1. INTRODUCTION 
(1) Historical Developments 
The Berne Convention, the fountainhead of modern copyright, 
was revised in Stockholm in 1967 and Paris in 1971. Tech-
nological developments preceded apace after 196 5 and yet 
further opportunities were opened up to creative people to 
manifest and exploit the fruits of their creativity in new 
types of media. A Convention for the Protection of Pro-
ducers of Phonograms was adopted in Geneva in 1971 and this 
Convention supplemented the provisions of the Rome Conven-
tion of 1961 for the Protection of Performers, Producers of 
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations. A Convention 
relating to the Distribution of Programme Carrying Signals 
Transmitted by Satellite was adopted in Brussels in 1974. 
In particular the desire on the part of the legislature to 
bring South African copyright law in conformity with the 
minimum provisions of the Paris Text of the Berne Convention 
and thus make accession to this text of the Convention pos-
sible prompted the decision to repeal the Act of 1965 and 
replace it with an up-dated statute. The Geneva Convention 
for the Protection of Phonograms and the Brussels Convention 
for the Protection of Programme Carrying Signals also 
exercised an influence because it was considered to be 
417. 
expedient to have South African copyright law conform with 
the requirements of these Conventions and make accession to 
them possible as well. 
The 1965 Act was considered generally to be excessively 
detailed and complicated and a simplification of the law of 
copyright was sought. This was particularly true of the com-
plicated transitional provisions in the Sixth Schedule to 
the 1965 Act. All these considerations gave rise to the 
adoption of the Copyright Act 98 of 1978. As stated above, 1 
the notion that the 1978 Act simplified the question of the 
copyright enjoyed by earlier works is fallacious notwith-
standing superficial impressions created to the contrary. It 
is also doubted whether the repeal, as distinct from the 




Repeal of Earlier Legislation 
Copyright Act, 1978, repealed the 
as amended, except for Section 46, 
Copyright Act, 
which dealt with 
deposit requirements for various works with certain librar-
ies. This Section was subsequently repealed and replaced by 
the Legal Deposit of Publications Act, Act No. 17 of 1982. 
The Copyright International Conventions Proclamation, 1966, 
as well as the subsequent Proclamations which extended its 
provisions to additional countries, with the exception of 
Proclamation No. R231, 1973, relating to the United States 
of America, were repealed and replaced by Proclamation No. 
R2565 dated December 22, 1978. The latter Proclamation was 
in turn repealed by Notice 704 dated 25 September 1987. 
Proclamation No. R231, 1973, dealing with the United States 
1. See p 113 supra. 
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of America, was repealed and replaced by Proclamation No. 
R566 of March 3, 1981. The 1978 Act and its subordinate 
legislation currently regulates the law of copyright in 
South Africa subject to the provisions of Sections 41 and 
43. 
(3) Reorganization of the Legislation 
The 1978 Act did away with the distinction between so-called 
"original works" (i.e. literary, dramatic, artistic and 
musical works) and so-called "other subject matter" (i.e. 
cinematograph films, 
lished editions) and 
the subsistence of 
sound recordings, broadcasts and pub-
simply regarded them all as "works" for 
copyright in which originality was 
required. Nothing turns on the abolition of the aforemen-
tioned two broad classifications of works under the 1965 
Act. 
Although bringing South African copyright law into a situa-
tion which would enable South Africa to accede to the 
aforementioned International Conventions was one of the 
objects of the 1978 Act, to date no steps have been taken to 
bring about such accession. 
2. CLASSES OF WORKS PROTECTED 
The provisions· of the Copyright Act 1978 relating to the 
classes of works in which copyright can subsist, and the 
conditions for, duration and ownership of, copyright under 
the 1978 Act have been described in Chapter II of this 
work. 2 The reader is referred to the definitions of the var-
2. See pp 13 et seq. 
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ious classes of works, which are, literary, musical and art-
istic works, sound recordings, cinematograph films, sound 
and television broadcasts, programme carrying signals and 
published editions. The definitions of these classes differ 
in some instances to the corresponding definitions under the 
1916 and 1965 Acts. 
The 1978 definition of a literary work is more elaborate 
than the corresponding definition under the earlier two Acts 
and it includes dramatic works as a species of the genus. 
Dramatic works were treated as a separate category to 
literary works under the earlier two Acts. However, it is 
submitted that nothing flows from this reorganization of the 
classes of works. The 1978 definition of literary work must 
thus be compared to the combined definitions of literary 
work and dramatic work under the previous two Acts. It is 
submitted that the class of work give~ the appellation 
"literary work" in the 1978 Act is no broader than the com-
bined classes of works given the appellation "literary work" 
and "dramatic work" under the previous two Acts; it must be 
noted that the 1978 definition does not include 
cinematograph films as a type of dramatic work, as distinct 
from the scenario or script (this was the position under the 
1965 Act as well). As in the 1965 Act, the 1978 definition 
of "literary work" does not include maps, charts and plans, 
which types of works are classed as artistic works in the 
1978 Act. 
As in the previous two Acts, there is no definition of 
"musical work" in the 1978 Act and the scope of this class 
of work thus remains unaltered. 
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The scope of the definition of "artistic work" in the 1978 
Act has been extended as compared to the corresponding 
definitions under the previous two Acts. Under the 1965 Act, 
the descriptive phrase "irrespective of the artistic quality 
thereof" only applied to category (a) of the definition 
which comprised paintings, sculptures, drawings, engravings 
and photographs. This implied that the other two categories 
within the definition, namely works of architecture and 
works of artistic craftsmanship, required a modicum of art-
istic quality. Under the 1978 Act, this descriptive phrase 
relates to the entire definition of artistic work which 
means that even works of architecture and works of artistic 
craftsmanship are not required to have any artistic qual-
ity. 3 The definition of "artistic work" under the 1916 Act 
made no mention of whether or not artistic merit or quality 
was required of any of the categories of works within the 
definition. 4 
The Copyright Amendment Act, 1983, introduced a new category 
of works into the definition of "artistic work" under the 
1978 Act. These works were called "works of craftsmanship of 
a technical nature". 5 This amendment to the definition of 
"artistic work" also had the effect of broadening the scope 
3. In regard to the requirarent of artistic merit for =rks of art-
istic craftsmanship UIXler the 1965 Act, see George Hensher Limited v. 
Re.stamile Upbolstecy (Lanes) Limited, (1975) RR:: 31. 
4. In Klep ValveS (pty) Ltd v. Saunders Valve Co Ltd, 1987 (2) SA 
11(A), the Appellate Division held that artistic merit was =t a 
requ:iremant f= a drawinJ to enjey CXJPYright uroer the 1916 Act. 
5 • In regard to this claSs of ~ see Butt v. Sdlul. tz & Arxlther, 
1984 (3) SA 568 (E); Sdnlltz v. Butt, 1986 (3) SA 667 (A); Basal Afrika 
(pty) Ltd v. Gratzlel (pty) Ltd & Another, 1985 (4) SA 882 (C); Kanilrook 
Distributing v Haz Products & others, case No 21810/84 in the WID -
uru:epmted. 
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of the type of work designated as "artistic work" as com-
pared to the earlier Acts. 
The definition of "cinematograph film" read together with 
Section 2(l)(b) of the 1978 Act is extremely wide and is, it 
is submitted, broader in its scope than the corresponding 
definition under the 1965 Act. It is arguable whether the 
definition in the 1965 Act covered a film fixed for the 
first time on a video tape6 and it did not, it is sub-
mitted, cover a micro chip such as one bearing the programme 
of a home video game.7 
The definition of "sound recording" in the 1978 Act differs 
substantially from the corresponding definition in the 1965 
Act but the scope of the two definitions appears to be the 
same. 
In the category of work termed "broadcast" in the 1978, 
television broadcasts and sound broadcasts have been lumped 
together. The scope of the definition of "broadcasts" in the 
1978 Act does not appear to be any broader or narrower than 
the scope of the aggregate of the definitions of television 
broadcasts and sound broadcasts under the 1965 Act. 
Programme carrying signals are a new category of work for 
which provision has been made for the first time in the 1978 
Copyright Act. 
6. See Laddie, Presoott & Vitoria, '!he Modern Law of Copyright, para-
graph 7.18, footn::Jte 6, in. which it is argued that the =rrespc:nj.ing 
definiticn umer the United Kingdcm Copyright l\ct of 1956 does =ver 
video tapes. See also p 379 supra. 
7. See page 18 supra. 
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The term "published edition" was not defined in the 1965 
Act, but it would seem that the scope of this class of work 
as defined in the 1978 Act is the same as the scope of this 
class of work under the 1965 Act. While Section 16 of the 
1965 Act made reference to published editions of literary, 
dramatic and musical works, and the definition of "published 
edition" in the 1978 Act makes reference only to literary 
and musical works, no difference in the scope of the class 
of work has been brought about by this change as "dramatic 
works" have been incorporated into "literary works" as a 
species of the genus in the 1978 Act. 
3 . THE AUTHOR 
The identity of the "author" of the various classes of works 
under the 1978 Act has been discussed in Chapter II of this 
work. 8 In some instances, namely the following, different 
persons have been designated as the author of a class of 
work under the 1978 Act as compared to the 1965 Act: 
(a) Under the 1978 Act, th,e author of a photograph is the 
person who is responsible for the composition of the 
photograph, while under the 1965 Act (and the 1916 
Act), the author was the owner of the material on which 
the photograph was taken, e.g. the negative. 
(b) Under the 1978 Act, the author of a sound recording is 
the person by whom the arrangements for the first 
fixing of the sound of a performance or of other sounds 
were made, while under the 1965 Act, the author of a 
8 • See w 27 et seq supra. 
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sound recording was the maker of that sound recording; 
these two persons could be the same but are not neces-
sarily so. 
4. INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT 
The effect of the repeal of the Copyright Act, 1965, by the 
Copyright Act, 19 7 8, the repeal of the Copyright Interna-
tiona! Conventions Proclamation 1966 by Proc R2565 of 22 
December 1978, and the repeal of the latter proclamation by 
Notice No 704 of 25 September 1987 is that copyright 
regulated by the 1978 Act (and subject to Section 43 
thereof) is conferred upon works emanating from all the 
countries listed in Schedule I to Notice No 704 dated 25 
September 1987, and from the United States of America, 
irrespective of when a particular work was made. For 
instance, Egypt is listed in Schedule I to GN 704/1987 (and 
was also listed in Schedule I to proc R2565) but it was not 
listed in the First Schedule to the Copyright International 
Conventions Proclamation, 1966. Copyright protection to 
Egyptian works was thus granted for the first time on 22 
December 1978 (the date on which proc R2565 came into opera-
tion). Notwithstanding this, Egyptian works made in, say, 
1930 will nevertheless enjoy copyright provided such works 
were of a type now capable of being the subject of copyright 
at that time, i.e. 1930. This follows because, in terms of 
Section 43, the Act, as extended by GN 704/1987, applies to 
Egyptian works made prior to its commencement in the same 
way as it applies to Egyptian works made thereafter. Zim-
babwe is listed in Schedule I to GN 704/1987 but was not 
listed in Schedule I to proc R2565/78. The same principle 
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applies and after 25 September 1987 Zimbabwean works will be 
protected whenever they were made. 
Section 43(a)(ii) of the 1978 Act provides that, notwith-
standing the fact that the 1978 Act is retrospective, it 
shall not "be construed as creating any copyright which did 
not subsist prior to 11 September 1965". This disqualifica-
tion applies also to foreign works but a distinction must be 
drawn between foreign works made prior to 1917 and foreign 
works made between 1 January 1917 and 11 September 1965. 
A work made prior to 1917, whether of South African origin 
or of foreign origin, did not enjoy copyright under the Act 
of 1916 unless a pre-1917 copyright in that work passed 
through the South African 1917 Gateway and was superseded by 
a substituted right. By virtue of the provisions of Section 
43 (a)( ii) of the 1978 "Act this position was not altered in 
regard to works of South African origin and nor could it be 
altered in the case of works of foreign origin. Accordingly 
a foreign work which did not enjoy copyright in South Africa 
on 1 January 1917 does not become the recipient of copyright 
by virtue of anything contained in the International 
Proclamations. 
In regard to foreign works made after 1 January 1917 it is 
submitted that Section 43(a)(ii) must be interpreted to mean 
that the retrospectivity of the ,1978 Act cannot confer 
copyright on any work which was not of a type capable of 
being the subject of copyright under the 1916 Act (read 
together with the retrospective provisions of the 1965 Act), 
for instance, a sound broadcast, but not to mean that it 
cannot confer copyright on a foreign work where the 1916 Act 
had not been extended to the country from which it emanates. 
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The alternative interpretation, namely, that the retrospec-
tivity of the 1978 Act cannot create copyright in a particu-
lar work (e.g. an Egyptian literary work) where such 
copyright did not subsist prior to 19 65 would, it is sub-
mitted, nullify the objectives of the international provi-
sions of the 1978 Act and would place South Africa in breach 
of its obligations under the Berne Convention. For instance, 
Article 4(1) of the Berne Convention requires South Africa, 
as a signatory, to protect the works of authors of foreign 
member countries in the same way as we protect the works of 
South African authors. A literary work made by a South 
African author in 1930 would enjoy copyright in South 
Africa. Likewise we are, with effect from 1978, required to 
protect a literary work made by an Egyptian author in 1930. 
Certainly, the 1965 Act granted copyright to foreign works 
made before 1965 in cases where the 1916 Act had not been 
extended to a particular foreign country, but where the 1965 
Act had been so extended. In this regard we refer to the 
provisions of Section 3 7 ( 2) of the Sixth Schedule to the 
1965 Act. This section read: 
"Where at any time after the commencement of any provi-
sion of this Act, a provision which contains such a 
reference (to countries to which the provision or 
extends or to qualified persons) has not been applied 
in the case of any country by virtue of Section 32 of 
this Act, the reference shall, with respect to any time 
before the provision is so applied, be construed as if 
the provision did apply to that country. " (words in 
parenthesis added). 
The provisions of Section 37(3) are to the same effect and 
they read: 
"For the purpose of determining whether copyright sub-
sists in any work or any other subject matter at a time 
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when a provision containing such a reference has been 
extended to a country other than the Republic, the 
reference shall be construed, in relation to past 
events, as if that provision had always been in opera-
tion and had always extended to that country." 
In accordance with my interpretation of the retrospectivity 
of the 1978 Act in regard to foreign works, read together 
with Section 43(a)(ii), it would follow that, in the case of 
United States works, only the current Proclamation extending 
the operation of the 1978 Act to works emanating from the 
United States would be relevant to present questions of 
copyright relating to United States works; the provisions of 
the preceding Proclamations would be irrelevant. The 1978 
Act, as presently extended to United States works, regulates 
the copyright in works of American origin no matter when 
they were made (excluding works made prior to 1917), but 
subject to the provisions of Section 43(a)(ii) in regard to 
the type of work concerned. However, in Barber-Greene Com-
pany & Others v Crushquip (Pty) Limited9 considerable dis-
cussion of the question of which American Proclamation was 
applicable to works made at various stages prior to 1979 
took place. It was not necessary for the court to decide 
this issue but in the light of the above submissions the 
whole discussion was unnecessary as the only relevant 
Proclamation was the current Proclamation. In consequence, 
the discussion of the relative effects of the three United 
States Proclamations in the Barber-Greene case10 would seem 
to have been of little consequence and of academic interest 
only. 
9. case No 14752/83 in the WID - unreported. 
10. SUpra. 
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5. APPLICATION OF SECTIONS 43 AND 41 OF THE 1978 ACT 
This thesis has examined what copyright subsisted prior to 
1917 and qualified to pass through the 1919' Gateway and 
under the 1916 and 1965 Acts (and what copyright did not 
subsist under these Acts), and the ownership, duration and 
continued subsistence of such copyright. Sections 41 and 43 
of the Copyright Act 1978, i.e. the Sections of the Act 
which embody the transitional provisions and which regulate 
the manner in which the Act of 1978 applies to works made 
prior to 1979, must be interpreted against this background. 
Section 43 will be dealt with first. 
A. SECTION 43 
(1) Works Dating from Prior to 11 September 1965 
In the case of a work made or published prior to September 
11, 1965, one must have regard in the first instance to the 
1916 Act in order to ascertain whether the work in question 
was a suitable subject for copyright under that Act. 
In the case of works made prior to 1 January 1917 one must 
have regard to whether by virtue of pre-1917 South African 
copyright laws (including the Roman-Dutch common law of 
copyright), the British Copyright Act of 1842 read together 
with the British International Copyright Act of 1886, and in 
the case of dramatic, musical and artistic works, the 
British Act of 1911 read together with pre-1912 British 
copyright laws, that work qualified to pass through the 
South African 1917 Gateway. The ownership of the substituted 
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right under the Act of 1916 depends upon the ownership of 
the "old" copyright under the qualifying laws and the dura-
tion of the copyright under the qualifying laws is sig-
nificant in the case of "old" copyrights which had been 
assigned because upon the hypothetical expiration of the 
"old" copyright the ownership of the "new" copyright 
reverted to the author or his heirs. 
In the case of a work made or published after 1 January 1917 
one must have regard to the conditions which had to be met 
for the subsistence of copyright under the 1916 Act, i.e. 
status of the author or maker of the work, place of making 
of the work and/or first publication. 
If the work, being a pre-1917 work, in fact qualified for 
copyright under the 1916 Act, or being a post-1917 work, 
would have been a suitable subject for copyright under the 
1916 Act, one must then look to the 1965 Act, and in partic-
ular the Sixth Schedule thereto, to ascertain the ownership, 
duration and continued subsistence or validity of the 
copyright. If the work, being a post-1917 work, did not 
qualify at the relevant time for copyright under the 1916 
Act, one must nevertheless have regard to the retrospective 
provisions of the 196 5 Act to see whether copyright was 
retrospectively conferred upon a work of that nature by the 
later Act; for instance, a published edition which did not 
enjoy copyright under the 1916 Act but was retrospectively 
granted copyright under the 1965 Act. In the event that a 
work enjoyed copyright because same was granted retrospec-
tively under the 1965 Act, then obviously one must once 
again have regard to the 1965 Act in order to ascertain the 
ownership, duration and continued subsistence of the 
copyright. Should the work not be of such a nature that it 
429. 
would have enjoyed copyright under the 1916 Act nor would 
have been granted copyright retrospectively by the 1965 Act, 
then no copyright will subsist in that work notwithstanding 
the retrospectivity of the 1978 Act. If the work, being a 
pre-1917 work did not enjoy copyright under the Act of 1916 
then no copyright is created by any of the subsequent legis-
lation.11 
The aforegoing is subject to two exceptions, namely, in the 
case of cinematograph films, and, as to the duration of 
copyright in literary, musical and artistic works which were 
unexploited at the time of the death of the authors thereof. 
These exceptions will be discussed below. 
(a) Cinematograph Films 
As stated above, cinematograph films were treated as 
dramatic works under the 1916 Act and this treatment was 
perpetuated in the 1965 Act, as far as pre-1965 
cinematograph films were concerned. Cinematograph films 
were, however, also treated in a somewhat secondary manner 
as sequences of photographs. 12 Section 43(c) brought about a 
change to this principle and it provided that pre-1965 films 
should be granted copyright retrospectively as the sui 
generis class of work first created in the 1965 Act and 
embodied in the 1978 Act. In other words, films which had 
been made in, say, 1940, and which had prior to 1979 enjoyed 
11. This follc:MS fran secticn 34 of too Sixth Scl'alule to .too 1965 
Act, whrch provided that too 1965 Act did rot cx:nfer copyright on any 
work made prior to 1 January 1917 unless an "old" copyright in that work 
passed through too 1917 Gateway, read togetoor with Section 43(a)(ii) of 
the 1978 Act which provided that the 1978 l>ct did =t create any 
copyright which did =t subsist prior to 11 September 1965. 
12. See p 379 supra. 
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copyright as dramatic works, both under the 1916 Act and the 
1965 Act, with the copyright owner being the author of the 
dramatic work or his successor in title, were by the 1978 
Act retrospectively granted a completely fresh copyright 
with the owner being the person responsible for making the 
arrangements for making the film, or his successor in title. 
The copyright owners of the two separate copyrights could 
well be different persons. Section 43(c) of the 1978 Act 
takes cognizance of this situation and makes certain 
arrangements as between the two separate copyright owners. 
Furthermore, it is of significance that the sub-section 
requires the author of the "cinematograph film" (i.e~ the 
new work) to indemnify "the user", who is presumably his 
licensee, against any claims made against him by the owner 
of the copyright in the film, i.e. the dramatic work. It 
would thus appear that, not only does the sub-section create 
a fresh copyright in the cinematograph film per se, but the 
effect of Section 43 as a whole perpetuates the copyright in 
the dramatic work. If this were not so, there would be no 
necessity for the author of the cinematograph film per se to 
give his licensee any indemnity against possible action 
against him by the owner of the copyright in the film qua 
dramatic work. There is nothin:g contained in the 1978 Act 
which terminates the copyright subsisting in a cinematograph 
film qua dramatic work under the 1965 Act, indeed all the 
indications are to the contrary. In consequence it is sub-
mitted that there are two parallel copyrights in pre-1965 
cinematograph films. One of the implications of this state 
of affairs is that the copyright in the cinematograph film 
per se could expire (the duration in terms of the 1978 Act 
is 50 years after the end of the calendar year in which the 
film is first lawfully made available to the public) while 
the term of the dramatic work is still extant (the duration 
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of this term would be fifty years after the end of the 
calendar year in which the author of the "dramatic work" 
died). The a foregoing applies also to cinematograph films 
made prior to 1917.13 
(b) Unexploited Literary, Musical or Artistic Works 
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In terms of Section 43(d) of the 1978 Act, although the term 
of the copyright in a pre-1965 literary, musical or artistic 
work (other than a photograph) might have expired under the 
1965 Act, where such works have not been exploited as con-
templated in Section 3(2)(a) of the 1978 Act, that copyright 
is resuscitated for the term for which provision is made in 
the said Section 3(2)(a). Section 3(2)(a) of the 1978 Act 
provides that where a literary, musical or artistic work 
(other than a photograph) had not during the lifetime of the 
author been published, performed in public, been embodied in 
records offered to the public, or broadcast, the term of 
copyright endures for a period of fifty years from the end 
of the year in which the first of any of these acts is done 
subsequent to the death of the author. This in effect 
provides for perpetual copyright to exist in the case of an 
unexploited work of the aforementioned type. This pro~ision 
relates only to the term of copyright, i.e. the duration of 
copyright which otherwise exists or existed under the 1916 
Act or the 1965 Act. For the reasons advanced above14 this 
13 • Secticn 43( a)( ii) of the 1978 Act which prevents the creation of 
copyright which did rot subsist prior to 11 September 1965 ani thus in 
prin::iple prevents the retrospective creation of copyright in pre-1917 
works which did rot pass through the 1917 Gateway (by virtue of the 
provisicns of Secticn 37 of the Sixth Schedule to the 1965 Act) is made 
subject to Secticn 43(c) which has the effect that the prohibiticn does 
rot apply to the retrospective creaticn of copyright in cirenatograph 
films provided for in paragraJX!. (c) of that Section. 
14. See footrote 13. 
provision of the 1978 Act applies also to pre-1917 works 
provided they were the subjects of copyright which passed 
through the 1917 Gateway; if a substituted right came into 
existence the duration of that substituted right has been 
retrospectively extended. 
It could happen that a copyright which existed under the Act 
of 1916 or was retrospectively granted under the Act of 1965 
expired prior to 1979, whereupon the work fell into the pub-
lic domain, but that copyright was subsequently resuscitated 
by Section 43(d). In that regard the Section provides that 
such resuscitation is subject to any rights acquired by a 
third person while the work was in the public domain. It is 
submitted that the effect of this is that any "infringement" 
of the copyright during the period that the work was in the 
public domain is exempted. Furthermore, the perpetuation 
after the resuscitation of the copyright of any activities 
begun while the work was in the public domain is also exempt 
from copyright. In other words, the "right" preserved by the 
Section is the right to carry out and continue carrying out 
any otherwise infringing activities undertaken by a third 
person while the work was in the public domain. 
(2) Works Dating from Between 1965 and 1979 
In the case of a work made or published prior to January 1, 
1979, but after September 11, 1965, one must have regard to 
the relevant provisions of the 19 65 Act in order to 
ascertain whether the work was of such a type as to be 
capable of being the subject of copyright under that Act and 
whether it met the conditions for subsistence of copyright 
under that Act, (i.e. the status of the author, place of 
first publication, the status of the author at the time of 
first publication and/or the place of making of the work). 
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The country of origin of a foreign work must, however, be 
viewed in the light of the international provisions of the 
1978 Act and its Regulations, and the place of first pub-
lication and the "qualified person" status of the author 
must be assessed accordingly. 1 5 
If the work enjoyed copyright under the 1965 Act, then the 
ownership, duration and continued subsistence or validity of 
that copyright is determined by the 1965 Act. In the event 
that the work would not have enjoyed copyright under the 
1965 Act, then one must have regard to whether copyright has 
been granted retrospectively to the work in terms of the 
1978 Act. This could happen in the following circumstances: 
(a) the definition of the class of work under the 1978 Act 
is wider than the equivalent definition under the 1965 
Act and the work in question falls within the wider 
definition but not within the narrower definition. 
Examples of this are works of craftsmanship of a tech-
nical nature, works of artistic craftsmanship having no 
artistic qual! ty, and micro-chips being cinematograph 
films. 
(b) the work belongs to a class which was not capable of 
being the subject of copyright under the 1965 Act, but 
is capable of being the subject of copyright under the 
1978 Act. An example of this type of work is a 
programme carrying signal. 
Insofar as a particular work might be granted copyright 
retrospectively in terms of the 1978 Act, being a work which 
did not qualify for copyright under the 1965 Act, the owner-
ship, duration and continued subsistence or validity of that 
15. Seep 426 supra. 
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copyright will be determined by the 1978 Act, notwithstand-
ing the fact that the work was made during the currency of 
the 1965 Act. This factor could make a difference to the 
work as, for instance, if it was to be decided that a 
cinematograph film first fixed in the form of a video tape 
in, say, 1970, would not have qualified for copyright under 
the 1965 Copyright Act, the duration of the copyright in 
that film would be determined by the 1978 Act and not the 
1965 Act and the term of copyright for a cinematograph film 
could be different under the two Acts. 
There are two classes of works which, by virtue of certain 
peculiarities, warrant special mention. They are artistic 
works of a technical nature and published editions. These 
two classes of works will be dealt with below. 
(a) Artistic Works of a Technical Nature 
Drawings of a technical nature are generally designs of 
articles intended to be reproduced in a three-dimensional 
form. It will be recalled that Section 22( 1) of the Third 
Schedule to the 1916 Act stated that the Act did not apply 
to designs capable of being registered under Chapter II of 
the 1916 Act, except designs which though capable of being 
so registered were not used or intended to be used as models 
or patterns to be multiplied by any industrial process . 16 
Accordingly, where a drawing of a technical nature was such 
that the design of the article depicted in the drawing was 
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16 . See p 328 supra. In the case of designs capable of being 
registered as such but not interx:led to be used as m:xiels or patterns to 
be multiplied by an industrial prCXJeSS, the relevant "intentic:n" was 
that of the maker of the wrn:k at the time of such making. See King Fea-
tures Syndicate Inc v o and M Kleeman Limited 58 RPC 207. 
capable of registration as a design under the designs legis-
lation, that drawing .did not enjoy any copyright under the 
1916 Act unless, even though the design was registrable, the 
article depicted in the drawing was not used or intended to 
be used as the basis for industrial mul tiplication. 17 If, 
however, the design of the article depicted in the drawing 
was such that it was incapable of registration under the 
designs legislation, because the design of the article was 
dictated solely by the function which it had to perform, 
copyright nevertheless subsisted in the drawing even though 
the drawing might' have served as the basis for industrial 
multiplication. The subsistence or otherwise of copyright in 
the technical drawing thus was determined largely by whether 
the design of the article depicted in the drawing was 
capable of being registered as a design. 
The 1965 Act perpetuated the position as described above 
regarding technical drawings made prior to 1965. 18 As stated 
above, the 1965 Act also sought to prevent there being an 
overlap in the protection available to designs under design 
legislation and copyright legislation. This Act, however, 
sought to achieve this objective in a different way to the 
1916 Act. It did not provide that technical drawings depict-
ing articles capable of being registered as designs did not 
enjoy copyright; instead, it provided that in certain cir-
cumstances, certain aspects of the copyright in the drawings 
would not be enforceable. These circumstances were provided 
for in Section 11 of the 1965 Act, which Section cor-
responded basically with Section 10 of the 1956 British 
17. See Klep Valves (pty) Ltd v. Saunders Valve Co Ltd, 1987 ( 2) 
SA l(A). 
18. See p 381 supra. 
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Copyright Act. The British courts in a line of cases com-
mencing with Darling v. Honnor Marine19 and culminating in 
British Leyland Motor Corporation and Others v Armstrong 
Patents Co Ltd and Others20 held that the "forfeiture" of 
the enforceability of the copyright in a technical drawing 
only applied where the design of the article depicted in the 
drawing was capable of registration as a design; where the 
design of the article was dictated solely by the function 
which the article had to perform, the "forfeiture" did not 
take place. A similar interpretation was given to Section 11 
of the South African 1965 Act in the Scaw Metals case. 21 It 
is submitted that the "forfeiture" of the enforceability of 
part of the copyright in technical drawings in terms of Sec-
tion 11 of the 1965 Act did not in any way affect the 
validity or continued subsistence of the copyright per se in 
the drawings in question. What happened was that that part 
of the copyright which would have fallen within the scope of 
a corresponding registered design became unenforceable but 
the balance of the copyright continued to subsist and could 
be assigned, enforced, etc. In essence, the "forfeiture" of 
the enforceability of certain parts of the copyright in a 
technical drawing in terms of Section 11 of the 1965 Act was 
in the nature of a statutory defence to a claim of copyright 
infringement which could be relied upon by a defendant in 
the given circumstances. This "forfeiture" also did not 
create a vested "right" in favour of third parties in the 
sense of the vested rights discussed in Chapters V and VI 
above. In all those instances the legislation specifically 
19. 1964 (RPC) 160 
20. 1986 FSR 221. 
437. 
21. Scaw Metals Ltd v Apex Foundcy (pty) Ltd & llnother, 1982 (2) SA 
377 (D). 
created a right in favour of a third party and that third 
party was required to have met certain requirements before 
the right was available to him. No such provisions are con-
tained either in Section 11 of the 1965 Act or in the 1978 
Act. Accordingly, to sum up, the 1965 Act, unlike the 1916 
Act, conferred copyright on a technical drawing irrespective 
of whether the design of the article depicted in the drawing 
could have been registered as a design. 
The manner in which the 1978 Act deals with copyright in 
technical drawings and works of craftsmanship of a technical 
nature and the enforceability of such copyright has been 
discussed in Chapter II of this work. 22 Although the amend-
ment of the definition of "drawing", and thus of "artistic 
work", so as to introduce a specific reference to drawings 
of a technical nature was only introduced in the Copyright 
Amendment Act, 1983, this was done by way of clarification 
and it had already been held in a number of cases that the 
definition of "artistic work" has always included drawings 
of a technical nature.23 The amendment to the definition of 
"drawing" brought about by the Copyright Amendment Act, 
1983, simply clarified existing case law. 24 
Under the 1978 Act, and taking cognizance of the provisions 
of Section 43, the copyright in technical drawings is regu-
lated as follows: 
22. See p 49 supra. See also "Cqlyright llillE!Idlent .1\ct, 1983 - Pro-
tecticn of Industrial and Tedmical Wol:ks" by O.H. Dean, De Rebus, March 
1984, p.114 and "'lbe Great Copyright Ccntroversy" by OH Dean, De Rebus, 
July1988, p 469. 
23. See f= instan:::E Scaw Metals v Apex Foundry (?ty) Ltd & Another, 
supra. 
24. See Klep Valves (?ty) Ltd v Saunders Valve Co Ltd, supra. 
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(a) If the work was made prior to September 11, 1965, one 
must determine whether the design of the article 
depicted in the technical drawings would have been 
registrable as a design in terms of Chapter 2 of the 
1916 Act. If it was not registrable - the design was 
dictated solely by the function of the article - then 
copyright subsisted in the drawing. If the design was 
registrable, but it was not used or intended to be used 
as a pattern to be multiplied by an industrial process, 
copyright nevertheless subsisted in the drawings. If 
the design was registrable and was used or intended to 
be used as a model or pattern to be multiplied by an 
industrial process, then no copyright subsisted in the 
drawing. This position was preserved under the 1965 
Copyright Act and by Section 43( a)( ii) of the 1978 
Act. 
(b) If the drawing was made after September 11, 1965, 
copyright subsisted in the drawing irrespective of 
whether the design was registrable under the designs 
legislation prevailing at the time; the fact that the 
copyright in the drawing was unenforceable in respect 
of designs which were registrable at the time, during 
the currency of the 1965 Act, is now irrelevant. 
(c) The enforcement of the copyright in a drawing of a 
techoical nature, irrespective of when it was made, is 
determined by the 1978 Act, in particular by those 
provisions of the 1978 Act which determine when part of 
the copyright becomes unenforceable. 25 
(b) Published Editions 
25. See pp 61 arxl 100 et 5&1 supra. 
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The term of copyright subsisting in a published edition 
under the 1965 Act was twenty-five years. 26 The 1978 Act in 
its original form did not protect published editions, save 
that in terms of Section 43 (b) it preserved the copyright 
which subsisted in a published edition under the 1965 Act 
for the remainder of the term granted to that work under the 
1965 Act. This position was changed in the Copyright Amend-
ment Act, 1984, and protection for published editions as a 
class of work was reintroduced. In terms of Section 43 of 
the 1978 Act, such protection was retrospective subject to 
the provisions of that Section. The term of copyright con-
ferred upon published editions once this class of work had 
been reintroduced into the 1978 Act was fifty years. 27 It 
would appear as though the longer term of copyright does not 
apply to works made prior to January 1, 1979, in view of the 
provisions of Section 43(a)(i) of the 1978 Act. In terms of 
that sub-section, the term of copyright which subsisted 
under the 1965 Act, is to be unaffected by anything con-
tained in the 1978 Act. While the intention of Section 43(a) 
was not to prejudice copyright owners rights under the 1965 
Act, it would appear as though in this instance the effect 
of the provisions of Section 43(a)(i) is to disadvantage the 
owner of the copyright in a published edition under the 1965 
Act as compared to the owner of copyright which subsists in 
a published edition in terms of the 1978 Act. It would thus 
seem that a published edition published before January 1 
1979 enjoys a term of copyright of twenty-five years from 
the end of the calendar year in which the edition was first 
published, while a published edition published after that 
26. Secticn 16(2) of the 1965 Act. 
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27. See Secticn 3(2)(f) of the 1978 Act, as C3I'IEOOa:l by the Copyright 
Arrerrlrrent Act, 1984. 
date enjoys a term of fifty years from the end of the year 
in which the edition is first published. 
B. SECTION 41 - SAVING OF VESTED RIGHTS 
As discussed above, 28 it is submitted that the effect of 
Section 41(1) of the 1978 Act is to preserve vested rights 
in favour of third parties created in the 1916 Act and 
preserved in the 1965 Act, and created in the 1965 Act, 
which were not specifically repealed, amended or modified in 
the 1978 Act. 29 These vested rights deriving from the ear-
lier repealed copyright statutes continue in principle to 
operate today. It is of course possible that particular 
rights enjoyed by individuals under these provisions might 
have elapsed through the effluxion of time by virtue of the 
nature of the particular right itself but such rights have 
not been terminated on account of the repeal of the statute 
which granted them. 
See pp 94 et seq supra. 
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28. 
29. The vested rights in questioo are th:>se discussed oo p 368 arx:l 
p 413. 
CHAPTER VIII 
C 0 N C L U S I 0 N 
The law of copyright in South Africa has come a long way 
since 1803 when the Batavian Republic took the first tenta-
tive steps to introduce the law of copyright into the 
Netherlands including its provinces, inter alia the Cape. 
The footpath trodden by the legislature of The Netherlands, 
has in South Africa been joined by paths and ways coming 
from a variety of other directions and has now become a 
highway carrying a not-insubstantial amount of traffic. Pro-
gress along these various routes has been confused and com-
plex and much of the journey has been undertaken in the 
dark. A stage has, however, now been reached where at least 
the road ahead is relatively straight and travelers equipped 
with a map can find their way. As far as possible the neces-
sity for travelers to re-traverse routes behind them should 
be avoided. 
In view of the automatic coming into being of copyright and 
the long term of subsistence of copyright in comparison with 
other intellectual property rights (which in most cases are 
created by registration in any event), whenever a new 
copyright act is passed the inevitable and indispensable 
transitional provisions cannot fail to introduce fresh com-
plications and complexities. It is submitted that this 
thesis bears ample testimony of this situation. It is sub-
mitted further that this thesis also bears witness to the 
fact that the apparently straightforward approach of seeking 
to provide in a statute that the basics of copyright in 
existing works must be ·determined in the light of the law 
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which prevailed at the time of their production is grossly 
deceptive. This was the approach of the legislature in Sec-
tions 41 and 43 of the 1978 Act. The alternative approach, 
namely that of attempting to provide in a curren-t statute 
detailed provisions regulating the copyright in works pro-
duced in the past, as was done in the 1965 Act, is fraught 
with problems and difficulties. This approach caused the 
statute to be excessively detailed and complicated and not 
to be susceptible to easy interpretation and comprehension. 
This gave rise to, and was partly responsible for, the per-
ceived need to repeal the 1965 Act by the 1978 Act. 
The aforementioned considerations are not only of academic 
importance. It has more than once been said that the provi-
sions of the law of copyright relating to old works are so 
complicated and uncertain that it is not worth the while of 
the owner of copyright in such a work to endeavour to 
enforce his rights. The complications, risks and attendant 
costs are thought to be so high that copyright owners have 
in the past elected rather to forego their rights. A law 
which gives rise to this situation is failing in its pur-
pose. The view that copyright is not worth enforcing because 
the law is too complicated is perhaps an extreme one and is 
not justified but nevertheless it exists amongst a substan-
tial number of people. 
It is perhaps significant that since the coming into opera-
tion of the 1978 Act there have been 36 known judgments 
delivered in copyright cases whereas over the previous 
century and more there were only 4 7 such cases. Copyright 
holders appear to be more willing to litigate and enforce 
their copyright under the 1978 Act than they were under any 
of the previous copyright laws. Of course this position may 
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well be influenced by other factors such as the greater 
scope and demand for the exploitation of works subject to 
copyright and thus the greater incentive to infringe such 
rights. Nevertheless the fact still remains that copyright 
enforcement under the 1978 Act is more viable than it has 
been at any stage throughout the history of copyright law in 
South Africa. 
Let it not be thought that it is being contended that the 
1978 Act is a perfect piece of legislation. This is far from 
the case and there is considerable room for improvement of 
the present Act. What is being contended is that in the 1978 
Act the law of copyright has been cast in a reasonably 
acceptable and manageable form. Copyright law can be 
improved and adapted in the future within the framework of 
the 1978 Act so as to properly regulate the law of copyright 
both for the present and for the foreseeable future. At the 
present time there is no need to replace the 1978 Act with 
yet another Act which would inevitably have yet further 
transitional provisions to deal with then existing and past 
works. Such a development could not fail to further compli-
cate the law of copyright and a consequence of this would 
perhaps be the inhibition of the enforcement of their rights 
by copyright holders. 
At the present time the Government has expressed the desire 
and intention to consolidate all intellectual property 
statutory law in a single Act. This would involve the repeal 
of the Act of 1978 and its replacement by the envisaged con-
solidated Act. Such a step would amount to reverting to the 
position which obtained in the Act of 1916. Little if any 
need can be seen for such a step. Viewed from the perspec-
tive of the law of copyright it is not only unnecessary but 
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for the reasons advanced above it is also most undesirable. 
It would lead to unnecessary complication of the law of 
copyright to the probable prejudice of copyright owners 
whose interests the law of copyright seeks to protect and 
nurture. To bring about this situation in the interests of 
administrative tidiness (which appears to be the only con-
ceivable purpose of such legislation), even assuming that 
there is such a need and that the new legislation would ful-
fill that need and achieve that purpose, is not sufficient 
justification for perpetuating into the future additional 
difficulties and complications of the nature which have been 
experienced in the past and which emerge from this thesis. 
Such a development would give additional cause to travelers 
along the present highway of copyright to have to turn 
around and re-traverse the difficult terrain behind them. 
This would be no service to the author. 
The lesson to be learned from a study of the transitional 
provisions of the 1978 Act is that in copyright law, as in 
life in general, the past cannot be brushed aside or altered 
with the stroke of a pen. Nor can the record be easily 
rewritten. Copyright, like people and the society in which 
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